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Meanings of Violence and Its Impact on Socio-Political Relations among 
the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi, Northern Kenya 
Abstract 
This thesis investigates the ways in which the Turkana and Samburu pastoralists groups use 
violence to negotiate their day to day relationships. Violence in the form of cattle raids, highway 
banditries, targeted shootings, torching of manyattas, vandalism of key resources such as schools 
and dispensaries and displacement of the ‘ethnic other’ are deployed by the two groups to gain 
power, cement in-group identity and eliminate competitors from common resources. In this study 
pastoralists’ violence is analysed as a resource and an agency through which individual and 
collective negotiations of socio-political relations between the Samburu and Turkana are carried 
out on a day to day basis. While pastoralists’ violence in East Africa has been seen in past 
studies from a moralist perspective as something negative, ‘primitive’ and as a symptom of 
break-down of law and order, this study, analyses violence as an a tool in the hands of the 
individual warrior’s, groups of warriors, political and business elites, deployed strategically to 
meet well planned ends of gaining power at an individual or collective level. 
 
To understand the changing meanings and purposes of violence among the Turkana and 
Samburu of Baragoi of Northern Kenya, this study approaches violence in Baragoi as a product 
of structural, proximate and processual factors. The interconnection between these three factors 
are explored through the following key arguments: that violence among pastoralists in Baragoi is 
part of a historical contest over socio-physical spaces between the Turkana and Samburu that has 
been ongoing since the pre-colonial times and has exacerbated over the years through the 
policies of colonial administrators and independent Kenya governments. Further, the regional 
instability in Eastern Africa has in effect contributed to the ‘normalising’ of violence through the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons among the marginalised pastoralists of Northern 
Kenya. Historical marginalisation of Northern Kenya has further contributed to ‘normalisation’ 
of pastoralists violence as incidences of massacres are passed-off as cultural killings based 
cultural affinities among pastoralists. Passing off massacres as ‘cultural’ illustrates government’s 
disinterest and inability to govern pastoralist’s borderlands.  In the contest over socio-spatial 
spaces of Baragoi, use and threat of violence in this case determines movement patterns of 
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people and their livestock, electoral outcomes, grazing patterns, trading routes, location and 
access to livestock markets. 
The changing meanings and purposes of violence is also seen in the way the state interacts with 
the Samburu and Turkana. Residents narrate chronologies of ‘operations’ where paramilitary 
police have been deployed to ‘bring peace’ between the two groups. Contrary to the desired 
peace, these operations have tended to precipitate more violence as the state’s modus operandi of 
using greater instruments of violence including bombs and helicopter gun-fire have tended to 
cause deaths of people and livestock. Those who have lost livestock in such operations plan for 
new cycles of violence aimed at appropriating stock from ‘enemy’ groups and revenging lost 
lives. In this case the state as an actor in pastoralists’ violence deploys it as a route to inter-
communal peacebuilding but it results into more violence. 
 
Violence is also analysed as a tool in the hands of political competitors used to gain power. Local 
elite conduct political campaigns based on their ‘protection credentials’ that is their ability to 
provide security for their ethnic groups against ‘enemy’ communities. Proof of protection 
credentials is tenable only through mobilisation of warriors for war, procurement and supply of 
arms and ammunition to warriors. Pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi is therefore linked to elite 
competition for and preservation of political power. Competition for political and economic 
power among elites further facilitates the patron-client networks between warriors, chiefs and 
Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) on the one hand and the political and business elite on the other 
hand and this enables the sale and distribution of weapons used to conduct raids among enemy 
groups. 
 
Incidences of massacres reveal the inter-connectedness of past narratives of violence, to current 
violent contest and those of the future. Processual analysis of violence is applied in this thesis in 
the case of the Baragoi massacre of November 2012. It shows cases of pastoralists’ violence (in 
this case cattle raids) that have led to massacres in Northern Kenya to have been in situations 
where secondary actors mobilised for revenge (mostly political leaders). Revenge therefore plays 
a significant role as a catalyst for collective violence.  
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This thesis analyses the state as a structural and proximate actor in violence among the Turkana 
and Samburu of Baragoi. Through the institution of KPRs, I argue that violence among 
pastoralists in Baragoi also stems from the local violent entrepreneurship that goes on in grazing 
lands among KPRs and warriors. The participation of KPRs in raids and highway banditries 
using government-issued arms and ammunition also reveals the complicity of the state in 
violence among pastoralists firstly through its neglect and marginalisation of Northern Kenya 
and secondly through its weak and unsupervised voluntary police unit; the KPRs which 
exacerbates the informalisation of violence in Northern Kenya. 
 
Violence and culture are also seen as mutually producing phenomena among the Turkana and 
Samburu of Baragoi. Violence is argued in this thesis has having the capacity to expand the 
cultural parameters of the traditional practice of cattle raiding. Violence among pastoralists that 
targets women and children in Baragoi today, reveal changes in the interpretation of female 
identities. While past studies argued that women and children were protected from violence 
though norms based on the notion that ‘women belonged to everyone’ as they adopted the 
identities of their husbands regardless of their ethnicities at birth (in patrilineal societies). This 
study reveals that increased targeting of women conforms to a more primordialist interpretation 
of identities among the Turkana and Samburu. The stringent interpretation of identities of 
women can also be argued to have expanded forms of violence on women such as rape, killing of 
milking stock and vandalism of women group investments. Stringent interpretation of ethnic 
identities can further be argued to have led to the diminishing of inter-ethnic marriages among 
the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi.  
 
In summary, this study views violence among the Samburu and Turkana as a key driver of 
societal change based on its capacity to expand cultural parameters of institutions. It (violence) 
generates this general effect through the creation of fear that limits or precipitates movements 
and massacres that lead to displacements and dependency on relief supplies. The study applies 
several concepts drawn from anthropological theories of violence to explain the history and 
changing meanings of violence among pastoralists of Baragoi. This ethnographic study is the 
result of 101 in-depth interviews, 16 focused group discussions, 111 event calendars’ interviews 
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and secondary data from the Kenya National Archives on the history of migration and settlement 
of the Samburu and Turkana in Baragoi, police signals, Occurrence Book data and personal notes 
obtained from respondents during the nine months of fieldwork in Northern Kenya compliment 
the interviews. 
 
Key words: Samburu, Turkana, pastoralists, violence, Northern Kenya 
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Bedeutungen von Gewalt und ihr Einfluss auf sozio-politische 
Beziehungen zwischen den Turkana und den Samburu in Baragoi, 
Nordkenia 
Zusammenfassung  
Diese Arbeit untersucht die Art und Weise, wie Viehhirten der Turkana und Samburu Gewalt 
nutzen, um ihre alltäglichen Beziehungen auszuhandeln. Gewalt in der Form von Raubzügen auf 
Rinder, Überfällen auf Fernstraßen, gezielten Schießereien, Bransstiftung in Manyattas und die 
Zerstörung von Schlüsselressourcen wie Schulen und Apotheken sowie die Vertreibung der 
„ethnischen Anderen“ werden von den beiden Gruppen genutzt, um Macht zu erlangen, um 
Gruppenidentitäten zu festigen und Konkurrenten um gemeinschaftliche Ressourcen 
auszuschalten. Diese Studie untersucht die Gewalt unter Pastoralisten als Ressource und 
Handlungsoption, durch welche tagtäglich individuell und kollektiv sozio-politische 
Beziehungen zwischen den Samburu und Turkana ausgehandelt werden. Während frühere 
Forschungen die Gewalt untere Hirten in Ostafrika vor allem aus einer moralischen Perspektive 
als etwas Negatives, „Primitives“sowie als Symptom des Zusammenbruchs von Recht und 
Ordnung betrachteten, untersucht diese Studie Gewalt als Handlungsoption von individuellen 
Kriegern (den warriors), Gruppen von Kriegern sowie politischen und wirtschaftlichen Eliten, 
die Gewalt strategisch nutzen, um angestrebte Ziele von individuellem oder kollektivem 
Machtgewinn zu erreichen. 
Um die dynamischen Bedeutungen und Ziele der Gewalt zwischen den Turkana und den 
Samburu in Baragoi (Nordkenia) zu verstehen, analysiert diese Studie die Gewalt in Baragoi als 
ein Produkt struktureller und unmittelbarer Faktoren sowie als Prozess. Die Verbindung 
zwischen diesen drei Faktoren wird durch das folgende zentrale Argument hergestellt: die 
Gewalt zwischen den Pastoralisten in Baragoi ist Teil eines historischen Kampfes um sozio-
ökonomische Räume zwischen den Turkana und Samburu, der seit vorkolonialen Zeiten 
ausgetragen wird und über die Jahre durch die Politiken der Kolonialverwaltung und den 
Regierungen des unabhängigen Kenias verschärft wurde. Desweiteren hat die regionale 
Instabilität in Ostafrika zur „Normalisierung“ von Gewalt durch die zunehmende Verbreitung 
kleiner und leichter Waffen unter marginalisierten Hirtengruppen in Nordkenia beigetragen. 
Auch die historische Ausgrenzung Nordkenias hat die „Normalisierung“ der pastoralistischen 
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Gewalt verstärkt, indem Vorfälle wie Massaker als kulturelle Tötungen eingestuft wurden, die 
auf der kulturellen Zugehörigkeiten der Hirten basieren würden. Massaker als „kulturell“ 
durchgehen zu lassen, illustrieren das Desinteresse und die Unfähigkeit der Regierung, die 
Grenzgebiete der Hirten zu regieren. Im Kampf um sozio-ökonomische Räume in Baragoi 
bestimmt die Anwendung und Androhung von Gewalt Bewegungsmuster von Menschen und 
ihrem Vieh, Wahlergebnisse, Weidemuster, Handelswege sowie die Orte und den Zugang zu 
Viehmärkten. 
Die sich ändernden Bedeutungen und Ziele der Gewalt werden auch in der der Art und Weise 
deutlich, wie der Staat mit den Samburu und Turkana umgeht. Bewohner erzählen von Einsätzen 
einer paramilitärischen Polizei, die Frieden zwischen den beiden Gruppen stiften sollte. Im 
Gegensatz zum angestrebten Frieden haben diese Einsätze jedoch noch mehr Gewalt verursacht. 
Die staatliche Vorgehensweise basierte auf noch stärkeren Mitteln der Gewalt wie Bomben und 
Beschuss aus Hubschraubern, die zum Tod von Menschen und Vieh führten. Hirten, die Vieh 
durch diese Einsätze verloren hatten, reagierten mit neuen Zyklen von Gewalt, die darauf zielten, 
sich Vieh von „feindlichen“ Gruppen anzueignen und Tote zu rächen. In diesem Fall nutzte der 
Staat als Mittel gegen die Gewalt unter Hirten ebendiese als Weg der Friedensstiftung, was aber 
in größerer Gewalt endete. 
Gewalt wurde auch als ein Instrument in den Händen politischer Konkurrenten analysiert, 
welche es nutzen, um Macht zu erlangen. Lokale Eliten führten politische Kampagnen durch, die 
auf ihren Fähigkeiten als Sicherheitsdienstleister basieren, also darauf, die Sicherheit vor 
„verfeindeten“ethnischen Gruppen herzustellen. Diese Fähigkeiten können nur durch die 
Mobilisierung von Kämpfern, sowie durch die Beschaffung und Versorgung mit Waffen und 
Munition bewiesen werden. Die Gewalt unter Hirten in Baragoi ist daher mit dem Wettstreit der 
Eliten um den Erhalt ihrer politischen Macht verbunden. Dieser Wettstreit um politische und 
ökonomische Macht unter den Eliten fördert außerdem Patronagenetzwerke zwischen Kriegern, 
chiefs und KPRs (Kenia Police Reservists) auf der einen Seite und den politischen und 
wirtschaftlichen Eliten auf der anderen Seite. Dies ermöglicht den Verkauf und die Verteilung 
von Waffen, die für Überfälle unter verfeindeten Gruppen genutzt werden. 
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Massaker zeigen die Verbindungen vergangener Narrative von Gewalt zu den aktuellen und 
zukünftigen gewaltsamen Kämpfen. In dieser Arbeit wird die Gewalt am Fall des Baragoi 
Massakers im November 2012 als Prozess analysiert. Es zeigt Fallstudien von Gewalt unter 
Hirten (in diesem Fall Raubzüge auf Rinder), die zum Massaker in Nordkenia geführt haben 
sowie zu einer Situation, in der sekundäre Akteure mobilisiert wurden, um (zumeist politische 
Anführer) zu rächen. Rache spielt daher eine wichtige Rolle als Katalysator für kollektive 
Gewalt. 
Diese Arbeit analysiert den Staat als strukturellen und unmittelbaren Akteur in der Gewalt 
zwischen den Hirten der Turkana und der Samburu in Baragoi. Ich argumentiere, dass durch die 
Institution der KPRs Gewalt unter Hirten in Baragoi auch von einer lokalen gewalttätigen 
Bewirtschaftung herrührt, die zwischen KPRs und den Kriegern auf den Weiden vorherrscht. Die 
Beteiligung von KPRs an Überfällen und Banditentum unter der Verwendung offiziell 
genehmigter Waffen und Munition zeigt auch die Mitschuld des Staates an der Gewalt unter 
Hirten, zum einen durch die Ausgrenzung Nordkenias und zum anderen durch die schwache und 
unbeaufsichtigte freiwillige Polizeieinheit KPR. 
Gewalt und Kultur sind gegenseitige Phänomene zwischen den Turkana und Samburu in 
Baragoi. Gewalt hat, so wird in dieser Arbeit argumentiert, die Fähigkeit die kulturellen 
Parameter der traditionellen Praxis der Raubzüge auf Rinder auszuweiten. Die heutige Gewalt 
von Hirten gegen Frauen und Kinder in Baragoi deckt Veränderungen im Verständnis weiblicher 
Identitäten auf. Frühere Studien argumentierten, dass Frauen und Kinder vor der Gewalt 
geschützt waren, da sie im allgemeinen Verständnis „allem gehörten“. In den patrilinearen 
Gesellschaften der Turkana und Samburu nehmen die Frauen die ethnischen Zugehörig ihrer 
Ehemänner an, unabhängig von ihrer gebürtigen Ethnizität. Diese Studie zeigt dagegen, dass die 
zunehmende Fokussierung der Gewalt auf Frauen einer Interpretation von festgelegten 
Zugehörigkeiten bei Geburt zwischen den Turkana und Samburu entspricht. Die strenge 
Interpretation der Zugehörigkeiten von Frauen kann auch als Erweiterung der Gewalt an Frauen 
gesehen werden, beispielsweise durch Vergewaltigungen, das Töten von Milchvieh sowie 
Zerstörung von Investitionen von Frauengruppen. Desweiteren kann argumentiert werden, dass 
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die strenge Interpretation ethnischer Identitäten zu einem Rückgang inter-ethnischer Heiraten 
zwischen Turkana und Samburu in Baragoi geführt hat.  
Insgesamt untersucht diese Arbeit die Gewalt zwischen den Samburu und Turkana als 
wesentlicher Treiber gesellschaftlicher Veränderungen. Gewalt hat die Kapazität, kulturelle 
Parameter von Institutionen zu erweitern. Sie erzielt ihre allgemeine Wirkung durch die 
Verbreitung von Angst, die Bewegungen einschränkt oder auslöst sowie Massaker, die zu 
Vertreibungen und Abhängigkeiten von Hilfsgütern führen. Die Studie wendet verschiedene 
Konzepte aus ethnologischen Gewalttheorien an, um die Geschichte und die sich ändernden 
Bedeutungen der Gewalt zwischen Hirten in Baragoi zu erklären. Diese Ethnographie ist das 
Ergebnis von 101 Interviews, 16 Fokusgruppendiskussionen, 111 Interviews, die um einen 
Kalender der Ereignisse herum geführt wurden sowie Sekundärdaten des kenianischen 
Nationalarchives zur Geschichte von Migration und Siedlungen der Samburu und Turkana in 
Baragoi. Aufzeichnungen der Polizei, Daten zum Auftreten von Gewalttaten und persönlichen 
Aufzeichnungen aus neun Monaten Feldforschung in Nordkenia ergänzen die Interviews. 
Schlagworte: Samburu, Turkana, Hirten, Gewalt, Nordkenia 
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1.0 Introduction 
On the 22
nd
 of November 2014, an 18 year old Turkana man was shot dead in Loworarik grazing 
field. The body of E. Ekiru was found on the Samburu side of the grazing field. I visited the 
scene with the police team. Initial reports indicated that Ekiru was shot in a fierce exchange of 
fire during an attempted raid by the Samburu. At the scene it was established that Ekiru had been 
shot twice on the neck and once on the back with the bullets exiting from his chest. Police 
officers were intrigued as there was no evidence of a fierce exchange of gunfire. Two AK47 and 
one G3 spent cartridges were recovered from the scene. A reconstruction of the scene by the 
police revealed that only a few people from the Turkana side had crossed over to the Samburu 
side. These Turkana warriors had come without livestock as there were no traceable or ‘fresh’ 
footmarks or cow dung to indicate the presence of livestock. Later it was revealed that Ekiru 
alongside his two friends had actually gone to the Samburu warriors who were grazing at 
Loworarik to sell ammunition. Apparently, Ekiru and his kinsmen knew the Samburu colleagues 
and there was an element of ‘mutual trust’ that enabled their transaction. But Ekiru was left 
behind by his kinsmen and that was when a Samburu marksman hidden away from the venue of 
the transaction shot him from the back with an AK47 as he was leaving. One of the Samburu 
warriors who had just bought ammunition from Ekiru then picked Ekiru’s gun (a G3 rifle) and 
shot him twice on the neck. It was later revealed that the G3 rifle that belonged to Ekiru had been 
stolen by Turkana raiders from the Samburu of Uaso Rongai. The G3 rifle was a government 
issued firearm that was assigned to a Samburu Kenya Police Reservist (KPR) who had been one 
of the two KPRs killed by the Turkana of Kawap in a raid at Uaso Rongai on the 18
th
 of October 
2013.  
 
The killing of Ekiru brought a lot of tension and animosity between the Turkana and Samburu as 
the government could not trace and arrest Ekiru’s killer. In a government meeting, a Samburu 
chief narrated how Samburu elders and political leaders had helped the killer to escape. He was 
given a safe passage that enabled him to relocate and settle among his kinsmen in Isiolo. At a 
meeting convened to reduce the rising tension among the Turkana of Lomerok from where Ekiru 
hailed, the elders were very categorical to the District Commissioner. They demanded that the 
killer of Ekiru be brought to them so that they could administer justice on behalf of Ekiru. They 
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also demanded that his gun (the G3 rifle stolen from a murdered Samburu KPR) be returned to 
them. These were their pre-conditions to the government for peace between the Turkana and 
Samburu. The killing of Ekiru puts into perspective the different ways in which production and 
reproduction of violence occur in day to day interactions of the Samburu and Turkana. First, 
violence is not just produced by illegal arms but also through government-issued arms. Secondly, 
violent action is not just attributable to elites and outsiders but also to the interactions and 
transactions between the two groups through trade in arms and ammunition. Thirdly, pastoralists’ 
violence is not only confined to incidences of livestock raids but rather, the killing of a person 
from an ‘enemy’ community brings some social value to the killer.  
Violence or ‘war’ has become part and parcel of daily life among these pastoralists. This thesis 
seeks to comprehend the ethno-history of violence among pastoralists and its consequences 
among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi in Northern Kenya. It seeks to analyse the changing 
meanings and purposes of the culturally embedded pastoralists’ violent practices and its impacts 
in the socio-political relations among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. It also aims to show 
that there are fragile mutual relationships between the pastoralists groups in Baragoi, through 
past cases of marriage and trade linkages, at the same time very quick changes of situations 
(peaceful action/ warlike situation) and that victims are not victims as individuals 
(depersonalized) but because they represent ethnic categories. 
To do this, this study aims to trace the history of violence among pastoralists’ in Baragoi by 
giving an analysis of the complexity of actors and their motivations who have contributed to the 
mutation of violence as a practice from the colonial times to date between the Samburu and 
Turkana groups of Baragoi. This thesis further seeks to analyse the cultural parameters and 
institutional frameworks of pastoralists’ violence, how it has changed overtime and the impacts 
of these changes on day to day decisions such as safety in grazing lands, access to cattle markets, 
and safety in accessing public utilities such as hospitals and schools. 
 
Violence among pastoralists in Eastern Africa has been explained through a number of 
viewpoints. Some have leaned on the ecological-functionalist school of thought, particularly the 
environmental scarcity angle largely borrowing from Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994) and his 
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colleagues. In applying this concept, many authors of the anthropological orientation have 
attributed pastoralists’ violence in this region to competition over scarce and diminishing water 
and pasturelands (Schilling et al 2012; Glowacki and Gonc 2013; KHRC 2010; Osamba 2000; 
Bevan 2008a). Further, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in what anthropologists 
describe as the Karamoja Cluster
1
 has been argued to largely contribute towards violence among 
pastoralists in this region (KHRC, 2010; Schilling et al, 2012; Bevan 2008b; Wepundi et al 2011; 
Leff 2009; Bollig & Österle 2011). Incidences of  violence among pastoralists have further been 
attributed to influence by local politicians and businessmen who organize community warriors 
for raids to raise campaign cash or as a means of creating mayhem that eventually leads to the 
disenfranchisement of opposing voters (IRIN News 2014, Schilling et al 2012, KHRC 2010, 
Greiner, 2013). Other scholars have looked at pastoralists’ violence as a consequence of state 
institutional failure (Chikwanha 2007, KHRC 2010, Amutabi 2010, Fleisher 2000, Mulugeta and 
Hagmann 2008). Some scholars have gone further to attribute pastoralists’ violence to failure of 
local institutions (Gray et al 2003; MercyCorps 2011; Kratli and Swift 1999; Eaton 2008b). 
Violence among rural communities has also been viewed as part of the daily routine of life 
(Kramer 2007). Lastly, pastoralists’ violence has been viewed as business. Fleisher (2002: 146) 
in his study of cattle raids among the Kuria along the Kenya-Tanzania border was informed that 
“war is good for thieving”, to imply that violence facilitates raiding of livestock to meet huge 
demand for beef in urban centers in Kenya. Similarly, KHRC (2009) in its documentary of 
violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya found strong business linkages between cattle 
raiders and elites. 
 
The above studies have expanded understanding of violence among pastoralists in Eastern 
Africa. They have attributed increased use of violence among pastoralists in Eastern Africa to 
external factors such as environmental scarcity, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, 
commercialisation of raids and the role of political competition in influencing violent raiding. 
While these analyses are significant into understanding the phenomenon of violence; further 
                                                          
1
 “Describes a larger cross-border area of land which covers the Karamoja area of North-Eastern Uganda, parts of 
South-Eastern South Sudan, South Western Ethiopia and Northwestern Kenya” Powel J (2010:2). Inhabited by 
pastoralists groups 
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explanations on why pastoralists’ warriors are increasingly using violence in their day to day 
relationships with their neighbours is at the core of this thesis. This study seeks to go a step 
further to broaden the understanding of violence among pastoralists by focusing on the multiple 
meanings, purposes and forms of violence practiced by pastoralists in Baragoi. While many 
scholars who have worked in this region have documented the consequences and latent causes of 
cattle raids, this study seeks to understand the role of violence in pastoralists’ socio-economic 
and political interactions through the prism of anthropological theories of violence. 
Even though the above mentioned authors have written extensively on various aspects of the 
culture of raiding and increased violence among pastoralists in Eastern Africa, the literature 
above implies that ‘peaceful’ raiding is a thing of the past and therefore non-existent. Contrary to 
this view, there is evidence that peaceful small time raiding still occurs; a series of these peaceful 
raids coupled with revenge and counter revenge precipitates large scale violence that sometimes 
leads to massacres. Fewer studies have contextualized pastoralists’ violence in this region as a 
consequence of institutional transformation. In this thesis I look at the actors and factors internal 
to and external to pastoralists’ societies. I seek to understand how these have contributed to the 
transformation of the cultural practice of raiding which had more or less known and workable 
checks and balances that prevented escalation of violence. I argue that violence among 
pastoralists in its myriad forms must be seen as a resource that interactions between the Samburu 
and Turkana tend to produce and reproduce to meet specific ends. Moreover, I argue that even 
though the above postulations explain aspects of today’s violence among pastoralists’, 
understanding the changing forms and uses of violence as a resource is key to comprehending 
the inability of peacebuilding intervention measures to succeed in this region.  
In this thesis, I analyse pastoralists’ violence not only through as a consequence of resource 
scarcity but rather; as an expressive action which denotes multi-level contests between 
pastoralists groups. While violent cattle raids have been broadly documented in Northern Kenya, 
the location of violent action among herders has been overlooked. Since raids take place within 
specific geographies in pastoral societies, a focus on the ‘places’ of violence may reveal the 
various meanings and purposes of raiding, which majorly occur in the grazing lands. This 
suggests that pasturelands are contested spaces by opposing groups of herders distinguished by 
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identity markers such as clannism or ethnicity. Raiding hence can be assumed to be used as a 
tool for negotiating access, user and ownership rights to specific grazing lands. The occurrence 
of raids within contested grazing lands implies that pasturelands are strategic geographical 
spheres of production and also areas of specific cultural meanings to different groups. Raids 
therefore may be used to claim or contest grazing lands as livelihoods spaces, cultural spaces, 
territorial spaces and lastly, as political arenas that specific groups identify themselves and their 
leaders with.  
Moreover, the escalation or de-escalation of violence among pastoralists have been ignored. Why 
do violent raids intensify in some communities while others are able to contain it? Schlee (2004) 
argued that the escalation of violence in pastoralists’ communities is dependent on the 
interpretation of multi-level relationships and shared interdependencies between herders. 
Violence escalates when herders sharing common resources identify each other as enemies and 
therefore have an incompatible relationship that demands exclusivity to the resource. Schlee 
explains that chances of violence escalation after raids involving stealing of one or two animals 
depend on the exploitation of these ties. Therefore revenge raids often do not target those 
perpetrators of the initial raid but their kin living in nearby villages. 
Violence among pastoralists’ can also be evidence of elite capture and transformation of the 
institutional meaning and functions of the cultural practice of raiding. While increased violence 
has been attributed to institutional change, the identification of new actors within the value chain 
of violence has been limited. Dave Eaton (2010) identified the ‘traider’ as an intermediate agent 
who obtains livestock immediately after raids and sends them to the markets. In the context of 
violence in Baragoi, this study will seek to identity new networks of actors that facilitate 
pastoralists’ violence to serve different interests. 
In this thesis, I conceptualize violence among pastoralists in Baragoi as follows:  I analyse 
violent cattle raids in its traditional form, as a means for replenishing stock after periods of 
droughts and a source of cattle for payment of bride wealth. I argue that even though cattle raids 
have become sophisticated over the last five decades, understanding the practice of raiding 
cannot ignore its very foundations and the socio-economic and political value that it served in its 
traditional form. I analyse pastoralists’ violence as spatial contests between distinct groups, 
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indicating that violence through cattle raids is used to negotiate access and utilization of 
pasturelands among warriors from different groups. I analyse violence as a means of establishing 
power and hegemony over other groups. The use of violence establishes a clear hierarchy in 
social relationships, distinguishing the perpetrator, the victim and the observers, and entrenches 
the position of the perpetrator as the dominant person in the relationship. Violence is examined 
in its function to communicate the incompatibility and dispute between groups, the killing of 
victims is also used to convey a grave message to the kin or tribesmen nd women of the victims. 
Since violence is directed towards the body and may result in death or injury to people and 
livestock, the use of violence denotes the inevitability of the contest and the view by the two 
protagonists of the violent act as a zero-sum game.  
Violence among pastoralists will be studied as an identity marker, establishing ‘us’ verses ‘them’ 
as well as geographical spheres of exclusivity while excluding ‘others’ from a given area. 
Pastoralists’ violence in this case is used to demarcate territories and to lay historical claim on 
the  indigenousness of a people to particular area. Violence thus is the means through which 
territorial claims based on clans or ethnic identities are launched, contested, won, lost or 
preserved. So far, pastoralists’ violence in Northern Kenya has not been viewed as a tool for 
promoting ethno-nationalism. Watson and Schlee (2009:3) describe ethno-nationalism as “a 
strong sense of difference and a lack of tolerance for sharing territory and resources.  When a 
strong sense of identity is combined with competitive and negative stereotyping of others, 
conflict is more common”. What could be the role of ethnonationalism in mobilisation for 
pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi? And how has ethno-nationalistic politics contributed to 
politically motivated violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi?  
I analyse violence among pastoralists in Baragoi as a resource in itself.  This analysis will be 
based on the use of violence as a means of negotiating every day relations between the Samburu 
and Turkana. This analysis is premised on the assumption that violence is increasingly used as an 
agency through which political, economic or socio-cultural claims are launched, negotiated and 
settled.  I analyse revenge as a major motivation for the progression of violence from an incident 
between two individuals to group or collective violence in which mobilisation is carried out 
based on clan or ethnic identities. Lastly, this thesis moves away from the moralist view of 
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violence as something negative and ‘primitive, it seeks to understand the persistence of 
pastoralists’ violence despite decades of peacebuilding by various parties. In my analysis I aim to 
contextualize pastoralists’ violence and understand its meanings and purposes in the socio-
political relations between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. 
1.1 Objectives of the study 
i. To understand the multi-level roles of violence in the cultural practice of cattle raids and 
its implications in the socio-economic and political interactions between the Samburu and 
Turkana communities in Northern Kenya. 
ii. To understand how violence is used to negotiate access to space, land and territories 
among pastoralists groups in Baragoi. 
iii. To establish the network of actors who influence and participate in the business of 
violence among pastoralists in Baragoi. 
iv. To establish the linkages between various forms of pastoralists violence and the 
incompatibility of inter-communal conflicts resolution systems among the Turkana and 
Samburu of Baragoi  
Having read on violence among the Samburu and Turkana in Kenyan media, my mission in 
Baragoi was to ascertain why violence happens and why it is so vicious between these groups. 
While it is generally presumed that violent conflict between pastoralists is due to competition 
over limited pastures and water resources. I sought to find out if there is a deeper meaning and 
reason to high levels of violence and to establish the roles of different actors in this conflict. 
1.2 Main Research Question 
What are the meanings and purposes of the socio-cultural practices that constitute pastoralists’ 
violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi?  
i. What is the historical background to violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi? 
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ii. How is violence deployed to negotiate day to day socio-political relations between the 
Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi? 
iii. Who are the major actors in conflicts among pastoralists and how is violence used as an 
organizing principle to rally the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi? 
iv. To what extent has violence among the Samburu and Turkana expanded its own cultural 
parameters and how has this expansion contributed to the targeting of women and children? 
1.3 The Study Area 
Baragoi has been described as the “epicenter of intertribal violence” (Mkutu 2005:31) and as a 
“new center of violence” (Mkutu 2005:314). In the recent past it has also been described as the 
‘Valley of Death’ (Standard 2012) due to its more recent association with the November 10th 
2012 massacre of 42 policemen after a botched police operation to recover raided livestock from 
a Turkana manyatta at Lomerok. Baragoi however has a century-long history of violent 
confrontations between the pastoralists groups inhabiting the area; the Turkana and Samburu 
(Stigand 1910, Lamphear 1976). Violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi has been 
characterized to be “fuelled by socio-political factors characterized by the threats of expulsion of 
the Turkana from the District and violent competition over natural resources such as water and 
pasture” (CEWARN 2004:10). Violent relations between these pastoralists’ and the state is also 
evident in paramilitary operations, communal punishments and clashes that have continued since 
early 1900s to date (Rutten 1989; Lamphear 1976; Umar 1997:19; Wepundi et al 2011; Mburu 
n.d). Studies on pastoralists’ violence have been carried out by scholars in Northern Kenya 
(Bollig and Österle 2007; Greiner 2013: Sharamo 2014). While Bollig, Österle and Greiner spent 
their time among the Pokot and analysed the factors that motivated violence between the Pokot 
and their Samburu, Turkana and IlChamus neighbours. Sharamo (2014) in a more recent study 
looked at the key role of local politics as a motivation for pastoralists’ violence within the newly 
devolved system of County governments with a focus on Samburu, Turkana and Borana groups 
of Isiolo County. Other author’s like (Galaty 2005a: 115) documented series of cattle raids and 
massacres among the Turkana, Samburu, Rendille and Arial herders who had camped in Elbarta 
plains (Baragoi) during the drought season of August 1996. His analysis focused on the role of 
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security forces in abetting cattle raids and he argued that the Turkana were favoured (and 
therefore more successful in raids) by the security forces due to collusion and ethnic affinity 
between the Turkana and the local head of police who was a Teso
2
 (Galaty 2005a:118). The 
other work that touches partly on pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi was the PhD thesis of 
Kennedy Mkutu (2005) which looked at cattle raids in Baragoi as part of a wider study on the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons within the Karamoja cluster of Eastern Africa. I 
chose to conduct my study in Baragoi because even though the area is associated with cycles of 
violence and is considered as a valley of death by mainstream Kenyan media; no comprehensive 
study on the nature and motivations for violence among the Turkana and Samburu has been 
conducted.  Baragoi is also unique in the sense that the two pastoralists groups have historical 
claims on the social and geographical space that is Baragoi and these claims are at the very 
foundation of the continued strife that influence and motivate new cycles of violence. In 
choosing Baragoi, I aimed to understand the meanings and purposes of violence among the 
Samburu and Turkana and how violence is used to navigate day to day relationships of 
pastoralists within the shared and contested socio-physical space. 
1.3.1 Demographic Background of the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi 
Samburu North sub-County (Baragoi) is part of the three sub-Counties that make up Samburu 
County, one of the 47 Counties in Kenya. Samburu County is one of the poorest counties in 
Kenya with 73 per cent with of its population living below poverty line according to Kenya 
integrated Household Budget survey (KIHBS 2009). Baragoi is located in the Northern part of 
Samburu County and borders Turkana County to the north, Marsabit County to the North East 
and Baringo County to the South-west. It is inhabited majorly by the Samburu and Turkana 
pastoralists (GoK, 2009). The Samburu are the majority in Baragoi making up 78 per cent of the 
58,000 inhabitants (GoK 2009).  The Turkana community makes up 15 per cent of the 
population while the remaining 7 per cent is shared between the Somali, Meru and Kikuyu 
traders who are mostly located in Baragoi Town
3
. In 2013, 35-40% of Baragoi residents were in 
need of food aid (Humanitarian Response 2013) while only 3 per cent of Baragoi residents have 
                                                          
2
 A Nilotic community inhabiting border areas between western Kenya County of Busia and eastern Uganda districts 
of Sorroti and Tororo 
3
Personal observation during my 9 months fieldwork in Samburu North sub-County 
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high school education as compared to 6 per cent average of Samburu County (Ngugi, Kipruto 
and Samoei 2013). In Baragoi, only 19 per cent of residents have primary education (Ngugi et al 
2013:12) meaning 81 per cent of Baragoi residents have no formal education. In terms of access 
to water, only 23 per cent of Baragoi residents have access to improved sources of water (Ngugi 
et al 2013:16) 
 
Baragoi (Samburu North sub-County) is further divided into two administrative units (Divisions) 
namely Nyiro and Baragoi. Pastoralists can be found in both Divisions. The Turkana for instance 
live in Parkati location in Nyiro Division. Similarly, Turkana used to live in Kawap center of 
Kawap location (located in Nyiro Division) before they were evicted through violence and 
vandalism by the Samburu of Uaso Rongai in October 2013.  The Samburu live in Uaso Rongai, 
South Horr, Tuum, Seren and Arsim locations in Nyiro Division, while in Baragoi Division they 
live in Latakweny, Ndoto, Suiyan, Baragoi and El Barta locations. In Baragoi Division, the 
Turkana live in Nachola, Marti and Baragoi town locations.  
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Figure 1: Map of the Study Area 
 
Source: Author 
The map above shows the administrative sub-locations within Samburu North district (Baragoi). 
It also shows the current violence hotspots areas as well as the road (red line) which acts as the 
physical boundary of Samburu and Turkana territories. Administratively, the sub-County is 
served by a Deputy County Commissioner (District Commissioner) who sits in Baragoi town. He 
is assisted by two Assistant County Commissioners (District Officers) for Baragoi and Nyiro 
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Divisions. The Nyiro Assistant County Commissioner is based in South Horr. Under the 
Assistant County Commissioners are fourteen administrative Chiefs appointed by the 
Government of Kenya under what was known as provincial administration before the 
promulgation of the constitution of Kenya in 2010. The chiefs are in charge of day to day 
administration of these locations and are responsible for reporting security situations such as 
occurrence of raids to the police or their immediate bosses (Assistant County Commissioners). 
They are further charged with resolving disputes between villagers and also communicating and 
effecting government policy at the village level. For instance chiefs arrest brewers of illicit brews 
and disseminate government policy agendas such as the availability of free primary education or 
government immunization programmes against diseases such as polio. Chiefs in Kenya work 
closely with Assistant Chiefs from the various sub-locations at the lowest tier of formal 
government administration. Baragoi (Samburu North sub-County) is made up of the following 
administrative units (locations); Baragoi, El Barta, Kawap, Tuum, Uaso Rongai, South Horr, 
Arsim, Marti, Latakweny, Ndoto, Seren, Suiyan, Nachola and Parkati. 
 
Baragoi (Samburu North sub-County) is a semi-arid area with a maximum of 400mm annual 
rainfall. The temperatures in Baragoi range from 22 degrees centigrade to 35 degrees centigrade 
during the dry seasons of November to February. It has two rainy seasons from March to May 
and August to October. The Turkana and Samburu population in Samburu North sub-County are 
mostly involved in nomadic pastoralism as a major source of livelihood. However, pastoralists 
are increasingly settling down to more permanent villages as is the case in Marti Center, 
Bendera, Ngilai, Uaso Rongai, South Horr Center, Parkati, Logetei, Natiti, Thuree, Nachola, 
Naling’ang’or and Leilei villages. The settlement of pastoralist’s households does not mean the 
death of nomadism. Morans from these communities spend most of their time hundreds of 
kilometers away from home in search of pasture and water. Baragoi however is also noted for its 
riches in pasturelands especially along the Kawap-Tuum-Nasiischo corridor which attracts 
herdsmen from as far as Wamba and Archers Post during the long droughts from November to 
February and again between May and August.  
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Pastoralist households in Baragoi further draw their livelihoods from the sale of milk (especially 
by women and girls), sale of charcoal (Turkana women and girls), employment as house-helps 
by migrant groups and civil servants working and living in Baragoi town (Turkana women). The 
majority of Samburu and Turkana male adults who have retired from warrior hood are involved 
in livestock trade. The Turkana owing to lack of livestock markets on their side of the ethnic 
boundary buy and sell livestock among themselves at Huruma market within Leilei in Baragoi 
town. Burji
4
 livestock traders also buy goats from Turkana men and these are transported to 
urban centers in other parts of Kenya. Samburu men on the other hand have access to livestock 
markets in Tangar and Tuum and Masikita. Both communities however supply their livestock to 
butcheries within Baragoi town. 
 
In other centers like Tuum, the ‘Soko la Amani5’ that was established in 2014 through the efforts 
of the Tuum Catholic Parish, the Catholic Diocese of Maralal, the Samburu County Government 
and Turkana and Samburu elders. Apart from facilitating trade among the Samburu and Turkana, 
the livestock market aimed at bringing these groups together as an avenue for inter-group 
cohesion among previously warring Samburu of Tuum and Waso Ronagi and Turkana of Parkati 
and Kawap. The Turkana from Parkati location trek 26 kilometers to attend this market every 
Monday while Samburu livestock traders from Tuum, South Horr, Lonjorin and Uaso Rongai 
also participate in trade there. 
 
Baragoi town is the largest center in Samburu North district. As per the last census (GoK, 2009), 
Baragoi is inhabited by 4,600 residents. The town sits along the Maralal-Marti-South Horr-
Loiyangalani Highway. By design the road that passes through Baragoi town headed to 
Loiyangalani also marks the distinct territories of the Samburu and Turkana. In Baragoi town the 
Turkana community have settled and own businesses on the southern part of Baragoi town while 
                                                          
4
 Agro-pastoral and entrepreneurial community of Cushitic extraction that initially settled in Moyale and Marsabit 
areas of Northern Kenya. Today recognized as entrepreneurs and livestock traders supplying major urban centers 
such as Nairobi. 
5
 Meaning ‘market of peace’ perhaps to signify how violent raids have impeded trade relations between the Turkana 
and Samburu in Nyiro Division of Samburu North sub-County. 
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the Samburu also own property and reside on the upper side of the town perhaps indicating the 
security risks that crossing the boundary entails for members of both communities.
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Table 1: Demographic Dynamics of Samburu North 
Location Sub-location Ethnic 
Identity of 
inhabitants 
Total 
Population 
No. of 
Households 
Area in 
Sq. 
Kilometers  
Population 
Density 
Division 
Arsim Arsim Samburu 1536 300 231.95 6.62 Nyiro 
 Ngurunit Samburu 1312 281 421.26 3.11  
 Ilaut Samburu 828 828 82.79 10  
Baragoi Baragoi town Samburu/Tu
rkana 
4694 924 2.23 2102.48 Baragoi 
 Bendera Samburu 1579 341 8.06 195.57  
 Naling’ang’o
r 
Turkana 1719 383 7.15 240.32  
Tuum Ijuuk Samburu 480 74 85.93 5.59 Nyiro 
 Tuum Samburu 1738 344 125.97 13.38  
Marti Kalele Turkana 867 171 143.37 6.05 Baragoi 
 Lokorkor Turkana 796 163 276.02 2.88  
 Muroa Kiring Turkana 1875 409 732.27 2.56  
Latakwen
y  
Latakweny Samburu 2066 455 274.39 7.53 Baragoi 
 Loikumkum Samburu 2651 559 281.76 9.41  
Ndoto Lesirkan Samburu 2397 554 196.47 12.2 Baragoi 
 Lodua Samburu 1689 352 204.49 8.26  
Parkati Lkayo Turkana 2916 359 164.54 17.72 Nyiro 
 Parkati Turkana 1767 320 181.16 9.75  
Waso 
Rongai 
Lkotikal Samburu 887 194 242.91 3.65 Nyiro 
 Simale Samburu 700 125 130.2 5.38  
 Waso Rongai Samburu  1981 390 31.86 62.17  
Kawap Lonyang’aten Turkana 3057 543 134.11 22.79 Nyiro 
 Losurkoi Turkana 929 181 295.95 3.14  
 Nakwei Turkana 1612 222 176.76 9.12  
South 
Horr 
Lonjorin Samburu 2149 317 154.46 13.91 Nyiro 
 South Horr Samburu 4433 874 185.29 23.92  
Suyan Marti Samburu 659 146 144.37 4.56 Baragoi 
 Suyan Samburu 1160 268 420.73 2.76  
Nachola Nachola Turkana 1953 415 257.12 7.6 Baragoi 
 Nakuprat Turkana 1889 333 287.68 6.57  
 Terter Turkana 1185 192 348.44 3.4  
Seren Seren Samburu 2433 465 365.5 6.66 Nyiro 
El Barta Ngilai Samburu 1977 417 285.93 6.91 Baragoi 
Total   57,914 11,245 6,881.1   
Source: GoK (2009)
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Government offices and major services centers such as the hospital, Baragoi Girls Secondary 
School, Baragoi Mixed Secondary School, Baragoi Primary School, the Police Station, the DC’s 
office, the Catholic Church and offices of Christian Children’s Fund (CCF)6-the children’s 
sponsorship NGO offices are located on the ‘Samburu side’ of the town. On the Turkana side of 
the boundary, one finds the Baragoi slaughterhouse and Baragoi Boys Secondary school as the 
outstanding public infrastructure; this lends credence to Turkana notions of marginalisation and 
discrimination in terms of allocation and access to resources and government services in Baragoi. 
Baragoi is also an administrative unit (location) headed by a chief. It is the only location where 
one chief administers both the Samburu and Turkana areas in Baragoi town sub-location.   In the 
other two sub-locations, the Chief of Baragoi works with a Turkana assistant chief who heads 
Naling’ang’or sub-location while a Samburu assistant chief heads the neighbouring Bendera sub-
location. 
 
Baragoi town is also a business outpost with Kikuyu, Meru, Somali and Burji businessmen and 
women some who were born there while some moved to Baragoi in the early 1970s. On the 
Turkana side of the ethnic boundary there exist many businesses run by Somalis, Kikuyus, 
Merus and the Turkana; this is enhanced by the local Turkana intermarriages with these settler 
groups. On the Turkana side women engage themselves in selling charcoal, firewood and milk. 
On the lower part of the Turkana side is Leilei market; a Turkana business hub with wholesale 
shops, clinics, photocopy shops, butcheries, hardware’s, M-Pesa kiosks, boutiques and eateries. 
A walk through Leilei market also reveals the laid back nature of the Turkana men. While their 
women are engaged in all sorts of small scale income generating activities, Turkana men wake 
up and come to sit on the verandas of shops along the market streets, chewing tobacco and khat
7
 
while sharing the news on security situation of their villages. 
 
                                                          
6
 CCF nowadays known as ChildFund 
7
 Also called ‘miraa’ in Kenya, a stimulant whose leaves are chewed as an intoxicant, very popularly among morans 
and elders of the Samburu and Turkana communities. Slowly being adopted by young women in these areas. 
Originates from Meru County. 
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On the Samburu side of Baragoi town, there are fewer shops. A walk on the streets of the 
Samburu side of Baragoi town also reveals the different roles of men and women in Samburu 
society; women and young boys and girls are seen hawking milk to Baragoi town residents while 
the men come to town later in the day to meet friends, drink alcohol on the Turkana side and buy 
khat. The fragility of inter-communal relations in Baragoi town is evident in the huge presence of 
Samburu KPRs often armed with German made G-3 rifles and always in groups. 
 
In terms of security personnel, Baragoi town has officers the Kenya Police and the 
Administration police units. There is a Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) barrack currently being 
built just 2 kilometers out of Baragoi town, indicating the levels of insecurity that is experienced 
in Baragoi. Four kilometers from Baragoi town is the Kambi ya Nyoka
8
 Operation camp that 
hosts officers from the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) and the General Service Unit (G.S.U). 
Another seven kilometers from Baragoi town in Nachola center we also find the Nachola GSU 
camp that was located there to fend off Pokot raiders who frequently raided the Turkana. 
 
Apart from Baragoi town, other centers within Samburu North sub-County include Marti, Tuum, 
South-Horr, Lesirkan and Masikita. Marti sits about 49 kilometers from Baragoi town. It is 
located between Maralal and Baragoi town and it is the place where the Baragoi-Maralal bus 
makes a stop for passengers to stretch their legs and have health breaks. Marti is an 
administrative unit (location) headed by a Turkana chief but the town center is shared by 
Turkana and Samburu residents. The Turkana manyattas are within Marti town, while Samburu 
manyattas are located behind the Marti Operation camp and fall administratively under Marti 
sub-location of Suiyan location. Tuum center is located in Nyiro Division and is inhabited 
exclusively by the Samburu. It sits at the foot of Ng’iro Mountain and the people of Tuum 
cultivate crops and fruits due to the good soils and ample water streaming down from the 
mountain. Tuum is also an administrative unit (location), headed by a chief. The distance from 
Baragoi town to Tuum is 50 kilometers and the area is within some of the richest grazing lands in 
Baragoi. Just outside Tuum center is the Tuum Operation camp that houses security personnel 
that were deployed there to stem incessant pastoralists’ violence that occurred between the 
                                                          
8
  Meaning ‘Camp of snakes’ in Swahili language. 
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Samburu of Tuum and Turkana of Parkati and Kawap. The distance from Tuum to Parkati is 26 
kilometers, and many Turkana from Parkati have established strong social networks with the 
Samburu of Tuum because many have to spend a night in Tuum before finding a vehicle for 
onward journey to Baragoi town. The Catholic Parish in Tuum also serves the Turkana of Parkati 
and through this Turkana worshippers from Parkati participate in church activities in Tuum.  
 
South Horr sits at the border between Samburu and Marsabit Counties. It is located about 52 
kilometers from Baragoi town and is inhabited by the Samburu and Rendille communities in 
majority with a sprinkling of other trader minorities. The majority of the Rendille however reside 
in Marsabit side of the town, although there are Rendille households that I interviewed during 
this study that were born and bred on the Samburu side of the town. Most people in South Horr, 
be they Rendille, Turkana, Somali or Meru speak the Samburu language fluently. Masikita is 
also inhabited exclusively by the Samburu community. It is located about 28 kilometers from 
Baragoi town and located in the lush El Barta plains. It was originally inhabited by the Ogiek 
(Stigand, 1910). It is believed that these Ogiek were assimilated by the Samburu in early 1900s. 
Masikita is also an administrative unit of the government of Kenya (location), headed by a chief. 
1.4 Fieldwork, Data collection and Methodology 
In my nine months of fieldwork in Baragoi, I visited 14 locations in Nyiro and Baragoi Divisions 
of Samburu North sub County (Baragoi). In the initial stages I spent time having very informal 
discussions with Catholic priests and catechists at the Baragoi Parish on drivers of pastoralists 
violence among the Samburu and Turkana. From these discussions, I learnt of the variety of 
proximate and latent causes of violence between the Samburu and Turkana. For instance 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons was always blamed but the priests also pointed at 
land as an underlying factor in these conflicts. Further in my initial weeks I ventured into 
Baragoi town just to observe peoples ways of life. Initially everyone was very skeptical about my 
presence. I started with meeting local chiefs and with the help of my research assistant Boniface 
and the local priest.  I started asking very informal questions about the origins of Samburu and 
Turkana of Baragoi. These historical questions’ enabled me to gain the confidence of my 
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respondents. Through the chiefs I was referred to elders from the Samburu and Turkana, most of 
these elders in their late 70s and 80s were usually found just outside the manyatta’s having a nap.  
 
In my discussions with the elders, it was clear that there has been a historical contention between 
the Samburu and Turkana on which community arrived in Baragoi first. The Samburu insisted on 
Baragoi being Samburu land and therefore ‘indigenous’ to them. They used the term Nkopang, 
meaning owners of the land in Kisamburu. The Turkana elders maintained that their forefathers 
were the ‘original’ inhabitants of Baragoi. Through participant observation, I was able to 
decipher the social positioning of elders in Samburu and Turkana societies. In these societies, 
elders sit under specific trees. Normally some would be sleeping while others sitting. Here they 
share the ‘news’ about previous day happenings in their manyattas. Most of these involve issues 
of security and grazing patterns of livestock. Under these trees, every elder carries with them a 
long knife and a spear. While the knife can be used for cutting meat, the spear especially among 
the Turkana is used very ceremoniously and it is a symbol of authority.  
 
 
Photo 1: Discussion with Turkana elders at a Nachola manyatta in Baragoi, February 2015, Source: Author 
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Outside the manyattas I also noticed the milking stock being grazed by younger boys and girls 
armed with bows, arrows and whistles. My enquiries revealed that the whistles were meant to 
alert male members of the older age-sets (the retired warriors) who were often seated under 
another tree or in one of the huts in the manyatta of the sighting of ‘enemy’ morans. Herding of 
milking camels, goats and cows by younger boys and girls indicates the division of labour in 
Samburu and Turkana societies. While older boys Lchekuuti 
9
 accompany the morans to grazing 
fields, the younger children are socialized into their future roles as herds-boys by grazing 
milking stock around the manyattas. Women can also be seen milking cows, goats and camels 
and nursing the newly born livestock or building or repairing manyattas. As part of the Catholic 
Diocese Maralal team on peacebuilding and alternative livelihoods among the Samburu and 
Turkana, I visited many villages where I interviewed retired chiefs, chiefs, KPRs, morans, retired 
police officers, politicians, women group leaders, catechists and other persons of interest through 
purposive sampling. I conducted interviews largely centered on history of violence among the 
Samburu and Turkana communities and actors in pastoralists’ violence.  
 
I visited Baragoi Police Station and Baragoi Administration Police Headquarters to introduce 
myself to the police chiefs of Samburu North sub-County. This was important as I was 
researching on sensitive security issues and that required the support, cooperation and 
participation of the police. At Baragoi Police Station, I met and interacted with the police 
officers including the Officer Commanding Police Station (OCS).  In our informal discussions 
with police officers, I realized that they were more willing to discuss the events of the Baragoi 
massacre. I gained their perspectives on how the massacre was organised, how the morans from 
both sides were mobilized and the roles played by political leaders in organisation of violence. 
From the police I was also able to observe their response to incidences of violence. In one such 
case, there was a report by Samburu elders that a severed head of a dog had been found on the 
Baragoi-South Horr highway near Ngoriche hills. The severed head was placed on the Samburu 
side of the road and the head of the dog faced a path leading to Bendera village of the Samburu.  
As per the Samburu complainants this severed head of a dog was part of Turkana witchcraft that 
was done to ‘prepare the path of raiders’. The Samburu therefore required police action in 
                                                          
9
 Meaning shepherds in Samburu language 
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dealing with ‘likely planned Turkana raid’. The case of the severed head of a dog exemplifies 
that violence has meaning. The cultural interpretation of this act of witchcraft as a message of 
impending violence shows that pastoralists’ violence cannot be simplified as mere cattle raids 
due to scarcity of resources. The placement of the severed head of a dog on a path leading to a 
Samburu village shows the communicative role of violence (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992). The 
severing of the head of the dog is a symbolic gesture of the impending severity of the violence 
directed against the enemy. At the same time, the placement of the severed head on a path 
leading to Samburu village symbolically communicates well in advance the imminence of war. 
Association of dog sacrifice and its direction towards the enemy was also found by Knighton 
(2007: 476) among the Karamojong which is interpreted as a curse against enemies. 
 
My fieldwork was often dictated by ‘news’ of violence incidences from time to time. From 
October 2014 for instance, a new cycle of violence started from a grazing land shoot-out in 
Ngorishe and spread into Baragoi town. Being based in Baragoi town and living near the Baragoi 
District hospital, news of shootings in the grazing fields brought high levels of tension in Baragoi 
town. Periods of violence thus made Baragoi and its environs a landscape of certain uncertainity 
(Müller-Mahn 2013). In many cases when a Samburu herder was injured or killed, Samburus 
would quickly troop into the hospital and the Turkana patients would take off, running to the 
Turkana side for their safety. In my initial discussions with morans from Logetei, Bendera and 
Ngilai villages, I learnt that these morans knew each other. Most of them grazed together and 
many had visited each other’s villages at night during raids. It was worthy of note that many of 
the Turkana morans in their mid-20s had never gone past the Baragoi sub-District Hospital 
during the day. Going past the hospital was considered unsafe. Similarly, many of the Samburu 
morans had never ventured beyond Leilei market during the day. In essence my discussions with 
Turkana and Samburu morans brought to the fore the role of fear of violence in redefining socio-
spatial spaces in Baragoi. Areas declared unsafe were often based on past narratives of violence 
that community members carried from one generation to the other. These narratives of past 
violence defined Baragoi landscape in terms of safe and unsafe routes, safe and unsafe settlement 
areas for both the Samburu and Turkana, safe and unsafe markets, safe and unsafe grazing lands. 
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Past narratives of violent events later became a basis for the reproduction of violence through 
revenge acts. 
 
From my location at the Catholic Parish, I was able to walk to many nearby villages like 
Mnanda, Bendera, Naling’ang’or, Natiti and Logetei. In Mnanda (a Samburu village) I went with 
Boniface my assistant and a KPR officer to the boreholes where morans were drawing water for 
their livestock. The organisation of the tasks of drawing water for animals embodies moran ethos 
of teamwork, togetherness and brotherhood (Wasamba 2009). To draw water into a drinking 
trough for cattle, in many cases four morans had to enter the borehole and position themselves at 
different heights on the walls of the borehole. The one at the lowest end scoops the water with a 
USAID
10
 cooking oil container and passes it above him to another until the fourth one pours the 
water into the trough. Most of this is done while humming. The convinient use of a USAID 
cooking oil container exemplifies the relief food culture that is entrenched among pastoralists in 
Northern Kenya. It shows the levels of marginalisation and the ‘distance’ between the state and 
its citizens in terms of facilitating long term development initiatives. It also shows the existence 
of ‘ungoverned space’ where Non Governmental Organisations and their international partners 
fill in the void left by the Kenyan state (Menkhaus 2007; Mkutu and Wandera 2013). Outside the 
borehole there were armed KPRs providing security to the animals. The guns belonging to the 
warriors drawing water could be seen in the shade next to the KPRs. In my informal discussions 
with these morans, I was informed that boreholes were for exclusive use by the respective 
communities. As the dry season set in, the borehole waters diminished forcing everyone else to 
compete for use waters from rivers Nasiischo in Nyiro and Langat in Baragoi Divisions 
respectively. This was partly seen as a contributing factor to conflicts between the Samburu and 
Turkana. 
 
In Baragoi I also attended church services at the Baragoi Catholic Church. I observed that many 
of the Turkana and Samburu elites were Catholics. In discussions with the priests, I was 
informed that many of the local businessmen and politicians were former recipients of education 
bursaries and scholarships from the Catholic Church. This shows the incapability of many 
                                                          
10
 United States  Agency for  International Development 
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pastoralists’ households to afford basic education but also points at the marginalisation of 
pastoralists in this region in terms of access to basic amenities such as education and the critical 
role of the church especially the Catholics in filling this void through scholarships for brilliant 
pastoralist’s children. At the same time the priests blamed these local leaders of promoting 
violence among the Turkana and Samburu through incitements and supply of arms. Towards the 
end of August, I conducted my first focused group discussion with Samburu morans in Bendera 
village. We discussed their roles in Samburu society and their relationships with Turkana 
morans. During these discussions we explored moranhood as an institution among the Samburu 
(Wasamba 2009). It became very clear to me that Samburu society holds morans in high esteem 
given their role as protectors of the community. We explored their relationships with Samburu 
elites and other leaders. They mostly valued leaders who supplied them with relief food and 
arms. This point to the patron-client relationship between these two groups and how it can be 
exploited by elites to foment raids and other acts of violence based on ethnic identity. 
 
In September 2014 I spent time visiting Turkana villages in Logetei where I interacted with 
morans and retired morans. We explored the root causes of Samburu-Turkana conflict and the 
consequences of conflicts on pastoralists’ livelihoods. We further discussed the roles of retired 
morans among the Turkana. I learnt that every evening, Turkana elders and retired morans sit 
and review the day in terms of pasture options and security challenges. In these meetings, 
grazing pasture destinations for the next day are also agreed upon. One morning I was dropped 
by my colleagues from the Catholic Diocese of Maralal at 7am in Logetei because I wanted to 
witness how morans organise the security for livestock from the kraals to the grazing fields. I 
observed that before livestock leave the kraals, a group of armed morans as members of the 
‘advance team’ take the lead to survey the route that the shepherds and the back-up team will 
pass through with the livestock.  The herds’ boys usually from about the age of 8 up to 13 are the 
ones who do the actual herding of livestock. Behind the shepherds are the ‘back-up’ team of 
morans, equally armed to provide security cover for the herds’ boys and the livestock. In all the 
Turkana and Samburu villages that I visited, I observed that trenches or ‘mahandaki11’ were dug 
around cattle kraals. These trenches are the places where warriors spend the night, well 
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 In Swahili language 
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positioned to monitor ‘enemy’ movement and strategically placed for shooting of the enemy. 
This further point to the role of morans as communal force within a fluid security situation. The 
security infrastructure such as trenches shows the gravity of insecurity between the Samburu and 
Turkana and the determination of morans to protect livestock which is the base of pastoralists’ 
households’ survival. 
 
 
Photo 2: A Samburu from Lkororo age-set demonstrates how firearms are held inside the security trenches 
(mihandaki) outside Bendera village in Baragoi, October 2014, Source: Author 
In October I spent a lot of time in Marti and Suiyan villages where I also interviewed KPRs, 
chiefs, Samburu and Turkana morans and police officers. Marti is a unique place in Turkana-
Samburu relations because it is the only town where the two communities have nurtured friendly 
relations. This is evident in the close proximity of their settlements. I was informed that the 
Turkana and Samburu of Marti signed a pact to share information and to protect each other 
against raider warriors from other villages. Marti town is such a contrast to Baragoi town; in 
Baragoi one can observe groups of armed Samburu KPRs when they come to the Turkana side. 
This shows the uncertainty that these communities face when in ‘enemy’ territory. In Marti the 
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two groups interact more and cases of Samburu and Turkana youth seated together listening to 
music or playing bao
12
 is common.  In discussions with Samburu morans from Marti sub-
location of Suiyan location, I was informed of conflict incidences and their causes. Discussions 
with Turkana warriors also revealed the role of ex-servicemen some of whom were chiefs in 
organizing revenge raids. 
 
Towards the end of October I visited Tuum for the first time and spent my first few days with the 
Chilean priest and nuns from Guatemala and Mexico. The priest having lived among the 
Samburu in Barsaloi and now in Tuum was conversant in Samburu language and we discussed 
causes of pastoralists’ violence among the Samburu of Tuum and the Turkana of Kawap and 
Parkati. In Tuum I also interviewed the Assistant Chief of Ijuuk sub-location as well as the Chief 
of Tuum. My discussions with these chiefs centered on the most recent Turkana raid that led to 
the loss of about 80 cattle from Tuum airstrip in March 2013. We further discussed 
circumstances that lead to revenge raids between the Turkana and Samburu.  
 
I also spent the weeks of early November 2014 in South Horr. In South Horr I wanted to 
understand how ‘Operation Turkana Out of 199713’ was organised and executed. Here I 
interviewed a retired moran of mixed parentage from Rendille and Samburu communities. This 
moran also happened to have participated in the Lomerok raid of 29
th
 October 2012 as well as 
the Baragoi massacre of 10
th
 November 2012. He outlined how raids are organised among the 
Samburu. He further highlighted the value of the gun among the Samburu and who receives the 
gun of a fallen warrior. I also interviewed the chief of Loruko sub-location, an area which was 
abandoned and its people resettled in South Horr due to heightened Turkana raids. During our 
discussions at his home, I also noted that he was married to a Turkana woman a rare occurrence 
given the increased animosity between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. In South Horr, I 
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  A traditional African board game originating from the coast of East Africa 
13
 Operation Turkana Out was a series of organized violence episodes that aimed at evicting the Turkana from South 
Horr in 1997. It was led by a retired army officer from the Samburu community and it was executed by the torching 
of Soweto manyatta that was inhabited by the Turkana. The Turkana were later housed by the South Horr Catholic 
Parish and thereafter relocated by the church among their kin in Loyangalani, Baragoi and Maralal. 
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also had discussions with retired chiefs, and two retired military men who explained how the 
Samburu started acquiring arms and ammunition in the early 1990s. 
 
In mid-November I returned to Baragoi and organised a focused group discussion with KPRs 
from Samburu villages of Bendera and Ngilai near Ngilai dispensary. The discussions centered 
on their job as security agents at the local level and their reasons for engaging in raids and 
highway banditries. One evening we attended a Samburu wedding dance and visited several 
other lororas
14
where I witnessed the security vigil that Samburu morans and retired morans have 
to put up to protect the livestock. I organised for a similar focused group discussion with KPRs 
from the Turkana community at Nachola Primary School where issues of the imbalance of 
firepower between the Samburu and Turkana in terms of arming of KPRs was raised.  
 
November 2014 also saw the start of a new cycle of violence, incidents of killings and revenge 
attacks continued almost every week making my movement into other villages impossible. I 
spent the end of November conducting interviews with women and women leaders on their 
experiences of pastoralists’ violence within Bendera, Ngilai, Logetei, Naling’ang’or and Natiti 
villages. In these discussions, we recorded narrations of personal losses that pastoralists’ women 
have experienced. Through these interviews I noted that unlike what I had read in many 
anthropological materials on the cultural requirement for protection of women, children and the 
aged during raids, there seemed to be none among the Samburu and Turkana. In the words of 
Hutchinson (2000) women were literally ‘fair game’ in the violence between the Samburu and 
Turkana. 
 
The data presented in this thesis was collected from July 2014 to April 2015. Archival data was 
collected from the Kenya National Archives for a period of one month from July to August 2014. 
Data from the Kenya National Archives contains documentation of ethnic boundary making by 
colonial administrators for Samburu and Turkana pastoralists. The archival data is further 
                                                          
14
 An enclosure that houses several households/manyattas among the Samburu and Turkana. Occassioned by 
insecurity that forced pastoralists’ households to live in larger compounds for security purposes, in Turkana 
language it is called awi 
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augmented by secondary literature obtained from Stigand (1910) and Lamphear (1976). This 
data covers movement into Baragoi by both communities and shows not only the nature of the 
contest and violent raids that occurred at that time but also the key issues that contributed to 
violence among the Turkana and Samburu. This period is also partly informed by Spencer’s 
(1965) documentation of inter-communal relations between the Samburu and Turkana and the 
role of colonial administrators in fueling violence. 
 
From August 2014, I conducted 102 in-depth interviews. I also collected oral history narratives 
with morans, retired morans, elders, women, police officers, chiefs and KPRs in Baragoi town, 
Marti, Natiti, Thuree, Nachola, Bendera, Ngilai, Parkati, South-Horr, Tuum, Lonjorin, Mbukoi, 
Charda, Kadokoyo, Logetei, Uaso Rongai, Naturkan, Ngoriche, Lenkima and Lesirkan areas. 
Further, community resource mapping exercises were conducted among the Turkana and 
Samburu in South Horr, Thuree, Natiti, Uaso Rongai, Tuum, Parkati, Baragoi town, Nachola, 
Bendera, Ngilai, Marti, Suiyan, Lenkima, Logetei, Marti and Naling’ang’or villages. 101 event 
calendars’ targeting pastoralists women aged over 55 years and aimed at documenting forms of 
violence experiences by women and the impact of pastoralists violence on households were 
drawn in Bendera, Uaso Rongai, Lonjorin, Thuree, Parkati, Natiti, Nachola, Lenkima, Logetei, 
Naling’ang’or, Suiyan, Marti and Tuum villages. Four biographical interviews of notable raiders 
and the two retired paramount chiefs from the Turkana and Samburu communities was 
conducted as well as 11 focused group discussions (FGDs) with groups of warriors, elders, 
women and local opinion leaders.  
 
During my fieldwork I also attended formal administrative and community security meetings 
organised by government officials popularly known as ‘barazas’ convened by chiefs from the 
Samburu and Turkana communities as well as by the office of the Deputy County Commissioner 
of Samburu North sub-County in South Horr, Charda, Lenkima, Ngilai, Marti, Thuree, Baragoi 
town, Nachola and Ngoriche hills. Further I visited hospitals to see victims of violent raids, 
attended livestock markets, animal inoculation days, warrior peace meetings, churches, funerals, 
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burials, traditional weddings and sapana
15
events during my time in the field and observed 
discussions, relationships and transactions between members of the Turkana and Samburu 
communities. 
 
Other sources of secondary data were reports and petitions forwarded to the CDM by concerned 
citizens from Baragoi over the spiraling violence since early 1990s. Further I obtained secondary 
data on violence incidences with a special focus on violent raids from 2005 to 2015 from Baragoi 
Police Station. These came in the form of Occurrence Book (OB) entries, police signals and 
police chronology of events. I also obtained project reports from the CDM that are relevant to 
inter-communal relations between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. Newspaper cuttings 
covering incidences of raids and massacres, opinion pieces on the causes of raids in Northern 
Kenya were also collected from the three leading Kenyan newspapers; the Daily Nation, the 
Standard and the Star. Lastly I obtained three documentaries on the nature and causes of 
pastoralists’ violence among the Samburu and Turkana. The Samburu State of War done by 
NTV
16
 journalist Nimrod Taabu (2013) in Baragoi, No Man’s Land a documentary produced by 
Jeff Lekupe (2011) a Samburu journalist based in Maralal and focused on marginalisation and 
appropriation of pastoralists lands as the root cause of violence in Northern Kenya and finally the 
Business of Violence a Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC, 2009) production that delves 
into the linkages between cattle raiding and elite entrepreneurship in Northern Kenya. 
1.5 Chapters Arrangement 
In chapter one, I present the problem of violence in Baragoi by briefly introducing the production 
of violence between the Turkana and Samburu in the grazing lands. I further define the problem 
of violence among the Samburu and Turkana and how it facilitates the interactions between these 
groups. Thereafter I present the study objectives and key questions. Further, I present the 
research design and give an analysis of key themes explored during the ethnographic fieldwork 
                                                          
15
 Initiation ceremony that admits men into the elderly-stage of life practiced by the Pokot and Turkana where a man 
spears a bull.  Also called sapan or athapan (in Turkana) 
16
 Nation Television, a private TV station that belongs to the Nation Media Group; the largest media organization in 
East and Central Africa owned by His Highness the Aga Khan. 
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in Baragoi. In chapter two, I apply historical analysis to trace the history and settlement of the 
Samburu and Turkana in Baragoi. Through the analysis of archival data, I delve into the 
contested history of Baragoi as a physical and social space between the Samburu and Turkana. I 
further analyse the role of colonialism and its impact on pastoralists’ violence between the 
Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. Further, I analyse violence among pastoralists in post-
independence Baragoi and the roles of key actors. Lastly, I analyse violence in Baragoi after 
1996 and its impacts in redefining socio-political relations between the two communities. In 
chapter three, I present an analysis of the role of violence in the social organisation of warrior 
groups among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. In this chapter, I aim to show the role of 
culture in the organisation of violence and how this organisation enables group cohesion for 
defense and aggressions purposes againsts enemy groups. 
 
In chapter four, I focus on the theoretical dimensions of violence among pastoralists in Baragoi. 
The aim here is to analyse the meanings and purposes of violence among pastoralists in Baragoi 
by looking at its embeddedness on cultural interpretations of the actors themselves and how this 
basis of culture is used ingeniously to mask competitions for power between the two groups. To 
understand the dimensions of violence in Baragoi; I analyse violence as a catalyst to processes of 
societal change. Further, I analyse violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi as a 
consequence of strategic actions of herders and those outside pastoral lands, thus linking 
violence to collective action. I also analyse violence among pastoralists in Baragoi as a 
communicative tool that hints at the incompatibility of inter-communal conflict resolution 
systems. Violence among pastoralists in Baragoi is also analysed as part of day to day 
transactions that occurs in the value chain of the ‘business of violence’, thus underlining violence 
as a resource that enables the negotiation of everyday life.. I further link violence and 
marginalisation by analysing the role of ‘ungoverned spaces’ in violent entrepreneurship among 
the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. In my analysis of the basis of violence among pastoralists’ 
in Baragoi, I also focus on revenge and its role in propelling cycles of collective violence. 
Violence among pastoralists is further analysed as a basis for power contests from the individual, 
group, communal and even at the national levels. Lastly, this chapter analyses violence among 
pastoralists in Baragoi as a means through which identities are created and preserved. 
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In chapter five I present an empirical analysis on data that pertains to the spatial dimensions of 
violence and its impact on socio-political relations between the Samburu and Turkana. In this 
chapter, I analyse the role of contests over land, pasture and water resources in catalyzing social 
change between communities in Baragoi. Further, I focus on the role of culture as an anchor of 
violence among pastoralists in Baragoi and how grazing lands are used as ‘staging’ grounds and 
as warrior’s spaces for the practice of violence. In chapter six, I focus on socio-political power as 
a key driver for violence in Baragoi. I analyse the changing roles of actors in violence among 
pastoralists and include an analysis of new entrants of County politicians as power holders and 
their impacts in local power dynamics. In chapter seven, I focus on processual analysis of 
violence and the roles of various actors that come into play to facilitate the processes of violence. 
To do this I present a thick description of the Baragoi massacre and analyse events before and 
after. Through this case study, I aim at bringing out the progression from conflict to violence and 
the key actors that facilitated this massacre.  
 
In chapter eight, I focus on the role of the state in violent entrepreneurship by analysing the 
policing systems in Northern Kenya through the Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs). Through the 
focus on KPRs I aim to show linkages between weak policing systems, marginalization, illegal 
sale and distribution of state arms and ammunition and its impacts on pastoralists’ violence in 
Baragoi. In chapter nine, I apply the concepts of primordialism and performative ethnicity to 
analyse the expanding cultural parameters of pastoralists’ violence by conceptualizing the 
increased targeting of women and children during episodes of cattle raids. By focusing on 
women, children and the aged, I aim to show culture and violence as mutually producing 
phenomena and their roles in catalysing societal change through displacements, creation of 
dependency on relief supplies, movement patterns and choice of marriage partners between the 
Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. Lastly in chapter ten I outline study recommendations and 
conclusions. 
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History of Violence and Settlement of Samburu and Turkana in Baragoi 
2.0 Introduction 
Violent conflict among pastoralist groups in the Karamoja cluster has been a well-documented 
historical fact (Gray 2009; Bevan 2008a; Onyango 2010; Leff 2009). Conflicts that have 
occurred in Baragoi can be traced to the contested manner of this pastureland at the beginning of 
the 20
th
 century. Having been christened as ‘Samburuland’ by colonial administrators and later 
called Samburu district, the history of Baragoi reveals multiple contests, assimilations and 
sometimes even periods of co-existence between the groups that were already inhabiting these 
areas such as the Turkana, Samburu and Ogiek (Stigand 1910). The history of Baragoi is also 
linked to the battle to control the then Northern Frontier as the British and Ethiopian Empires 
claimed strategic territories before the borders were finally settled upon (Spencer 1965:xviii; 
Spencer 1973:159). The history of the migration of the Samburu and Turkana communities into 
what is today’s Baragoi is vital in understanding the meanings and purposes of violence among 
these pastoralists. 
2.1 Migration History of the Samburu to Baragoi 
The Samburu are a pastoralists group inhabiting today’s Samburu County but also settled in 
neighbouring Laikipia, Isiolo and Marsabit Counties (Wasamba 2009:146; Sperling 1987: 1). 
They have been described as “nomadic” or “semi-nomadic” by various authors (Spencer 1965; 
Wasamba 2009; Sperling 1987) to emphasise their reliance on livestock as a basis for their 
survival. Folklore posits that the Samburu originated from ‘Oto’ (Lesorogol 2002:16; Lemoosa 
1998:24). This place of origin is claimed to be “somewhere in the north” (Lesorogol 2002: 16; 
Waweru 1992:79-80). Lemoosa (1998:24) pinpoints the location of ‘Oto’ to be “the present area 
south of the Ethiopian Highlands covering llleret in the north-east of the Lake Turkana to Hurri 
Hills (Ldonyo Lemelepo)”. Another account claims that the first Samburu man ‘Samburi’ landed 
at Malalua near Leroki plateau from heaven (Wasamba 2009:146). The Samburu are also argued 
to have split from the Laikipiak Maasai in the 16
th
 Century and moved northwards (Spencer 
1973: 149; Mutsotso et al 2015:23).  The Samburu are further argued to have originated from 
three unidentified groups that initially lived in western part of lake Turkana, another group 
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having inhabited El Barta (Baragoi), and another having arrived from Laikipia (Mutsotso et al 
2015:23). Other accounts from Spencer (1973:152) allege that the Samburu left Leroghi plateau 
due to attacks from the Laikipiak Maasai, while others believed that the movement of the 
Samburu up north was due to livestock losses and starvation (Spencer 1973:152). The Samburu 
people speak ‘Samburu’ language. It has been described as a ‘Maa’ language closer to the 
Maasai language (Wasamba 2009:147). The Samburu language is claimed to be related to 
Turkana and Karamojong languages (Wasamba 2009:147). The Samburu comprises of two 
major sections: the Ngishu Narok (owners of the black cattle) and the Ngishu Naibor (owners of 
the white cattle). The Ngishu Narok are further divided into the following clans: the Elmasula, 
the Nyarapai, the Il Pisigishu and the Il Ngwesi. The Ngishu Naibor are divided into the 
following clans: the Long’eli, the Legumai, the Lorogishu and the Loimusi. The El Masula; the 
dominant Samburu clan takes the lead in all the ceremonies such as the initiation of new age-
sets. In Baragoi the above clans reside in the following areas: 
 Elmasula (biggest clan)-Tuum, Wasorongai, Ol Doinyo Mara and South Horr 
 Lorogishu- Masikita, El Barta (Bendera and Ngilai), Nyiro 
 Long’eli- Suiyan, Ngilai, Marti 
 Legumai- Marti, Ngilai 
 Loimusi-Kurungu, Ndoto 
 Il Ngwesi-Arsim, Latakweny 
 Il Pisigishu- Seren, Anderi 
 Nyaparai (smallest clan)-South Horr 
Samburu society is divided into different age-sets that succeed each other. Warriors get 
circumicised every 13-15 years and are charged with roles such as communal security and taking 
care of livestock. The name Samburu is claimed, to originate from the word Samburr which is 
the name for the livestock-hide bags that the Samburu used for carrying meat (Lanyasunya n.d). 
It seems that the word Samburr was initially used to identify the Samburu as Stigand (1910) did 
while addressing an inter-communal peace meeting between the two communities in Baragoi. 
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The Samburu call themselves Loikop
17
 meaning owners of the land. When they moved to today’s 
Samburu land, literature shows that the few who kept livestock actually reared white goats which 
is derived from the word Nkeneji a ‘people of white goats’ (Lesorogol 2008), a term that was 
initially used by travelers in the Northern part of Kenya to describe the Samburu. Another 
account by von Hönhel and Teleki (quoted in Stigand 1910:61) refers to the Samburu as 
Burkeneji or Lo'eborkeneji with the same meaning as explained by Lesorogol (2008). This also 
shows that the Samburu previously kept small stock and their adoption of cattle and camel 
herding is due to their interactions with the Borana, Turkana and Rendille communities from the 
neighbouring districts (Sperling 1987: 5). 
 
Even though the  exact dates of the movement of the Samburu into Baragoi area is unknown, 
Spencer (1973:152) in his fieldwork there in the 1950s was able to trace the Lkipiku age-set 
(those initiated around 1837) to have captured Mounts Kulal and Ng’iro from the Borana. 
Stigand (1910) found the Samburu settlements in Baragoi area, South Horr, Barsaloi, Opiroi and 
Lesirkan.  Stigand (1910:81) in his attempts to reconcile the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi 
noted that each side presented to him a history of claims over “grazing grounds and ancient 
rights” to imply disputes over historical ownership of Baragoi and it resources. The designation 
of the Samburu/Turkana boundaries and attempts by colonial administrators to expel Turkana 
who had settled in Baragoi area before the arrival of the colonizers seem to have given the 
Samburu a sense of entitlement to Baragoi area. According to archival records, Mr. 
Kittermaster
18
 who administered the area from Barsaloi is recorded to have sent away the 
Turkana from El Barta grazing fields due to their constant “quarrelling with the Samburu”19. The 
contest between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi was therefore ongoing in the early 1900s 
                                                          
17
 The term loikop has been translated as owners of the land, the word Ngop meaning land and Loi meaning ‘owner’. 
However, Lesorogol (2008), a researcher married to a Samburu, has translated it as ‘people’ and attributed this 
naming of the Samburu to the Maasai. 
18
 Colonial Administrator based at Barsaloi before 1912 also served as officer in charge of Northern Frontier District 
and Acting District Commissioner of Turkana  
19
 KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/8 (1922) ‘Settlement of Certain Turkana in the N.F.D’ Office of the Officer in Charge of the 
N.F.D to the Honourable, The Colonial Secretary, Colony of Kenya, El Barta, April, 26
th
 1992 
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when the British administrators took charge of the area. The contest stemmed initially from 
competition over water and pasture resources and historic claims of ownership of the 
geographical space of Baragoi. The conflict between these groups was  further aggravated by 
legitimating of the Samburu as the bona fide residents of Baragoi and the Turkana as the 
‘visitors’ in Baragoi with limited rights to resources. To fully understand the dynamics of the 
contests over Baragoi between the Samburu and Turkana, it is important to look into the 
migration history of these groups. 
2.2 Migration of the Turkana into Baragoi 
The Turkana are a nomadic pastoralist group inhabiting the Northwestern part of Kenya 
(Gulliver 1958:900; Akabwai n.d: 3). The Turkana refer to each other as ‘Ng’iturukana’ and their 
language ‘Ng’aturukana’ (Ohta 1989:1). A majority of the Turkana reside in Turkana County. 
Substantial populations of the Turkana can also be found in Samburu, Marsabit, Isiolo and 
Laikipia Counties. Among the Turkana of Baragoi, the only two clans are represented: the 
Ng’ibilai and the Ng’issir sections. These groups reside on the Turkana side of today’s Baragoi. 
The exact time of the movement of Turkana into Baragoi is difficult to ascertain. However, 
available literature attributes the movement of the Turkana into Baragoi to two major reasons; 
the Turkana, led by war leaders such as Ebei, constantly ventured into Baragoi to raid livestock 
from the Samburu. Lamphear (1976) and Mburu (2001) noted the emergence of diviners who 
through their ability to predict the future consolidated the power to organise for expansionists 
raids that enabled the Turkana to acquire livestock and move into distant lands during times of 
drought. Secondly, the movement of the Turkana into Samburuland is attributed to drought in 
Turkanaland (Stigand 1910; Lamphear 1976). The role of war leaders especially of Ebei is 
legend that the Turkana of Baragoi still speak very proudly of. Lamphear traces Turkana 
movement to Baragoi to 1903. According to Lamphear (1976: 231-232), the Turkana, led by 
their war leaders, were forced by drought to move across “Loriu mountains” into Baragoi plains 
to exploit abundant pasturelands. 
Similarly, Stigand (1910) has argued that the Turkana migrated to Baragoi due to drought and 
limited pastures in Turkanaland. Indeed Stigand (1910) noted the presence of the Turkana in 
Baragoi when he made his journey from Nairobi to Abyssinia through Northwestern Kenya. 
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While on his way from Lesirkan to Baragoi, Captain Stigand was informed by Ogiek elders that 
“The Turkana and Samburr at Baragoi, it appeared, had fallen out over grazing grounds, and war 
between them was imminent” (Stigand 1910: 79). Stigand’s account of a meeting with Samburu 
elders along Baragoi River revealed the simmering tension between the two groups: 
 “It appeared from their accounts that the Turkana wished to oust them from their grazing 
ground, and from the well-grassed plains of Em Barta, threatening to fight them if they 
did not go. They said that they were not strong enough to fight with the Turkana, and 
they could not move, for they had nowhere else to go” (Stigand 1910: 79). 
It seems that when Stigand visited Baragoi on his way to Addis Ababa, the Turkana were already 
settled in Samburuland. This perhaps explains him being approached by Turkana chief Longelich 
and Samburu chief Legarbes to resolve the grazing land disputes that contributed to warfare 
between the two groups. Captain Stigand recorded his verdict to the Turkana and Samburu 
people as follows: 
“Therefore I say to you, Turkana, you must not cross this stream and build your kraals on 
the same side as the Samburr, and I charge you, Samburr, that you do not move your 
kraals likewise to the west side of the stream. “Now, this is my decision: You, the 
Samburr, graze your cattle on the east side of Baragoi, and when you come to water, 
approach from the east, and water your cattle from that side, and do not let even one lamb 
cross over to drink from the other side, You, the Turkana, graze your cattle on the west 
side, and likewise water from that side, and not one man or animal must cross to this 
side.” Now as to grazing grounds, take this stream as your boundary, and after the stream 
take this big tree of Baragoi and the rocky peak of doinyo ngiro you all see before you, 
and let this line be a boundary to you that neither tribe may cross to the other side”. 
(Stigand 1910: 82-83). 
According to Lamphear (1976: 233), the Turkana, under severe ecological pressure occasioned 
by one-year long drought, moved into Baragoi again and “captured most of it by 1911”. Their 
movement and war strategy was once again led by Ebei, the war leader. The violent nature of 
Turkana migration and settlement into Baragoi shows the incapacity of the nacent colonial 
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administration at this time. The role of Ebei, the war leaders is further captured in Lamphear’s 
records of Turkana raids in 1913: 
“In the meantime, Ebei continued to defy the British in the south. From the end of 1913, 
he led his armies against the Samburu, driving them entirely out of the lands south of the 
Lake, and then attacking them and their Rendille allies east of the Lake and threatening 
the Administration's lines of communication between Marsabit and Loivangoleni” 
(Lamphear 1976: 237).  
Turkana expansion into Marsabit and Samburu districts was therefore driven mostly by the need 
to escape colonial administrators control pastoralists movements in Northern Kenya. Further 
migration of the Turkana into Baragoi area was also occasioned by droughts that drove the 
Turkana to seek and conquer pasturelands in Samburu district. To comprehend the dynamics of 
violent conflicts among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi, the next section delves into the 
history of violence and factors that have contributed to this among the two communities. 
2.3 History of Violence between the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi 
Violence that prevails among the Samburu and Turkana today in Baragoi stems from the violent 
nature of the formation of Baragoi as a geographical, social and livelihoods space. The history of 
violence in Baragoi can be divided into four main parts: the pre-colonial period, the colonial 
period, the post-independence period (the Ngoroko period), and violence after 1996.In the pre-
colonial period the culture of raiding was a shared practice accepted by pastoralists as a means of 
livestock acquisition to enable pastoralists’ survival and fulfillment of social obligations such as 
payment of bride wealth. The entry of colonialism brought forth a new dimension to the culture 
of raiding. Colonial officers saw cattle raiding as a breach of order. Policies were therefore put in 
place to control warrior age-sets among the Samburu and the Turkana. In the immediate post-
colonial period independent Kenya’s policy towards the marginalised pastoralist areas of 
Northern Kenya were officially neglected through Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 (GoK 1965). 
This Sessional Paper was the blue print for economic and social development drafted by the 
Kenyan government that outlined the state’s investment priorities in different regions of Kenya 
and in various sectors of the economy. The paper (GoK 1965:42) argued for prioritizing the 
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investment of state resources in areas of Kenya with good rainfall, good agricultural lands and a 
people ‘receptive to development’. From the late 1960s to early 1980s Ngoroko incursion into 
Baragoi led to the introduction of KPRs. The post 1996 raids were characterized by ethnic 
mobilization, involvement of security agencies and increased influence of political leaders 
contributing to increased violence among the Samburu and Turkana. 
2.3.1 The Pre-colonial Period 
Cattle raids in the pre-colonial period have been described as aiming to restocking livestock after 
devastating droughts (Mkutu 2000). This implies that raids conducted during the pre-colonial 
times were occasioned by the need to survive the impacts of drought and to reestablish herds for 
pastoralists’ households. Further, raids during the pre-colonial period took place within an 
institutional framework where there were clear sanctions on the target, timing and objective of 
raids. Greiner et al (2011) further noted that raids in the pre-colonial period were aimed at 
conquering territory. Similar insights are expressed by Lamphear (1976) who traced the history 
of Turkana war leaders’ incursions into Baragoi. The incursions were occasioned by droughts 
and the need to capture more territory (pasturelands) for survival of communities. Oba (1992) 
has however argued that the superior military strength of the Turkana during the late 18
th
 century 
was actually because they mostly survived the rinderpest epidemic, which devastated most of 
their neighbours’ cattle during this time. According to him military incursions by Turkana war 
leaders into Samburu were expansionist in nature as they sought more grazing lands for their 
increased population. 
2.3.2 The Colonial Period 
The early colonial period was marked by the arrival of colonial administrators in what was 
designated as the Northern Frontier. Baragoi initially formed part of this region where 
colonialists decreed emergency laws and movement of non-natives to and within the Frontier 
occurred only after the issuance of special permits. According to Stigand (1910), the Samburu 
inhabited only some parts of today’s Baragoi; this can be attributed to lower population density 
at the time. In his journey through Baragoi, Stigand pointed out that the Samburu lived along 
Baragoi River. In his description, he alleges that Baragoi River is a permanent water source, 
much to the contrary today. He further describes other Samburu settlements as being in the Horr 
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Valley (today’s South Horr) and Nyiro Mountains (today’s Tuum and Waso Rongai areas). 
Stigand does not describe other Turkana settlements but records meeting them along Baragoi 
River.  
This period is also marked by establishment of colonial administration of Northern Kenya. 
Attempts at controlling warriors and changing warriorhood as an institution were the major pre-
occupations of colonial officers during this period (Odegi-Awuondo 1992). Greiner et al (2011) 
further noted that the colonial period was marked by setting up of district boundaries aimed at 
restricting pastoralists’ movement in a bid to keep law and order. Archival records from this time 
elucidate cases where colonial officers came up with boundaries and attempted to divide grazing 
lands and water sources as exclusive to particular communities
20
. Lamphear (1976) however 
blamed colonialism for the violent nature of raids in the early periods of colonial establishment. 
Citing cases from the Samburu and Turkana, Lamphear argued that the brutality with which 
colonial soldiers sought to control and administer pastoralists, especially the Turkana of 
Southern Turkana areas, directly contributed to their incursions and raids on the Samburu of 
Baragoi. Similarly, Broch-Due (2005: 10) blamed colonialism for “creating and exacerbating 
conditions of civil unrest, warfare and poverty”, which it had supposedly aimed to stem. This she 
argues was done through policies such as communal punishments and confiscation of animals as 
a means of pacification of warring groups. These measures were in effect counter-productive and 
served to create animosities and opportunities for further episodes of violence as communities 
who suffered from raids by colonial administrators organised similar raids against their 
neighbours (Broch-Due 2005:10)  Pastoralists’ violence between the Samburu and Turkana can 
therefore be understood as a phenomenon which was ongoing before the colonial administrators 
established themselves in Baragoi. However, colonialist policies that sought to treat the Turkana 
as second-class residents of Baragoi may have enhanced the contest over access to water and 
pasture resources thus leading to solidification of group identities that would later be used as a 
basis for organisation for future violence.  
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the Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley Province, Nakuru, 29
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Militarisation of Samburu and Turkana groups can also be linked to their recruitment and 
participation in wars and expeditions as part of colonial British armed forces.  Their participation 
in these wars was further aided by the organisation of some of these groups through the age-set 
system. Samburu young men join age-sets after circumcision; those circumcised during the same 
period are grouped together into an age-set. An age-set therefore also serves as a rallying point of 
comradeship (more like a life membership club) and enables the construction of group cohesion. 
Spencer (1965:151) noted that Samburu morans from the Ilmerisho age-set “participated in the 
punitive expedition against the Turkana in 1914”. In another account by Rutten (1989:51) 
Samburu young men were recruited by the British colonial administrators as part of the punitive 
mission against the Turkana that led to deaths of Turkana and the confiscation over 130,000 
livestock in 1915. In the run up to the Second World War, Turkana and Samburu warriors were 
recruited into Kings African Rifles (KAR), Spencer (1973:164) recorded that 348
21
 warriors of 
the Ilmekuri age-set from the Samburu community fought along the British in Burma.  The 
Ilmekuri age-set was made of Samburu warriors who were circumcised between 1935 and 1936 
(Spencer 1965:81). Many of these warriors who served in the World War II were later recruited 
to serve as policemen and chiefs within their villages, others were appointed  as “Reabsorption 
Assistants” and made moran Laigwenak (moran leaders) thus linking their military experinec as 
ex K.A.R with their roles as community defenders
22
. Some were later accused by the same 
colonial government of training warriors to conduct violent raids against ‘enemy’ communities. 
Similarly, Mburu (2001) noted the recruitment of the Turkana into KAR;  
“During the Second World War Turkana warriors enrolled in large numbers as Askari for 
the Kings African Rifles not primarily to fight for King and country as to acquire military 
skills and weapons for the purpose of punishing their northern neighbours” (Mburu 
2001:156) 
Even though the colonial period was marked by containment of warriors by forcing them to 
marry early so that they don’t create chaos (Spencer 1965), the military training offered to 
warrior age sets through the participation in expeditions and WWII laid the basis of military-like 
formation that is witnessed in many violent raids today. Mburu (2001) and Gulliver (1958) also 
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 KNA DC/SAM/4/1 (1948) Samburu Circumcision records that about 500 tribesmen from Ilmekuri age-grade 
enlisted in the K.A.R 
22
 KNA DC/SAM/1/2 (1946) Samburu sub District Annual Report, Maralal 
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noted how the recruitment of Turkana warriors and how their involvement in colonial wars 
enhanced their military skills and contributed to violent raids among the Turkana and their 
neighbours. The colonial period also saw the introduction of collective punishment and trespass 
fine as a means of controlling raids. Collective punishments were punitive measures adopted by 
colonial officers to reduce raiding incidences by punishing whole villages in cases where 
warriors from particular villages were proved to have raided their neighbours
23
,
24
. While it has 
been argued that the colonial period was marked by peace among warriors and less raids 
(Greiner et al 2011:80), colonial policies such as recruitment of warriors into KAR and punitive 
expedition missions facilitated their further training in military combat that enabled a more 
violent form of raids in the ensuing periods. The use of warriors from ‘enemy’ communities as 
part of punitive expeditions further reinforced enmity between these groups and informed 
justifications for revenge violence. Colonialism further solidified ethnic identities by drawing 
boundaries based on ethnicities. Broch-Due (2005:7) analysed the drawing of administrative 
boundaries along ethnic lines by colonialists as a Eurocentric methodology that had applied in 
state formation in Western Europe based on singular ethnicities such as Britons forming Great 
Britain and the Germans forming Germany. She argued that ethnic identity therefore became the 
basis of administrative and political power building blocks in the colonial and post-colonial 
states thus precipitating conflicts related to rights to land and access to other resources for those 
communities who were deemed to be ‘foreigners’ in certain districts. This led to justifications of 
‘indigineity’ to certain districts such as Samburu thus contributing to violent contests of the 
geographical and social space of Baragoi between the Turkana and Samburu. The map in Fig.2 
below shows the major access routes to towns and centres of Baragoi and the larger Samburu 
district in 1954. 
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  KNA AG/1/342 (1930) The Collective Punishment Ordinance, 1930, Samburu District (for Cattle thefts, Raids 
etc) General, Attorney General’s Office, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 
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 KNA/BB/12/33 (1954) Boran-Rendille Incident at Muddo Koni on 3
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Figure 2: Map of Samburu district in mid-1950s 
 
Source: Samburu District Report (1954) adopted from Samburu District Development Plan (2001) 
2.3.3 The Post-Colonial Period 
This period was marked by the introduction of Sessional Paper No 10 (GoK 1965:42) on African 
Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya. Through this paper, the independent 
Government of Kenya outlined its developmental priorities and clearly stated its disinterest in 
constructing state infrastructure in arid pastoralists Northern Kenya. This policy paper launched 
the official marginalization of pastoralists in Northern Kenya in terms of its access to basic 
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services such as security, health and education. Archival documents during this time indicate a 
rise in raids but also show continuity in the colonial policy of engaging village elders in dispute 
resolution through the payment of blood money
25
.  
 
Archival records from the post-colonial period also record increased movement of pastoralists 
across their traditional districts
26
. It also records increased cases of inter-ethnic warfare among 
pastoralist groups residing in Isiolo, Samburu and Marsabit areas. In most cases incidences of 
renegotiations of access to water and grazing lands located at inter-ethnic boundaries were 
carried out in efforts to stem increasing pastoralists’ violence. The government also actively 
pursued a policy of forcefully taking livestock deemed to be trespassing on certain grazing lands. 
The policy was punitive as it allowed the police to take up to 25 per cent of the arrested livestock 
thus encouraging raids aimed at restoring the lost herds (Lamphear 1976). 
2.3.4 The Ngoroko Period 
The Ngoroko period started in the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Ngorokos were ‘rebel’ raiders 
from Turkanaland who according to Oba (1992) were former servicemen who acquired illegal 
arms and conducted raids outside Turkanaland. Bollig (2010) described the ‘state of civil war’ 
that prevailed during one of the Ngoroko attacks in Nginyang’ area of East Pokot. He argues that 
Ngoroko had a military organisation and firepower which devastated pastoralists’ households 
among the Pokot and Samburu. In one instance the Ngoroko shot dead 20 Pokot men, women 
and children during a raid in East Pokot (Bollig 2010). Mkutu (2005:173) noted the rise of 
Ngoroko attacks in Baragoi in 1965, this he was told led to the spiraling of violence between the 
Samburu and Turkana that laid the basis for today’s strife between the two communities 
inhabiting Baragoi.  
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Skoggard and Adem (2010:4) have attributed the rise of Ngoroko among the Turkana to the 
emergence of diviners as war leaders who not only blessed warriors before going to raids but 
participated in the organisation and leading of raiding parties. The rise of the Ngoroko has also 
been attributed to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons among the Turkana 
(Skoggard and Adem 2010:4). They argue that the introduction of guns in Northern Turkana 
enabled the independence of warrior groups from the control of elders. Ngoroko and the culture 
of violence was aided by the establishment of ‘separate power structures’ set up by great diviners 
and war leaders who took control of war making. Lamphear (1976) recorded that at the height of 
his powers, Ebei, the Turkana war leader in the early 1900s commanded up to 3,000 armed 
raiders from different clans of the Turkana. It is from these bands of fighters that the Ngoroko 
that terrorized Samburu and Pokot populations into the late 1980s emerged. The impact of 
Ngoroko raids on pastoralists’ livelihoods in Baragoi is well captured in the chronology of their 
raids in the late 1960s and 1970s as follows: 
“In the early years of independence (1969) the Ngoroko invaded the villages of Lekupe 
and Lesokoyo at Tuum in Baragoi Division, injuring one and stealing several livestock. 
In 1970, the Ngoroko raided Baragoi area killing Lentoimaga
27
 of the Lmekuri age set. In 
the same year they raided Lepatoiye in Simale taking livestock. In 1972, the raiders 
invaded Tuum where eighteen of them were killed. In 1980, the bandits raided Lengees 
and Uaso-Baragoi manyattas injuring many people” (Mkutu 2005:270) 
 
Ngoroko attacks on Turkana and Samburu populations of Baragoi escalated between the mid-
1960s to early 1980s. Missionaries who worked in Tuum and Parkati areas recorded the security 
threat posed by the Ngoroko and their need to obtain arms with the permission of the police 
(Tablino 2006:74). The indiscriminate nature of the Ngoroko attacks on fellow Turkana of 
Parkati is also described by Tablino (2006: 75) who noted the fear of the people of Parkati and 
also of the frequency of retaliatory attacks by Samburu groups from Tuum and South Horr who 
in their frustration revenged against the Turkana of Parkati. The devastating nature of Ngoroko 
attacks is further captured by Tablino’s (2006:75) respondent who witnessed the “skeletons of at 
least fifteen victims” in Parkati area.  Bollig and Österle (2011) documented several incidences 
                                                          
27
 Father to the current Samburu North (Baragoi)  Member of Parliament, Alois Musa Lentoimaga 
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of Ngoroko attacks among the Pokot in 1977. These attacks provide a preview of the slipping 
away of the institutional framework that previously guided the cultural practice of cattle raiding. 
In their work, Bollig and Österle (2011) also documented the rise in retaliatory attacks between 
the Pokot and Turkana around Kapedo. It can be argued that Ngoroko attacks fuelled the need 
for Pokot and Samburu communities to acquire arms. This need was later fulfilled by the local 
political leaders who appealed to the government for arms citing the Ngoroko as a threat to their 
livelihoods and security. The Ngoroko period was marked by incessant attacks on less armed 
pastoralist groups.  
 
 
Photo 3:  The memorial cross at the spot where Fr. Luiggi Graiff of South Horr was killed by Ngoroko 
bandits in 1981, Source: Author. 
 
In Baragoi, a catholic priest was killed by Ngoroko between Parkati and Tuum in 1981. Fr. 
Luiggi Graiff was an Italian parish priest from Trento who worked at the South Horr parish. His 
work required him to administer the gospel to Catholic groups in parish outposts such as 
Loonjorin, Parkati and Tuum areas. He was attacked and killed when Ngoroko bandits ambushed 
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them while he was driving from Parkati to Tuum with a group of Turkana altar boys who were 
being transferred to a boarding school in South Horr (Tablino 2006:75). The introduction of guns 
among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi contributed in the alteration of social relationships 
between these two groups. This can be seen in subsequent attacks and solidification of ethnic 
identities as explained in the effect of violence after 1996 (Mkutu 2000). 
2.3.5 Pastoralists’ Violence After 1996 
The year 1996, marked a turning point for relations between the Turkana and Samburu of 
Baragoi as raids became more violent. Mkutu (2008) interviewed Samburu warriors who 
informed him of their acquisition of arms from the Borana and Somali herders. The impact of 
arms on the relations between the Samburu and Turkana communities was reflecting in 
increasing numbers of livestock lost during revenge raids. Galaty (2005a:115-118) spent the 
month of August of 1996 in Baragoi and recorded some of the vicious raids between these 
groups. He particularly noted the inflow of ammunition and the complicity of the security forces 
in aiding or abetting cattle raids.  Mkutu (2008) estimated that in 1997 the Samburu lost 5,000 
animals due to raids from the Turkana, which was significantly higher than the minimal numbers 
lost in the pre-1996 era when the Samburu still used traditional weaponry. In essence, as Mkutu 
(2008) argues, the acquisition of arms by the Samburu altered the relations between pastoralists 
in Northwestern Kenya. Raids became more frequent. Another reason for increased raids after 
1996 was the building of strategic inter-tribal alliances for the preservation of hegemonic control 
over pasturelands. A case in point was the Samburu-Pokot alliance that led to the Lokorkor 
massacre of Turkanas in December 1996 (GoK 2006; Galaty 2005a: 117). 
 
The year 1996 was thus the beginning of a new phase of pastoralists’ violence among the 
Samburu, Turkana and the Pokot from the neighbouring Baringo County (Mkutu 2005:172). This 
period recorded several massacres in Baragoi area such as in Soito el Kokoyo, Lokorkor and 
Keekoridony areas. It is worth noting that conflict after 1996 escalated due to involvement of a 
number of new actors. Osamba (2000) blamed raids among the Pokot on the Marakwet on local 
politics. Raids during this period sought to displace villagers to prevent them from voting for 
certain candidates in the 1997 elections. The same trend has been visible in subsequent elections. 
Kagwanja (2014) also noted the increased prominence of illicit traders who hired warriors for 
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raids. He argued that cattle traders worked together with security officers to facilitate the 
movement of raided animals from pastoralists’ arid lands of Northern Kenya to urban centers 
where the demand for beef is high. Kagwanja (2014) further pointed to the increased role of gun 
merchants who exploited the ‘ungoverned space’ (Mkutu 2008) that is, most of arid Northern 
Kenya.  
 
Pastoralist violence in Baragoi is therefore very much intertwined with the history of its people, 
the Turkana and Samburu and their neighbours, the Turkana of South Turkana and the Pokot 
from East Baringo. From the pre-colonial times when raiding was a cultural practice it 
transformed from a well-controlled and institutionalised practice to a means of resisting colonial 
rule in the early colonial period. While it can be argued that colonial policy attempted to control 
or even stop cattle raiding (Greiner et al 2011), I argue in concurrence with Lamphear (1976) and 
Spencer (1965; 1973) that recruitment of Samburu morans of Merisho and Terito age-sets in 
1914 (as part of KAR punitive expedition on the Turkana) played a significant role in 
transforming morans into communal paramilitary units. Samburu and Turkana World War II 
veterans used their military skills to train raiders after the end of World War II (Lamphear 1976; 
Spencer 1965). As a result colonialism not only contributed to violent conflict through the 
military conquest of Northern Kenya but also through training of local morans in real war 
situations. Even though colonial administrators prevented cases of raids through punitive 
measures such as collective punishment (where cattle belonging to specific clans or villages were 
confiscated as punishment for raids) or fines for trespass (where 25 per cent of the trespassed 
herd were confiscated by the state), raids continued in smaller scale during this period only to 
escalate later after independence.  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to trace the history of migration, settlement and violence among the Turkana 
and Samburu of Baragoi. It has established that violence among the two communities was on 
going when the colonial administrators gained control of the area in the late 1890s. As captured 
by Stigand (1910) and Lamphear (1976), the battle over the social and geographical space of 
Baragoi was spurred by droughts in Turkana that forced the Turkana people to move to Baragoi 
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in search of water and pasture.  Turkana religio-military leadership also contributed to their 
conquests of Baragoi by 1911 (Lamphear 1976, Mburu n.d). Colonial administration has in a 
way contributed to the strife and violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. This is 
evident in the recruitment of warriors from both groups to serve in the Kings African Rifles 
(Rutten 1989, Spencer 1976). As noted by Spencer and Rutten many of these former combatants 
later played a significant role in training morans to conduct cattle raids among enemy 
communities in Baragoi. The post-colonial periods saw the rise of violence as the independent 
Kenya governments sought to pursue a policy of marginalisation of pastoralists groups who were 
deemed in official government policy to be ‘unreceptive to development’ (GoK 1965). The 
absence of the state contributed to increased violence through the Ngoroko attacks that 
heightened tensions and led to inter-ethnic arms race as communtiies sought to acquire firearms 
for self protection. The state’s intervention in the early 1980s led to further militarization of these 
pastoralists through the introduction of Kenya Police Reservists thus confirming the 
governments’ inability or disinterest in tackling decades of marginalisation of pastoralists groups 
in Northern Kenya in terms of provision of basic services such as security and infrastructures. 
The inter-ethnic arms race peaked in 1996 massacres and large-scale raids that occurred in 
Baragoi area. The violence witnessed in the socio-political relations among the Samburu and 
Turkana of Baragoi must therefore be understood from its historical roots. It is a symptom of 
decades of neglect that has forced communities to ‘embrace’ violence as a necessity of survival 
and as resource critical to their day to day manouvres of life in the absence of the state within an 
increasingly predatory environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 
 
The Role of Violence in Social Organisation of Warriors among the 
Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi 
3.0 Introduction 
Knowledge, motivation, practice and  organisation of violence among the Samburu and Turkana 
of Baragoi is passed on from one generation of warriors to another through socialization by 
elders and other community members including women from early ages. Participation in 
violence especially cattle raids against ‘enemy’ communities is the hallmark of warriorhood and 
maleness. Societal pride, recognition and sense of achievement among one’s peers is bestowed 
upon accomplished warriors, through songs and narrations (Heald 1997). Older males regale 
younger males with narrations of their conquests as well as their defeats thus instilling in the 
youngsters the identity of the enemy, a sense of their territory and the need to seek justice 
(revenge) on behalf of their fathers or to surpass the prowess of their elders in war. This chapter 
looks into the organisation of violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi; it focuses 
on the role of violence in the solidification of group identities among warriors. Drawing from 
similarities in the organisation of violence among the Pokot warriors (Bollig 1990:74-76) and the 
Karamojong (Knighton 2007: 469-473 this chapter aims to highlight the role of culture in 
organisation for violence to show the relevance of violence as a practice and a performance in 
the maintainance of group cohesion and identity among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi 
(Bollig 1990:75). The characterisation of violence as a performance is seen in the manner in 
which discussions on impending raids are convened. As Bollig noted, discussions over 
impending raids or war are led by “men who are known for their ferocity and courage (nyakan) 
and to a certain emotional state (sirumoi)” (1990:75). Similarly among the Samburu, preparation 
for war occurs during mini-meetings and night dances where morans exhibit high levels of 
agitation locally described as “kukula mori28”. Emotional preparation for violence is also vital 
for the success of raids, as Bollig (1990:81) established among the Pokot, warrior leaders prepare 
their colleagues for raids by exhibiting a state of rage aimed at preparing them for the raid: 
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 In Swahili language loosely translates to ‘being in state of rage’ 
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“A man in this emotional state has staring eyes. He takes on a gait which is easy to 
differentiate from the normal way of walking. When talking he utters short sentences; 
every now and then he will shout the name of his favourite oxen and those of his 
ancestors. If he has been a successful raider he will make allusions to his deeds. These 
ngal nyo pö sirumoi (the words of rage) chill the audience and eventually bring other men 
into the state of sirumoi and prepare them emotionally for the raid” (Bollig 1990:81).  
It is from these discussions and dances that bravery and leadership in situations of war are 
exhibited or practiced in readiness for raids orfor defence of territory. The role of raiding in 
enhancing group cohesion among pastoralists’ warriors is well captured in Knighton’s (2007) 
description: 
“In time of war, the leaders and the warriors gather their clan-based cattle-camps into an 
alomar, which becomes a fighting unit on full alert for the defence of their cattle and 
people. If you have cattle there you are obliged to participate in attack as much as 
defence” (2007:469).  
Raids among pastoralists however are religio-political events that involve a larger number of 
actors in its preparation and execution. As noted by Bollig (1990:75) and Knighton (2007:469) 
cattle raiding is regarded highly among the elders and culture dictates that raiders have to seek 
the blessing or a religious or ritual leader to foresee the success of their mission. This shows the 
siginifcance of traditional raiding to pastoralists as a political-cultural and religous event. The 
success of warriors in raids is seen as collective victory by the raiders’ kin over their traditional 
enemies. The planning of a raid is often discussed for the first time during a communal feast 
(Knighton 2007:469; Bollig 1990:75); this further shows that raiding as a practice involves 
covert participation of all members of society even though it is the warriors who spearhead the 
violent process of forcefully acquiring cattle from enemy groups. Raiding as a political event 
among the Turkana is seen in Lamphear’s description of the its leaders as ‘war leaders’ (1976) to 
signify not only the aim of acquiring livestock but also their power and ability to mobilise their 
communities into a common cause such as the conquest of a contested grazing land held by 
enemy groups. Leading war or raids is for those who have shown their ferocity and are well 
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accepted among peers. Knighton in his study among the Karamojong noted the existence of 
ekadedengan, meaning a fierce warrior, similar to Bollig’s finding of the character of nyakan 
among the Pokot (Bollig 1990:75). War or raids in this case can be seen as a form of 
socialization where only the brave, ferocious and exemplary leaders take part. The practice of 
raiding was therefore a platform through which these desired communal values were exhibited, 
perfomed, praised and inculcated in the minds of younger generations. In the next section, I look 
into the role of generation sets in the practice of violence among the Turkana and Samburu of 
Baragoi. 
3.1 The Role of Generation Sets in the Practice of Violence in Baragoi 
Samburu and Turkana pastoralists are organized into generation sets which are initiated 
periodically and given the duty of providing safety to communal livestock (Spencer 1973:33; 
Knighton 2007:475). Spencer defined an age-set among the Samburu to “consist of all those men 
(age mates) who have been initiated during a certain period of time and they tend, therefore to be 
approximately of the same age”. Ceremonies that accompany the initiation of new warriors 
involve a display of bravery among the initiates. A case in point is the Arelmongo
29
´which 
requires Samburu boys due for circumcision (Laiok) to show their strength and ability to strangle 
the ox with their bare hands
30
.  The completion of the circumcision of a Samburu youth marks 
the beginning of warriorhood. As noted by a colonial administrator who witnessed the initiation 
of the Lkimaniki age-set in Kirisia hills in 1948, once a Samburu laioni has been circumcised the 
boy starts to sing “I am a warrior. I did not show fear or run away. Bring me blood to drink31. 
Among the Turkana, generation sets succeed each other, thus one cannot be in the same 
generation set with their father; instead they fall within the same set as their grandfather. As 
Gulliver (1958:902) noted, these sets alternate between the stones (Imurut) and the leopards 
(Erisait). Upon initiation after the age of eighteen, a Turkana “youth becomes a young man: he is 
able to wear a man's mudded headdress and to carry a man's weapons, to fight in war and to 
marry” (Gulliver 1958:902). Drawing from the Karamojong, Knighton (2007:475) attributed 
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 KNA/DC/SAM/4/1 (1948), A.D. Shirreff, Samburu Circumcision, District Commissioner, Maralal 31
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 KNA/DC/SAM/4/1 (1948), A.D. Shirreff, Samburu Circumcision, District Commissioner, Maralal 31
st
 December 
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cases of unrest and raiding among young warriors to the delay in initiation of these young men 
and as a means of gaining prestige among girls. Raids and unrest among morans is also as away 
of putting pressure on elders to expedite the initiation of the morans. Among the Samburu the 
initiated age-set are called Ilmurani while among the Turkana they are the Ng’imurani. For the 
Samburu, succeeding of one age-set by another is through circumcision which is done 
periodically. As Spencer (1973:150-165) and I noted from fieldwork in Baragoi, Samburu age-
sets in recorded history have conducted initiation ceremonies involving the circumcision of 
succeeding age-sets since the 1760s as shown the table below: 
Table 2: Names of Samburu Age-sets from 1768-2005 
Age-set Year of Initiation 
Sakanya 1768 
Lmeishopo 1781 
Lpetaa 1795 
Lkuruka 1809 
Lkipayang 1823 
Lkipiku 1837 
Lkiteku 1851 
Ltarigirig 1865 
Lmarikon 1879 
Lterito 1893 
Lmirisho 1912 
Lkileku 1921 
Lmekuri 1936 
Lkimaniki 1948 
Lkishili 1960 
Lkororo 1976 
Lmeoli 1990 
Lmetili (Lkishami) 2005 
Source: Drawn from Spencer (1973:150-165) and Author’s fieldwork notes 
Generation sets among the Samburu and Turkana are associated with the practice of violence in 
many ways throughout their history.  As noted by Spencer (1973:149), the moran of Ilkipiku age-
set captured Mount Ngiro from the Boran while later age-sets the Ilmirisho and Ilmikuri were 
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drafted as part of Kings African Rifles in expeditions againsts the neighbouring Turkana as well 
as to participate in the two World Wars (Spencer 1973:159-163). The Ilkileku age-set 
circumcised in 1921 were noted to have “caused a great deal of trouble by stock-thieving and 
spear blooding....and this trouble arose largely through the tribal tradition which demands that 
warriors must prove their manhood by some exploit before winning a wife
32
. The colonial 
administrators viewed the institution of moranhood as a source of trouble as captured in the 
Handing Over Report-Samburu District of 1944
33
: 
“The moran by their very nature are a perpetual source of trouble, steps have been taken 
to clip their wings-firstly by reducing their numbers and opportunities to a minimum by 
delaying the circumcision of new age grades and encouraging the early marriage of 
morans and secondly by prohibiting many of their activities which normally are 
precussors of mischief, such as carrying spears (this applies to Samburu of all age 
groups), holding meat-feasts in the bush, dancing the ‘Baragoi’ dance e.t.c”  
In the handing over report of Samburu district in 1952
34
, Mr. J.M.B Butler in notes to Mr. T.J.F 
Gavaghan wrote:  
“No Samburu moran is allowed to carry a spear until he marries, in other words, until he 
stops being a moran”  
This shows that warriors were expected to display their braveness in defending their 
communities against traditional enemies. Fighting in war or taking part in cattle raids is thus the 
essence of warriorhood among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. In the next section I delve 
into the preparation for raids among the Turkana of Baragoi. 
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3.2 Preparing for Raids among the Turkana 
Raids are products of well-planned actions. To understand the processual approach to analysis of 
violence, we look into how the Samburu and Turkana communities organise themselves for 
violence. According to Turkana elders
35
, they encounter attacks from almost all of their 
neighbours, a condition which made them embrace raiding as a way of life. Traditionally, their 
main reason for raiding is to obtain livestock (ng’ibaren) to which their survival depends 
(Schilling et al 2012; Mburu 2001; Lines 2009). At other times the Turkana also engage in raids 
to seek revenge over past atrocities by their neighbours (Lutta 2014; Gakio and Mosoku 2012; 
Powers 2011). Raids are also pursued by the Turkana as an economic activity (Schilling et al 
2012; IRIN News 2014; KHRC 2010). Like any other economic activity, a raid begins by laying 
a plan. The process begins by surveying of prospective area for raids. Spies (Ng’irototin) usually 
three or four in number are sent to make a reconnaissance tour to the area of interest. The 
reconnaissance takes a few days as the spies are expected to lie in the thicket and watch the 
movement of warriors from the targeted community and to ascertain their routine to enable 
successful ambush.  
 
Among the Samburu and Turkana, the suspicion of having spies from the ‘enemy’ community 
lying in the thicket or tiptoeing in the dead of the night is real. When elders wake up in the 
morning footmarks around the compound are traced and analysed to establish whether spies from 
other communities may have visited to establish the possibility of launching a raid. Many cases 
of spotting the footmarks of spies are reported to the police as a security threat to the livelihoods 
of affected herders. An illustration of the sighting of spies is well captured as follows: 
“To the post are five Samburu male adults from Munanda village….who report that in the 
night of 30/04/2008 about six men suspected to be Turkana entered their village on 
spying duties most likely with the aim of stealing stock. The footmarks were discovered 
in the morning and as per the footmarks they went around several manyattas and finally 
exited by breaking through the security fence. The footmarks were traced to a nearby 
lagga where they walked towards the Turkana side” (Baragoi Police Post Occurrence 
Book 30
th
 April 2008). 
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The spies are responsible for the following: 
i. To identify appropriate routes (ng’ipindinga) to be used while raiding for easy and 
prompt movement of livestock and raiders  
ii. To know the location of various ‘ng’aandakia’(where men hide during exchange of fire) 
iii. Estimate the appropriate raiding time 
iv. Know the estimated number of armed men within the targeted vicinity of the raid. 
After three or four days the ng’irototin come back home to meet ajore (the group of raiders).  
They relay their findings and the ajore deliberates upon them. The deliberations and discussions 
touch on the departure time, division of labour within the raiding group with commanding heads 
for each section, the identification of suitable Emuron (a seer) who can foresee the path of the 
raiders and bless the raid. The ajore then dismisses for preparation and the plan is kept as secret. 
The preparation includes the following: 
i. Each individual must have a gun of any kind but an AK47 (amakada) is preferred. 
ii. Each individual must carry a well loaded aruba (for bullets) and Epuko (kind of poach to 
carry bullets) 
iii. A jerican wrapped with rugged clothes to carry water 
iv. Small knifes like ‘ng’abara’ and ‘ng’ilienga’ for feeding purposes. 
v. Some money for emergency purposes in case of hunger or sickness. 
The journey usually begins that very day, especially late evening or early morning. The ‘ajore’ 
are led by the ‘ng’irototin’ to ‘awi ang’imoe’-home of the enemies where the raid takes place. 
The main objective of the raid is to acquire as many livestock as possible by engaging in gun 
battle with those who get on the way. If the raids are successful, the raiders are received with 
song and ululation by their women.  
3.3 Preparation for Violence: The Role of Songs and Narrations 
Broch-Due (2005:26) has argued that narrations give “voice” to the intended violation acts thus 
serves to justify and legitimize these actions and compels the actors in the ‘virtues’ of violence. 
Narrations further help in shaping violent actions by bringing forth memories of violence in the 
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past and obligating current generation to ‘do justice’ on behalf of their kin. Through songs, social 
experiences are shaped and framed to meet current challenges. Solutions for these social 
challenges can also be sought by drawing parallels with similar situations of the past. Raids 
whether traditional or ‘modern’ are imbued with psychological preparation and solidification of 
group solidarity (Coser 1956). Even though the benefits or motivations for raids may be for the 
individual, songs are composed and sang that portray the act of raiding as of great benefit to the 
community, to the clan or family of the raider. An example of the song sang to justify a revenge 
raid among the Turkana is as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This song shows the close relationship between pastoralists’ men and women in the production 
of violence. Guns are owned by men among the Turkana but the custodians of the gun within the 
household are the women (Onyango 2010). In some cases, the gun is given a lady’s name (in this 
case referred to as ‘Nasike’, to portray the closeness between a man and his firearm). It also 
shows that violent action is a lived experience, it is part of daily life and revenge acts are 
expected, violence therefore oscillates (Elwert et al 1999) from action to reaction.  This song 
therefore puts into perspective the positive role of pastoralists’ households in facilitation of 
violence among the Turkana of Baragoi. To understand the role of culture in the processes of 
Oooooh! emoitaka ng’ide kanyekiriamea *2 
Thuwa ng’ithapatomea, kanyekiriamea, 
Todemutu nasike atome, eunae nee 
Chorus 
a) Eunae nee,naui nakapakana  
aaaah!*2 
b) Aguma ng’imoe apethee, nakapakeng 
ang’abothia aaaah! 
c) Aguma ng’imoe lorionokuwa, 
(lotoronkowa alomoding’ia)*2 
aaaah! 
d) Eunae nee, naui nakapakang’a 
aaaah! 
e) Aguma ng’imoe apethee, lokapakeng 
ang’abothia aaaaah! 
f) Aguma ng’imoe 
lotoronkowa,lotoronkowa 
alomoding’ia aaaah 
Oooooh! Strong are the sons of the union 
We of the age group (ng’ithapatomea) in union 
Snatch nasike (name of a lady) the gun and bring 
here 
Chorus 
a) Bring it here, to the house of my father 
aaaah!*2 
b) The enemies have shot the widow of “ 
ang’abothia”(name of the husband) 
c) The enemies have shot “ lorionokowa”( 
name of a man meaning black headed) in 
cold blood aaah!*2 
d) Bring it here, to the house of my father 
aaaah! 
e) The enemies have shot the widow of 
“ang’abothia”(name of the husband) 
f) The enemies have shot “lorionokowa” 
(name of a man meaning black headed) in 
cold blood aaah! 
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violence, in the next sections we look into the organisation for raids among the Samburu of 
Baragoi. 
3.4 Organisation for Raids among the Samburu  
Similarly among the Samburu, raids occurred for various purposes. It was a social-cultural and 
economic activity among the Samburu people (Kaimba 2011; IRIN News 2014; KHRC 2010). 
The Samburu are also motivated to raid to protect their pastures from intrusion by other groups 
(Mutsotso 2013; KHRC 2010; Osamba 2000). As with the Turkana, the Samburu also engage in 
raids for revenge purposes (SCCRR 2013). Further revenge raids may be conducted to draw even 
over battles lost in the past
36
. Raids are first organized before they are conducted to make them 
successful. There is no limited or specific number of people required to conduct a given raid but 
the number can vary depending on the motivations for the raid and its type.  The Samburu 
classify raids in two broad categories: Lwuampa and Njore. Similar categorisations have been 
recorded by Masuda (2009) in his study of the Banna of Ethiopia.  Lwuampa is a raid organized 
by a small number of warriors ranging between four and twelve. Normally an even number is 
preferred since it’s believed to have a high probability of success based on past experiences. The 
prime purpose of Lwuampa is to steal from the enemies without engaging in a gun battle unless 
the raiders are identified by the enemies either before stealing the animals or when caught during 
recovery of stolen animals. In this raid, minimal or no destruction is done to the enemies except 
confiscating a small number of livestock from them, which are then driven away stealthily. In 
any case rituals are performed before the occurrence of any raid. These include blessings from 
elders, girls and preferably from a blessing specialist traditionally called ‘Lais’ or 
‘Lamayianani’. A Lamayianani often hails from a family known to have been naturally endowed 
with powers to provide blessings. In most cases nowadays, the warriors may seek the blessings 
secretly from a Lamayianani without the knowledge of other elders. 
 
Njore is a raid comprising of not less than 50 armed people and has no maximum limits. It’s 
normally a well-organized raid whose planning and organization can take up to a whole month 
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and a minimum of two weeks. Njore mostly takes place as a response to an immediate situation, 
these can be seen in terms of revenge raids or politically organised raids in which various vested 
interests of raiders and other actors are galvanized around ethnic identity and warriorhood. The 
occurrence of a Njore is therefore a consequence of effective mobilisation and planning by the 
warriors and those who support them. The imminence of Njore in Baragoi town is often 
noticeable. Morans can be seen purchasing large amounts of food in the shops; many morans can 
be seen roaming the town in the evenings and at night (NPS 2013). The planning of Njore 
requires series of meetings to lay appropriate strategies that will ensure the defeat of the targeted 
enemies. These meetings are usually stage managed/ masterminded by a ‘laigwanani’ (an 
orator). A Laigwanani is a vastly experienced retired moran most often a junior elder with an 
excellent track record in planning, organizing and successfully commanding raiders. During 
these meetings, the prospective raiders are motivated through war songs.  They can also be 
rebuked to make the cowards and undecided lot make informed decisions in regard to the raid. 
Those who show any form of cowardice and those perceived to be unfit to participate in the raid 
as a result of cultural considerations are eliminated from the njore at this point. 
Moreover, before a final move to launch an attack, a secret perambulation is done in the area to 
be attacked by a minimum of two and a maximum of four people selectively and categorically 
chosen. Those chosen must be courageous warriors with a well proven track record in successful 
spying on enemy territories. The core reason sending the spies are to gain clear knowledge of the 
terrain and the targeted area of attack. They are expected to achieve the following; to fully 
understand the terrain, identify the access routes, they should also identify the well-guarded 
routes, the approximate guns possessed by the enemies and establish the levels of alertness 
amongst enemy ranks. This exercise takes around a week depending on the time taken to fully 
gather the information. After such extensive arrangements, with well laid strategies, the raid is 
then conducted usually at dawn between 4-5 am or before sunset at around 5pm or 6pm. If the 
raid turns successful, massive looting is usually done and a maximum number of livestock are 
confiscated. Among the Samburu, successful raids are also marked by songs by the morans. War 
songs among the Samburu aim to instill bravery among the warriors and to promote the war 
discourse as a necessity to correct past wrongs. War songs therefore form part of the 
socialization narratives that children are inculcated in from an early age. Warriors sing these 
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songs to convey their victory over the common enemy and the ability of the warrior as an 
individual to contribute towards the required collective effort of the community to stand up and 
be counted as a defender of the community against the common ‘enemy’. As Spencer (1965) 
noted, the Samburu warriors invoke the names of their fathers during some of these victory songs 
to show the high honor and family pride that taking part in war bestows upon the individual 
warrior but also to the afore mentioned father.  War songs therefore present narratives of 
dehumanisation of the enemy and legitimization of the acts violence as heroic and for the 
common good of the community. 
A famous song after Samburu raids is called Lkushorodo [a Samburu War Song] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wooyio wooyio 
                      Woooo Woooh[eeeh] 
Nturukunya yieyio wo papa 
Lmuran wootuata alimu [chorus]     
Kobore lmuran wotua nkalup 
     Wo lpisiai woti ntomoni [chorus] 
Supuko loo lkuume 
    Kirishakita mperia wuanata [chorus] 
Yabayie nkishuang’ youreisho 
  Kira nkera napoypoy [chorus] 
  Kore payee abulu nang’enu 
  kore  naigutie lowuoru lebata 
  neigutie lowuoru lesoro 
  naitoki aigutie lepere 
Meibai ntae kule 
  Kulo kishami lemong’or 
  Lmuran woong’or ntoyie 
  Nomongor mparakuo  
Lmeirishi lenaasakalai 
   Nkejek yeishirakini 
Nyoshi natii ale owuo 
   Loturia laing’ok yedir 
   Kedir ltipilit nkong’u 
    Loomoidio lemekwet 
 
Wooyio wooyio 
Wooo Wooo (eeeh) 
Exercise perseverance you mum and dad 
as I announce to you the dead warriors  
the number of dead warriors 
exceeds a thousand [chorus] 
The Turkana homesteads we have raided  
 With our superior weapons [chorus] 
The last time our community [cattle and children] was living 
In fear of adversaries was while we were young children, 
After we grew up and developed bravery, 
We scared away the wild animal and 
 The ill-motivated human beings [enemies] [chorus] 
May the curse be cast upon you all those who drank the milk of this 
cattle [livestock] 
And yet you fail to assume your responsibility of protecting the 
community [livestock and children] 
 Instead, you fight over girls rather than fighting to ensure protection 
of the community, [chorus] 
My much treasured cattle, now that you have decided to side with me, 
lets run away from these village of cowards which have failed. 
[Chorus]The renowned brave proverbial warrior [Lenaasakale] the 
community depends on and yearns for your    protection against the 
enemies.                                            
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This song also shows the way in which victory in war is celebrated as a familial and communal 
feat. A victorious warrior is seen as a ‘real’ son of his parents and the parents take great pride in 
identifying with his victory in cattle raids. This song also implies that victory in war is not only 
seen in joy at the present time but also as a means of avenging past wrongs which the warriors 
were informed of as children, thus violence is seen to be linked with a peoples past, present and 
their future aspirations (Galaty 2016). The socialization of warriors into narratives of war 
therefore emphasizes the need to avenge past defeats as a way of inculcating violent action as a 
legitimate means of correcting past wrongs (Wood 2007).   The killing of the ‘enemy’ does not 
end the enmity, the mutilation and desecration of the enemy is seen to fulfill the real meaning of 
victory. Violence is therefore not only just a means of defeating the enemy but a means of 
dehumanizing and debasing a human being to distinguish ‘them’ from ‘us’ (Tablino 2006). This 
song therefore seeks to instill group ethos among the warriors as those charged with security of 
the community. It identifies the enemy and dictates how to relate with the enemy.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The practice of cattle raiding among pastoralists in Eastern Africa fulfills political, social and 
economic functions in these societies. Organisation of raids among the Samburu and Turkana of 
Baragoi reveals the participation of various key stakeholders in the processes of violence 
preparation among these groups. The practice of raiding is not just aimed at the acquisition of 
livestock from neighbouring groups but rather to build internal cohesion among a group of 
warriors and also to unite the community behind the warriors through events that seek to 
appreciate and display certain societal values such as ferociousness and other leadership skills 
deemed critical for success in raids against enemy communities. The practice of raiding therefore 
not only brings prestige to successful raiders and enables them to acquire cattle to pay 
bridewealth; it also raises their stature as leaders among their peers and in the eyes of the larger 
society. Successful raiders (and killers of the enemy) among the Samburu wear copper bracelets 
to signify their achievements at war. 
Socialization into violence among new age-sets starts by the strangling of an ox with bare hands 
as a display of braveness among the Samburu. In many cases, revenge raids are justified through 
songs, this shows that every day narratives of raids lost and those won play a big role in 
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inculcating into young boys their future roles as defenders of their communities for past 
injustices through revenge raids. Even though the practice has changed over time, this chapter 
shows that culture plays a big role in the organisation of violence as evidenced by similarities 
portayed in my study among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi and those of Bollig (1990) 
among the Pokot of Baringo, Northern Kenya and Knighton (2007) among the Karamojong of 
Uganda. 
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Approaches to the Phenomenon of Violence 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical foundations of violence among the Samburu and Turkana of 
Baragoi who inhabit Samburu North sub-County in Northwestern Kenya.  In this chapter, I base 
my social and cultural analysis of the phenomenon of violence by making the following 
conceptual assumptions; that violence is strategic action aimed at achieving well planned ends. 
My analysis of violence among pastoralists in Baragoi is based on the premise that it is beneficial 
to the communities involved; it is a transaction that utilises the patron-client networks that exists 
locally and these are exercised to bring positive returns to key actors on both sides of ethnic 
divide. Turkana and Samburu warriors, ammunition sellers and gun traders involved know and 
‘trust’ each other enough to enable the trade in arms and ammunition in spite of the ‘traditional’ 
enmity and contempt with which these two groups treat each other. I analyse violence as a power 
contest exercise; the use of violence is aimed at gaining power or asserting the power and 
hegemony of one community or group of warriors as a collective over the other at any particular 
moment. Chance of occurrence of violence between groups of herders’ or between a herder and 
an individual passerby is based on place-identity; how one is identified during periods of 
heightened violence determines whether they are attacked or not.  
 
Violent acts between herders have meanings. The gorging of the eyes and cutting of limbs of 
captured raiders by their ‘enemies’ or the collection of genital trophies by the Samburu, cannot 
simply be ignored, these actions that mutilate the bodies of fallen raiders must draw deeper 
interpretations and meanings. The culture of raiding and how it legitimizes violent action and 
behavior among the warrior age-sets among the Samburu and Turkana is also looked into. The 
central role of revenge in the production and reproduction of violence among the Samburu and 
Turkana is used in this chapter to draw theoretical meanings of violence in this thesis.  Further, 
the state plays a prominent role in the production and reproduction of violent relations between 
itself on the one hand and the Samburu and Turkana groups on the other. My analysis of violence 
in Baragoi further looks into how acts of revenge through raids and torching of manyattas 
reproduce enmity between the Samburu and Turkana that further fans the violence. In my 
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analysis of the socio-political interactions of day to day life of the Samburu and Turkana of 
Baragoi, violence is seen as a resource used to negotiate inter-ethnic relations of power, to 
cement in-group relations and to precipitate social change from time to time. 
 
The choice of these dimensions of violence is informed by the nature of pastoralists’ violence as 
observed among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. I analyse violence among pastoralists in 
Baragoi as a social process given the history of the Turkana and Samburu and how violence 
between the groups have transformed their relations since 1911. In looking at violence as 
strategic action, I focus on logistical support that propels violence as well as actors and interests 
that buttress processes of collective violence. By focusing on the communicative role of 
pastoralists’ violence, I am informed by my own observations of the symbolism of violence 
among the Samburu and Turkana and how symbolic acts are interpreted culturally to 
communicate imminence of violence. Further I focus on the transactions that underlie 
pastoralists’ violence among the Samburu and Turkana to emphasize the agency of actors in the 
value chain of the business of violence. By focusing on violence as power relations, my aim is to 
situate power in the different forms of violence such as raids, highway banditries and attack on 
women. Similarly, contests over social and physical spaces of pastoral productions are also 
viewed as power contests over productive spheres of pastoralists’ economy. The focus on culture 
is critical as it is the basis of socialization for power contests. Culture is vital in understanding 
violence socialization and how it impacts on narratives that inform future acts of violence. 
Lastly, I focus on revenge as ‘cog in the wheel’ of pastoralists’ violence. As one of the key 
motivations for pastoralists violence revenge enables our understanding of violence as a political 
process.  
4.1 Violence as a Catalyst of Social Processes of Change 
According to Beck (2011:349) violent actions are processes aimed at reconfiguring relationships 
between groups or individuals. From this perspective, understanding of violence goes beyond the 
focus on violent action or the harm that violence causes on the body. She argues that for violence 
to be part of a societal process, it must be inscribed into societal structure in order to enable the 
negotiation or renegotiation of relations between groups. Violence is noted by Bowman (2001: 
 63 
 
27) to be a “force” through which old physical and social boundaries are destroyed and recreated. 
Violence therefore is not just the act of violating someone rather it has long lasting implications 
on relationships between individuals and societal groups. Similarly, Coser (1956) argues that 
conflict provides an opportunity for the creation of ‘new situations’ that re-order society. Violent 
conflict thus is considered as a ‘stimulus’ for societal change. In this case the use of violence 
catalyses processes through which old social orders are preserved. Further, Broch-Due (2005: 
17) views violence as a tool useful in the fragmentation of “old structures” and the creation of 
new ones.  This shows the power of violence in redefining or re-ordering social relationships in 
society.  According to Galaty (2005b) violence involves two different forms of societal 
fragmentations; its embodiments of “multiple aims, intents or emotions” and its generation of 
“multiple refractions conveyed along distinct trajectories as people speak of what they have 
heard, many times over” (2005b:173). In this way violence facilitates the creation and 
establishment of new social orders among groups. Beck (2011) and Sagawa (2010) have 
described the practice of violence as a social technique aimed at reconfiguring relationships of 
power. This is similar to Harrison who observed that: 
“Violence is a mechanism for creating discrete groups through the attempted negation of 
their pre-existing interrelations” (Harrison 1993:18) 
 
Along the same line, Turton (1994: 26) argued that war is a “common ritual language” through 
which groups show their significance and ability for self-preservation as units distinct from 
others.  Abbink (2000: xii) viewed violence as having “the effect of a ‘creative’ or at least 
‘constituent’ force in social relations: deconstructing, redefining or reshaping a social order, 
whether intended or not”. Acts of violence in this case are seen as having an impact on human 
relations at both the individual and communal levels and often resulting in the reconfiguration of 
human relationships. Abbink (2000: xii) further argues that in its aim to redefine and reconfigure 
relationships violence is used in interpersonal relations to “establish relations of power, force and 
dominance” by one group over another. Aijmer (2000:1) pointed out the vital role of violence in 
the formation of social relationships. He described it as a “latent ingredient” to emphasize the 
critical role that violent action plays in shaping human relations and in defining social and 
physical boundaries of human interactions.  
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Watson (2009:178) makes the point that the use of ethnic identities to mobilize groups into 
violence is a process that “depends on the way in which ideas of the self and of culture and 
identity are used”. This implies that organisation for group violence often involves the 
mobilisation of people based on specific identity markers such as ethnicity or clans. Beck (2011) 
concurs with Riches (1986) that as social process violence takes place within the ‘transactional 
model’ or the triangle of violence where violent acts are carried out, inflicted upon others and 
interpreted by some witnesses. The interpretation of violent actions by witnesses determines the 
possibility of escalation or de-escalation of violent behavior among groups. Mamdani (2001) has 
argued that violence has the capacity to create a new habitus that disrupts the social relations 
while at the same time reorganizing people’s ways of doing things. Chronic violence he argues 
has the capacity of a cyclical effect thereby reproducing itself from time to time to reorganize 
societal relations. Pastoralists’ violence during raids in manyattas or in grazing lands will thus be 
examined as a social process seeking to redefine relationships between groups of herders in 
regards to their rights of access to social and physical spaces of pastoralists production. Further, 
violence among pastoralists in this study will be analysed as a major determinant in inter-
communal relations evident in movement patterns of herders and non-herders, local political 
relations, settlement patterns, access to cattle markets, choice of marriage partners and even 
access to and dependency on relief supplies. Analysis of violence as a social process is crucial in 
this study as it helps us to understand its role in changing communal relations between the 
Turkana and Samburu. It enables our analysis of the history of pastoralists’ violence and its 
consequences. It further enables our identification of key actors’ that have sprung up to facilitate 
the processes of violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. Analysis of violence as a 
social process further enables our understanding of the role of violence as a catalyst of societal 
change. 
4.2 Violence as Strategic Action 
Elwert et al (1999:11) have described ‘oscillating violence’ as those violent actions that are 
characterized by “a typical pattern of alternating appeasement and violence….between outbreaks 
of violence and phases of controlled violence influenced by social forces that strengthen 
oscillation”. From this perspective violence can be considered as strategic when several actors 
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work in tandem in planning and execution of violence. Recurrence of violence has been linked to 
breakdown of state’s monopoly of the instruments of violence (Elwert 1999:86). Breakdown of 
state’s monopoly over violence creates opportunities for ‘violence open areas’ where strategic 
actors work in tandem to benefit from the markets of violence (Elwert 1999:86). Further, the use 
of violence as a strategic action is seen in the manner in which political competitors supply 
ammunition and weapons well in advance before major raids are organised. Subsequently, actors 
who may engage in violence first assess the conditions, indicating a planned endeavor (Greiner 
2013). Violence becomes a viable option when there is a high probability of success is therefore 
a calculated choice (Aijmer 2000).  
 
Hagmann and Peclard (2011:8-9) have placed resources and repertoires at the center of 
organisation of violence for the preservation of hegemonies. Resources are “material bases for 
collective action” (2011:8) such as the presence of a mobilizable group or standing army that can 
quickly step up to exert revenge in a violence situation. Repertoire is the ideology that helps in 
whipping up the emotions and justifies violent action as appropriate and legitimate such as 
ethno-nationalistic politics (2011:9). The use of ethno-nationalism as a means of mobilisation of 
warriors has been blamed for the rise of violence especially in contests over pasture and political 
positions and business opportunities in towns. Watson and Schlee (2009:3-4) have defined 
ethno-nationalism as “a strong sense of difference and lack of tolerance for sharing territory and 
resources” with the ‘other’. They have argued that the smart use of ethno-nationalistic politics by 
elites from these communities accompanied by “competitive and negative stereotyping of others” 
(Watson and Schlee 2009:4) precipitates violent reactions in areas where institutions of 
arbitration are weak or non-existent. Violence is therefore a means to an end (Buchanan-Smith 
and Lind 2005). Organisation for collective violence whether motivated by tangible resources 
such as livestock, land or water is enabled through by drawing upon strategic “social and cultural 
repertoires in order to give social meaning to violent action” (Hagmann and Peclard 2011:11). 
Mobilisation for violence in pursuit of communal goals such as protection of land against 
‘enemy’ groups often have to draw upon the social meanings of violent action as a means to 
mobilizing violent actors (Schlee 2004) based on inclusion and exclusion models. 
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At given times in pastoralists’ history, there have been cases where two distinct identities have 
formed strategic alliances as a platform for violent raids. Violence can also be a means through 
which groups can either execute threats or claim opportunities (Korf et al 2010); the use of 
violence therefore indicates the intention either to maximize group or individual opportunities. It 
also indicates the collective capacity of the pastoralists groups to guard themselves against 
external threats. Greiner (2013:221) noted the history of strategic alliances and how these were 
effective in claiming pasturelands against the Kikuyu community in Laikipia area in the 1990s. 
Violence in this case was used as a means of launching contestations over land and territories 
against perceived ‘outsiders’. This points to a more politicized function of pastoralists’ violence 
and shows its emergent force as a tool for renegotiating territorial claims. Lastly, Kalyvas et al 
(2008) highlighted the role of violence in the creation and maintenance of group order. Violence 
in this case is projected towards the common enemy not only to demonstrate the power of the 
group but also as a means of preserving in-group solidarity “in the face of outside challenge” 
(2008:1). Analysis of pastoralists’ violence as strategic action is vital in understanding cases of 
strategic alliances that communities have built from time to time to execute collective violence. 
It enables our understanding of key interests that drive collective violence and how groups of 
actors who may have been enemies come into agreement to use violence against a newly defined 
enemy.  
4.3 Violence as a Message-Victims as Examples 
Aijmer (2000:1) as well as Schröder and Schmidt (2001: 3) have argued that violence is not 
senseless but rather replete with meaning and symbolism. Aijmer (2000) further argued that the 
symbolism of violence facilitates its role as “an expressive device” used in the construction and 
reconstruction of desired realities by those involved in its execution. Violence is expressive and 
therefore communicative (Riches 1986). Violence or the threat of it is aimed at conveying certain 
messages from the perpetrators to their victims and the witnesses. Holtzman (2016:165) aptly 
captures the communicative role of violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya as follows: 
“Viewed as a cultural system, violent acts not only do something but also say something. 
They may say something to the perpertrators co-ethnics (e.g about their resolve) and to 
victims (e.g about how far they might go about future actions). Adversaries each have 
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much to say to observers-for instance, about the legitimacy of their actions or who is the 
“perpertrator” and who is the “victim”. Since an attack maybe justified as a retaliation for 
a greater wrong, as a preemptive self-defense or as a police action (e.g recovery of stolen 
cattle)” (Holtzman 2016:165) 
 
Hendrickson et al (1998) in their work among the Turkana of Northern Kenya noted that cattle 
raiding is a means through which pastoralists communicate the incompatibility of sharing 
resources or the intention to shield a common resource away from would-be competitors. They 
further argued that cattle raids occasioned by competition over resources indicate weakness or 
absence of institutions for conflict resolution. As explained by Masuda (2009:58), the sound of 
gunfire signifies the possibility of death or injury to an individual or a group in a particular 
locality. According to Hendrickson et al (1998) cattle raids among pastoralist groups indicate the 
incompatibility of institutional systems of resource use. Raids therefore communicate the aim of 
one group to dominate the utility of a shared resource to the disadvantage of a competing 
resource user. Raids may be used to set new parameters for renegotiations over the collective use 
of common resources (Hendrickson et al 1998:190).  
 
Violence during raids further communicates power contests between two distinct groups (von 
Trotha 2011). In violent situations, the perpetrators assert their power forcefully over the 
victim(s). The use of violence over the weaker party guarantees domination over strategic 
spheres of influence such as grazing land or livestock and entrenches the skewed relationship 
between the two groups until such a time when the victims gain the upper hand through the 
acquisition of weapons and exert revenge for past violence. In this section, I seek to analyze 
pastoralists’ violence through the symbolic approach in looking at the communicative role of 
violence and how the symbolism and performance of pastoralists’ violence displays power 
contests and configurations among pastoralists groups from time to time. Symbolic approach to 
understanding violence enables our analysis of the meanings and purposes of pastoralists’ 
violence and allows this study to move away from a moralist perspective which views violence 
as breakdown of law and order (Aijmer 2000). 
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Narratives of past violence and the “perfomative quality” of violent acts not only cause the 
physical harm that is intended but also generates debate among witnesses on both sides of the 
divide (Schröder and Schmidt 2001:6). Performance of violence therefore serves to convey the 
message of incompatibility and necessity of confrontation between two groups beyond the venue 
of the contest. Violence narratives are equally used to socialize warrior-age sets as a means of 
building group cohesion for future wars aimed at settling old scores or gaining ‘balance’ of 
power. Analysis of pastoralists’ violence as a means of communication allows this study to delve 
into the symbolism of violence. It broadens our understanding of pastoralists’ violence not only 
as a one-time event in some isolated grazing land but as a representation of antagonistic relations 
between groups through space and time. It allows our analysis of violence as a process and not 
an event by connecting isolated incidences of violence to historical inter-communal hostilities 
and cultural socializations that legitimizes violence on ‘enemy’ groups. 
4.4 Transactional Violence 
David Riches (1986) came up with the triangle of violence in which he envisioned a performer, 
victim and witness (es). This model contributes to the analysis of interactions in violence 
situations as it places subjectivity at the center of violence analysis and shows that violent 
actions are contested actions whose interpretations is dependent on the allegiance that witnesses 
have in relation to the victim(s) or the perpetrator(s) Stewart and Strathern (2002:3). This model 
has however been criticized by Stewart and Strathern (2002) who argued that Riches triangle of 
violence did not take into account group or collective violence. Bakonyi and de Guevara 
(2012:2) have argued that collective violence serves three distinct purposes; it “activates social 
boundaries, mobilises fighters to take part in violence and lastly mobilises resources for violent 
action”. In this study collective violence is exemplified by the massacres and acts of ethnic 
cleansing during periods of heightened political competition that have been recorded in Northern 
Kenya (Greiner 2013; Österle 2007). Analysis of collective violence will adopt an emic 
perspective as a methodological approach to understand motivations for collective violence from 
the actors’ points of view. Charles Tilly’s repertoire of actions (1981) will also be applied to 
show how communities plan, mobilise, fund and execute violent raids to achieve various 
purposes such as self-preservation and political supremacy within a given constituency. 
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In the case of Baragoi I propose that violence should not be seen simply as a ‘triangle’ of 
interactions but as a more complex action involving actors who may not be directly involved as 
perpetrators, victims or witnesses. In this study I seek to broaden this perspective to connect the 
triangle of violence to a network of actors such as pastoralists’ elites and state security agents 
who ‘feed’ the triangle of actors to fuel the cycle of violence. My study will adopt an 
ethnographic case study approach to illuminate cases of day to day transactions in instruments of 
violence between groups in Baragoi. Further my study looks into how patron-client relationships 
between these groups encourage and foster transactions into arms and ammunition and their 
impacts in sustaining competitions over power and influence among pastoralist groups in 
Baragoi. Analyses of the transactions that fuel pastoralists’ violence are vital in understanding 
the network of actors that support the ‘business of violence’ in Northern Kenya (KHRC 2009). In 
this study, transactions reveal the network that supports the business of violence and links 
pastoralists violence with global trade in small arms and light weapons. Further, analysis of the 
transactions in instruments of violence helps in our positioning of pastoralists as active actors in 
violence and not as victims and enables our analysis of pastoralist violence as a resource and an 
agency that pastoralists use from time to time to navigate day to day socio-political relationships. 
In this study I analyse transactions in arms and ammunition between elites and warriors as part of 
the patron-client relationships that facilitate violence among the Turkana and Samburu of 
Baragoi. 
4.5Violence and Marginalization 
Several authors have argued that violence among groups stems from perceived or real 
inequalities in the distribution of socio-economic and political resources (Cramer 2002; Gurr 
2000; Greiner 2013:234). Gurr has further argued that vicious violence has higher potential to 
occur in marginalised areas with weak state systems. Pastoralists’ violence and the value chain of 
the business of violence enable its operation in areas with limited state presence. This conforms 
to the argument by Straight (2009) who described the interrelatedness of ‘small wars’ and 
marginalization. She argues that description of pastoralists’ violence as ‘small wars’ entrenches 
marginalization of pastoralists in Northern Kenya as it contributes to the attribution of violence 
to culture and the fight over water and pasture. She argues that understanding pastoralists’ 
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violence within the broad spectrum of political competition and the globalised nature of arms 
proliferation gives a more concrete prescription of meanings and purposes of pastoralists’ 
violence.  
 
Straight (2009) further argues that categorization of pastoralists violence as ‘cultural’ further 
serves to marginalize pastoralists as it masks historical inequalities in resource allocation and 
service provision that Northern Kenya has suffered since independence. She further argues that 
culture is used by main stream media to hide the key actors and issues that propagate in pastoral 
violence thus enabling its continuity. As Witsenburg and Zaal (2012) have noted, the 
marginalisation of Northern Kenya, its geographical vastness and aridity presents a golden 
opportunity for non-state actors to emerge and engage in the business of violence. In my study, 
linkages between marginalisation and pastoralists’ violence will be analysed through the political 
economy approach to show how historical and political marginalization of herders in Northern 
Kenya and violence mutually reproduce each other to serve the interests of elites. Analysis of the 
linkages between violence and marginilisation is vital for this study as it helps to show the place 
of pastoralists’ violence in national debates. On the one hand, pastoralists’ violence in this study 
is shown an issue of little national significance, thus entrenching the plight of pastoralists to the 
margins of national priorities. On the other hand state marginalization and the presence of 
‘ungoverned spaces’ in pastoralists lands is used to support the argument that historical 
marginalisation in terms of resource allocation and service provision contributes to ‘shadow 
economy’ run by non-state actors who trade in essential and highly demanded public goods such 
as instruments of violence. Further, linkages between violence and marginalisation will enable 
this study to explain the role of the state as a major actor in pastoralists’ violence in Northern 
Kenya. This will be through the analysis of the role of Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) and their 
role in pastoralists’ violence. 
4.6 Revenge and the Production and (Re) production of Violence 
While revenge raids have been well fairly documented (Eaton 2012), its role in reproduction and 
escalation of violence needs to be further examined. Stewart and Strathern (2002:108) have 
argued that “revenge is the major motivation in the reproduction and replication of violent 
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relations”. In other words, acts of revenge spur cycles of violent action as each group claims the 
position of ‘victim’ in Riches (1986) triangle. Revenge during group violence further blurs the 
distinction between perpetrators, victims and witnesses as these positions change swiftly. 
Revenge therefore has a measure of ‘social usefulness in society and this is deployed from time 
to time to get a sense of ‘justice’ among groups (Wood 2007b: 10). Revenge can also be seen as 
a form of “self-help” violence that enables the administration of justice on behalf of previous 
victims (Elwert et al 1999:21). Revenge as a central cog in motivations for violence is argued to 
provide linkages between culture, psychology and local politics (Stewart and Strathern 2002). In 
other words, revenge violence is organised as a just cause based on cultural legitimation of 
violence and aimed at ‘getting even’ by correcting past atrocities. Revenge is therefore critical in 
mobilisation for violence (Fleisher 2000).   
 
Cultural orientations prescribe the nature of revenge in every violent situation. The planning and 
execution of revenge motivated violence is a political process (based on mobilisation) that does 
not just occur spontaneously but is often a response well considered by those seeking ‘justice’. 
Narratives of revenge therefore are used to inform new cycles of violence as new generations are 
given the responsibility of settling ‘old’ debts. In this study, I analyse revenge as a mechanism 
within the social structure of pastoralists social systems used as an ‘organising principle’ 
historically to settle past debts of violence.  Further, acts of revenge are seen as the genesis of 
collective violence as family members and the clans from which the victim hails feel culturally 
obliged and justified to avenge the death or the raid of their kin (McFate 2008: 298). Eaton 
(2012:60) associated cattle raids among pastoralists along the Kenyan/Uganda border with the 
creation of “asymmetrical retaliations” meaning revenge attacks targeted relatives or clan mates 
of perpetrators of previous acts of violence. Revenge therefore not only served to ‘get even’ but 
it widened the cycle of violence by targeting those not directly involved in the initial acts of 
violence. Revenge violence is therefore seen as a key building block of oscillating violence.  
 
Revenge has been argued to be motivated by accumulated debts that are stored in collective 
memories and arise out of past incidences of raids, attacks or killings by members of one 
community upon another (Sagawa 2010:91). Payment of these ‘debts’ are also argued to be 
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motivated by pride and anger. Pride is gained by standing up to fulfill the duty of avenging the 
death of a close kin (Diamond 2008) while anger at the devastating loss of one’s kin at the hands 
of raiders is argued to motivate retaliation (McCabe 2004: 98). Eaton (2012:50) further argues 
that debts that lead to pastoralists’ violence can also stem from exaggerations of the numbers of 
livestock stolen in previous attacks. Violent raids thus sets off series of claims and counter 
claims that serve as a motivation for opposing groups to get even but at the same time is used 
opportunistically by those who seek to benefit from violence as a premise for further violent 
raids. Exacting revenge therefore creates more ‘debts’ of violence as it widens the number of 
actors involved. Cases in which raiders’ use ‘trick routes’ to avoid the hot pursuit of their victims 
is also blamed for increased pastoralists violence as victims wrongly accuse and attack innocent 
communities among whom raided livestock passed, this further creates a new web of debts that 
propel violence (Eaton 2012). Revenge in pastoralists’ violence is therefore analysed in this 
study as a result of accumulated debts that are used by political actors as the basis for 
mobilisation for fresh attacks. 
 
Analysis of the role of revenge in pastoralists’ violence is crucial in understanding violence as a 
process. It illuminates the processual factors that propel conflicts into violence and helps to 
connect incompatibility of social institutional frameworks for conflict resolution with violence 
escalation. Acts of revenge violence in this study further enables our analysis of pastoralists’ 
violence as socio-political interactions where domination and control of ‘enemy’ groups informs 
the need for revenge to maintain a balance of power. Analysis of revenge violence among 
pastoralists enables our understanding of the role of violence narratives in socialization for future 
violence and its motivation for settling past ‘debts’. The concept of revenge enables us to 
connect place-identity relationships and acts of violence. It enables us to analyse cases of 
‘random’ inter-group violence as linked to a wider web of revenge cycles in which the place and 
the identity of the perpetrator and the victim is critical in violent action. The multifaceted forms 
of pastoralist revenge violence is also illuminated by looking at how these are organised, from 
family level revenge, communal revenge raids and politically organised revenge and how these 
three forms of revenge interact and inform trajectories of pastoralists violence. Revenge is 
analysed in this study as not only a matter of ‘getting even’ but a means of preserving personal 
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and communal pride; it is connected to power relations at the individual and group levels. 
Revenge is therefore analysed in this study as the linkage between past, present and future 
violent actions. Lastly, understanding revenge as ‘accumulated debts’ may enhance our 
understanding of pastoralists’ violence not only as isolated incidences but as processes that are 
culturally embedded and politically motivated. 
4.7 Violence as Power 
Violence has been defined as “the assertion of power” (Schröder and Schmidt 2001: 3). This 
means that violent actions denote power contest between rival groups or individuals. The use of 
violence by one group of actors against another implies a high stakes contest in which parties are 
not willing to lose (von Trotha 1999). This implies that violence is used instrumentally to settle 
disputes between people, the ‘settlement’ of disputes is deemed complete by physically subduing 
an opponent. Von Trotha (2011:32) on the other hand viewed violence as “a form of power: it is 
a doing, above all a doing-to and on the part of the victim a being-done-to”. This emphasizes the 
role of agency of violent action. It facilitates asymmetric relations between those involved in 
conflict. Further, Aijmer (2000:1) argued that violence “offers a strong foundation for the 
construction of power”. Further linkages between violence and power is found in Abbink’s 
(1998:274) definition that it “is the human use of symbols and acts of intimidation and/ or 
damaging (potentially lethal) physical force against living beings to gain or maintain 
dominance”. Violence is therefore a means of domination, connected with the uplifting of the 
self-worth of the victor among his/her peers or community and the lowering of the self-worth of 
the victim among his/her peers or community (von Trotha 2011:32) It is a means of 
overpowering, controlling and eliminating the enemy (Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008; Schlee 
2009).  
 
Ken Masuda (2009) and Sagawa (2010:95) have argued that the acquisition and display of 
firearms as is common among pastoralists in Eastern Africa is symbolism of power. Moreover, 
violence can be a means of showing one’s individual power among the group. Drawing from his 
research among the Banna of Ethiopia, Masuda (2009) argued that traditional Banna masculinity 
and power was constructed around spears and arrows. The introduction of guns in Banna society 
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simply replaced the instruments of power among male Banna people. Owning a gun therefore 
replaced owning a spear as a symbolic show of power among males. Warriors as individuals and 
as groups were socialized from an early age after initiation to show pride and distinction in their 
new roles as protectors of the home and the community. Spencer (1965:87) in his study among 
the Samburu, observed the transition from boyhood to manhood among the Samburu and noted 
the significance of vows that morans made to their mothers “to no longer eat meat seen by any 
married woman”. In essence the Ilmugit37 ceremony which occurs after circumcision of the new 
moran age-sets sought to instill group discipline and cohesion as it required young Samburu 
teenagers to ‘behave like men’ and prove their manhood by dissociating with women including 
their own mothers (Spencer 1965). Refusing to eat meat prepared by women as well as eating in 
groups with fellow morans therefore not only enhanced group cohesion but also fostered the 
collective power of the group. Similarly, Heald (2000) noted the critical role of cattle raiding 
among the Abakuria of Southern Kenya. To be a man meant to be a successful raider. Successful 
raiding is also linked to success in finding marriage partners and gaining respect among peers 
and the society at large. Hendrickson et al (1998:192) noted that among the Turkana, “warfare is 
a rite of passage” that society expects its warrior generation to undertake with pride and honour 
to their mothers and fathers but also in honour of their forbearers. Violence in this case is an 
avenue through which individual power is gained and shown to the rest of the community. 
Violence is used here as the building block of male identity in society (Abbink 1998: 278). 
 
Writing on ethnic relations in the Karimojong neighbourhood Gray (2009:75) argued that the 
violence witnessed between the Karimojong and their neighbours perhaps indicated “shift in 
local power structures and control of resources”. Greiner (2013) also linked escalation of 
pastoralists’ violence among the Pokot and their neighbours to shifts in power structures among 
these groups. In essence the power to sanction violence among pastoralists is argued to have 
shifted from the hands of elders to those of elites. Given the centrality of militancy to intra and 
inter-group relations among pastoralists in Eastern Africa, the shifting of sanction powers from 
elders to elites presents a new phase through which the practice of violence is carried out, albeit 
with different aims. Still it presents violence as a dynamic agency as and an ‘everybody 
                                                          
37
 Ceremony held to bless new generation of Samburu warriors by elders 
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resource’ that can be used to claim and preserve power among competing groups (von Trotha 
2011).  
 
Analysing the power that an individual acquires among his group by killing a person from an 
‘enemy’ group, Poissonier (2010) argues that communities that glorify the killing of their 
neighbours as a means of upward social mobility should be viewed more as ‘favourite enemies’ 
rather than ‘traditional enemies’ as is described in anthropological publications. The term 
‘favourite enemies’ is used here to denote the preference and socio-cultural meaning that killing 
members of certain groups bring to their neighbours as opposed to killing any individual from 
some distant lands. Poissonier (2010:237) in a study on the Konso of Ethiopia noted that: “the 
killing of ‘traditional enemies’ is beneficial for the well-being and prosperity of the land and the 
group”. The violence that leads to killing of the ‘traditional’ or ‘favourite’ enemy is associated 
with the meritorious complex (Poissonier 2010). This implies that the killing of a ‘traditional’ or 
‘favourite’ enemy is a means through which warriors gain recognition evident through 
scarification (the creation of markings on the chest, shoulder and back as evidence of prowess at 
war and to convey that a person has killed the enemy in battle) and adoption of honorific titles. 
 
Warriors acquiring weapons for individual use in raids are also able to contribute to collective 
aggressive or defensive use of weapons as a community. By demonstrating good skills in raiding, 
the use of a warrior’s gun in a raid demonstrates his power to gain livestock that enables his 
accumulation of wealth and guarantees his independence from his father. His power in the use of 
instruments of violence is also seen as a communal asset. The practice of violence is therefore a 
learned experience from the household where young boys are trained to use a rifle at the ages of 
four or five (Sagawa 2010:95). Socializing of young boys on how to use rifles is aimed at 
inculcating from an early age their role in the family as defenders of the family herds. Initiation 
and joining of warrior age-sets is marked by acquisition of personal rifles and the ability to 
engage in appropriative violence at the individual level (Sagawa 2010). This implies that the 
individual rifle is seen as a communal resource, just as the individual is part of the larger 
community. Hence the individual’s rifle can be deployed to bolster collective violence effort in 
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situations of inter-communal violence (Sagawa 2010). Participation in inter-communal violence 
and success in it brings pride and recognition to the individual. 
 
Violence can also be a means of obtaining and preserving political power (von Trotha 2011:33). 
In Northern Kenya, past studies (Osamba 2000; Greiner 2013) have shown that aspiring political 
leaders have from time to time sponsored violent raids and other forms of conflicts to 
disenfranchise supporters of their would-be opponents to enable their success at the ballot box. 
Violent raids have also been organised by political leaders as a means of preserving political 
power as was the case in Marakwet during the 1997 General elections where the then ruling 
party KANU faced stiff competition from opposition groups (Eaton 2008). Violence as a means 
of attaining political power is also explored by Lynch (2015) who noted that cattle raiding as a 
practice has become highly politicized. She noted that in Turkana and Baringo Counties, contests 
over administrative boundaries are carried out through politically sponsored violent raids. 
Similar observations were recorded by Greiner (2013:218) who conceptualized violent raids 
among the Pokot and their neighbours as “a powerful political weapon” deployed to facilitate 
contestations over administrative boundaries, land disputes and to eliminate political competition 
of rival ethnic groups.  High prevalence of violence therefore is indicative of the declining power 
of inter-communal conflict resolution mechanisms and the rise of political leaders and elites who 
have filled this space to manipulate warrior age-sets into violence for personal gain (Elwert et al 
1999:22). Analysis of the various forms of power is critical for understanding forms of pastoral 
violence. It enables our definition of pastoral violence as a power contests between individuals or 
groups. Secondly, analysis of pastoralists’ violence as power contest helps in understanding the 
key interests of the actors in violence and the consequences of their violent actions. Further 
analysis of pastoralists’ violence as power contests enables us to connect violence with local and 
national politics. It further enables our understanding of changing power symbolism among 
pastoralists for instance from spears to automatic rifles. 
4.8 Culture and Violence as Mutually Producing Phenomenon 
To define culture I draw from Lederach (1995:9) who viewed it as “the shared knowledge and 
schemes created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and responding to the 
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social realities around them". Arguing that traditional cattle raiding is a culturally accepted and 
shared tradition among pastoralists, Onyango (2010), Oba (1992) and Heald (2000) have 
outlined the core functions of cattle raiding as: a means of reaching societal threshold of 
adulthood among males, retaliation for past raids, attaining upward social mobility as a brave 
warrior, acquiring animals necessary for the payment of bride wealth, setting up the economic 
independence of an individual by acquiring livestock to build one’s herd and gaining territorial 
control of a particular grazing field. The practice of cattle raiding and its violent performance is 
therefore first all interpreted as a shared and commonly understood norm. In line with Galtung’s 
(1990:291) definition of cultural violence as “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our 
existence-exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal 
science (logic, mathematics)-that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural 
violence”. In this regard violence among pastoralist groups in Northern Kenya is expected 
among the warrior age-sets. Success in violence bestows upon the perpetrator societal honor 
while cowardice and non-participation in violent raids bestow ridicule.  
 
Sagawa (2010) noted the replacement of spear with guns among Daasanach young men. He 
noted the increased celebration and blessing of newly acquired guns as part of Banna culture. 
This is similar to Fukui and Markakis (1994) observation that culture may serve as a motivating 
factor in violent conflicts that are aimed at laying emphasis on the difference between groups 
since those who lead such wars of self-preservation are themselves preserved in the memories of 
their kin through folklore and heroism. This is also in concurrence with (Anderson 1999) who 
argued that in places where violence is used to access power and to reconfigure relationships 
between groups, there must be ‘staging areas’ where violence is expected and the threat of 
violence is real. Cultures of violence therefore designate specific actors and arenas for violence 
where the threat of violence is real. Pastoralists’ violence especially cattle raids are in themselves 
acts of cultural performance (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992). Preparation for raids are enacted 
and re-enacted through matches in military formations, shootings in the air and adorning of 
military uniforms by morans (Taabu 2013). These performances imply military preparedness to 
face the ‘enemy’ and courage to defend one’s people. As Abbink (1994) has argued, cattle 
raiding as a cultural practice produces elements of violence as parts of its practice and 
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performance but pastoralists violence that is supported by other actors who use warriors as 
pawns also produces a culture of its own. Analysis of culture and violence as mutually producing 
phenomenon enables our understanding of the crucial role that culture plays as a baseline of 
violent socialization among warrior age-sets in pastoralists societies. It further puts into 
perspective how violence narratives are used to socialize younger boys for future wars. Lastly, 
analysis of the interactions between culture and violence will help in our understanding of the 
changing cultural parameters of pastoralists’ violence and may help to explain the targeting of 
women, children and the aged in pastoralists violence today. 
4.9 Violence and Place-Identity Relationships 
Scholars such as Hauge (2007), Schlee (2009); Glowacki and Wrangham (2013) and Houtteman 
(2010) have argued that the built environment bestows upon its inhabitants a distinct identity that 
gives meanings to their existence. Inhabitants therefore protect their built environment either as 
their sphere of production, ancestral land (heritage) or territory in which they claim exclusivity 
or dominance against outsiders. How people identify with a particular place or area determines 
their dedication and commitment to protect it from others. Wood (2009) has argued that:  
 
“The connection between space and identity is easily and intuitively grasped. Identity is 
always, or at least usually, formed in some sort of place, in space and time” (Wood 
2009:229) 
The notion of engaging in violence to reinforce one’s identity as distinct from that of the victim 
pertains, for example, to the Afar and Karrayu of Ethiopia (Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008:79). 
The authors argue that violence is “also reproduced through positive sanctions within the two 
groups as a young man’s failure to confront the ethnic ‘other’ is seen as shameful and, 
conversely, aggressive attitudes towards the ‘traditional enemy’ are recognized by members of 
the respective group”. My study seeks to put into context the nature and effect of violence among 
pastoralists in Northern Kenya. It seeks to show that violent actions maybe ‘destructive’ to 
public order as functionalists have argued but in the case of Baragoi, it serves symbolically to 
galvanise groups based on ethnic identities. In this case, I will use the symbolic approach to 
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analysis of violence to point out its ‘constitutive’ meanings and purposes (Stewart and Strathern 
2002:2).  
 
Analysis of place-identity during the process of violence enables us to explain how violence 
adopts a ‘life of its own’ and its ability to create social and physical sanctions that restrict 
movements and redefine relationships between former neighbours. It further enables our 
understanding of the periodicity of violence. Place identity relationships further links acts of 
violence to power contests over spaces and enables our analysis of locations where violence 
occurs. This will improve our understanding of the changing nature of pastoralists’ violence as it 
isolates the situatedness of violent action. Lastly, place identity reveals the formative power of 
violence (Broch-Due 2005:27), it shows the role of violence in shaping human perceptions of 
identities and how the forging of identities can be the basis of violence, especially during periods 
when competition for resources is acute. For the purposes of this study, violence among 
pastoralists in Northern Kenya is seen broadly as those culturally embedded threats, witchcraft, 
symbolism and physical harm that are carried out against defined ‘enemy’ groups and aimed at 
communicating incompatibility, assertion of dominance, cementing of in-group solidity or 
obtaining political advantage by occasioning the eviction and displacement of others. 
 
In summary this thesis is based on the following key propositions; that pastoralists’ violence in 
Baragoi is rooted on historical claims that have informed multi-layered contests fought over this 
social and spatial area from the pre-colonial times up to date. The historical claims have been 
used as a rallying point at different times to solidify group identities and mobilise warrior groups 
for violence. Secondly, while violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi has been 
ongoing over the last one and a half century, the meanings and purposes of these actions have 
changed depending on the immediate interests of these groups. Thirdly, the changing meanings 
and purposes of pastoralists’ violence has in effect been a driver for social change in Baragoi. 
Violence has therefore become a significant determinant of people’s behaviors patterns in terms 
of choice of residency, trading partners, trading routes, water sources, and even marriage 
partners. 
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Figure 3: Analytical Framework of the Study 
 
Source: Author (based on analysis of field data) 
Legend 
1= Linkages to Structural factors in violence 
2= Linkages to processual factors in collective violence 
3= Violence as a Resource 
4= Linkages to incompatible inter-communal conflict resolution systems 
5= Communicative role of violence 
6= Linkages to ethno-nationalism as a tool for violent mobilisation 
As indicated in the analytical framework above, this study situates violence between the 
Samburu and Turkana primarily on historical claims to land and contestations over indigineity to 
the socio-physical space of Baragoi. Violent action is seen to be driven by cultural orientations 
aimed at capturing power in socio-political relationships among individuals and groups. As 
stated by Blystad (2005), acts of violence among pastoralists in Baragoi can be interpreted by 
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analysing the meanings conveyed in cultural practices and how these meanings evolve as groups 
negotiate and renegotiate their socio-political and economic positions and relations overtime.  
 
Cattle raids are used primarily as a means for warrior mobilization and identity assertion among 
groups. Through raids warriors cement their relationships towards each other as a collective who 
must focus collectively on the ‘enemy’. In this way pastoralists violence is used as a collective 
means of protecting resources from others who don’t belong culturally. Cattle raids are therefore 
used as a ‘launching pad’ for those seeking power at the local, inter-communal or even national 
levels (Greiner 2013; Kagwanja 2001). Violence meted out during cattle raids is therefore 
primarily a means of capturing power, whether in the form of resources such as land, water, 
livestock or as a means to disenfranchise potential opponents from a common electoral area 
(Straight 2009). Pastoralists’ violence is facilitated especially at the collective levels through 
patron-client relationships between warriors and the local elite, who supply weapons, incite 
violence and even bail out those arrested for crimes such as cattle raiding. Violence is therefore 
enmeshed in identity wars where people engage in war to show their distinction from their 
neighbours (Schlee 2004). The state is a critical participant in the creation of the violent 
environment itself through marginilisation (GoK 1965; Mkutu 2007) and also through its weak 
policing systems which encourage informalization of violence through the KPRs (Mkutu and 
Wandera 2013; Mkutu 2015). The above situations combine to precipitate socio-cultural change 
among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi as people are forced to adapt to new situations such 
as living in ‘security villages’, adoption of triple fencing, limiting their mobility to specific 
places, avoiding certain ‘unsafe’ markets, high dependency on relief supplies due to losses 
during raids and inability to sustain alternative livelihood options due to insecurity. ‘All out 
wars’ in pastoralists’ lands are most oftenly driven by revenge and political mobilization based 
on ethnic identities. Revenge serves as a catalyst for warrior mobilisation and as political capital 
through which political leaders embrace their opportunity to show their ‘protection credentials’ 
to their communities by facilitating war through the supply of arms and ammunition to maintain 
their communal hegemony over ‘enemy’ groups. 
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Locating Violence: Grazing Lands as Contested Spaces between the 
Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to explain the frequent violent raids between the Samburu and Turkana 
through the prism of grazing lands as contested spaces. I apply the concepts of space, culture and 
geographies of violence to argue that violence between pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya 
not only occur due to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons but also as a symbolic 
power struggle over contested spaces such as grazing lands and water-points as spaces with 
socio-cultural meanings to groups. Grazing lands are analysed as spaces within which culture 
and violence mutually reinforce each other through socialization, practice and mobilisation.  
Grazing lands as arenas of violence play a significant role in the initiation, nurturing and 
establishment of war ethos in the psychology of warriors as well as physically as markers of 
territory. This chapter further explores how pastoralist warriors exploit their grazing lands as 
venues of violence, where plans for raids are nurtured and executed. Dominating pastoralists’ 
spaces guarantees survival and gives socio-cultural meanings to pastoralists’ way of life. Even 
though pastoralists’ violence stems from the culture of raiding, today’s violent cattle raids are 
aimed at establishing dominance over strategic geographical spheres of production and 
protecting places of identity. This shows that violence among the Samburu and Turkana is 
applied as a means through which strategic grazing lands are acquired and protected during the 
drought periods and also as a means of protecting group identities by defending places of socio-
cultural meanings to specific groups. 
 
It is notable that violence in Northern Kenya takes place in specific conflict corridors. These 
include grazing lands, inter-communal water pans, rivers and manyattas. Furthermore, recent 
experiences from Baragoi reveal that violent raids occur during specific periods of the year when 
access and user rights to grazing lands are fiercely contested and sometimes fatally negotiated. 
While the nature of these contests can be classified through the scarcity thesis as advanced by 
Homer-Dixon (1994) and his colleagues, the contest over resources in Baragoi has been ongoing 
for over a century and these contests are not just about water and pasture but also the historical 
claims of indigineity to the geographical and social space of Baragoi (Stigand 1910; Lamphear 
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1976). The location of violent conflicts between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi conform 
to Straight et al (2016) concept of ntoror among the Samburu. As argued by Straight et al, ntoror 
are places of sweet grass that attracts claims and counter claims of ownership and indegineity 
thus becoming contested landscapes of conflicts. Accordingly, Straight et al (2016:168) argue 
that: “Ntoror illustrates pastoralist landscapes as agentive: inspiring intercommunity encounter, 
conflict, and the creation of new identities in the aftermath of environmental and human-made 
disaster”. Thus the concept of Ntoror links pastoralists’ landscapes with their histories, thus 
placing the landscape as an active agent which influences the conflicts that pastoralists engage 
in. Contests over grazing lands in Northern Kenya denote efforts to dominate strategic spheres of 
production at critical moments for pastoralists’ livelihoods (Watts 2001). The violence witnessed 
during the dry season in Baragoi therefore represents spatial contests over power to access and 
user rights to grazing lands. The production and reproduction of violence through cattle raids in 
Northern Kenya is due to the available physical space coupled with limited state security. This 
gives opportunities to sub-state actors to deploy violence as a means for negotiating access to 
scarce resources as well as preserving the physical space within which the resource is located for 
individual or collective good. 
5.1 Historical Background to Contests over Grazing Lands: The Turkana Expansion  
The contest over grazing lands in Samburu County might have begun in the late 1800s, when 
members of the Turkana community moved to Baragoi due to drought. Indeed Captain Stigand 
(1910), a British Colonial Army Officer and a big game hunter during the early colonial period 
noted the presence of the Turkana in Baragoi when he made his journey from Nairobi to 
Abyssinia through Northwestern Kenya. He was also informed of the tension and conflict 
between the Samburu and Turkana pastoralists over grazing lands and pasture by the Ogiek who 
at that time lived in Lesirkan. In his documentation of pastoralists’ relations in Baragoi, Stigand 
noted the fears of the Samburu who at that time were weak in military organisation as compared 
to the Turkana (Spencer 1965). The bone of contention between the two groups was the grazing 
lands of El Barta plains. 
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Stigand (1910) although a passer-by found himself thrust into mediation of pastoralists conflicts 
between the Samburu and Turkana. He attempted to demarcate pastoralists’ spaces for the 
Samburu and Turkana respectively. He designated Baragoi River as the boundary between the 
two groups. From the arbitration efforts of Captain Stigand, one can observe that disputes over 
pastoral space between these two groups were ongoing over one century ago. The demarcation of 
ethnic/resource boundaries between these two groups and the need to access pastures during the 
dry season still contributes to pastoralists’ violence today. Further, the designation of specific 
resource areas as exclusive to one group is evident today in Baragoi and is a great source of 
conflict as pastoralists tend to seek pasture for the livestock to avoid decimation during droughts. 
 
The colonial administration noted that even though the Turkana could be assumed to have 
originated from Turkana County, they were found in Baragoi at the onset of colonial rule. 
Therefore they had some rights to share resources in the same pastoralists’ space as the 
Samburu
38
.  Their settlement in Baragoi was based on the following reasons as advanced by 
colonial administrators
39
: 
i. They were here before the country was administered. Captain Stigand in his book “To 
Abyssinia through Unknown land” tells of settling grazing boundaries at Elbarta between 
the two tribes 
ii. The Samburu being terrified of both Abyssinian raiders from the North and Turkana 
raiders from the West will not live far away from the Government Boma at Barsaloi even 
though  a detachment of men is kept at Lesergoi North of Elbarta 
iii. The Turkana at Elbarta act as a buffer between raiders and the Samburu to the South and 
the Rendille to the East 
                                                          
38
 KNA DC/SAM/3/1 (1931) Present Policy regarding the tribes in the Vicinity of the Horr Valley, from the District 
Commissioner, Northern Frontier Province, Isiolo to the Provincial Commissioner, Northern Frontier Province, 
Isiolo, 1
st
 April 1931 
39 39 KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/8 (1922) Settlement of Certain Turkana in the Northern Frontier District, Office of Officer 
in Charge of N.F.D to the Honourable, the Colonial Secretary, Colony of Kenya,  El Barta, April 26
th
 1922. 
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iv. There is no grazing to spare in Turkana proper and this area is free and can be spared by 
the Samburu 
v. The Turkana have behaved extremely well over the eviction of the tribe under extreme 
provocation 
The battle over Baragoi grazing lands between the Turkana and Samburu was of significant 
concern to the colonial administrators; Mr. Kittermaster
40
 who administered the area from 
Barsaloi is recorded to have sent away the Turkana from El Barta grazing fields due to their 
constant “quarrelling with the Samburu41 in 1912. Still colonialists were later convinced that 
apart from the fact that they found the Samburu and Turkana within the Baragoi grazing fields, 
the Turkana although deemed to be “outsiders” would remain in Baragoi but under the following 
stringent conditions in regards to grazing: 
i. That they were not to go to the grazing or waters on Nysheshe [today called Naisischo] 
or those under the Mathews Range. That they could water on the Guilguil River (Baragoi 
river) and graze their stock at no point more than two hours to the South of this River on 
the Elbarta plains. That they could use the water at Lesorgoi if they did not interfere with 
the Wandorobo Samburu who watered there on occasions. That they could go as far 
North as Laisamis beyond Lalerok but must not go as far as Sarima which water was 
reserved for the Government and the Rendille camel men. That they were not to visit or 
graze the slopes of Mt. Nyiro or Kulal. 
ii. That they were to act as a buffer for raids and protect the Rendill, El Molo Wanderobo or 
Samburu 
iii. That they were not to kill game 
iv. That they were to be registered and would be taxed at an low rate 
                                                          
40
 Colonial administrator in charge of Samburu, then based in Barsaloi in 1912 
41
 KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/8 (1922) Settlement of Certain Turkana in the Northern Frontier District, Office of Officer in 
Charge of N.F.D, Sd. J.M. Llewellyn, Lt.Col. Commanding, 5
th
 K.A.R, El Barta, April 26
th
 1922. 
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v. That if they failed in any of these provisions they should remember that even though they 
have the right to graze in El Barta in the eyes of the Governement it was Samburu 
country and they would be turned out at any time should they prove to be troublesome 
That they were not to have any other Turkana as they would be given no further grazing 
grounds in the N.F.D 
 
The restrictions placed on the Turkana herders as stated above captures the need to preserve 
pasturelands for the Samburu with the hindsight of the colonialists that the grazing land primarily 
belonged to the Samburu and the Turkana were treated as second class inhabitants of Baragoi. 
However, these restrictions did not take into account the need to access specific rich grazing 
lands during periods of drought. Further in creating rules that restricted movement of pastoralists 
and their livestock, these regulations ignored the significance of mobility to nomadic 
pastoralism. The battle for pastoralists’ space and the violent contests in the grazing lands of 
Baragoi stem from these historical restrictions which did not allow for the nurturing and 
evolution of local inter-communal institutions of resource sharing. These restrictions hinged on 
the power of the colonial government or state authorities to administer or supervise access to 
grazing lands something which the colonialists did effectively and thus limited pastoralists 
violence at that time. The upsurge in violence among the Turkana and Samburu after 
independence to date points to weak or ineffective institutional capacity to arbitrate in 
pastoralists’ socio-spatial disputes. 
 
Subsequent letters from colonial administrators further attempted to define the social-spatial 
spaces of different pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya. For instance in 1947, the District 
Officer of Samburu-Maralal, in his communication with the Provincial Commissioner, Rift 
Valley Province
42
, quoted an agreement reached on inter-ethnic boundaries by earlier 
administrators at South Horr. In this agreement, it was stated that: 
                                                          
42
 KNA/PC/NKU/3/13/9 (1947) Boundaries: Boundary with Marsabit from Koiya to Lake Rudolf, Agreement 
reached at South Horr on 24
th
 June 1942 between G.R.B Brown, Esq, District Commissioner, Rumuruti and J.K.R. 
Thorp, Esq, District Commissioner, Marsabit. 
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“The El Barta Turkana might use water at Sirima, Lysamis, but they shall not use water 
anywhere else on this boundary; they shall not graze east of the boundary line, and they 
shall not make any use of the Horr Valley or Ol Doinyo Mara”. 
The quote above further point to the attempts of colonial administrators to restrict the movement 
of Turkana herders in their in search for pasture and water. Given that Sarima is a distance of 
100km from Baragoi and Ol Doinyo Mara is between Baragoi and Sarima, it is inconceivable 
that the Turkana were expected to pass through the Horr valley all the way to Sarima. This shows 
a very top-down administrative approach to rangeland management. There is no evidence that 
the colonial administrators attempted to involve local community elders in formulating resource 
sharing pacts between the two groups. It is also worthy to note that despite the fact that the 
Turkana were living at Kawap at the foot of Mt. Nyiro, they were expected to move with animals 
all the way to Sarima for water, in spite of the abundance of water around Mt. Nyiro and river 
Nasiischo. The battle for socio-spatial spaces among the Samburu and Turkana is therefore very 
much linked to their own survival as pastoralists but also influenced by the role of government 
administrators in drawing arbitrary resource boundaries that not only limited livestock mobility 
but also consolidated territorial claims leading to exclusivity of certain groups from previously 
shared resources. 
 
Later in 1956, the movement of Turkana herders in and out of El Barta grazing fields in Baragoi 
continued to be a matter of grave concern to colonial administrators. This led to conflict between 
the Turkana who were perceived as “outsiders” and Samburu who were viewed as “owners” of 
the land. The role of drought in the movement of the Turkana in and out of El Barta plains is 
further captured in an annual report by the District Commissioner of Maralal
43
: 
“There is no doubt that the creeping infiltration of Turkana into and across Samburu still 
continues. When the El Barta plains became completely denuded of grazing owing to the 
lack of rain much of the Turkana stock disappeared over the boundary into Lodwar 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
43
 KNA/DC/SAM/1/4 (1956) Samburu District Annual Report: Intertribal Relations-Turkana 
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district and at the end of the year when the latter district was suffering more severely 
larger numbers have infiltrated back into Samburu”. 
The movement of the Turkana from Lodwar district to Baragoi is therefore linked to weather 
patterns and the survival of livestock. Their movement into Baragoi can also be seen as 
‘invasion’ of socio-spatial spaces designated for the Samburu through colonial ethnic boundaries.  
The intensity of contests over grazing lands through raids seems to have gone a notch higher 
after 1960. The District Commissioner of Maralal district in his annual report of 1961
44
 noted the 
following situation: 
“The Samburu-Turkana relations were generally bad, though more on a tribal than a 
personal basis. The Samburu demanded the removal of the Turkana to the west of the 
Suguta, including all those who have over the past 36 years established a prescriptive 
right to the grazing concession to the east of Suguta. This demand was not meant to cure 
the ancient tribal animosities, and it followed a year when the two had given equal 
offense in the tally of stock raids and petty barbs”. 
 
The quote above captures the entry of political dimension to the battle for socio-spatial spaces 
between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. In 1961 there was a general election in Kenya and 
the elected Member of Parliament of Samburu district was a Turkana called Peter Areman. He 
won not because the Turkana were in majority but because by that time a good number of El 
Barta Turkana had moved to Maralal and settled in Loikas area, given that very few Samburu 
voted during this election, the Turkana candidate was elected and this irked Samburu politicians 
who started agitating for the relocation of the Turkana population ‘beyond Suguta valley45’. The 
narrative of moving the Turkana beyond Suguta valley is still used by today’s politicians to 
incite violence during the electoral period. From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the 
battle over pastoralists’ spaces in Baragoi is over a century-old. It is rooted in historical contests 
precipitated by colonial ethnic boundary making that designated Baragoi as primarily Samburu 
territory. These contests of spaces have further been exacerbated by droughts and the necessity 
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 KNA/DC/SAM/1/4 (1961) Samburu District Annual Report: Inter-Tribal Affairs-Samburu-Turkana. 
 
45
 Euphemism for relocation back to Turkanaland 
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for mobility of pastoralists’ livestock in search for ample pastures to sustain their livelihoods. 
Pastoralists’ violence therefore denotes power contests over socio-spatial spaces of production 
replete with socio-cultural meanings of pastoralists’ memories and identities as distinct groups of 
people. In the following section, I aim to critically analyse the role of space in the production and 
construction of violence in contested pastoralists grazing lands. To achieve this, I integrate 
geographical and anthropological approaches to space, culture, riskscapes and warscapes to 
capture the interactions between humans and their environments in the construction of violence. 
5.2 Contested Spaces and the Production/Construction of Violence 
Violence has been described as a practice that has social and spatial dimensions (Tyner 2012: ix). 
Acts of violence aim to regulate the behavior of people through space (Tyner 2012: ix). Foucault 
(1979:148) argued that “spaces provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out 
individual segments and establish operational links”.  Foucault (1979) envisaged spaces as static 
and passive arenas that influence human behavior. He however implied that humans do not 
influence spaces. Michel de Certeau (1984:117) saw spaces as “a practiced places” denoting the 
interaction between forms such as an empty office building with the people who seek services in 
it. Georg Simmel (1950) argued that space contains the following distinct properties: exclusivity; 
arguing that two bodies cannot occupy the same space; space therefore denotes attempts at 
domination and control. He also argued that space can be seen as boundaries that guide human 
experience and social interaction. In this sense Simmel saw space as pockets of sub cultures 
which include specific groups of people for specific purposes while excluding the rest of society. 
He further argued that social formations arise out of the interactions in social space. Given the 
exclusivity that social space provides for its members, certain cultural practices draw in specific 
sub groups that subscribe to the shared practice. Those who are admitted to such social and 
physical spaces may be admitted on the basis of age, gender, ethnic identity or a given cultural 
attribute such as bravery or prowess in hunting.  For Simmel, the management of ‘personal 
space’ in situations where one or more distinct groups were within each other’s proximity 
precipitate confrontations as one group threatens the personal space of the other. Simmel noted 
that change of location through nomadic migrations altered the relationships between groups as 
immigrants were seen as ‘strangers’ and their utilization of production areas resisted and 
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frowned upon by the locals . The ‘strangers’ were seen as encroachers within the productive 
sphere of the natives. Migration of encroachers can therefore be argued to lead to contests over 
social and physical spaces which catalyse societal change in terms of forced movement of people 
due to insecurity within certain spaces. 
 
Witsenburg and Zaal (2012:3) defined “space’ as a concrete area, identifiable on a map, with x 
and y coordinates, where things happen between people, where the natural environment is 
visible, where society’s interactionss with nature occurs, where human structures are built, and 
where people move between concrete points”. This definition depicts the socio-physical relations 
that take place within spaces; however it doesn’t take into account, the relationships that are 
nurtured when humans own a space and make it a place of identity. Mulugeta and Hagmann 
(2008:73) in their study of the Karrayu pastoralists in Ethiopian Awash Valley described 
pastoralists’ space in the following terms; “pastoralist space comprises a territorial and a 
symbolic dimension. Geographically, it designates the incessantly contracting borders of the 
Karrayu home territory and the bitter struggle to defend rangeland resources against encroaching 
adjacent groups, agro-commercial interests and conservationists. Symbolically, it refers to a 
landscape of meanings that is driven by governmental and outsider recognition of and herders’ 
identification with ‘pastoralist identity”. In the case of Baragoi, I analyse pastoralists’ space as the 
socio-physical areas where pastoralists groups interact as collectivities, the places where they 
derive their identities and memories, their places of rituals and ceremonies, grazing lands, 
manyattas, livestock corridors, salt licks, livestock markets, cattle dips and water resources used 
by their livestock in the wet and dry seasons. 
 
Wood (2007a:20) argued that both ‘built’ and ‘imagined’ spaces are critical for the ‘production 
and construction of violence’. According to him, space is the location of violence and provides 
the motivation and sometimes even the strategy for violent action. Further, he argues that “space 
is also connected to its construction, the ways that physically forceful acts are individually and 
collectively interpreted” (2007a:20-21). According to Wood there exists a strong linkage 
between space and violence given that violence takes places within defined spaces; territories. 
Violence can therefore be used as a tool for drawing physical and social boundaries between 
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groups and individuals (Wood 2007a:21). In defence of territories, violence is therefore a marker 
of group dominance over physical and social spaces and the resources contained within its 
boundaries. Wood describes the type of violence used to exclude specific groups out of specific 
territories as “exclusionary violence” (2007a:24). In his view, exclusionary violence is not only 
used to establish dominance or exclusivity in resource use but also to demonstrate power over 
particular spaces of production. Violence over socio-physical spaces are therefore power contests 
pitting one group against the other. The significance of space for the production of violence is 
further emphasized by Anderson (1999) who argued that for violence to occur there must be 
‘staging areas’ where the threat of violence is real and expected. Staging areas in this case are 
socio-physical spaces where the practice of violence is cultural legitimate. Staging areas further 
prescribe individuals or groups who have the legitimate use of violence within these spaces as 
well as the instruments of violence.  
Spaces also give socio-cultural meanings to groups. Mutsotso (2013) noted the role of spaces as 
avenues of cultural rites that apply violent behavior as a means of upward social mobility. In this 
case, performance of violent acts in these spaces as a rite of passage admits community members 
to the next phase of life. The practice of violence within these physical and social spaces not only 
bestows honor and respect among one’s kin but also places upon them the duty to practice 
violent action in defense of the social and physical space against the intrusion of those who have 
not attained similar status but also against those defined as the ‘enemy’. Culture therefore 
establish strict rules of behavior among group members and legitimize the use of violence to 
maintain and defend it against outsiders. Foucault (2004) linked violence along the borders with 
social elite’s pursuance of influence and their attempts to control areas of strategic production. 
Violence in this case is used to acquire power and influence over geographical and social spaces 
by elites. Deploying violence to gain exclusive use of geographical spaces can be interpreted as 
the use of exclusionary force to establish “dominance over spaces” (Wood 2007a:24). Contests 
over grazing lands among pastoralists groups was also noted as the genesis of violence outbreak 
between Garre and Degodia pastoralists in North Eastern Kenya (Schlee 2009:217) in 1998. The 
use of violence can therefore be aimed to assert hegemony over ‘enemy’ communities and 
entrench exclusive utility of certain socio-physical productive spaces.  
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Violence can also be a mechanism through which society is ordered. Through violent action 
distinctions between “them” and “us” is established based on ethnic identities, gender, age etc 
(Lefebvre 1991). Violence therefore serves as a means through which social stratification of 
society is established often with the aim of preserving of group interests. Contests over spaces 
can also be seen in the context of ‘mijoni’. ‘Mijoni’ is a term used to imply no man’s land among 
the Samburu. Mijoni are areas rich in grazing land but fiercely contested between rival groups to 
such an extent that no single group has managed to exert exclusive control. As a result they 
become spaces of insecurity, where no group dares graze their cattle (Witsenburg & Zaal 2012). 
This ultimately alters the local ecosystem of the area to the detriment of local pastoralists’ 
livelihoods. Violence in this case serves as a means for effecting environmental change through 
the alteration of local ecosystems, thus contracting pasturelands and limits the mobility of 
pastoralists. If violence is territorial and includes the aim of gaining exclusivity in use of 
resources, then it must be seen as a competition for power and a means to rally collectivities into 
a common agenda. In this case, space then is the venue within which the struggle for control and 
access to the vital resources is contested. Lastly, Broch-Due (2005:15-16) has linked density of 
violence with topography and intimacy, thus implying that wars are fought over and determined 
by built environments as well as social relationships among the residents. Topography, she 
argues determines the safety options that those fleeing war can retreat to in order to ‘normalise’ 
their lives as refugees or internally displaced persons. Intimacy of war on the other part implies 
the closeness of relations between combatants. Are they strangers to one another? Closeness in 
social relations between actors in war is argued to play a significant part in the levels of hatred, 
frequency of war and the choice of revenge technologies. Revenge violence is therefore not only 
driven by the need “to get even” but also in relations to whether the ‘enemy’ shares the same 
topographical and intimate space. In the next section I analyse the ways in which culture and 
violence mutually produce violence in space. 
5.3 Culture and Violence as Mutually Producing Phenomenon in Space 
In discussing the linkage between culture and violence Wood defines culture as “historically 
accumulated collections of beliefs and practices which are socially produced and aimed at 
meeting psychological needs” (Wood 2007b:3). This implies that human behavior is guided by 
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the socio-cultural and the environmental context within which the human is situated. Culture 
prescribes rules of engagement with other members of society within certain geographical 
locations (2007b: 4). Culture may also define how people of different cultural orientations treat 
each other as neighbours, strangers or competitors. Culture therefore is crucial in determining 
and shaping human relations especially their identity and meanings of their identities in relation 
to their socio-spatial spaces. Galtung (1990:291) defined cultural violence as those aspects of 
cultures that are used to normalize or legitimize violent action among groups. In other words 
cultural violence are norms, mores and other forms of human socializations that accepts violence 
as a means to some ends within specific spaces. Similarly, Wood argues that violence incidences 
are interpreted through the prism of culture (2007b:4). Thus culture is a medium for legitimizing 
violent action among groups. 
 
Wood views violence as inevitable consequence of socio-spatial relationships in society. He 
attributes the existence of violence in human relations as critical to sustenance, status and 
security needs of different groups (2007b:7). Violence is therefore a means through which 
territories can be gained or protected as well as a means through which group sustenance can be 
guaranteed. Culture thus prescribes the nature of ‘accepted’ violence, its rules, its location and 
the intended purposes. Cultures further shape the means, meanings, location and purposes of 
violence. Wood (2007b:7-8) argues that culture designates what types of violence is acceptable 
and which ones are prohibited. He further states that when a culture legitimizes violent action as 
normal, it assigns particular actors to carry out the said violent action under certain 
circumstances within specific spaces. Cultures of violence are therefore historically developed, 
socialized into the potential actors and later passed on from one generation to another (Wood 
2007b:7). Cultures of violence are dynamic and change depending on the times, technology and 
violence potential in every generation. In legitimating elements of violent behaviors in society, 
cultures of violence are enhanced and celebrated as a good thing. Cultures therefore not only 
legitimize violent actions buts they also project these action into the larger society. 
 
Wood (2007b:10-11) further linked the legitimization of violence within some cultures as an 
avenue through which male community members compete, preserve or gain power in society. 
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Violence is therefore a known means of acquiring or preserving power. The power to be acquired 
or competed for must be something culturally sanctioned like the need to get a wife or household 
sustenance. The cultural need to get a wife goes hand in hand with the need to raid livestock to 
meet that goal. Through cattle raids therefore violence is used to gain livestock to meet a critical 
socio-cultural threshold. Similarly, with the increase in the proliferation of arms and the 
commercialisation of raids, shrewd businessmen hire warriors who are culturally mandated to 
conduct cattle raids to do so not for socio-cultural reasons but for commercial gains. Culture in 
this case is therefore used to gain economic power. Vengeance as a legitimate means of 
correcting injustice among many cultures is also used by pastoralists’ communities to correct 
past wrongs or to restore the status quo (Wood 2007b:10). Revenge raids are therefore seen as 
normal and expected occurrences among pastoralists groups. The normality of revenge further 
entrenches violence in cattle raids as a means of correcting wrongs, acquiring socio-economic 
power and prestige in inter-communal relationships.  
 
Among communities that legitimize violence as part of their socio-cultural practices, the physical 
pain inflicted upon initiates through circumcision or scarification and the place of the violent 
action are argued to have symbolic meaning to the specific cultural groups. Such spaces of 
cultural violence are not open to every member of the community but only to those that are 
“ritually authorized and empowered by the social collective” to perform the violence that 
transforms a member of society from one age-group to another, to transition a member to a 
higher social class, or even to admit one back into the fold of the social collective (Broch-Due 
2005:19). Socio-cultural transformations of relationships are therefore legitimized through 
violence within specific spaces. Acts of violence within socio-cultural spaces therefore not only 
help in building group identity among initiates but also in creating a bond between initiates and 
the place of initiation, thus enhancing its own identity with the transformation of the lives of its 
initiates. Violence in this sense is used to create and sustain the bond between humans as social 
beings and their environments. In expounding on violence over social spaces, the next section 
analyses grazing lands as landscapes of certain uncertainty to emphasise on the need for 
inhabitants to negotiate constant risks posed by the built environment and also by the strategies’ 
deployed by actors to negotiate their relationships in a harsh environment. 
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5.4. Grazing Lands as Landscapes of Certain Uncertainty 
Contests over grazing lands have the capacity to transform these productive spaces into 
“territorial units characterized by mutual interactions between its elements whereas risk are 
regarded as structuring phenomena that shape the landscape into a riskscape” (Müller-Mahn 
2013: xviii). This means that the insecurity that prevails in contested grazing lands thus 
transform landscapes into “risky territories” which avails advantages and disadvantages to 
different actors within pastoral areas. The nature or severity of the contests has an impact on 
human and livestock mobility depending on the risk levels of attack or raid. The levels of risk 
further shape human choices in terms of weapons for defence. The uncertainty and fear that one 
faces in grazing lands therefore transform grazing lands into places of high risk in which 
expectations of personal harm is high. Müller-Mahn has defined riskscapes as “landscapes of 
multi-layered and interacting risks that represent both the materiality of real risks and the 
perceptions, knowledge and imaginations of people who live in that landscape and continuously 
shape and reshape its contours through their daily activities” (2013:xvii).  Contested landscapes 
are characterized with formations that endow actors with military advantage such as hilly areas 
and busy shrubs for easy camouflage. Further, contested landscapes also present areas critical for 
livelihood sustenance such as good grazing fields and water sources. On the other hand, 
landscapes under contests are places of ‘inevitable congregation’ since everyone seeks to utilise 
the common resource thereby increasing the probability of violent contests in the absence of 
institutional frameworks of resource sharing. Contested landscapes are therefore areas fraught 
with fear brought about by the violent nature of the contest but also by the strategic location of 
the area of the contest. Grazing lands as contested landscapes therefore play a significant role in 
shaping violence that is carried out for material purposes but it also shapes people’s perception 
of the specific area. Contested areas gain their own reputation as ‘dangerous places’ through 
human experience of violence. The timing and nature of violence expected in contested 
landscapes is carried through human memories of past victims and projected to the larger 
society. Grazing lands therefore are not just landscapes of material contests but also landscapes 
of violent memories through which human experience is nurtured and future violent action is 
planned and executed as a compensation for past ‘injustices’. 
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 Photo 4: Showing the prevalence of arms within Baragoi landscape along the Tuum-Baragoi Highway in 
February 2015, Source: Author 
Nordstrom (1997) introduced the concept of warscapes to imply places of extreme brutality and 
spaces of insecurity characteristic of civil war situations. She argued that cultures of violence 
emerge in warscapes as a dynamic reality which shapes and is shaped continually by all actors 
within and without the locality of the war (1997:123). Warscapes as integral structures of 
violence are thus critical in shaping the behaviors of actors and victims of violence. The concept 
of warscapes therefore denotes the daily reality of risk and uncertainty occasioned by insecurity 
within social spaces. Korf et al (2010) linked the social construction of ‘warscapes’ to the 
practice of violence. They argued that warscapes have “differentiated arenas, networks and 
connections of relational spaces in which distinct human trajectories coexist” (2010:386).  
Warscapes can therefore be seen as areas of socio-physical contests which are part of networks 
of relationships that promote the use of violence in pursuit of power for territorial or other 
political purposes.  
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Figure 4: Contested Pasture and Water points in Baragoi, Samburu County 
 
Source: Author 
The map in Fig. 4 above shows the contested grazing and water-points along the Turkana-
Samburu border in Baragoi. From the map it can be seen that these contested spaces are all 
reserve grazing lands that herders use only when they are faced with major droughts. The use of 
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these spaces leads to the concentration of a large number of pastoralists within these areas 
precipitating competition over resource use coupled with claims of resource ownership in these 
areas. Violence during these times of ecological stress is high given the multiplicity of claims 
and the levels of illegal arms available.  In the next section, I apply the above concepts to analyse 
pastoralists’ violence in the grazing lands of Baragoi. 
5.5 Conceptualizing Grazing Lands as Contested Spaces in Baragoi  
Drawing from the ideas of Witsenburg and Zaal (2012), Wood (2007a; 2007b), de Certeau 
(1984) and Simmel (1950), this chapter conceptualizes grazing lands in Baragoi as four distinct 
spaces: livelihood spaces, socio-cultural spaces, territorial spaces and political spaces. First of 
all, violent cattle raids in Baragoi have been occasioned by competition over pasture and water 
resources during the dry seasons leading to violent shoot-outs in specific grazing lands along the 
Turkana-Samburu ethnic boundary. This finding conforms to that of Ember et al (2012:159) 
whose analysis of raiding in Turkana County showed that dryier months have a higher intensity 
of violence contrary to the finding of Witsenburg and Adano (2009) in Marsabit who had argued 
that raids occur mostly during the wetter months. These contests are therefore partly triggered by 
the need to access or preserve livelihood spaces. This is well captured in a police signal form 
Baragoi Police Station (2011): 
“Assistant Chief of Kawap location a Turkana male adult aged 40 years reported that 
unknown numbers of raiders suspected to be Turkana stole unknown numbers of goats 
and camels from Rendille herders who had relocated to Kawap area in Samburu North 
from Marsabit in search of pasture” (Baragoi Police Station 23rd September 2011) 
 
In their study that linked topography of pastoralists’ lands and violence, Adem et al (2012:11) 
found that, plains (grazing lands) are places of strategic importance to pastoral livelihoods. In 
their view “plains serve not only as key rangelands but also as important staging grounds for 
herd splitting and coalescing in response to changing resource conditions”. Secondly, grazing 
lands are venues for cultural rights exclusive to particular groups. The contest over these grazing 
lands may not necessarily be over the rights to graze in particular areas but to protect specific 
holy places such as mountains or rivers where warriors from specific groups are circumcised. 
 99 
 
Thirdly, grazing lands are further seen by warriors as territorial space exclusive to them as ethnic 
units. The Samburu see the whole of Baragoi and indeed Samburu County as their territory and 
the competition with the Turkana of Baragoi during the dry spell imply invasion of their land by 
‘outsiders’ even though the Turkana have shared these resources with the Samburu for over a 
century. The Turkana are “no owners of soil” to paraphrase Simmel (1950:3). Lastly, warriors 
perceive grazing lands as their political space, the space where the political leaders meet them to 
strategise on how to subdue the enemy for instance through the provision of arms and 
ammunition. 
Figure 5: Pastoralists Conceptualisation of Pastures 
 
 
Source: Author’s Analysis based on field data 
5.5.1 Contested Grazing Lands of Baragoi 
In Baragoi contests over ‘productive spaces’ occur during the drought periods. Contrary to the 
findings by Witsenburg & Adano (2009) that shows pastoralists groups are most likely to 
cooperate and share their limited resources during periods of drought, my observation in Baragoi 
disapproves this notion. In Baragoi, access to pasture and water is seen in ethnic terms and 
pastoralists from time to time use ethnic identities to allow or deny other users access to vital 
productive resources. For pastoralists’ livelihoods, pasture and water are seen as strategic 
production resources during periods of drought and thus access or lack of access to these 
 100 
 
resources is key to explaining pastoralists’ violence (Lefebvre 1991; Wood 2007a). Further 
violent raids during the drought period are not necessarily aimed at replenishing the herds. This 
is because at this time, many herds are physically emaciated. Nonetheless raids during droughts 
are used to demarcate spheres of influence and to protect specific grazing fields from the 
encroachment of one’s ‘enemies’ (Wood 2007b). Many at times the few raided animals may be 
sold locally to butcheries in the local urban areas or the warriors would just slaughter and eat a 
raided animal within the grazing field (Fleisher 2000). In the dry seasons in Baragoi, the Turkana 
and Samburu engage in armed contests over exclusive access to Ngoriche, Mbukoi, Kawap, 
Polytechnic, Marti and Pillay grazing fields along the Marti-South Horr highway. The contested 
nature of these grazing lands is captured in interviews below: 
 
“Lnkuume (Turkana) do not belong here. This is our place and our cattle can graze anywhere in 
Samburuland” (Interview Samburu moran, October 2014 Ngoriche hills)  
 
“Ngor (Samburu) are invading our territory. This road separates our pastures from theirs. But 
because of their politicians, they are coming in large numbers from Wamba and Archers Post to 
use our pasture while they preserve theirs for use once ours is over. This is why we raid them so 
that they can be afraid and move to their side of the (ethnic) border.”(Interview Turkana moran 
October 2014, Ngoriche hills) 
 
The notion of space as a venue for social interaction (Simmel 1950) and a territorial sphere 
(Wood 2007a) within which pastoralists strive for exclusivity for their survival is well 
demonstrated in Baragoi. Nomadic pastoralism thrives on mobility of livestock which requires 
vast grassland (space) for livestock production. In Baragoi, specific spaces are often contested 
during the drought periods. Access and use of these spaces by the Samburu and Turkana 
pastoralists guarantees the continued life of pastoralists’ households and their livestock. 
Pastoralists’ violence manifests of socio-spatial contests over exclusivity to grazing lands among 
the Samburu and Turkana. This is illustrated by the frequency of raids in specific pasturelands in 
Baragoi during the long drought of the year 2011 as shown in the table below: 
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Table 3: Grazing lands as Arenas of Raids from 2010-2011 
Period Pastureland Occurrence Ethnic 
group 
21
st
 November 
2010 
Naagis Report of a Samburu raid of Turkana cattle where one Turkana herder was 
killed and two children injured at Naagis grazing field. 
Samburu 
2
nd
 December 
2010 
Marti Report of a banditry attack by 20 Pokot raiders on Samburu herders at Marti. 7 
cattle and 300 goats stolen. 
Pokot 
5
th
 February 
2011 
Lbaaogol Report of attempted bandit attack of Samburu herders at Lbaaogol grazing 
field by Turkana raiders where one raider was shot dead. 
Turkana 
6
th
 February 
2011 
Naiyanatir Report of banditry attack by Pokot raiders on Turkana herders at Naiyanatir 
grazing field in Nachola location. One Turkana herder injured. 
Pokot 
12
th
 February 
2011 
Mutirata Report of banditry attack by Turkana raiders on Samburu herders at Mutirata 
grazing field in Suiyan village. One KPR killed and his gun taken by raiders. 
Turkana 
18
th
 February 
2011 
Lowang Report of shooting of a Pokot raider after Pokots attempted to raid Turkana 
herders at Lowang grazing field next to Nakuprat village. 
Pokot 
8
th
 June 2011 Ndonyongere 
Mbokoi 
Report of a raid at Ndonyongere Mbukoi grazing field where Pokot raiders 
attacked Samburu herders and killed one Samburu herder and made away with 
unknown number of livestock 
Pokot 
17
th
 June 2011 Ndonyo 
Nkoroto 
Attempted raid at Ndonyo Nkoroto grazing field by about 100 raiders from 
Turkana. One Turkana raider was killed. 
Turkana 
30
th
 June 2011 Ngoriche hills Raid and rape of a Samburu girl 17 years old by Turkana raiders. 5 camels 
where stolen from her. 
Turkana 
2
nd
 July 2011 Nalepito Report of Pokot bandit attack at Nalepito area in Parkati village. 30 raiders 
made away with 2786 shoats. Two Turkana morans shot dead. 
Pokot 
11
th
 July 2011 Lasam Report of 200 Samburu raiders who attacked Lasam area of the Rendille and 
killed 9 people, injured 3 people and stole unknown numbers of livestock 
Samburu 
26
th
 August 
2011 
Lkayo Report of a Pokot raid at Lkayo grazing field in Parkati location. A 60 years 
old Turkana man was killed while his son was injured. Unknown numbers of 
livestock stolen 
Pokot. 
23
rd
 September 
2011 
Karuwaton Report of a Turkana raid of Rendille herders who had crossed into Samburu 
North in search of pasture at Karuwaton in Kawap location. Unknown numbers 
of stock stolen. Two goats shot dead. 
Turkana 
12
th
 December 
2011 
Soit Ngiron Report of cattle raid by the Turkana at Soit Ngiron in Lesirkan location. One 
Samburu was shot dead while three others sustained bullet wounds. 
Turkana 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Kenya Police Signals from Baragoi Police Station (2014) 
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The table above indicates that competition over grazing pastures in Baragoi is high during the 
dry seasons. This is often between the months of October to early March and between May to 
August. Violent raids are therefore dependent upon seasonality. During my fieldwork conflict in 
the grazing lands flared in late October 2014. Part of the reason for the flare-up of violence was 
that there was drought all over Samburu County and warriors from the other two districts; 
Samburu East and Samburu Central moved with their livestock to join their kin in Baragoi, this 
brought tension as the Samburu groups moved into the Turkana side of the grazing lands 
especially in Kawap area. The Turkana argued that this was a strategy devised by the Samburu to 
exhaust their grazing land while preserving their own for future use while the Samburu warriors 
argued that they were in Samburu land and therefore had the exclusive right to utilize their 
grazing lands within Samburu County without consulting the Turkana. 
 
From the table above we can observe that in the 14-month period that is covered, 14 people were 
shot dead during violent raids in pasturelands while 12 others sustained bullet wounds. This 
point to a high stakes contest that prevails in grazing lands and the ‘normalcy’ within which 
violence is used to negotiate access to socio-spatial pastoralists’ spaces among the Turkana and 
Samburu of Baragoi. The effect of violence in terms of deaths, injuries, rapes and livestock lost 
points to the agency of violence in achieving specific ends and ultimately in altering socio-
political relations between groups. It further points to the role of pastoralists’ space in the 
production and construction of violent behavior. All the deaths and injuries occurred due to the 
necessity to carry firearms in the grazing lands. Grazing lands as areas where ammunitions are 
sold further increases the probability of outbreak of violence whenever access to pasturelands is 
contested.  
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Photo 5:  Samburu warrior armed with an M-16 rifle at a livestock vaccination day in Tuum grazing fields, 
November 2014; Source: Author 
5.6 Illegal Arms and Ammunition Trade in Pastoralists Space 
Grazing lands as areas in which illegal arms and ammunition are sold and used for practice, 
defense or attack purposes can be seen in police reports from Baragoi Police Station. In 
interviews with morans, KPRs and police officers it was established that morans are increasingly 
engaged in the sale of ammunition to fellow morans in the grazing fields. Such incidences point 
to the changing nature of pasture lands from contested productive spaces into arenas for 
transactions of the implements of violence and as warrior’s collective space for interaction and 
transaction (Simmel 1950). Pastoralists consider those within the warrior age-group to be 
responsible for handling instruments of violence and engaging in collective protection of ethnic 
territory, its people and livestock. Weak policing infrastructure within grazing spaces gives rise 
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to other state and non-state actors who procure the services of warriors-given their expertise of 
the terrain- to engage in the sale of ammunition further fueling violence. 
In interviews with police officers, we posed the question of how illegal weapons that fuel violent 
cattle raids get to warriors in Baragoi grazing fields. One senior officer
46
 informed us that the 
remoteness of Samburu County helps in the transportation of illegal arms and the response was 
as follows: 
“Communities in Samburu County are believed to be in possession of over 20,000 illegal 
firearms and the Samburu community acquires their firearms by purchasing them from 
Somalis who ferry the arms to Isiolo from Moyale along the Ethiopian-Kenya border and 
also through the Kenyan-Somali border. The firearms are hidden in safe houses in Isiolo 
until market days at Archers Post where arms are sold clandestinely to willing buyers 
who are mostly morans but at times also businessmen and politicians. An AK47 goes for 
KSH 30,000; a G3 rifle goes for KSH 40,000 while an M16 goes for 60,000. A bullet is 
bought at about KSH 100 depending on demand and supply dynamics” (Interview with a 
security officer in Baragoi, November 2014).  
The Samburu warriors mostly use M16 rifles as their weapons of choice.  The M16 is brought 
into Kenya through Somali traders who traverse the increasingly dangerous Kenya-Somali 
border. The limited presence of security personnel in these areas and the corrupt few 
immigration and security officers present at the border enables the smooth entry of M16 guns 
into Northern Kenya all the way through to Isiolo County which neighbours Samburu County 
along the Uaso Nyiro river. From there local arms merchants who double up as transporters of 
goods further take advantage of limited security presence in Samburu County to travel over 
180kms into Baragoi area. They carry weapons hidden in sacks to Baragoi from where the 
weapons and ammunitions are distributed to local gun runners who exchange the guns for 
livestock, mostly in the grazing lands. The table below shows the types of guns found in the 
grazing lands of Samburu North: 
 
 
                                                          
46
 Interview with a security officer during a security meeting with Morans in October 2014 at Ngoriche hills, 
Samburu North sub-County 
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Table 4: Guns Found in Grazing lands of Baragoi 
Type of Gun User Community Entry into Samburu 
County 
Origin 
AK 47/Amakada 
(among the Turkana) 
Mostly Turkana morans, also 
available among Samburu 
morans 
Turkana acquire AK47 
from Gun-traders from 
Turkana County. 
Sold to Samburu 
households  through 
exchange of animals 
Also brought in to Baragoi 
through gun merchants 
who run transport 
businesses in Baragoi 
Mostly from Turkana 
North, obtained from 
traders from South Sudan 
G3 Morans recruited as KPRs, 
mostly among the Samburu 
Government issued, 
available to the Kenya 
Police Service 
German made 
MK IV, MKII, MK I Issued to KPRs mostly of 
Turkana origins, also owned by 
the local Samburu and Turkana 
when previous owners are killed 
during raids 
Government issued to 
KPRs 
British made in 1871 
Carrabin Rifles Samburu and Turkana, obtained 
illegally from government 
officers  
 
Government issued to 
police officers  
 
French made  
 
M-16 Majorly the Samburu  
 
Somalia-Isiolo-Samburu 
route  
 
American made, first 
manufactured in 1960s as 
a response to the Soviet 
invention of the AK47 
aasault rifle 
 
Amatidae the Turkana  Initially used by the 
Turkana Ngoroko to attack 
Turkana and Samburu of 
Samburland  
Locally made by the 
Turkana 
In use from 1930s  
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on field data 
 
The table above shows the variety of guns found in the grazing lands of Baragoi. Among the 
Turkana the AK 47 (Amakada) is more popular owing to its weight (lighter) and easier to use 
when targeting an enemy within a range of 600 meters. The Turkana also have their locally made 
gun called amatidae. Most of these were in use in the 1980s and early 1990s before the influx of 
illegal and government-issued arms in the area. The use of locally made guns points to a 
formerly active blacksmiths industry to cater for the high demand for weapons in Baragoi. This 
further highlights the violent nature of the contest for social spatial spaces between the Samburu 
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and Turkana of Baragoi. Among the Samburu warriors, the M-16 is the preferred weapon. 
According to my Samburu informants
47
 the M-16 is their gun of choice due to its ‘devastating’ 
impact. Unlike the AK47, I was they informed that when a G3 or M-16 pierces vital organs of 
the human body chances of survival of the enemy becomes minimal. The M-16 is also vital for 
long distance shoot-outs and can be used for targeting people beyond 600 meters; it is further 
preferred by the Samburu due to its bomb-sound, which they believe disorients the opponent, 
thus giving them an advantage in ambush situations. Through government supply the Samburu 
and Turkana KPRs have other weapons such as the German-made G3 and others such as the 
MK1, MKII and MKIV, however these are slowly getting phased out since their ammunition are 
no longer in production. Lastly, the French-made Carrabin rifles are also found in the grazing 
lands of Baragoi. This weapon is mostly issued to security officer especially those coming for 
‘operation’ duties in Baragoi. Some of these are later obtained by warriors either through killing 
of police officers or sale by officers commanding stations. 
5.7 Grazing Lands as Places and Spaces for Warrior Mobilization 
Grazing lands in Baragoi have been used in recent times as avenues of warrior mobilization. The 
political leadership has been noted to travel to grazing areas such as Suiyan, Marti, Ngoriche and 
Nasiischo River to address warriors. Major raids have often occurred after political incitements 
by leaders in grazing lands. A case in point was the Baragoi Massacre
48
 which occurred weeks 
after local politicians mobilized youth around Munanda grazing field in the outskirts of Baragoi 
town. Indeed in a documentary
49
 ‘No Man’s Land’ by Jeff Lekupe (2011), the exploitation of 
grazing lands as warriors’ space where politicians visit and distribute arms and ammunition is 
evident. Grazing lands as the fiefdom of the warrior is a noted reality along the Maralal-Marti-
Baragoi-South Horr-Loyangalani route
50
. This route is situated within the contested grazing 
                                                          
47
 Discussion with Samburu moran-leaders at the DO Office in Baragoi, October 2014 
48
 Mobilization for Baragoi massacre can be traced to early October 2012 with series of politically organised raids 
taking place between the Turkana and Samburu. The massacre occurred on 10
th
 November 2012 
49
 The documentary ‘No man’s land’ captured the role of land in violent conflict among pastoralists in Northern 
Kenya. It shows meetings between politicians and warriors prior to cattle raids in Samburu-North sub-County 
50
 Personal observation for 10 months in Samburu North and Police Signals from Baragoi Police Station from 2005-
2014 
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lands between the Samburu and Turkana given that the colonial administrators designated the 
road as the inter-ethnic boundary between the two groups. In this area, warriors strut the turf 
alongside their animals loaded with automatic rifles. Nimrod Taabu (2013) in another 
documentary ‘Samburu State of War51’ noted the ‘use of guns more like walking sticks’ in 
Baragoi grazing lands when he visited Lomirok and Marti areas.  The warriors told him that ‘one 
cannot graze livestock in the area without a gun’. This points to the high stakes nature of the 
contest for socio-spatial spaces between the Turkana and Samburu. 
 
Warriors themselves use the grazing fields as arenas for their own mobilization before raids. In 
my discussions
52
 with Samburu warriors, I learnt that whenever warriors are seen within Baragoi 
town buying maize flour and cooking oil in bulk then a raid was in the offing. I was informed 
that raiders often purchase food items and then retreat to the grazing fields to strategise how to 
carry out the raid. The grazing field is away from human habitation and far from the watchful 
eyes of the security forces thus a conducive for the practice of violence such as the testing of 
firearms. Grazing lands have also been used as training grounds for young warriors. In 
discussions
53
 with chiefs from the Turkana and Samburu communities, we were informed that 
young warriors are trained to aim and shoot at early ages of eight in the grazing fields. The 
grazing fields therefore provide exclusionary spaces that enable the practice of exclusionary 
violence (Wood 2007a). 
5.8 Grazing Lands, Spaces of Dominance and Territoriality  
The battle to control grazing fields during the drought season in Baragoi is pursued under the 
discourses of Nkoopang, among the Samburu. It means “owners of the land” in Samburu 
language. In my meetings with Samburu chiefs, they argued that “Samburu land belongs to the 
Samburu” and they viewed the Turkana as ‘visitors’ or even encroachers. In many political 
meetings occasioned by violent raids and deaths in grazing fields that I attended in South Horr, 
                                                          
51‘ Samburu state of War’ delves into the gun culture of Turkana and Samburu communities and how violent raids 
using guns have led to massacres and displacements 
52
 Discussion with Samburu warriors at Bendera village in November 2014 
 
53
 Discussion with Samburu and Turkana chiefs at Ngilai Anglican Church in November 2014 
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Tuum, Baragoi and Ngilai areas, the Samburu political leadership (Samburu County government 
leaders) spoke of Samburu grazing lands as belonging to the Samburu community. The 
Turkana’s were advised in these meetings to move ‘beyond the Suguta Valley’ which is 
euphemism for asking the Turkana of Baragoi to move back to Turkana County, a place they left 
over a century ago. An illustration of the nature of the contest over space in grazing lands is 
captured by the following police signal: 
“It was reported through phone that today the 25th August 2013 at about 1200 noon the 
Samburu and Turkana morans were fighting at Mparah grazing field. During the incident 
two Samburu morans were injured as follows: one aged 24 years was shot on the left 
lower leg, while another aged 25 years was shot on the right buttock and the bullet lodged 
in the body” (Baragoi Police Station Police Signal 25th August 2013). 
While the above quote doesn’t give reasons for the fight between the Samburu and Turkana 
herders, the fact that it took place in the grazing field implies that contest was about the utility of 
the grazing field. Access to these productive spaces is therefore highly contested as can be seen 
in the injuries sustained by the Samburu herders. 
 
A more recent signal from Baragoi Police Station (2014) further captures the central role access 
to and utilization of grazing lands play in the violent contest between pastoralists groups in 
Baragoi: 
“It was reported by Ag. Chief Baragoi location at about 11.00 AM that there was a fire 
exchange between the Turkana and Samburu herders in Loworiak grazing field about 
14km south of the station. A contingent of police officers drawn from the GSU, AP, 
ASTU and the regular police rushed to the area and intervened. On arrival they were met 
with the sound of F.R.G and rifle fire. The police responded by launching two H.E 60mm 
bombs. Both parties ceased fire and dispersed. One Samburu male adult aged about 35 
years was shot on the back left shoulder. The police suspect that the motive of the fire 
exchange is the scramble for grazing fields. The Turkana’s are said to have invaded 
grazing field that is ordinarily used by the Samburus” (Baragoi Police Station Signal 14th 
December 2014). 
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The above quote captures the dilemma of many herders during the dry season where they are 
forced to move to the few places with adequate pasture for the survival of their animals. To 
guarantee the safe movement of their cattle in these pasturelands, they have to carry firearms to 
deter raiders from other communities from robbing them of their livestock. To gain access to the 
eventual pasturelands in an environment where there is no resource sharing formula, they have to 
use violence to negotiate access and to guarantee the utilization of the grasslands by their 
livestock. This is in line with Adem et al (2012), who have argued that drought and the necessity 
of mobility for herders in Northern Kenya contribute to pastoralists violence  and makes grazing 
lands ‘dangerous geographies’. Further the response of the police is also critical in understanding 
the production and reproduction of violence in grazing lands. As captured in the police report the 
police chose to launch a bomb to disperse a group of herders engaged in gunfire, the role of the 
state security apparatus in violence among pastoralists is seen in the excessive violence it uses 
which detrimental effect even on the environment and thus affecting pastoralists’ livelihoods as a 
whole. 
 
The Police Signal from Baragoi Police Post (2005) further places the battle for territorial 
exclusivity during the dry season at the center of pastoralists’ violence among the pastoralists 
groups in Northwestern Kenya: 
“An intelligence report reaching this post from the Samburu and Turkana herdsmen who 
are currently grazing their cattle at a place called Nasur in East Baringo just a few 
kilometers from Malaso escarpement is that on the 21
st
 day of December, they were 
confronted by Pokot tribesmen and ordered to drive their stock from their grazing field 
back to Baragoi, the said Pokots warned them that if they fail to abide by their order they 
will be attacked. Due to a severe drought prevailing here at Baragoi, the Samburu and 
Turkana refused to vacate the area. There is tension currently at the said area” (Baragoi 
Police Post Signal 23
rd
 December 2005). 
 
The quote above captures the linkages between drought, the essence of livestock mobility and 
the preservation of grazing lands as spaces of dominance by specific groups. East Baringo 
district forms part of today’s Baringo County. The district is inhabited by Pokot pastoralists. The 
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fact that Samburu and Turkana herders moved from Baragoi to Nasur a distance of over 100km 
shows the intensity of the drought in the month of December. Raids and other forms of 
pastoralists’ violence in grazing lands are therefore most likely to occur due to drought. The need 
for preservation of pasturelands for specific group’s exclusive access, mobility of herders with 
livestock and their concentration in specific rich grazing lands mainly used during dry periods 
and the sale of arms and ammunition in the grazing fields therefore inadvertently contribute to 
violent confrontations during periods of scarcity. Raids may therefore occur in places like Nasur 
during the dry season, when the Pokot who see themselves as the ‘owners of the land’ in Nasur 
view other herders from Baragoi as encroachers into their socio-spatial spaces of livestock 
production. Raids in this case are used to gain livestock from resource competitors as well as to 
create a space of insecurity (Witsenburg and Zaal 2012), that forces these ‘foreign’ herders to 
move away from the shared and contested pastureland. 
 
Photo 6: An armed Turkana warrior guarding the Samburu-Turkana pasture boundary at Ngoriche along 
the Baragoi-South Horr highway in October 2014, Source: Author 
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In my discussions with Turkana elders’ over the history of their contest over the socio-spatial 
space of Baragoi. They pointed out that the violence among the Turkana and Samburu is rooted 
in the colonial designation of Baragoi area as ‘Samburuland’ that merged Samburu socio-cultural 
claims to exclusivity in Baragoi space with their administrative and political interests. Mbembe 
(2000:267 quoted in Kefale 2011:77) noted a similar situation in Ethiopia where the ethnic and 
political and administrative boundaries were merged resulting into heightened ethnic solidarities 
that were later used as a basis of organisation and negotiation for political and economic gains 
against other groups. Similarly, the designation of Baragoi as ‘Samburu North district’ and later 
as ‘Samburu North sub-County’ was argued by Turkana elders as erroneous as it gives 
legitimacy to Samburu claims over the territory of Baragoi. As Kefale (2011:77) has noted, in 
situations where ethnic identities compete over territorial spaces, there exists a “direct equation 
between territory and ethnicity”. Violence between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi is 
therefore not only linked to contests over water and pasture but also to territorial contests 
stemming from colonial christening of the space as Samburu territory up to its current 
designation as Samburu North sub-County. 
5.9 Grazing Lands as Venues of Violence 
Bohle (2007:131), in his analysis of violence in Sri Lanka argued that for violence to occur 
among groups, the following prerequisites must be in place; the arena in which the violence 
occurs, the agenda (purpose) that violence aims to achieve, the actors involved in violent action 
and the types of violent actions that perpetrators carry out against each other. Using the grazing 
land of Baragoi as a socio-spatial area within which violence occurs (venue), I apply Bohle’s 
thesis to the analysis of pastoralists violence in Baragoi as follows; first, grazing lands are the 
arenas of violence with limited presence of state security and the existence of non-state actors 
such as gun traders who exploit weak policing systems to supply arms to greater Northern Kenya 
and use warriors to sell ammunition to fellow warriors in the grazing lands. The vastness of 
grazing lands coupled with limited police presence further encourage violent action since 
security officers are unfamiliar with the terrain and mostly ill-equipped to  prevent violence 
situations. Most of the times, the police are simply outnumbered, poorly armed and unfamiliar 
with the rugged terrain of the arid pastoral lands as compared to the warriors who are socialized 
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to herd and protect their livestock in the grazing lands from the early ages. Historical 
marginalisation of Northern Kenya can be seen in the poor road and telecommunication 
infrastructure in the area. This hinders police response to the violence incidences and aids the 
execution of raids and highway banditries as the warriors are more familiar with the terrain 
unlike security officers mostly posted from southern parts of Kenya. Most of the grazing lands 
are in remote areas with limited mobile phone coverage thus relaying of information on violence 
incidences takes days. The high dependence on nomadic pastoralism coupled with high illiteracy 
rates among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi implies that violence as a means of asserting 
individual or group claims to grazing lands will continue due to limited or no education 
opportunities, these confine warriors to nomadic pastoralism. Thus use of violence to protect 
livelihoods and territory is almost a necessity. 
 
Secondly, grazing lands can further be viewed as the place where agendas of violence are 
nurtured and carried out. In Northern Kenya, the major reason for violent raids in grazing lands 
is to protect collective territory from the encroachment of others. In Baragoi, the battle for 
protection of territory is pursued as an ethno-nationalistic agenda with the Samburu viewing the 
Turkana as outsiders and encroachers into their territory. Further, the pastoralists’ violence that 
occurs in the grazing lands of Baragoi is aimed at protection of pasturelands and water resources 
during droughts. Violence occurs along resource boundaries as well as on the banks of rivers 
Nasiischo and Langat. The need to protect specific spaces for cultural practices can also be seen 
to contribute towards pastoralists’ violence among the Turkana and Samburu. The Samburu for 
instance raid the Turkana when they use pasturelands along Mt. Ng’iro areas during the drought 
seasons. Mt. Ng’iro is a holy site for the Samburu used for circumcision of warriors, holding 
specific prayers and blessings of warriors. The violence at the foot of Mt. Ng’iro is therefore not 
only about greed for livestock nor are these motivated by the need to exert revenge over past 
raids. These raids serve to reclaim grazing lands as cultural treasures exclusive to the Samburu. 
These raids are therefore carried out for self-preservation of the Samburu identity. This in line 
with Schlee (2004) and Greiner (2013) findings that violent raids can be used as identity markers 
between distinct groups within a common pastureland. 
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In the last two decades, political leaders have found the mobilization of warriors in grazing lands 
under the pretext of ‘protection’ of territories to be a means through which power can be 
acquired and preserved. Organization of raids during the electoral periods aimed at 
disenfranchising potential voters of opponents (mostly belonging to different ethnic identities) 
have taken place in grazing lands. Such raids often serve multiple purposes such as the 
acquisition of livestock, displacement of opponents (from their voting areas) and mobilisation of 
warriors as voters and also for targeting perceived political enemies. Violence in the grazing 
lands is further fueled by the need to revenge for past raids. Warriors organize themselves within 
the grazing lands and agree to execute a raid either with the victim of a past raid or just by 
themselves without even consulting
54
 a past raid victim. This is in line with Eaton (2012), 
finding on the organization of warriors for revenge among the Pokot, Matheniko and other 
Karimojong groups along the Kenya-Uganda border. The legitimation of revenge can therefore 
be out of a group decision among morans or it can also be politically organised to involve a 
higher number of warriors.  
 
Thirdly various actors play significant roles in the conceptualization of grazing lands as avenue 
of violence. Raiders/warriors are the primary actors in the conceptualization of grazing lands as 
venues of violence. Warriors from the age of 15 till 30 among the Samburu are expected to live 
in the ‘bush’, their interaction with other members of the society is limited. Among the Samburu 
boys as young as eight go along with warriors’ to act as shepherds or lchekuuti. They are 
socialized into violence by the older warriors and are slowly introduced to handling of firearms. 
Warriors going to graze their animals are expected to carry firearms as the sole guarantee of 
defending one’s life and those of his animals. Pride and prestige of a warrior hinges on his 
abilities to herd the livestock and to account for all his father’s cattle upon return from the 
grazing lands (Parenti 2011). Indeed as I was told in Ngorishe; “one cannot graze livestock here 
without a firearm
55”. 
 
                                                          
54
 Interview at Munanda borehole on 4
th
 September 2014 
 
55
 Interview with a KPR officer at Ngoriche hills grazing lands on 17 October 2014 
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Other actors who take part directly or indirectly in the production or construction of violence in 
the grazing lands include the gun traders who are mostly local elites involved in transport 
business, some even owning wholesale shops in Baragoi and other towns such as Tuum, 
Lesirkan and South Horr. These traders use their lorries when ferrying grains and household 
goods to transport arms from Isiolo to Baragoi with the connivance of the security personnel. 
The state that has neglected the security needs of the Northern part of Kenya for over half a 
century has given rise to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and sale of arms. 
During this study, I interviewed
56
 security personnel including local Kenya Police Reservists 
(KPRs) who revealed that local politicians supply arms to warriors to execute raids to win 
political support. Incidences of sale of arms and ammunition to warriors by serving security 
officers
57
 were also recorded during this study. 
 
Fourth, violent actions stemming from contests over grazing space among the Turkana and 
Samburu can be seen in cattle raids, massacres, shootings of herders in grazing lands and shoot-
outs between herders in contested pasturelands. Further, rape of women collecting firewood or 
burning charcoal is reported in police records
58
. Shooting of wildlife by warriors for meat or just 
as targets while practicing shooting skills is also recorded
59
and further captured in interviews 
with morans
60
. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
56
 Interviews at Marti, Tuum and Lonjorin areas in Samburu North sub County in November 2014 
 
57
 Interview with security officer and one chief at Baragoi town in October 2014 
 
58
 Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book, 2009 
 
59
 Baragoi Police Station Signal, 2011 
 
60
 Interview with morans at Ngilai manyatta, November 2015 
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Table 5: Conceptualisation of Grazing Lands as Venues of Violence 
Arenas of Violence Agendas of Violence Violent Actors Violent Actions 
Limited state security Protection of territory Armed morans Raids 
Presence of sub-state 
actors, e.g. gun traders 
Livelihoods protection Gun traders Massacres 
Proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons 
Protection  of socio-
cultural space 
Arms transporters Highway banditries 
Vast marginalized spaces Protection of political 
sphere 
The state/ Kenya Police 
Reservists 
Shootings and shoot-outs 
in grazing lands 
Poor road and 
communication 
infrastructure 
Greed for livestock Politicians Rape of women collecting 
firewood in grazing lands 
High illiteracy levels and 
dependence on nomadic 
pastoralism 
Revenge over past raids Understaffed, demoralized 
and corrupt police 
Shootings of wildlife such 
as ostriches, zebras and 
antelopes 
Source: Author’s compilation from field data, 2014-2015 
 
From the table above we can observe the transformation of grazing lands into venues of violence 
construction and production (Bohle 2007; Sharamo 2014). We can further observe that grazing 
lands are transformed into arenas of violence due to several factors among them the limited 
presence of state security, the presence of gun traders and the easy availability of firearms within 
pasturelands of Baragoi. The ease and frequency with which cattle raids and other violent 
agendas are carried out is facilitated by the historical marginalisation that pastoralists inhabiting 
Northern Kenya have endured since 1963. Violence whether in the form of raids, highway 
banditries or shoot-outs between herders serve to fulfill socio-political purposes such revenge 
(Eaton 2012), to obtain livestock (Parenti 2011) or to eliminate political competition from a 
common constituency (Greiner 2013). Further, it is observable that violence in pasturelands is 
fuelled by multiple agendas. The major ones are to protection of territory, livelihoods and socio-
cultural spaces. However, due to the influence of politicians and the use of ethno-nationalism as 
a tool for galvanizing political support as is evident in the phrase ‘move the Turkana beyond the 
Suguta Valley’, pastures are continually viewed as political spheres and visited by politicians to 
meet warriors to plan raids, to seek political support or to endear themselves to warriors through 
the provision of relief food especially during the drought periods. 
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5.10 Concluding Remarks 
The battle over pastoralists grazing lands in Northern Kenya has often been attributed to external 
factors. Among them one can list the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the 
mobilization of warriors by politicians and the increased commercialization of raids. The role of 
geography and how it contributes to pastoralists’ violence has been long ignored. Watts (2000) 
has however argued that violence is the struggle over geographical space thus placing built 
environment as a critical factor in understanding violence.  Ample evidence shows that a 
majority of pastoralists’ violence is organized in manyattas but takes place in the highly 
contested grazing lands. The battle for pastoralists grazing lands is therefore a fierce contest over 
geography. Gaining access to pasturelands implies violently establishing control and dominance 
or exclusivity over space and territory. Looking at cattle raids in pastoralists grazing lands as a 
contest over ‘resource spaces’ widens our understanding of the role and nature of pastoralists’ 
violence. The role that space plays in the indoctrination of warriors and as the place of violence 
construction and production among the warrior-age set in many pastoralists’ societies conforms 
to the recent finding by Straight et al (2016) of the Samburu concept of Ntoror, as pastoralists’ 
landscapes which attract conflicts and produce violence. 
 
The practice of cattle raiding fits within Galtung’s (2003) definition of ‘cultures of violence’ as 
the norms used to violence legitimize violence against others. Among pastoralists of Northern 
Kenya, key perfomers of violence belong to the same age-set across the ethnicities and are all 
defined loosely as morans. Drawing from Bohle’s (2007) analysis of violence in Sri Lanka, I 
argue that the establishment of pastoralists grazing lands as venues of violence and as places for 
violence socialization and practice gives credence to the classification of grazing lands as socio-
spatial areas of violence. This perhaps explains our observation that warriors carry firearms only 
in the grazing fields, since the grazing field is viewed literally as a “jungle” void of any state 
regulations. In my discussions with Turkana and Samburu warriors, grazing lands were 
uniformly described using the Swahili word msituni meaning jungle. Drawing from Wood 
(2007a) my analysis focuses on grazing lands in Baragoi as contested socio-spatial areas where 
the production and reproduction of pastoralists’ violence among the Samburu and Turkana of 
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Baragoi determines aspects of socio-political relations in terms of safety, trade and mobility 
within livestock corridors. 
 
Violent raids in grazing lands between the Turkana and Samburu indicate the dearth of inter-
communal institutions of resource management in Baragoi. The role of inter-communal 
arbitration and management of grazing reserves was always left to the elders, in my 
observations; this does not work among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. Elder-brokered 
peace initiatives were often short-lived and the cycles of violence resumed after another raid. 
Through police documents, I learnt of the death of a Turkana community elder
61
 who was shot 
dead at an inter-communal peace meeting at Lonjorin (Baragoi Police Station 2008). Violent 
contests within the grazing lands of Baragoi can be argued to occur due to lack of inter-
communal grazing land committees that can be used to enable amicable pasture sharing during 
periods of droughts. 
 
While pastoralists violence in other parts of Kenya are linked to commercialisation of cattle raids 
(Fleisher 2000), the case of Baragoi reveals that violence is used more to preserve livelihoods. 
Violent raiding witnessed in Baragoi mostly aims at protecting pasturelands but also to preserve 
group identity of group within specific socio-spatial areas. Further, in the height of raids, revenge 
violence spreads to urban centers like Baragoi town making every possible space a battle field 
based on ethnic identity. Collective violence that stems from series of raids and revenge attacks 
lead to a broader contest between the Turkana and Samburu based on historical claims of 
indigenousness to the socio-spatial area of Baragoi. Place-identity plays a huge role during 
episodes of targeted violence that spirals from the grazing fields to Baragoi town. At these times 
chances of a shooting in the evenings along the roads of Baragoi town is always determined by 
the shooter’s conviction that the target is not part of ‘us’. Lastly, inter-communal peacebuilding 
efforts should take note of the fact that warrior age-sets are legitimated through cultural norms to 
make war, while elders are responsible for peacemaking.  
 
 
                                                          
61
 Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book 2008, 29
th
 April 
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While peacebuilding approaches among pastoralists have focused on elders as the controllers of 
warriors, understanding of the egalitarian nature of pastoralists’ societies and the specific roles of 
each age-group may help in redirecting peace-building efforts towards warriors, through warrior 
leaders among the Samburu and Turkana. 
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Cattle Raids in Northern Kenya as a  Manifestation of Elite Rivalry and 
Ethnic Politics 
6.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that livestock raids and pastoralists’ competition over water and pastures 
in Northwestern Kenya are manifestations of local ethnic political contests and rivalries aimed at 
controlling resources by evicting competitors from a previously shared area. The culture of 
raiding among the Samburu, Turkana, Pokot, Borana, Gabra and Rendille communities has 
changed over the last 40 years. Whereas elders were the gate-keepers of communal institutions, 
today new actors are at the fore front of new forms of violent raids. Among Samburu and 
Turkana communities politicians and shrewd businessmen have emerged to exploit ethnic rivalry 
that exists between these groups to use it to mobilize raids. Raiding in essence has adopted Karl 
von Clausewitz dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’. Warriors are 
armed and paid to carry out raids that serve the ‘selfish’ interests of elites. Competition for 
political influence is closely intertwined with competition over scarce water and grazing pastures 
among Turkana and Samburu. Given that pastoralists survive on decreasing pasture and water 
resources. This study shows that political elites arm their communities during the dry season to 
gain upper hand in contests to access limited resources. The raids are therefore aimed at solving 
historical challenges such as access to land as the case of Waso Rongai and Kawap below will 
show. Cattle raids no longer occur in traditional context of restocking but as a strategic tool used 
to settle communal challenges such as access to land. This is done through the moblisation of 
morans by communal elite  
 
The practice of cattle raids among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya is an age-old tradition 
that for a long time helped to maintain mutual inter-ethnic relations and supported the 
pastoralists’ social economy. Till some years ago, the raids had functions of “warrior 
socialization”, livestock genetic cross–breeding, pasture exploitation, control, and group 
negotiations. Traditions and peace building protocols, besides the low technology of weapons 
like sticks and spears, were used to keep conflicts to a bearable level. During these times cattle 
raids occurred under a set of mutually agreed rules that were laid down by elders and passed 
from one generation to another. According to these rules, raids took place mainly to replenish 
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stock after periods of droughts which often decimated the livestock population (KHRC 2010). 
Furthermore, raids were conducted on neighbouring communities to raise livestock for the 
payment of bride wealth. The practice of raiding to obtain bride wealth was premised on the 
notion that warriors had to prove their braveness to potential brides by showing courage and 
going into ‘battle’ to acquire livestock. Marrying using raided livestock was therefore a 
manifestation of prestige for the groom and high honor to the bride (Heald 1997; Fleisher 2000).  
 
Cattle raids have in the past therefore been driven by several factors and actors. Among the 
factors that contributed to this practice was seasonality and environmental change. In this case 
raids occurred after periods of droughts which most often lead to livestock death. Raids were 
therefore a means through which pastoralists households maintained sustainability of their 
livelihoods by restocking (Witsenburg and Adano 2009). Secondly, traditional cattle raiding was 
driven by the need for inter-communal socio-economic interaction.. The practice of raiding 
brought elders from neighbouring communities together to lay down the rules and to act as 
arbiters in case warriors violated the raiding stipulations. It further brought neighbouring 
warriors together as worthy competitors for the young women in their communities and for the 
pride and praise that accompanied noted prowess and success in cattle raids as expressed in 
traditional folklore, (Heald 1997). 
 
Traditional cattle raiding was regulated by elders who sanctioned warriors for killing women, 
children and the elderly. It was considered a taboo and in most cases, when these groups of 
people were killed or injured compensation in the form of herds of cattle was always given to 
make peace between neighbouring groups. Warriors who participated in raids were supervised 
by elders. For a raid to be successful the warriors needed the blessings of the elders and this 
meant that warriors could not unilaterally venture into unsanctioned raids since this would be 
deemed as an act of aggression by neighbouring communities. Young women as potential brides 
of the warriors also played a central role especially by urging their suitors to prove their courage 
by going for a raid and bringing to the brides homes raided animals as bride wealth, (Heald 
1997).  
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Since the 1970s cattle raiding as a traditional practice has changed tremendously. It has become a 
manifestation of ethnic competition for resources and political supremacy. Today, cattle raids 
between the Turkana and Samburu in Samburu North sub-County occur not as a means through 
which warriors from the two groups acquire livestock for payment of bride wealth but rather as a 
means through which warriors acting on the behest of elites and community politicians can 
disenfranchise competitors from the neighboring community from voting for their preferred 
candidates. In this case cattle raids have transformed into a political tool in the hands of 
politicians and budding politicians through which potential voters for rival candidates are 
displaced through sheer violence and burning of their homesteads thus forcing their expulsion 
from the electoral area (Osamba 2000).  
 
Given the insecurity that has pervaded Northern Kenya since independence; political leaders 
have perfected the mantra of campaigning on the pretext of ‘protection.’ Thus aspiring 
politicians use their clout and influence during and after political campaigns to prove their 
‘protection credentials’ by supplying arms and ammunition to communities who subsequently 
use these not only for self-protection but also for aggression against neighbouring groups. There 
is evidence from our research and also from newspaper articles in Eastern Africa that elites from 
pastoralists groups and politicians are at the fore front in purchasing weapons and ammunition 
which are then distributed to community warriors during periods of inter-ethnic tension (Wachira 
2015). The purchased weapons are then used for ethnic cleansing purposes with the sole aim of 
uprooting rival groups from the resource base to guarantee exclusive access to one group to 
shared inter-communal resources such as grazing land or water sources. 
 
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Northern Kenya is facilitated by elite 
groups who operate legal businesses such as transport and wholesale shops while also 
clandestinely dealing in the illicit gun markets. The limited presence of security personnel in 
these areas and their willingness to accept bribes enable the gun trade by pastoralists’ elites in 
Northern Kenya (Wachira 2015).  Guns such as the AK47, G3, HK11 and M16 assault rifles are 
acquired by elites and passed on to warriors through barter trade in exchange for cattle. Once 
warriors acquire guns, there are further hired (and paid in cash) to conduct massive cattle raids 
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by the same elites who seek to meet the huge beef demand of the urban populations such as in 
Nairobi, Kisumu, Nakuru and Eldoret (also see Eaton 2008; Fleisher 2000; Tablino 2006; Little 
1985). The practice of cattle raiding is therefore mostly driven by the economic and political 
interests of the elites from these regions to the detriment of inter-ethnic cohesion that is needed 
to sustain resource sharing among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya. The objective of this 
chapter is therefore to show the role of pastoralists’ elite in fuelling conflicts between the 
Samburu and Turkana communities. It discusses the various actors and their actions in 
facilitating the business of raiding. The chapter also adds onto and contextualizes the 
environmental security/scarcity argument and places communal agency and local politics over 
land at the center of organisation and moblisation for raids as a means to solving collective 
challenges in Northern Kenya. In efforts to illustrate the influence of elites in cattle raids in 
Baragoi, this focuses on chapter several cases among them the Turkana raid of the Samburu of 
Waso Rongai and the subsequent eviction of the Turkana from Kawap center by the Samburu as 
a representation of a bigger battle over the grazing lands of Kawap not only as a rich resource for 
grazing but as a future settlement area for the Samburu given their knowledge of the gazettment 
of Mt. Nyiro as a government forest (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 1961:813). In the next 
section, I focus on the role of elites in fuelling violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya. 
6.1 Elites and Cattle Raiding in Kenya 
Most literature has tended to discuss the root causes of pastoralist raids on competition over 
natural resources due to droughts and the impact of climate change and thus reiterate the 
environmental security/scarcity debate (see Witsenburg and Adano 2009). However, cattle raids 
are far more complex and go beyond resource scarcity. Pastoral raids must be seen within the 
larger context of political, social, resource and ethnic context. This is because their causes as 
well as the actors involve political, social, resource and ethnic cleavages. McCabe (2004) noted 
that raiding is a response to political as well as environmental events and not just scarcity. Thus 
there is a political ecology angle within which cattle raiding in Kenya should be understood. In 
the literature, the underlying root causes of raiding have been found by many scholars to emanate 
from poverty, payment of dowry, accumulation of general wealth, retaliation and culture of 
revenge, the lucrative cross-border cattle trade, availability and easy access to small arms, 
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climate change and resource scarcity, ethnic rivalries and politics (Bollig 1993; Fleisher 2000; 
Krätli and Swift 2003; McCabe 2004; Mkutu 2006; Eaton 2008; Witsenburg and Adano 2009; 
Schilling et al. 2012).  
 
Schilling and Akuno (2012) studied raids between the Turkana and the Pokot found that raiders 
reason for engaging in raiding among Turkana were “hunger”, “drought” and “wealth” while the 
Pokot named payment of dowry, wealth and the defending or expansion of territory. The 
availability of small arms in Kenya makes raiding more frequent and violent (Mkutu 2008). 
Raids between the Turkana and the Pokot for instance have involved the use of sophisticated 
arms.  Krätli and Swift (1999) in their study found that some actors could play multiple roles 
which can fuel conflicts: 
“…Of course, the (roles of the actors) may overlap. Individual raiders may engage in 
illegal trade with looted guns. Cattle traders may also be elders, politicians or 
administrators, and so may weapon dealers. Security forces may trade in weapons. 
Politicians may have interests in national/international business. Any of these may have a 
herd of their own, which may be built up by raiding, or be reduced by being raided by 
others.” (Krätli and Swift 1999:7) 
 
Thus various actors who do not physically take part in raids covertly fund and support raids for 
their interest. This is why Eaton (2008) says that cattle raiding is perpetuated and aided by local 
big men with connections to local administrations and national government. Bond (2012) 
drawing on her study among the Samburu and Pokot groups in Laikipia, captured the role of 
elites in cattle raids in the following manner: 
“A central point to conflict in Laikipia and Kenya generally is the position of elites, often 
politicians, in manipulating power dynamics and creating communicative strategies and 
discourses which serve their own interests. Many respondents in this study said that the 
politicians are heavily involved not only in the arming but also purposively marginalising 
their own constituents in order to maintain their dominating power within the political 
and business arenas” (Bond 2012: 6) 
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 In this study elites are defined as influential people within pastoralists’ societies by virtue of 
their political, administrative or financial capabilities who use these capacities to influence the 
behavior of warriors by hiring warriors to conduct cattle raids on their behalf for commercial or 
political reasons. In the context of Baragoi, elites are chiefs, Members of County Assemblies 
(MCAs), former councilors, businessmen, teachers, civil servants, Members of Parliament, 
Senators, Ward Administrators, Constituency Development Fund (CDF) managers and other 
members of these pastoralists groups who nolonger draw their primary surivival from 
pastoralism but retain substantial herds in their home areas through hired labour of extended 
family members. Further, elite in this context also include security personnel who are not 
necessarily from pastoralists’ communities but are involved covertly in the trade of raided 
livestock.  
 
The prominent role of elites in conflicts among pastoralists in Northern Kenya is notable in 
recent literature and newspaper pieces.  Leff (2009), Mkutu (2016:18) and Daily Nation (2012) 
all allude to the trend in which influential members of pastoralists societies increasingly use their 
financial and political influence to sponsor raids by paying warriors or by purchasing arms and 
ammunition for raids. The role of devolved public funds in funding cattle raids in Turkana was 
also captured in newspaper articles where a Member of Parliament was accused of diverting 
public funds for these purposes (Daily Nation 2012). This is similar to my own field experience 
in Baragoi where interviews
62
 with security officers revealed the complicity of public fund 
personnel in using state vehicles to distribute ammunition in the run up to heightened tension and 
subsequent violence among the Samburu and Turkana in December 2014. Elites who fuel violent 
confrontations among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi in pursuit of their personal interests 
such as votes or business opportunities often portray themselves as community spokespersons 
and their agendas as communal. This enables the mobilization of warriors as a political force 
aimed at meting violence at perceived opposition voters under the pretext of ‘protection politics’. 
CEWARN (2004:25) noted the prominent role that these elites play in fuelling violence in 
Northern Kenya. In interviews among the Borana and Rendille of Marsabit, Scott-Villiers et al 
(2014) were informed of the role of local teachers in fundraising for violence as follows: 
                                                          
62
 Interviews with various security officials in Baragoi in November and December 2014 
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“At the moment some teachers are going round the villages collecting KShs. One 
thousand from everybody both male and female to buy guns. They have been doing this 
for about three months now - since we are part of them it is difficult for them to hide 
from us” (Scott-Villiers et al 2014:22) 
 
Elites therefore contribute significantly to violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya in 
pursuit of their interests to capture and preserve their own economic and political power 
especially in areas where competition for these two forms of power is between two distinct 
ethinic groups. Apart from providing logistical support through purchase of arms, elites organise 
the means of transport usually lorries to ferry warriors to the place of violence.  
6.2 Ethnic identity/identity politics and pastoral violence 
Ethnicity is a fluid topic that can be manipulated by many interested actors for their own 
benefits. Lentz and Nugent (2000:2) note that “‘Ethnicity' is a dazzling, ambiguous category, 
which is at once descriptive, analytical and evaluative-normative” and has been interpreted by 
various people not only in academia, but also the world of politics and the media. Ethnicity is 
such a powerful resource for identification and collectivities. Barth (1994) argues that ethnicity 
plays a significant role in situations of resource competitions between groups as it can be 
employed as a mobilisation tool for collective action or war against the ‘other’. Groups will often 
come together under the banner of their collective identity to achieve aims such as raiding. Most 
ethnic identities in East Africa are constructed although many groups primordially claim it. 
Fukui and Markakis (1994:6) have argued that ethnic identities arise out of “specific situations, 
socially defined and historically determined”. Finally, Watson and Schlee (2009) view collective 
identification as critical in understanding how resources are claimed and distributed in society.  
In this chapter I argue that ethnicity is created and constructed into the world of cattle raiding in 
Kenya. The constructivist postulations on ethnicity which looks it as being ‘created’ is very 
important for our discussions on elite manipulation of ethnic identities in our study area. Schlee 
(2008) stated that ethnic groups in northern Kenya are political and military entities and are 
subject to power politics. Our conception of identity construction is more relevant in Lentz and 
Nugent (2000) explanation that constructionists lay emphasis on how ethnic idenitity is 
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manipulated as a garb for the pursuit of self-interest among local elites. Identity politics remain 
very strong in Kenya and is manifested in all facets of social and political life. This conforms to 
Horowitz’s (1985) and Turton’s (1997) conceptualization of ethnic identity as a platform through 
which local leaders moblilise their populations in pursuit of their interests. Turton (1997) further 
views the manipulation and exploitation of ethnic identities as a recipe for violence against the 
‘other’. Watson and Schlee (2009:2) further emphasizes the role of ethnicity in mobilisation in 
by arguing that chances of inter-group violent conflict are more pronounced “where collective 
identifications have become more salient and more ethno-nationalistic”. Similar sentiments are 
expressed by Watson (2009) in her study of the Konso relations with their neighbours.  
 
In cattle raiding, warriors engaged in raids are subjects of these inventions by elite who play on 
identity differences to achieve their ends (see also Eaton 2008). Groups in Kenya have often 
appeal to the ethnic identity to encourage raiding. This is because raiding groups in Kenya often 
tried to maintain ethnic boundaries or ethnic belonging and attachment which are known to 
create a sense of social and physical boundary among a group in opposition to others (Horowitz 
1985).  
 
According to Turton (1997) ethnicity is a mobilizable base from which identity cleavages among 
groups, political competition and conflict come to be organized. Posner (2005) has also noted 
that ethnic cleavages become the axis of political competition and conflict among groups. The 
author further argues that cleavages that emerge as salient is the aggregation of all actors' 
individual decisions about the identity that will serve them best by emphasizing these identities 
to suit their political ambitions. Thus, ethnicity is only instrumental in that it is used as a facade 
for political competition in which political actors (politicians, community leaders and political 
groups) will mobilize ethnic identity for political interests. Generally, pastoralists’ communities 
in Eastern Africa command little political influence and are rather products of elite political 
manipulation.  Krätli & Swift (1999) in particular found that political competition exacerbates 
inter-ethnic and inter-clan violence among pastoral groups in Northern Kenya by politicians 
enhancing their reputation and influence by supporting or initiating raids. Van den Broeck (2009) 
noted that local elites and politicians engage and mobilize warrior militias in organized raids 
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against their opponents and also to generate funds for electoral campaigns. They do so through 
ethnic identity using deep-seated ethnic cleavages among pastoral groups. The argument 
presented in this chapter theoretically is that so-called pastoral raids which are often seen as 
resulting from environmental scarcity and ethnic differences are actually not so but are products 
of identity and elite political manipulation and competition.  
6.3 Mobilization theory 
Closely linked to the issue of identity politics is the role of mobilization in organizing raids. 
Groups could mobilize in response to political, social/identity and resource needs. Conflict 
remains one important need that can motivate groups for mobilization. I use Etzioni’s (1968: 
243) definition of mobilization as “a process in which a social unit gains relatively rapidly in 
control of resources it previously did not control. The resources might be economic or military, 
but also political.” Thus raids are organized through mobilization with the aim of gaining control 
not only over resources (getting cattle wealth), but as a means to political power. Jenkins 
(1983:532-533) notes that the major issues in mobilization are: 
 The resources controlled by the group prior to mobilization efforts;  
 The processes by which the group pools resources and directs these towards social 
change; and 
 The extent to which outsiders increase the pool of resources. 
Thus, the collective action of groups and their array of resources including material and group 
cohesiveness (in this case ethnicity) are important in mobilization process.  
 
In Ted Gurr’s (1993) seminal work Why Minorities Rebel, he explains that communal groups 
often have as their focus political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of their self-
defined interests. Gurr (1993:167) defines group mobilization as “the calculated mobilization of 
group resources in response to changing political opportunities” while political mobilization 
“refers to a communal group’s organization for and commitment to joint action in pursuit of 
group interests.” Gurr (1993) argues that these groups often mobilize in response to challenges or 
obstacles posed by other groups. Gurr (1993) maintains that group mobilizations are based on 
ethnic identity and grievances or ethnic boundary maintenance (in primordial and instrumental 
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sense). Groups’ mobilization and their collective action depend on members’ shared interests and 
organization as well as their opportunities (Tilly 1978: 55, cited in Gurr 1993). Thus, in group 
mobilization, members within the groups usually are recruited through networks and their 
commitment for collective action is maintained through their collective identity (for instance 
ethnicity).  
 
Etzioni (1968) notes that in mobilization, existing social patterns are usually supported by a 
parallel distribution of power, vested interests, social habits and ideological underpinnings and 
the actors try to maximize support of allies. Among the Samburu and Turkana, mobilization for 
raiding is supposedly done through ethnic identity, but political actors implicitly manipulate the 
raiding process for their political interests. This is why Posner (2005:7) statement that “ethnic 
groups are mobilized or joined not because of the depth of attachment that people feel toward 
them but because of the usefulness of the political coalitions that they define - a usefulness 
determined exclusively by their sizes relative to those of other coalitions” is important here. The 
act of enemy creation has also facilitated raids. Political groups deliberately create enemies 
through political discourses and this encourages others to engage in raids against their ‘enemies.’ 
6.4 Change in cattle raids 
Several factors have contributed to the changing nature of the practice of cattle raids in Northern 
Kenya. During the colonial period, the whole of Northern Kenya was referred to as ‘Northern 
Frontier District’ (Khalif and Oba 2013). It was administered through emergency laws that 
sought to restrict movement of pastoralists groups by creating artificial resource boundaries.  In 
so doing the colonial government inadvertently created a new window of violent confrontation 
between pastoralists groups as it zoned off some groups from previously shared inter-communal 
resources. Cattle raids from the 1900s therefore started becoming an avenue through which 
military power to access and and utilize resources was exhibited. The need to win contests over 
resource access brought in new leaders of war, in Samburu North district a Turkana elder
63
 
mentioned a man named Ekului
64
 who led the battle to remove Samburu and Rendille herders at 
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Interview at Leilei, the Turkana village within Baragoi town in September 2014 
64
Interview in Samburu North 2015 
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Lokorkor. Ekului is one of the earliest ethnic-nationalist to emerge out of the Samburu-Turkana 
cattle raids. The battle of Lokorkor in 1971 led to the first Lokorkor
65
 massacre in which 35 
Samburu herders were speared to death and their animals stolen by Turkana warriors. As a famed 
Turkana warrior, he was the first person to spear a Samburu moran in a battle that lasted the 
whole afternoon. Turkana warriors thus composed motivation songs in his praise and also as a 
reminder to the subsequent generations of warriors the enmity with their Samburu neighbours. 
 
Change in the practice of raiding was further evident in the attempts of colonial officers to 
reduce the interaction of pastoralists groups in Samburu North sub County. In 1922
66
 the colonial 
administration decided that to delimit the boundary between the Samburu and Turkana by 
creating a grazing area exclusive to the Turkana as follows;  
Taking Baragoi as the S.E corner of the area, the Southern boundary is the River 
Guilguil. Permission to graze to a distance of 2 hours south of this river Guilguil.  Eastern 
boundary is line Baragoi-Kawop-Lellu-Legerthego-Laiorok (Lalarok), but not across the 
river. Northern boundary is the line running due west from Lalarok 
 
In later years the Maralal-Marti-Baragoi-Loiyangalani highway would be the defacto boundary 
that splits the Turkana and Samburu communities. This not only restricted mobility that 
pastoralists’ livelihoods depended on but it also forced Samburu households living among the 
Turkana to move back to the Samburu side. It drew a red line and contributed to ethnic 
stereotyping that encouraged enmity. For example, Turkana or Samburu herders whose livestock 
crossed the road to either side had to forfeit them or use force to retrieve their animals. 
 
                                                          
65
Lokorkor is located near Marti center in Baragoi, it is a rich grassland and a famed battle ground between the 
Turkana and Samburu. Lokorkor was the scene of a second massacre in 1996 involving the Samburu, Turkana and 
Rendille during which the Rendille who had come from Marsabit County were killed and their camels stolen by the 
Samburu and Turkana. 
66
KNA PC/NFD/4/1/8 (1922) Definition of Turkana Grazing Area in Samburu, Ref. Secretariat Letter No. 
S.11963/6/18 of 7/6/22 
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According to a KPR officer
67
 based in Parkati, Ngoroko
68
 from Turkana County were the first to 
come to Samburu County with guns. These Turkana Ngoroko had earlier acquired guns through 
trade with the Ethiopians. Ngoroko often came through Parkati which is a Turkana village and 
raided the Turkana of Parkati many times. They would then proceed to Samburu villages such as 
Tuum, Uaso Rongai, South Horr and Lonjorin. The introduction of guns changed the course of 
cattle raids as it brought in new actors such as arms traders and in some way opened up the 
cultural practice of raiding to other actors who are not pastoralists. In an interview with a 
resident of Parkati
69
, he said that that his father was given two guns by a Catholic priest in early 
1980s due to the frequent attacks that the Turkana Ngorokos were carrying out upon their 
kinsmen in Parkati. This was a curious change as cattle raids were never sanctioned against one’s 
own kin. This shows the rebellious nature of the Ngoroko and also the independence that the 
ownership of guns gave to pastoralists’ warriors; they did not need to seek the blessings of elders 
before venturing into raids as was the custom. 
 
In the early 1980s, a local Member of Parliament who was also a retired General in the Kenyan 
Army requested the then President of Kenya, Daniel Moi
70
 to provide arms to the local herders 
as Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) due to frequency of Ngoroko attacks. The whole of North-
western Kenya being part of the then vast Rift Valley Province and the political backyard of 
Moi, he granted the request of the Samburu MP. Villages like Parkati received 20 guns most of 
these were semi-automatic weapons such as the MK IV or MKI. The introduction of guns in 
these villages not only provided much needed firepower against the Turkana Ngorokos but also 
slowly replaced spears, bows and arrows as mark of masculinity among Samburu and Turkana 
men. Using the few security personnel in the area, the KPRs were trained on shooting skills at a 
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 Interview with KPR officer at Nakwei on the shores of Lake Turkana in October 2014 
68
The Ngoroko are identified as a rebel age-set that acquired weapons in Turkana County and moved out of Turkana 
settlements to raid and rape women at abandon (Skoggard &Adem, 2010). Skoggard and Adem (2010) describe the 
Ngoroko as an example of the slipping away of culture and a breakdown of the filial relations between fathers and 
their sons in Turkana society. 
69
A resident of Parkati village. His father was a chief in Parkati in the early 1980s and was the first man in Parkati to 
own a gun.  
70
Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, the 2
nd
 President of Kenya from 1978-2002 
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hill in Uaso Rongai. This case of providing guns shows the inability or unwillingness of the 
Kenyan state to provide adequate security to its citizens and points to state weakness in vast 
pastoralist’s dry lands of Northern Kenya. 
6.5 Complex Roles of Different Actors 
Change in the cultural practice of raiding among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya can be 
attributed to a constellation of actors as explained in the following sections: 
6.5.1 Colonial Administrators 
The role of elders as custodians of norms and mores of society has diminished in the last century 
(Leff 2009). The colonial administration system in Northern Kenya ignored the role elders 
played to resolve conflicts. Most of the times, colonial officers demarcated resource boundaries
71
 
without consulting local elders as indicated in ‘Present policy regarding the tribes in the vicinity 
of the Horr Valley’ below: 
 
1. The water at Sirima, the Horr Valley and Naiesecho to be inter-tribal as between the 
Rendille, Samburu and Turkana 
2. The Horr Valley to be open to the Turkana as a corridor from North to South 
3. The Turkana are not to be allowed manyattas in the Horr Valley but may keep their 
manyattas at Lonjorin and west thereof 
4. The Samburu may have manyattas in the Horr Valley by agreement with the Rendille 
5. This policy is the subject to consideration at any time if it found to lead to inter-tribal 
friction, or if it desirable to place the Turkana elsewhere 
6. The Turkana are not to go North of the motor track from Horr Valley to Sirima thence to 
Lake Rudolf. 
 
Colonial officers also did not understand that pastoralists groups had their own institutions for 
conflict resolution and mediation. The power and authority of elders to provide leadership 
especially on how to conduct raids and still live in harmony among pastoralists neighbours was 
                                                          
71
KNA DC/SAM/3/1 (1931) Present Policy Regarding the Tribes in the Vicinity of the Horr Valley, from R. G. 
Stone, the Provincial Commissioner to the D.C Samburu forwaded to the D.C Isiolo, 23
rd
 August. 
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therefore greatly diminished by colonial administrators who literally operated in Northern Kenya 
under emergency laws until early 1960s (Khalif and Oba 2013) . The power of colonial 
administrators can be seen in their solitary demarcation of the Samburu-Turkana ethnic boundary 
along a highway, this basically prevented both communities from accessing grazing lands in 
Ngoriche, Naagis, Nasiischo, Kawap, Lokorkor, Marti, Charda and Losurkoi areas, all these 
having been previously designated as inter-communal grazing reserves during periods of 
droughts and under the management of selected elders from the two communities. Thus, the 
colonial administrators interfered in the traditional process of resource allocation and arbitration 
thus undermining the power of elders to perform these functions.  
6.5.2 Ngorokos from Turkana County 
Ngorokos have been described by as a rebel group of raiders from Turkana community who 
disobeyed elders in their own villages upon owning guns through trade with pastoralists groups 
from Ethiopia (Skoggard and Adem 2010). The advent of the Ngoroko in Samburu County 
altered pastoralists’ relations between the Turkana and Samburu communities. The Ngoroko 
attacked mostly the Turkana at Parkati and the Samburu communities in Tuum, Uaso Rongai, 
South Horr and Lonjorin villages. Having the advantage of firepower as compared to the locals 
armed with spears, they easily raided livestock and killed many pastoralists including their own 
Turkana kinsmen. The Ngorokos attacked their Turkana in Parkati raided livestock and killed 
many locals (Lamphear 1976). According to survivors of the Ngoroko attacks in the early 1980s, 
the Turkana of Parkati were accused by the Turkana from Lokori of “not being Turkana enough” 
or of being Samburu”. In essence the Ngoroko used primordialism (Rex 2002; Eisenstadt 
2002:36) to categorise the Turkana of Samburu district as ‘others’ and this enabled them to 
justify raiding fellow Turkanat just as they raided the Samburu.  
 
To the Samburu, the Turkana whether from Parkati or from Turkana County were declared 
enemy and derogatorily referred to as Lnkuume
72
. While the Turkana refer to the Samburu as 
Ngor
73
. Similar use of ethnic identity marker against the other can be found in many pastoralists 
and agro-pastoral communities in Eastern Africa, for instance among the Shuwa and Gumuz in 
                                                          
72
It is a derogatory word used by the Samburu against the Turkana, it translates to “dark and dirty people” 
73
 Meaning people who apply different colours to their body 
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Ethiopia (Wolde-Selassie 2009). The seeds of inter-ethnic hatred were therefore entrenched 
through the actions of the Ngorokos. The fact that Ngorokos could only raid Samburu villages by 
approaching from the direction of Parkati led to suspicion that the Turkana of Parkati were 
probably colluding with their violent kin from Turkana district to raid cattle and kill Samburu 
villagers. Thus, the introduction of firearms into the raiding changed the dynamics of cattle raids 
and led to the support of political and business actors in providing arms for raids. 
6.5.3 Independent Kenya Government and Security Officers 
Change in cattle raid can also be blamed upon the attitude and action of independent Kenya 
governments since 1963. Through the Sessional
74
 Paper No. 10 of 1965 (GoK 1965), the 
Kenyatta
75
 administration deliberately chose to ignore the security and developmental needs of 
Northern Kenya. Given that Shifta
76
 war between Kenya and Somalia was fought until late 1960s 
the emergency law was extended in all of Northern Kenya thus restricting movement of people 
and animals while giving local administrators the carte blanche to ignore societal structures in 
decision making processes (Rinquist 2011). According to the records from the Kenya National 
Archives security officers from this time were involved in ‘communal punishments’. These were 
security led exercises in which the police would spearhead a mop up of animals from one 
community to compensate the community that had been raided while at other times security 
officers themselves conducted raids and confiscated animals from pastoralists’ households. The 
fact that communal raids could punish every herder including those that had not benefited from a 
raid by their community warriors enraged many herders from the Samburu and Turkana groups. 
This led to revenge raids as disaffected warriors organised themselves and conducted raids to 
‘return’ the livestock forcefully taken from them by security forces during communal 
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 GoK (1965); Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya, Government 
Printer, Nairobi 
75
Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Minister of Kenya (1963), President of Kenya from 1964-1978 
76
Shifta war was fought between Kenya and Somalia. The then Somalia government wanted to claim the 
Northeastern and some parts of Eastern Kenya where there are Somali Kenyans as part of Somalia territory.  
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punishments. One such case of abuse of power by independent Kenya security officers is 
captured in a letter by Ekiru
77
 (1995): 
 
The District Commissioner 
 Samburu District, 
P.O. Box 2 Maralal, 
                                                                                          Baragoi Township, 
                                                                                                     P.O. Box Baragoi via Maralal 
                                                                                                     12
th
 April 1995 
Dear Sir, 
RE: MISUSE OF POWER AND ATTEMPT FOR MURDER 
Please allow me to raise a complain to your office against the District Officer Baragoi Division, the O.C.P.P Baragoi 
Police Post and Corporal Edward of Baragoi Police Post. As your office is well aware of a raid led by the mentioned 
officers at Kawap location in Nyiro Division on the 7
th
 of February 1995, I hereby complain bitterly on the act they 
did to my father Mr. Lokia Kokolan Ekiru. 
 
The officers raided our animals: camels, cows and five goats. They asked some Samburu men to give false 
information that some of the animals belonged to them. But the Samburu men refused. In the evening of 8
th
 
February 1995 all our animals which were confiscated by the officers were given back to us except eight camels and 
four goats which are missing to date. A he-goat was found at the District Officer’s house and was returned to us. 
What am very bitter about was the way my father was made to walk naked infront of his two young wives. The old 
man had followed all their instructions and when he was ordered to go away, Corporal Edward Leparoiya opened 
fire at the old man as he walked away. A bullet passed very closely to the oldman’s ears and the remains of the 
bullet fell close by. I take this act as a murder attempt on my father. And I demand that appropriate action be taken 
against the mentioned officers.It has taken us time to report the matter officially. This is because the oldman was 
sick and when he recovered, he was going to kill himself had he not been restrained by some Turkana elders. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
Lawrence Ekiru 
                                                          
77
 Ekiru (1995) Misuse of Power and Attempt of Murder, Letter to the District Commissioner, Samburu District, 12
th
 
April 1995 
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6.5.4 Presence of trained military and police personnel among Pastoralists 
Taking cue from the colonial administrators’ employment of pastoralists’ warriors as the 
majority in the police, prison and armed forces, the independent administrations of Kenyatta and 
Moi recruited massively from pastoralists’ warriors who were deemed to be brave and obedient 
as required in the disciplined forces. The downside of this is that many of these later retired and 
were absorbed as village administrators. From my observation, 70 per cent of active village 
chiefs and more than 80 per cent of retired chiefs in Samburu North sub-County were either 
police officers or military officers. The influence of this disciplined forces elite contributed to 
tremendous change in the cultural practice of cattle raiding. In interviews with retired chiefs and 
security officers, we were informed of how some of these retired officers were crucial in training 
morans
78
 and using their networks to secure arms and ammunition. The fact that General Lenges 
was elected as the Member of Parliament of Samburu in 1980s and his role in requesting guns 
and ammunition for KPRs in Samburu district further points to influence  of members of the 
disciplined forces in militarization and mobilization of pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya for 
violent conflicts and raids. A case in point is the case of ‘Operation Turkanas Out’ in South Horr 
and drawn from an interview with a Samburu from the Lmeoli
79
 age-set: 
 
In 1997 I was in class eight at South Horr Primary School and next to the school was a 
Turkana manyatta called Soweto. We were neighbours with the Turkana, our girlfirends 
were Turkana. Conflict between our two communities had started in places like Tuum 
and Baragoi in 1996 and I remember that the Turkana also stole Rendille livestock at 
Syambu in 1996. The following year (1997) the Turkana attacked Lonojorin and killed 
three Samburu, after that we the Samburu became bitter with the Turkana. Our chiefs, 
councilors and elders had a meeting and a decision was made to ‘deal with the Turkana’. 
Around Soweto area, there were just 5 Samburu manyattas and ours was one of them. 
One of the manyattas belonged to a Samburu elder called Lentoiga who had a son called 
Lucas. Lucas was an ex-GSU officer. He was the leader of ‘Operations Turkanas Out’. 
He moblised warriors one day at noon and led them in torching Turkana houses at 
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 Morans are the warrior age-set among pastoralists groups usually between the age of 15-30 years old. 
79
 Age set circumcised in 1990. Interview 28th September 2014, South Horr Catholic Parish 
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Soweto. The following night, Lucas led some Samburu warriors who raided the manyatta 
of one Turkana elder called Eiyan and stole 50 goats. The Turkana were scared and some 
of them came to camp at the South Horr Catholic Parish where Fr. Pendezini gave them 
refuge. The following night, Lucas led Samburu warriors in throwing stones and shooting 
in the air just next to Soweto manyatta where some Turkana families had remained as 
they were now protected by the few AP officers based in South Horr. I remember that 
one Turkana middle aged man decided to move with his goats to South Horr AP camp 
and the next night Lucas and other Samburu warriors attacked the AP camp and sprayed 
it with bullets. The Aps responded by shooting one Samburu warrior dead, so they were 
not successful in that raid. 
 
The killing of the Samburu warrior by the APs brought a lot of tension in South Horr. 
Some Turkana families asked Fr. Pendezini to organize their evacuation out of South 
Horr while others remained. At the same time the Turkana from Baragoi mobilised to 
defend their kinsmen in South Horr by raiding a Samburu manyatta at Keleswa where 
they stole some livestock. A Turkana forester based in South Horr called Logelae Eiyan 
was shot in the buttocks while he was at the forestry office compound. The remaining 
Turkana families later convinced Fr. Pendezini to help them build another manyatta after 
Soweto had been razed down by Lucas and other Samburu morans. The new manyatta 
was called ‘Bethany’ and for about two months the Samburu and Turkana of South Horr 
lived in peace. But later the Turkana attacked Waso Rongai, in retaliation the Samburu 
warriors led by Lucas attacked Bethany and burnt everything. I was part of the Samburu 
warriors that attacked Bethany and we made sure all of them moved out except eight 
families who had become Samburu by adopting our culture such as circumcision. The 
Turkana families were assisted by Fr. Pendezini to relocate to Loiyangalani, Baragoi and 
Maralal. After that, Samburu elders met and made a declaration that there will never be a 
Turkana manyatta in South Horr because we consider them to be our enemy. 
6.5.5 Chiefs 
In the Government of Kenya administration system, chiefs represent the Office of the President 
at the village level. Chiefs are therefore influential in the day to day administration of villages. 
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They solve disputes between their people.  At the same time Chiefs have been accussed of 
moblising for violence among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya, their role in organizing for 
violence among the Rendille and Borana of Marsabit was noted as follows: 
“– these chiefs and sub-chiefs are the ones used to mobilise people and pass messages to 
villagers, to block the administration from knowing what is happening and organising the 
attacks. They also get a share of the proceeds or cut from politicians” (Scott-Villiers et al 
2014:16) 
Given the diminishing role of community elders in arbitration of disputes within communities, 
chiefs are continually playing a more central role. In Samburu North sub County, chiefs have the 
knowledge of the illegal arms that are found in each household. Chiefs have the power to appoint 
KPRs. KPRs report to their chiefs when incidences of raids take place. Raiders cannot enter a 
village with raided cattle without the knowledge and approval of the chiefs. In my interviews, I 
was informed that cattle raids changed when “chiefs became thieves”80. The chief of Tuum81 
location was for example a known trainer of warriors and preparing them for raids. This was 
because he was a retired military officer and had the requisite skills and the ethno-nationalistic 
ideology through which he justified raids. Thus chiefs themselves are embroiled in the business 
of raiding through both moral and physical support for raids. This helps them to maintain and 
consolidate their power. 
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Interview with Mrs. Narumbe at Baragoi AP Command 
81
Tuum Location is located in Nyiro Division; it borders Parkati, Kawap, Uaso Rongai and South Horr locations 
within the same Division. 
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Photo 7: Samburu and Turkana chiefs with the author at Ngilai village, Samburu North sub-County in 
January 2015, Source: Author 
The picture above was taken after a joint security meeting attended by the sub-County 
Commissioner, Samburu North in January 2015. Those in the picture from the left to the right 
include the Assistant Chief of Naling’ang’or of Baragoi town location from the Turkana 
community. Next to him is the Chief of Parkati Location also from the Turkana community, next 
to him is the Assistant Chief of Bendera sublocation of Baragoi town location from the Samburu 
community, and next to him is the Acting Chief of Kawap location, (a former KPR) from the 
Turkana community and on the extreme right is the Chief of Elbarta location from the Samburu 
community. 
6.5.6 Political and business elites 
The role of politics and business interests in cattle raiding emerged in the 1960s but became 
more pronounced in the 1990s. The contested nature of ethnicised politics among pastoralists in 
Northern Kenya and indeed in Kenya as a whole has contributed in a big way in the choice of 
political leadership in the marginalized Northern Kenya. Political leadership is increasingly 
associated with the abilitiy to protect ones ethnic group against the ‘enemy’ group.  As protectors 
of their communities, political leaders therefore influence government policy in favour of their 
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community thus contributing to tension and conflict among pastoralists. In Baragoi, the 
prominent role of political leaders in the conflict was noted in the mid 1990s when a Member of 
Parliament received livestock from the government as a compensation on behalf of his 
community (Turkana Community, nd:1): 
 “On May 28th 1995 Provincial Administration compounded 530 cattle belonging to the 
Turkana community and gave them the then MP of Samburu East in compensation of 
Samburu cattle raided by the Turkana” (Turkana Community, nd: 1) 
 
In a study in Marsabit, Scott-Villiers et al (2014) noted the role of political leaders in fuelling 
violence as follows: 
“The political leaders chosen by the people are warlords. The people here would not elect 
anyone who likes peace. They elect people who are good at speaking against other 
communities. They like such people because they would speak for them. They also feel 
that such leaders would liberate them from what we don’t know, and help them have the 
power to take up and own every place where there are good pastures. They look for 
people who promote violence to be elected as leaders. They also look at resources like the 
Constituency Development Fund [CDF]. They may plan using the CDF to buy guns and 
arm themselves. These are the kind of rumours that we get here.” Scott-Villiers et al 
(2014:24) 
 
The year 1996 was also a period of heightened political campaign since Kenya was to hold a 
General Election in 1997. Local Samburu politicians who at that time controlled Samburu 
County Council are alleged to have sponsored several raids which included burning of houses of 
Turkana villages in Logetei, Charda and Lomerok areas to disenfranchise potential political 
opponents for local council positions. The death of the Samburu District Commissioner
82
 in 1996 
whose helicopter was shot down in Nachola area while tracking raided Samburu livestock 
pointed to the sophistication of raiders by the early 1990s (Mkutu 2005:173). Raiding at this time 
was used a means of economic suppression and also as a tool for entrenching ethnic hegemony 
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of the Samburu over the Turkana. The use of ethnic identity to ferment of fuel violence against 
the ‘other’ was well captured by Horowitz (1998): 
“….elites do not merely steer the process (of boundary contraction) according to existing 
ethnic juxtapositions, but more or less shape them in view of their own material interest, 
with wide latitude to foment conflict and violence” (Horowitz 1998:19) 
Further cases that give credence to the involvement of political leaders in inciting or justifying 
raids in Baragoi can be found in the speeches made during community meetings. A case in point 
was an address by a Samburu Member of County Assembly (MCA) at a Samburu leaders’ 
meeting held in South Horr in October 2014: 
“My people, leadership has become something difficult in our County. Reason being that 
these raids have never stopped, however we are gathered here today as your leaders to 
discuss the way forward. I believe that you are all aware that Ole Lenku
83
 will be in 
Tuum soon and we need to plan on what to tell him. Recently we lost our cattle in 
Wasorongai, Tuum and Simale but what we need more is the evidence that the Turkana 
did it. We know that our men followed their footsteps to Marti and also those who lost 
everything are living evidence, so we need you to come in good numbers and defend our 
tribe even if you lost nothing because we are all fighting a common enemy. I also take 
this opportunity to warn you that you should all be alert always because you never know 
what happens next and you know this enemy is deadly. If they can come all the way from 
Marti to attack Tuum and Wasorongai then we should be alert”. 
 
Kratli and Swift (1999) have further linked illicit businessmen and the supply of weapons to 
pastoralists’ areas. They argue that suppliers of illegal arms in Northern Kenya facilitate raids 
since they give warriors weapons on credit and this motivates warriors to conduct raids and 
acquire livestock to repay their debts (firearms). 
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Photo 8: A Samburu elder addresse’s a Samburu leaders meeting in the presence of Samburu County 
leadership in South Horr, October 2014, Source: Author 
 
6.6 Cattle raids and politics in Baragoi: Illustrations 
In this section, I outline cases obtained from interviews with opinion leaders, morans from the 
Samburu and Turkana communities and also petitions and letters received from respondents 
detailing cases of involvement of political leaders and other influential people in Baragoi and 
beyond in cattle raids: 
On the 21
st
 of September 2011, a group of Turkana raiders attacked a Rendile manyatta at 
Angata in Nyiro Division. The Rendille had relocated there to graze at Kawap due to drought in 
Marsabit. The Turkana made away with unknown numbers of livestock. The Rendille and 
Samburu political leaders responded by mobilising for a revenge raid on the 28
th
 of September 
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2011 where 107 Samburu and Rendille morans out of which 87 were armed with G3 rifles
84
, 
while others armed with AK47 and a few others had spears gathered. Those at the fore front 
included a nominated Samburu MP, a Rendille MP and Assistant Minister from Marsabit 
County. They also mobilized a contigent of GSU, regular police, APs and RDU officers who 
were supported by a white Kenya police helicopter which landed in Tiyale a Turkana manyatta 
in Kawap location. The politicians alongside the District security command set up a command 
post at Tuum trading center as the group of Samburu and Rendille morans gathered Turkana 
livestock from around Kawap in revenge of the Turkana raid of 21
st
 September 2011. As a result 
9 Turkana male adults (herders), one Turkana female adult and one Turkana male child were 
killed alongside 200 camels and 600 shoats caught in the cross fire. Further 21,671 shoats were 
confiscated alonsgside 1372 camels and 463 donkeys. This became what the Turkana refer to as 
the Tiyale massacre. 
 
A second perspective on the role of local elites in influencing cattle raids among the Samburu 
and Turkana of Baragoi is captured in police records (Baragoi Police Station 2013) as follows: 
On the 18
th
 of October 2013 at about 10:46 hours, it was reported to Baragoi Police Station by 
the Assistant Chief of Baragoi Township location that unknown number of cattle raiders believed 
to be Turkana invaded Waso Rongai village and made away with unknown numbers of livestock. 
Unconfirmed reports further indicated that during the incident the raiders are believed to have 
killed two police reservists and made away with their guns. The police immediately made up a 
patrol team comprising of ASTU, GSU, AP and regular police and headed to the troubled remote 
area amid reports of heavy exchange of gunfire between the local KPRs and the rustlers. Shortly 
after a police chopper arrived in Baragoi from Nairobi carrying senior police officers who flew 
in to take an overview of the situation. The high powered team of senior security officers 
included, a Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of Operations at the GSU 
Headquarters, an Assistant Commisioner of Police and Deputy Director of Operations at Police 
Headquarters and an, Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of Operations at the AP 
headquarters. They were briefed by the OCS Baragoi and the GSU Commander in Charge of 
Baragoi Operation Camp before heading to the scene of murder and cattle rustling.The patrol 
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team reported back at 18:42 hrs after confirming the incident. The team did establish that the 
rustlers took away 280 cows and 440 goats belonging to 8 Samburu house holds. The raiders 
were about 200 in number who divided themselves in three groups giving the security team a 
hard time trying to repulse their advances. As one section of the raiders were engaging the KPRs 
in a fierce exchange of fire, the other sections of raiders escaping with the livestock met 
resistance from another team of security officers who were called in from Nachola GSU camp. 
However the raiders managed to escape with the animals towards Terter valley enroute to Suguta 
Valley.  
 
On the 20
th
 of October 2013, the acting chief of Kawap location, the Headteacher of Kawap 
Primary School, his deputy all reported to Baragoi Police Station that on the 18
th
 of October 
2013 at about 16:00hrs unknown of raiders believed to be Samburu tribesmen raided Kawap 
Center and left a trail of destruction on the local primary school, a health center under 
construction (near completion) and burnt a manyatta thus destroying several houses. During the 
incident the items reportedly destroyed included learning materials, solar panels and batteries, 
windpower, research computer, school furniture, 10 bags of cement, 20 pieces of timber, 15 
pieces of iron sheets, 10,000 litre water tank, 21 bags of maize, several bags of cereals, teachers 
quarters were broken into and looted. The heinous act costed the community approximately one 
million Kenyan Shillings. Two community groups known us Naletae Women Group and 
Nakwaleb Men Group both are yet to come to terms with the losses they incurred. Naletae 
Women Group lost nearly 78 chicken and six bags of chicken feed. The women were running a 
poultry farm within the hostile area of Kawap village. Nakwaleb Men Group got a funding from 
an NGO (ACTED) and were running a retail shop. Their estimated loss was retail stock of about 
Kenyan Shillings 120,000 and cash of Kenyan Shillings 30,000. On the same day again, Senior 
Police Officers arrived to oversee the security situation. On the 22
nd
 of October 2013, Baragoi 
Police Station Commander, Chief Inspector Owino and a team of police officers together with 
the victims of Kawap attack visited the scene. Nothing was salvaged except a computer housing 
case, chicken feeder, burnt metal boxes and electrical apparatus vandalized from the dispensary. 
As a result of the raid and vandalism of Kawap center 87 households were displaced (all of these 
later settled among their kin in other Turkana villages).  
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It is worth noting also that cattle raids before and after the eviction of the Turkana of Kawap 
Center points to the determination of the Samburu to gain exclusive access to the rich Kawap 
grazing field which was previously used by the Turkana. Even though the Turkana of Kawap and 
the Samburu of Uaso Rongai had been raiding each other violently since mid 1990s, the Turkana 
raid in Uaso Rongai in October 2013 during which 50 herds of livestock were stolen and 2 KPRs 
killed and their guns taken brought to the fore a new dimension of raiding between the two 
groups. According to police records
85
 the Samburu warriors in conjunction with the Baragoi 
town Chief who is also the brother to the local Member of Parliament took part in the demolition 
of Kawap Center. In interview with police officers in Baragoi, it was established that the land 
rover belonging to the chief was used to ferry some of the iron sheets and timber that was looted 
from Kawap School and Catholic Church. 
 
Photo 9: The vandalized Kawap Primary School, in Nyiro Division, Baragoi due to revenge raids by Samburu of 
Uaso Rongai in March 2014: Source: Author 
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The third example of the involvement of politicians in cattle raids was the February 2015 
incident in Marti center about 49 kilometers from Baragoi town. A senior political leaders from 
Samburu County was touring Baragoi area and when he reached Marti, his motorcade stopped at 
Marti Police barrier and he instructed one of his security aides to hand over a box containing 
hundreds of ammunition to the police constable who was manning the barrier. This was a curious 
incident because even though Kenya has a devolved system of governance the security function 
remains with the national government. Therefore one wonders where political obtain 
Government of Kenya issued ammunition. Besides, the fact that while handing over the 
ammunition the political leader allegedly told
86
 the officer to distribute the said ammunitions to 
KPRs in Marti area also draws questions about procedure of arming KPRs. Politicians have no 
role in arming KPRs according to Kenyan laws and regulations on security matters. The fact that 
political leaders can access state ammunition and distribute it in broad daylight to citizens’ points 
to weak accountability framework within the security apparatus. This bodes very negatively for 
sustainable peace among pastoralists in Northern Kenya given the fact that through the devolved 
system of governance, local politicians have more financial clout to acquire arms. 
 
A fourth example of the involvement of political leaders in cattle raids among the Samburu and 
Turkana emanate from interviews with police officers and warriors
87
 in Baragoi: At the height of 
the skirmishes between the Pokot and the Samburu from 2005-2007, Samburu political leaders 
including the then MP for Samburu West, the former Samburu East MP, prominent personalities 
within Samburu County Council and other civic leaders made a secret fund that raised the money 
to buy about 70 illegal firearms from Archers Post. Among the Turkana of Baragoi a Turkana 
politician was arrested and charged with organizing the Turkana morans to attack and kill 
policemen during the botched police operation at Lomerok. During interviews informants stated 
that a former councilor who is also a retired army officer, allegedly trained Turkana morans on 
marksmanship prior to the Baragoi massacre and was also investigated by police for mobilizing 
the Turkana manyattas in Baragoi area to raise funds for the purchase of firearms. The suspect 
was arrested and indicted in court where he was bonded to keep the peace for three months. This 
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shows the entrenched manner in which political leaders and other elites are implicated in the 
logistical and technical support for violence as it is an evenue through which power politics is 
pursued. 
6.7 Mobilization of raiders 
Just as Stewart (2009), Gurr (1993) and Etzioni (1968) have all espoused, cattle raids are 
mobilized and done on political and ethnic bases.  Elites and politicians continue to play a central 
role in mobilization for raids and revenge raids. During the dry season from November to 
February, several raids occurred after politicians and elites on both sides distributed ammunition 
to morans especially over the Christmas period. In an interview with security personnel
88
 in 
Baragoi town, some government vehicles associated with politicians were used at night to 
distribute arms and ammunition to morans.  Further, the killing of an 18 year old Turkana herder 
in Naagis grazing field on November 22
nd
 2014 who was apparently selling ammunition to 
Samburu morans heightened tension between the two communities and there is evidence that 
elites from both communities raised funds for purchase of arms and ammunition for subsequent 
raids (Wachira 2015). Other examples of mobilisation of warriors for raids are captured in police 
records as seen below: 
“To the station is Senior Chief of Baragoi town location who reports that while in the 
District Officer’s office, he received a call from a member of the Samburu County 
Council Peace Committee that Samburu morans are being gathered at Ngoriche dam 
around Kawap area on a mission believed to be a retaliatory attack against the Turkana of 
Kawap” (Baragoi Police Station 2012) 
 
The role of politicians and elites in the mobilization of raiders can be seen in the Baragoi 
massacre of November 2012. During this incident, a police officer
89
  estimated that through the 
efforts of local politicians 600 Samburu morans were mobilized, fed, armed and paid to conduct 
a raid in Lomirok village. Similarly, the Turkana through the local leaders mobilized for sniper 
morans (with some allegedly having come from the kinsmen in Turkana County). In the advent 
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of the devolved system of government, it was observed that the senior County officials while 
touring development projects in the area would go to grazing lands to address warriors. It is 
curious to an independent observer that these politicians never addressed the warriors from the 
two communities together. They mostly addressed Samburu morans in Samburu language. 
 
Politicians were also blamed for the evacuation of the Samburu of Marti who had lived cordially 
with their Turkana neighbours for decades. Given the uniqueness of their relationship the 
Turkana and Samburu of Marti resisted temptations to betray each other by sharing information 
of possible threats from raiders from other Turkana and Samburu villages in Samburu North sub-
County. However, the intervention of a senior Samburu politician who provided lorries and 500 
Kenya Shillings per every Samburu household to enable their relocation to Morijo in order for 
warriors from  other Samburu villages such as Suiyan and Ngilai to raid the Turkana of Marti. In 
an interview
90
 with a Samburu moran who led the evacuation of Samburu of Marti, he stated that 
the Samburu of Marti agreed to move because they did not want to be seen to “disobey their 
leaders”. This point to ethno-nationalism and its effect on inter-communal relations between 
pastoralists communities who were in all senses and purposes dependent on each other for 
security and trade in a volatile areas. 
 
Cattle raids in northwest Kenya have become arenas through which constellations of actors build 
ties and mobilize through politics to achieve their agenda and interests (see Log 2001; Bailey 
2001; Baily 1969). A wide range of actors in cattle raids take advantage of these conflicts for 
political, financial and other interests beyond the raids. Various actors other than the pastoralists 
become part of the conflict process leading to violent escalations. Actors would often claim to 
mobilize based on ethnic identities, but in reality they are mobilized politically to undertake raids 
that serve the interest of political groups.    
6.8 Raiding as state/authority failure 
One of the key prerequisites of the state is to provide security for the lives and property of its 
citizens. In return the citizens are expected to obey the laws and pay taxes (Rothbard 2009). The 
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Kenyan state has failed fundamentally in providing security and development for citizens of 
Northern Kenya. The disparity in development in Northern Kenya as compared to other parts of 
Kenya can be seen in minimal infrastructure, lack of adequate social services such as schools and 
hospitals. In the local parlance the pastoralists in Northern Kenya refer to their kinsmen living 
and working in other parts of Kenya as the ones living in ‘Kenya’. Even though the state has 
improved the security in Samburu North sub-County with police camps in Marti, Nachola, 
Tuum, South Horr and Baragoi town, raids still take place in broad day light as was the case on 
the 19 January 2015 at Baragoi Slaughter House
91
 where the Samburu raided Turkana goat-
herders and made away with 200 goats. The Turkana immediately retaliated by raiding 95 goats 
from Samburu herders next to Baragoi Mixed Secondary School on the same day. The fact that 
these raids took place about 700 meters from the Baragoi Police Station and Baragoi Command 
Post of the Administration Police points to the daring nature of Samburu and Turkana warriors 
and their confidence in their supply of ammunition. It also shows that police officers posted in 
Northern Kenya still believe that raiding is pastoralist’s culture and therefore it is okay to let it 
be. 
 
Cattle raids violent and fatal as they have turned to be are still not treated as robbery with 
violence. The fact that there is no legal framework for classifying cattle raids as robbery with 
violence points to institutional weakness on the part of the state and its lack of interest in tacking 
violent cattle raids. Chiefs who have the necessary intelligence from the local level on who the 
raiders are and where the raided animals are kept often offer to return the stolen animals if there 
is a real threat of police operation upon their villages but they never give information on who the 
raiders are. Thus raiders are never prosecuted or disarmed and the vicious of violent cattle raids 
continue unabated. 
6.9 Conclusion 
The practice of cattle raiding has functioned for centuries to sustain the pastoralist moral 
economy. However, societal changes such as colonialism and technological changes such as the 
introduction of guns and the role of open and pseudo-political actors have altered the social 
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structure within which cattle raids were carried out either to replenish decimated herds or to 
acquire animals for the payment of bride wealth. In its place, the new actors have continued to 
emerge, where pastoralist’s warriors are continually used as pawns in a game of political and 
economic domination by one ethnic group over the other. Cattle raids have therefore turned into 
a tool for expressing ethno-nationalistic tendencies (see Watson and Schlee 2009) as politicians 
sponsor raids to eliminate and disenfranchise their opponents while the business elites use the 
weakness of the state to maintain patron-client relationships with warriors and community 
members as they seek to gain from the business of selling arms and ammunition. 
 
The newly develoved political system is also seen as having opened a new front for inter-
communal contestations over power and resources among the Samburu and Turkana. In Samburu 
County Assembly, the Turkana are in Minority with one ward representative for the entire 
Turkana population of Baragoi. The Samburu are the majority holding key positions such as that 
of the Governor, Speaker of County Assembly as well as national positions such as the Member 
of Parliament as well as the Senatorship for Samburu County. The devolved system as noted by 
Sharamo (2014) in his study of pastoralists violence in Isiolo County is itself a driving factor for 
violence as groups compete for political power by organizing and mobilising their support based 
on ethnic identities. 
 
The chiefs as local administrators play a dual role of acting as agents of the government while at 
the same time supporting their respective communal agendas when it comes to raids. The same 
applies to some KPR officers. The linkage through patron-client relationships between chiefs, 
KPRs, local political leaders enables the distribution of ammunition and the bailing out of 
arrested raiders. This shows that pastoralists’ elites are involved in violence among the Samburu 
and Turkana of Baragoi because of the power it gives them through mobilization of warriors to 
conduct raids especially in revenge cases as was observed in the lead up to the Baragoi massacre. 
The practice of cattle raiding therefore has transformed into a means through which political 
ambitions and economic interests of the elite are realized and clearly manifested.
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From Cattle Raids to ‘All Out Violence’: A Processual Analysis of the 
Baragoi Massacre 
7.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I analyse escalation of violence in raids as precipitated by a combination of 
structural and processual factors. Using the example of the Baragoi massacre, I analyse the key 
issues that contributed to killing of 42 police officers on the 10
th
 of November 2012. To achieve 
this I give a critical look at the series of events that occurred to propel the raid into a massacre. 
My aim is to explain why some raids escalate into ‘all-out violence’ that lead to devastation of 
pastoralists livelihoods while others are easily resolved through the intervention of local 
peacebuilding mechanisms. I argue that for raids to become massacres a series of events precede; 
immediately after a raid occurs, the opportunity or window for dialogue is shut by the entry of 
secondary actors with vested interests in violent action. Entry of secondary actors not directly 
affected by the raid prompts the abandonment of ‘soft’ approaches such as inter-communal 
dialogue and brings into play the pursuit of ‘hard’ solutions such as revenge raids. Secondary 
actors increase the availability of instruments of violence through procurement and distribution 
of arms and ammunition in readiness for retaliatory attacks. They shift the focus of the dispute 
from a single raid to several past injustices against whole communities. The invocation of past 
injustices or raids is aimed at galvanizing communal support for the planned violence and serves 
to mobilize warriors and solidify ethnic identity against the ‘enemy’. Once the ‘we’ group 
identity is solidified; the enemy defined and identified, the ultimate goal of the conflict then 
changes from recovery of livestock to ‘finishing’ the enemy. I argue that massacres that arise out 
of raids are therefore products of processes such as warrior mobilisation and distribution of arms 
based on ethno-nationalistic identities. 
 
While in pre-colonial times morans were mobilized for raids based on the need to replenish 
decimated herds after droughts or the need to acquire livestock for the payment of bride wealth 
(Osamba 2000; Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008). Today’s raids are carried out mostly to solidify 
group identity based on ethnicity for political competition and resource scrambles (Coser 1956; 
Greiner 2013). Mobilization for big raids are carried out with ethno-nationalistic orientations that 
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seek to entrench ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality as a prerequisite for raids (IRIN News 2014). Even 
though cattle raids are carried out by warriors, the violence that accompanies the raids is 
significantly fueled by ethnic identity politics and ethno-nationalistic mobilisation involving 
politicians and educated elite (Kagwanja 2001; Greiner 2013; Sharamo 2014). In Baragoi, major 
raids and massacres have occurred after periods of mobilization based on ethnic identities. In this 
study I define a massacre as the intentional, indiscriminate of murder or killings of a group of 
people because of their socio-political orientations such as ethnic identities or political 
allegiances.  Unlike the traditional cattle raid in which the aim of violence is to forcefully acquire 
cattle, massacres among pastoralists in Northern Kenya aim to achieve several purposes; to 
convey a message of incompatibility of two or more communities existing within a common 
geographical area (often in land disputes between communities or to forcefully evict political 
competitiors from a common area of existence in the run up to a competitive political period, 
thus denying them a chance to cast their ballots and ensure a win for the organisers of the 
massacre. This chapter therefore looks into the processes of violence escalation. I argue that 
escalation of conflicts into violence situations depict contested relationships between the two 
warring groups (Simmel 1955). Using the Baragoi massacre as a case study, I analyse how raids 
lead to extensive inter-communal conflicts that results into displacement of people and massive 
loss of lives.  
7.1 The Baragoi Massacre 
Details on the Baragoi massacre (NPS 2013) are drawn from an investigative report published by 
the Kenya Police after the Baragoi massacre which outlines the chronology of events prior to and 
after the massacre and interviews with police officers who participated in the botched operation 
as well as priests from Baragoi Catholic Parish, morans, elders and women from the Samburu 
and Turkana communities.  The massacre was triggered by a Turkana raid of Samburu livestock 
at Lesirkan village in Ndoto location on 20
th
 October 2012. Raids between the Samburu and 
Turkana are often well calculated missions. The 20
th
 of October is a public holiday (Mashujaa 
Day
92
) in Kenya and so raiders chose a day when the security personnel were committed in 
celebrating heroes’ day. The Turkana raiders from Lomerok manyatta in Nachola location made 
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away with 501 from the heads of cattle Letipila family. According to the police reports (Baragoi 
Police Station 2012), the raided animals belonged to the following: 
i. Nkoyai Letipila-129 heads of cattle 
ii. Nginguge Letipila-176 heads of cattle 
iii. Zaire Letipila 116 heads of cattle (a nominated councilor) 
iv. Eli Letipila 80 heads of cattle 
The report further noted that police officers from Baragoi were mobilized to track the stolen 
animals. In the report (NPS 2013), it is recorded that police caught up with the alleged raiders at 
Lomerok village where there was an exchange of fire. The police were overpowered by the 
raiders forcing them to withdraw. On the 21
st
 of October 2012, the Samburu North police were 
further reinforced by Anti Stock Theft Unit
93
 (ASTU) and the police team again proceeded to 
Lomerok village. They were again overpowered and forced to withdraw. In an interview with a 
police officer
94
 who participated in the botched operation that became Baragoi massacre, I was 
informed that the failure of the police contingents to recover the raided livestock in two attempts 
forced the police and administrators to consider using elders in a series of peacebuilding efforts.  
As a result of the dialogue by elders the Turkana returned 20 heads of cattle on 23
rd
 October 
2012 (NPS 2013). Ten heads of cattle were further retuned by Turkana elders on the 25
th
 of 
October 2012. By this time the police report (NPS 2013:35) indicates that “about 400 armed 
Samburu morans” had been mobilized for retaliation purposes against the Turkana. Similar 
sentiments were expressed by  a local priest who wondered  who was feeding the Samburu 
morans gathered at the District Commissioner’s office compound and later in Mnanda village of 
Baragoi. A Samburu moran narrated how ammunition was distributed to them by Baragoi police 
officers in the presence of local politicians. I was informed that warrior-age sets from all over 
Samburu County were mobilised by senior politicians from the Samburu community in readiness 
for revenge raids. Despite the mobilisation of morans for revenge, efforts of elders to return 
stolen animals continued on the 27
th
 of October 2012 when Turkana elders brought back 14 
                                                          
93
 A specialized unit formed to track and recover stolen livestock 
94
 Interview at Baragoi town September 2014 
 153 
 
heads of cattle. However, as noted in the report (NPS 2013), Samburu elders allegedly rejected 
eight of these animals on grounds that these did not bear the Samburu clan branding marks. 
According to the police report, the delay in returning the remainder of the raided animals brought 
tension in Baragoi town, “as the Samburus roamed Baragoi town with their firearms” (NPS 
2013:7). By 29
th
 of October 2012, Samburu warriors camping at the DCs office compound were 
about 600 (NPS 2013:35) this further indicates a well planned mobilisation effort by actors 
interested in violence as a means of solidifying ethnic identity. These warriors invaded Lomerok 
village in attempts to recover their animals on the 29
th
 of October.  The Samburu morans made 
away with 205 camels from Lomerok village but 12 Samburu morans were killed while three 
Turkana morans were injured. Seven of those killed were buried at Samburu public cemetery, 
Baragoi on the 1
st
 of November 2012 in the presence of Samburu political leaders. Two bodies 
out of the twelve killed were never recovered and it is believed that they were eaten up by wild 
animals. 
On the 1
st
 of November 2012, senior police officers from the provincial headquarters based in 
Nakuru visited Baragoi and held meetings with Samburu North administrators, police officers 
and elders from the Samburu and Turkana communities. In this meeting Turkana elders were 
urged to ensure the return of the remaining Samburu cattle while the issue of the raided Turkana 
camels was not raised nor discussed (NPS 2013). The police officers gave the Turkana elders a 
deadline of 5
th
 November failure to which a paramilitary operation would be launched against 
raiders believed to be hidden in Lomerok village (NPS 2013). 
In a meeting called by a senior police officer to assess the progress of inter-communal dialogue 
by Turkana and Samburu elders on the 4
th
 of November, only Turkana elders attended and 
informed the police of their willingness to return 12 more heads of cattle (NPS 2013). On the 5
th
 
of November 2012, at a meeting meant for handing over of the animals by both groups, it was 
noted that inter-communal dialogue failed due to the failure by the elders from both sides to 
bring the stolen animals. It was then declared by the Samburu County Commissioner that an 
operation to recover the stolen animals be launched against the Turkana in Lomerok village. The 
operation dubbed “Rudisha Ngombe95” thus targeted Turkana village of Lomerok and 
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completely ignored the Samburu raiders that had raided the 205 Turkana camels on the 29
th
 of 
October 2012. 
Information from interviews with police officers, chiefs and the police report (NPS 2013) 
indicate that there was a disagreement among the senior police officers.  The officer tasked with 
the command of operation “Rudisha Ng’ombe” and the head of police units in Samburu North 
(OCPD) opposed the launch of the operation. They argued that it targeted the Turkana and 
ignored justified Turkana grievances of 205 camels raided by the Samburu. Their opposition was 
based on the following points (NPS 2013: 8): 
i. The operation would be suicidal due to inadequate number of personnel and 
unavailability of communication equipment’s 
ii. The Turkana had a legitimate complaint of 205 camels that was not being addressed 
iii. They wanted the operations to be well coordinated in order that both Samburu and 
Turkana locations would be hit simultaneously as carrying it out on Turkana alone would 
occasion serious animosity between the Government and the Turkana as it would appear 
that the Government is favouring the Samburu 
However, the police report (NPS 2013) as well as interviews with police officers indicate that 
these two senior officers were overruled by the head of police in the Rift Valley. The officers 
were further instructed to “prepare and execute the operation” (NPS 2013:8). This shows the role 
of state security officers in the production of violence among pastoralists groups. The fact that 
the advice of a senior police officer based in Samburu North on recovery of livestock was 
ignored points to influence from other actors whose interests were most likely commercial and 
political as far as conducting the raid was concerned. Divergent interests within the state security 
apparatus have been argued to contribute towards the escalation of violent conflicts (Kratli and 
Swift 1999). 
Events that proceeded after were continued mobilisation of Samburu morans and the 
reinforcement of police contingents from other parts of Rift Valley that were assembled in 
Baragoi town in readiness for the paramilitary operation. According to the report, on the 10
th
 
November 2012 a “combined force of 132 police officers and hundreds of KPRs from the 
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Samburu community” (NPS 2013:8) were assembled for the operation on Lomerok village. The 
team was later ambushed by Turkana morans during which 105
96
 people were killed among these 
were 42 police officers. Further 14 police officers were injured and a total of 29 firearms lost to 
the raiders.  In the next section, we apply a processual analysis to the Baragoi massacre to 
comprehend the progression of incidences of conflict to ‘all-out-violence’. 
Figure 6: Map of Samburu County showing the locations of raids that led to the Baragoi Massacre in November 
2012 
 
Fig 6 above shows the locations where raiders emerged prior to the Baragoi massacre of 
November 2012. The bodies of the killed police officers were received at Baragoi Primary 
School. The massacre led displacements of people and the alteration of livelihoods from 
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pastoralism to dependency on relief supplies. It further shows the effect of violence in terms of 
forced movements, fear and insecurity and the uncertainty that comes with irresponsive state 
policies such as displacements. In summary the map above shows the role of Turkana and 
Samburu in the production of violence and how the state inadvertently contributes to the 
establishment of spaces of insecurity that further produces more violence. To understand the 
Baragoi massacre, we look into past precedents of violence that have occurred between the 
Samburu and Turkana. 
7.2 Interconnectedness of Massacres in Pastoralists Lands of Northern Kenya 
Pastoralists communities inhabiting Baringo, Isiolo, Marsabit, Turkana, Samburu and Laikipia 
counties have at one time or the other been victims or perpetrators of massacres against 
neighbouring groups. Most of these massacres often involve the raiding of livestock, while 
others also involve the torching of houses and shooting of livestock in the ensuing cross fire. In 
this section, I analyse several incidences of massacres among pastoralists groups in Northern 
Kenya as shown in Fig 7 below while also looking into the response of the state to these cases of 
mass killings of pastoralists by their enemy groups. 
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Figure 7: Map of Northern Kenya Showing Areas Where Massacres Have Occurred in Recent Years 
 
Source: Author 
Contests over pasture, land and water along-side historical claims over specific districts in 
Northern Kenya have been used as an organizing principle for violence (Galaty 2016:112-117). 
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In effect, these contests have contributed in a significant way in the reorganization of pastoralists 
societies in Northern Kenya.  Galaty (2016:115) views these conflicts as processual given their 
long lasting impacts, their critical role in determining grazing and settlement patterns in 
pastoralists’ borderlands and their interconnectedness with past, present and future incidents of 
violence. In attempts to apply a processual analysis to the Baragoi massacre of 10
th
 November 
2012, it is critical that similar processes and incidences of collective violence that have occurred 
elsewhere in Northern Kenya be reviewed and contextualized. In this section I will review and 
contextualize the following massacres: The Lokorkor massacre of 1996, the Murkutwo massacre 
of March 2001 in Marakwet, the Turbi/Bubisa massacre of 2005 in Marsabit, the Kanampiu 
massacre of 2009 in Laikipia, the Todonyang’ massacre of 2011 in Turkana, the Kapedo 
massacre of 2014 along the Turkana-Baringo border and the Nadome massacre of 2015 at the 
border between Baringo and Turkana Counties in Northern Kenya.  
 
Violence among herders in Baragoi during the drought season of 1996 is noted by (Galaty 
2005a; Galaty 2016) to have been informed by past violence while at the same setting a 
precedent for future violence between the Samburu and Turkana. Galaty situates the conflict that 
led to a series of cattle raids and massacres in Baragoi in 1996 firstly to “historical claims” by the 
Turkana over some parts of Baragoi geographical area (Galaty 2016: 112). On the 26
th
 of August 
1996, Turkana raiders attacked and killed eighteen Samburu and Ariaal herders. In the process, 
the Turkana made off with 500 heads of livestock (most of which were later recovered) and set 
off a chain of violent incidents that continued over the next four months (Galaty 2005a; Galaty 
2016). The August 1996 raid by the Turkana of Baragoi on Arial and Samburu herders is vital in 
understanding the processes of violence in terms of its organisation (300-400 raiders) and its 
consequences in setting off new cycles of violence. In the month of October 1996, Turkana 
raided a total of 6300
97
 heads of livestock from the Samburu in three different raids (Galaty 
2005a: 117; Mkutu 2005:173). In a revenge raid by a combined team of raiders from Samburu 
and Pokot communities in December 1996, over 50 Turkana men, women and children were 
killed at Lokorkor near Marti (Galaty 2005a:117). This shows the potency of revenge as a 
catalyst in cycles of violence. Secondly, the case of Lokorkor massacre shows that once the 
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‘season’ of violence starts, it adopts a life of its own. This can be seen in the way the ‘space of 
violence’ expanded in this case from a pastureland raid in August 1996 near Kawap center in 
Nyiro Division to targeted violence in which women and children became victims in December 
1996 at a manyatta in Lokorkor near Marti center in Baragoi Division. Further, revenge violence 
in this case was the basic organizing principle through which warrior mobilisation and arming 
was done.  
 
Another massacre that reset societal relationships in Northern Kenya is the Murkutwo massacre 
that occurred in March 2001 in Elgeyo Marakwet County following an attack by the 3,000
98
 
armed Pokot  and Tugen raider “armed with AK47 assault rifles, a few assorted big guns such as 
rocket launcher and bazookas as well as grenades” on the Marakwet (Cheserek 2012:4; 
Kagwanja 2001:5). During this raid over 51
99
 people were killed including 17 children and 16 
women,  bodies set a blaze, 300
100
 houses burnt and thousands of livestock stolen (Cheserek 
2012:4). During the massacre 100 cattle and 300 goats were also stolen (Kagwanja 2001:6) 
Murkutwo massacre was revenge raid by the Pokot following an earlier raid by the Marakwet in 
July 2000 where over 500 livestock were stolen. To carry out this raid the armed raiders first 
“encircled and overpowered the 60 Anti-Stock Theft Unit police officers at Chesongoch camp”, 
thus making it impossible for the police to intervene as they were outnumbered (Cheserek 
2012:4; Kagwanja 2001:5). This shows a well laid plan on the part of the raiders and intent to 
cause maximum damage. It also shows that the process of violence starts with the conception of 
the idea and a well laid down strategy which is backed up with logistical organisation.  The 
attackers “cut of all escape and supply routes, trapped the hapless villagers in the middle and 
attacked from the rear and the front” (Kagwanja 2001:6). Some peculiarities of the nature of this 
violence are well captured by Kagwanja (2001) such as the deaths of Jemutai Kipchemeri a two 
and a half year old girl whose body was riddled with five bullets and that of 7 year old 
Jepchumba Kibusa “who raiders threw back in the inferno as she tried to escape” (Kagwanja 
2001:6).  
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99
 Kagwanja (2001:6) mentions 58 killed 
100
 Kagwanja (2001:6) mentions 600 houses torched 
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While it has been argued that traditional raiding had sanctioned against the targeting of women, 
children and the aged, such actions defy the norms of raiding and therefore the Murkutwo 
massacre when analysed from its targets and victims cannot be classified as a raid in the 
traditional sense (Hutchinson 2000). As Kagwanja was informed, the aim of the violence was to 
“teach the Marakwet a lesson” (2001:7). Violence in this case was used as a message to convey a 
long standing dispute over land, boundaries and incompatibility of political allegiances between 
the Pokot, Tugen and Marakwet communities. The victims of the violence, those burnt by the 
raiders served more as examples of the next phase of the politicized dispute between the 
communities. The Murkutwo massacre further highlights the role of violence as a means through 
which power and strategic interests are pursued. According to Kagwanja (2001) the attackers 
were drawn from a combined team of Pokot and Tugen warriors. Further showing that the 
violence was not meaningless or senseless but was a well-planned action aimed at achieving 
desired ends. 
 
Further the Murkutwo massacre shows the role of violence in precipitating processes of social 
change as communities are forced to move out of their lands and their lives transformed from 
farmers and agro-pastoralists to internally displaced persons reliant on emergency food relief 
(Opiyo 2010:125; Kagwanja 2001: 8). As a result of the fear of more attacks, many families 
moved away into forests and caves “in the rugged Lagam escarpment. While others took refuge 
in the Chesongoch Mission Church compound” (Kagwanja 2001:8), thus altering their modes of 
survival from agriculture and livestock keeping to dependency on relief supplies.  Violence in 
this case represents a literal “return to the caves” as noted by Kagwanja to metaphorically and 
practically demonstrate the capacity of violence to negatively and positively transform lives 
(Kagwanja 2001:8). The culture of cattle raiding is in this case used to anchor violence aimed at 
executing societal power contests by different interest groups.  
 
On 12
th
 of January 2005, Turbi/Bubisa massacres occurred when Borana raiders targeted Turbi 
Primary School in Marsabit County and slaughtered 86 people including 12 school children
101
 
from the Gabra community (TJRC 2013: 21; Mwangi 2006:81; Tablino 2006:314-317). The 
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following day, the Gabra warriors retaliated by ambushing and killing 10 Borana community 
members who were travelling in a Land Rover on their way to a Catholic church retreat at 
Bubisa (Tablino 2009:314). A number of structural causes were advanced in attempts to 
understand and explain the Turbi/Bubisa massacres. According to Hussein and Huka (2011), the 
massacres occurred due to local political rivalries, border disputes and the incapacity of state 
security agents to provide security for Gabra community members despite intelligence from the 
chiefs of an imminent Borana attack. A more historical background to the conflict was provided 
by Ouko et al (2005) as follows: 
“Three key factors underpin the cause of the Turbi conflict; the Borana/Gabra ethnic 
rivalry for dominance, the unresolved district boundaries and the resource use. Turbi 
currently falls under Marsabit district but Moyale people and the Boranas by extension 
believe that Turbi was part and parcel of Moyale district from the colonial times and 
should remain so. This explains why seemingly simple conflicts around the area often 
become too complicated to resolve. Moyale community first raised the issue during the 
Waitate Boundary Commission in Marsabit in 1984. They claimed that Turbi should be 
part of the Moyale constituency and not of the North Horr. This sentiment continued 
through the years with varying degree of intensity but became too strong when Moyale 
became an independent district in 1996 and Turbi remained as part of Marsabit district. 
The Gabra claim that Turbi belongs to them but Boranas believe that Moyale district 
boundary is at Lagh Warabessa (approximately 30km beyond Turbi). They justify their 
claim by the fact that a former Moyale MP constructed the Turbi pan, which is currently 
the main source of water for the Turbi people. Turbi boundary has remained a 
contentious political issue and very powerful campaign tool ever since for politicians 
from both North Horr and Moyale constituencies. The Moyale politician often pledges to 
bring Turbi back to Moyale while the North Horr one promises to retain the status 
quo”Ouko et al (2005:34). 
Ouko et al (2005) noted that “the attack on Turbi was construed as an intention to scare away the 
Gabras from the area so that the Boranas can take the land” (2005:15), thus pointing to the 
violence as a message on the dispute over land and boundaries between the Grabra and the 
Borana and the victims as examples of the military might and capacity of the Borana to ‘deal 
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with the Gabra’. On the other hand, the BBC (2005) looked into the processual nature of 
violence by placing revenge at the center of the mass killings as part of serial violence that had 
been ongoing between the Gabra and Borana for over three months. Mwangi (2006:81) recorded 
that the Borana attackers at Turbi Primary School were over 1000, thus pointing to the existence 
of a formal organisation, detailed planning and a clear chain of command in the execution of 
violence. The attack on children in a dormitory at Turbi Primary School and of church goers in 
Bubisa further shows that these attacks were not necessarily cattle raids but rather informed by 
primordial classification of the ‘enemy’. This can further be seen in the burning of houses 
(Mwangi 2006:81). The murdered children at Turbi Primary School were final year students 
from the Gabra community who would have soon graduated to secondary school, this means that 
violence was  aimed incapacitating the Gabra not only through the torching of huts but also their 
future prosperity that education of the young would bring to families and the whole community. 
Ouko et al (2005) made similar observation in the fact finding mission in Marsabit after the 
massacre as follows: 
 
“The attacks were highly organized. Some students could recognize parents from the 
school as some of their attackers. It is suspected the school was targeted because it is very 
core in the society and was seen as the best target to have the greatest impact. The 
mission was informed that, 3 weeks before the attacks, 10 children belonging to a certain 
community were removed from the school indicating their parents knew the attack was 
imminent” (Ouko et al 2005:35). 
The trend of attacking symbols of emancipation among rival pastoralists in Northern Kenya has 
been replicated in Turkana East where bandits attacked a government vehicle, injured a police 
officer and burnt national examinations that were on transit to Kapedo Secondary School (Lutta 
and Wanzala 2014; Koskei and N’gasike 2014). This shows high levels of intolerance among 
rival groups, thus expanding the purposes of violence from its traditional definitions of socio-
economic relations to wider societal supremacy battles aimed at not only acquiring power but 
also preserving hegemonic influence in the future. Even though the raiders stole  “about 3,000 
cattle, 5,000 sheep and 4,000 camels” (Mwangi 2006:81)  in the subsequent attack in Turbi 
villages, the targeting of children reveals the extent of instrumentality of violent action and its 
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potency in asserting power over its victims and the ‘victim’ community at large. While guns 
were used in this massacre as ‘implements’ of violence, the violence act itself is further seen as a 
weapon aimed at communicating the broader message of ‘psychological defeat’ not only to the 
victims but to the wider society of the Gabra (Bar On 2002:158). 
 
Further, Mwangi (2006:81) recorded that “an infant had his head smashed on a rock” thus giving 
a more vivid illustration of deeper meanings of violence as a message of hate and incompatibility 
between the two groups. While conceding that raiding is a shared practice between the Borana 
and the Gabra, Tablino (2006:315) asserted that the violence witnessed in Turbi/Bubisa massacre 
“did not occur in nomadic contexts”. In his view, the violence that occurred during these 
massacres could only be attributed to “alienation, anomie, uncertainty” (Tablino 2006:317). He 
blamed cycles of violence to “loss of meaning” of the traditional nomadic life that pastoralists 
have enjoyed arguing that those who committed the massacres were ‘town people’ for whom 
being hired for violence was simply a job and thus their actions could not be analysed through 
the prisms of culture of cattle raiding per se but as a new way in which pastoralists youth were 
being used as pawns in the commodification of violence for the benefit of power elites.. 
 
On 15
th
 September 2009 a raid at dawn by the Pokot on a Samburu manyatta in Kanampiu in 
Laikipia North district led to the killing of 34 Samburu herders (Wachira 2013). Of interest is the 
framing of the Kanampiu massacre as an “example” that the Pokot wanted to show their might to 
the Samburu after disagreements over land claims in Ltungai at the boundary between Samburu 
and Baringo Counties (Greiner 2013: 227). As a result, Kanampiu was used as a ‘staging’ ground 
for violence in the contest for political power and resources between the Samburu of Lonyek and 
Pokot of Amaiya and Churo. Violence as used here was not only communicative rather violence 
in this sense is the message (Calabrese 2012:109). While the battle between the Samburu and 
Pokot was on the surface seen as motivated by land claims in Ltungai conservancy, a deeper 
purpose was the battle for political power among Samburu and Pokot elites. The conflict over 
Ltungai conservancy gave the political leaders a platform through which they could show their 
‘protection credentials’ to their respective voting blocs in readiness for the 2007 General 
elections (Greiner 2012: 420; Barasa and Kipkoech 2006 quoted in Straight 2009:25). 
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Another recent massacre occurred in Todonyang’ when the Daasanech from Ethiopia ambushed 
Turkana women, men and children who were coming back to their villages from a shared market 
along the Kenya-Ethiopian border on the 2
nd
 of May 2011 during which 50 people were killed 
(Ng’asike 2011; SCCRR 2013:1). Even though the massacre was attributed to scarcity of water 
and pasture (SCCRR 2013:1) the nature of violence points to a more complicated situation than 
just scarcity issues as captured below by Ng’asike (2011): 
“The youngest victim of the attack was a three-week-old boy whose head had been 
shattered with a bullet and was found with his intestines protruding from his stomach, 
that were being devoured by vultures… other 19 bodies were still intact, although the 
eyes, especially of the women age between 20 and 25 years, had been gouged out 
(Ng’asike 2011: 1). 
 
Violence incidences in which desecration of dead bodies are carried out show linkages between 
culture and power (Wood 2007:5). The desecration of victims’ bodies show that power is not 
only earned by the perpetrator upon killing of the victim but further by carving or ‘injuring’ the 
deceased as a means of ‘inscribing defeat on the body of the enemy’. Incidences where 
mutilations of victims’ bodies are carried out have been argued by Broch-Due (2005:21) to fulfill 
two purposes; first to convey a message of defeat and disempowerment to the larger community 
from which the victim hails and secondly, to show the victor’s resourcefulness to his own 
community by coming back home not only with raided cattle for instance but the honour of 
killing the ‘enemy’ and obtaining a genital trophy. In the case of the Todonyang’ massacre, a 
local Member of Parliament linked the killings and the collection of genital trophies by the 
Daasanech as a  show of bravery and a step towards upward social mobility that is performed by 
Daasanech warriors before circumcision every August (Ng’asike 2011:2). CEWARN (2004) in 
its baseline report of relations among pastoralists in the Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster 
noted that when it comes to violence between the Turkana and the Daasanech “the aggressors 
tend to kill in line with one of their traditional rites (“ekichum”) whereby, to become a man, a 
young man has to kill an enemy who in this case is the Turkana” (CEWARN 2004:21) .This 
further shows the linkages between ritual practices and power as the Daasanech young men are 
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culturally expected to show their bravery by subduing their enemy as a means of gaining societal 
recognition that ensures promotion from one age-group to the next.  
 
Mutilation of dead bodies therefore not only serve as a resource for the victor’s community but is 
also stored in the memories of the defeated and is used in future for socialization against the 
enemy, as a means of mobilisation for violence and as a justification for  revenge attacks, thus 
fueling cycles of violence. The social consequences of Todonyang’ massacre are further captured 
by SCCRR (2013) as “many people dead; chief’s office and dispensary abandoned; a vandalized 
school and as a result learning was paralyzed in the area; economic activities suspended and an 
estimated population of 1200 villagers left homeless” (SCCRR 2013:1). As a result the inter-
communal trade between the Turkana and Dasaanech was paralysed and the ensuing insecurity 
limited movement of people as both communities moved to safe areas away from the common 
Kenya-Ethiopia international border (SCCRR 2013). Violence therefore plays a critical part in 
determining movement, trading and settlement choices of pastoralists groups within the 
Karamoja Cluster. At the same time violence or the threat of it is critical in the creation of spaces 
of insecurity as people move far away from unsafe areas (Witsenburg and Zaal 2012). 
 
On the 31
st
 of October 2014, Pokot bandits ambushed and killed 24 people including 21 
policemen in Kapedo area along the Baringo-Turkana border after “mistaking the police officers 
to be Turkana’s” (Conflict Barometer 2014:64). The killing of police officers in Kapedo was also 
part of a past precedent where a senior police officer was shot dead by a Pokot juvenile in the 
same area while in pursuit of Pokot livestock raiders after a raid on the Samburu (Österle 
2007:2013). In the case of the October 2014 police attack, the victims were ambushed while 
travelling in a police truck along Kapedo-Lokori road (Mabatuk and Koskei 2014:1). The raiders 
then burned the police truck and the Red Cross personnel who responded to their distress calls 
were fired upon by the bandits. Although the killing of these police officers was an immediate 
reminder of the Baragoi massacre of police officers in November 2012, the difference in this 
case was that these officers were ambushed while traveling, overpowered by group of bandits 
and executed. There were no cases or allegations of livestock involved. What was telling 
however is the quote above attributed to Senator John Lonyangapuo (Mabatuk and Koskei 
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2014:3), a Pokot scholar-turned politician who justified these violence actions along the 
traditional enmity between the ‘Turkana-Pokot’ as a basis for the killings and therefore 
something ‘normal’. Justification of pastoralists’ violence as ‘normal’ and ‘cultural’ has played a 
significant role in the marginalisation of Northern Kenya (Straight 2009:23). This state of neglect 
has contributed to the ‘ungoverned spaces’ that breed actors in the business of violence (KHRC 
2009).  
 
The Kapedo conflict between the Turkana and Pokot is not a new phenomenon as Österle (2007: 
203-204) noted several incidents in 2005 where the Pokot and Turkana warriors engaged in 
revenge attacks.  The siege over Kapedo is linked to territorial expansion of Pokot grazing lands 
since 1980s
102
. The expansion of Pokot grazing areas over the last three decades enabled them to 
lay claim to Kapedo Center, thus fuelling the violence between the two groups. In some of these 
incidences the Pokot blocked the road that passes through Kapedo to prevent food supplies from 
reaching Turkana population in attempts to force the Turkana to flee to ‘safer’ areas away from 
the contested Kapedo Center. This shows that the ambush and killing of the policemen in 
October 2014 was part of a long history of violence which is centered on the contest over land 
around Kapedo Center. Even though cases of cattle raids between the Turkana and Pokot have 
been ongoing around Kapedo, the actions of actors in violence as captured by Österle (2007) 
reveal that violence is aimed at evicting the Turkana from Kapedo. This is further corroborated 
by a Pokot memorandum presented to the Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission 
(Greiner 2013: 226) in which the Pokot laid claim to the local Kapedo Primary School. 
 
The last massacre in recent times was the Nadome massacre which occurred on 6
th
 of May 2015 
when Turkana raiders attacked Pokot settlements at Nadome village in East Pokot district. 
During the raid the Turkana allegedly stole 3000 goats while at the same time killed 12 women 
and children. An immediate revenge attack by Pokot warriors led to the killing of 42 Turkana 
raiders (Mabatuk 2015). While conflict between the Turkana and Pokot along their common 
border is not something new, various reasons for this violence has been explored by researchers 
and journalists. Ruto (2015: 1) linked the Nadome massacre to perennial border disputes between 
                                                          
102
 Personal communication with Michael Bollig, August 2016 
 167 
 
these two communities. While Lagat (2015:1) agreed that the dispute could be fuelled by 
disagreements over the boundary, he further observed that scarcity of water and pasture acted as 
a trigger to the recent massacre. Some peculiarities of violent action however betray these 
resource scarcity explanations as captured by Mabatuk (2015): 
“We come across the body of a woman, her child - a toddler strapped with a shuka103 
onto her back - also dead. Apparently, after felling the hapless woman, the heartless 
warriors went for the throat of the baby, slit it open and separated the tiny body from its 
even tinier head” (Mabatuk 2015:1) 
 
The stench of rotting bodies and desecration of infants led to the description of Nadome village 
where the massacre occurred as a ‘horror-scape’ (Mabatuk 2015:1) further highlighting the 
devastation and indiscriminatory nature of the violence. The violence was said to have started 
when a group of 400 raiders formed a ‘human ring’ around the village and started firing 
indiscriminately at sleeping mothers and children at 4am in the morning (Mabatuk 2015:1) this 
further points to the organisation of violence and its intended purpose in this case which was to 
wipe out members of the Pokot community who resided in this village. This reveals that the 
conflict aimed at evicting the Pokot residents of Nadome in what was deemed as Turkana land. 
These acts of devastating violence aimed to permanently inscribe the memories of its victims 
with the ‘horror’ they experienced in Nadome village (Mabatuk 2015). The Nadome massacre, 
thus set off the movement of people away from unsafe areas (Mabatuk 2015:2; Kipsang 2015). 
While episodes of pastoralists’ violence can be analysed based on structural factors such as 
boundary disputes and competition over diminishing land or pastures resources. The peculiarities 
of violent action demand a contextual understanding of violent actions. Can violence that 
involves the slaughtering of babies be termed ‘cattle raiding’? What could be the aim of such 
acts? In attempts to answer some of these questions, in the next sections I look into how raiders 
are psychologically prepared to execute these acts. I aim to show that violence that occurred 
during the Baragoi massacre was a product of processes which included psychological 
preparation of warriors to engage in wanton killings. In the next section processual approach to 
the analysis of violence is expounded upon drawing from cases in East and West Africa. 
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7.3 Pastoralists Violence through the Processual Approach 
Conflicts and violence between pastoralists have been explained through structural perspectives. 
These have focused on resource scarcity (Haro et al 2005; Theisen 2012; Adano et al 2012; 
Butler and Gates 2012), institutional weakness or failure (Mkutu and Wandera 2013; Mkutu 
2015, McCabe 1990; Menkhaus 2008), local politics (IRIN News 2014; Sharamo 2014; Greiner 
2013; Schilling et al 2012) and colonial history of violent conquest of pastoralists areas (Stigand 
1910; Lamphear 1976; Spencer 1965, Kratli and Swift 1999). Moritz (2010) citing cases from 
Cameroon and Burkina Faso argues that even though the above mentioned structural causes can 
precipitate conflicts and violence among pastoralists, many at times violence does not break out 
in other pastoralists’ conflicts despite the above conditions. In Kenya one can cite cases of 
cooperation between the Samburu and Rendille who live side by side with limited raiding that 
rarely spirals into massive raids and massacres (Spencer 1973). Citing cases from Ghana (Tonah 
2006) also opines that while conflicts between local farmers and Fulbe herders have at times led 
to inter-communal violence, many other similar conflicts have been solved without escalation. 
 
Basset (1988) argues that conflicts involving herders are complicated with various facets. Moritz 
(2010) further views conflicts between herders and farmers in West Africa to involve structural 
and processual causes. He argues that many explanations of violent conflicts involving 
pastoralists and agro-pastoralists often ignore the role of processes that proceed immediately 
after a dispute between herders. According to Moritz (2010: 139) structural factors such as state 
weakness and environmental scarcity can explain the triggers of conflicts “while processual 
variables explain conflict outcomes”.  Sandole (1999) noted the existence of two levels of 
conflicts: conflicts as start-ups and conflicts as a process. Conflict as a start-up means the 
underlying challenges that fuel contests between groups. These could be the inability of the state 
to police its borders thus enabling the easy flow of small arms and light weapons into its 
territory. Conflicts as a process means the series of events that propel a conflict situation into a 
massacre. These could be the mobilisation of warriors by a political leader. Or the massive 
purchase of arms by elites from one community in the guise of ‘protecting their people’. Kratli 
and Swift (1999) further captured the conflict processes that lead to violence in the following 
statement: 
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“As the raided herds need to be restocked, professional raids — well equipped, 
organized, highly effective — may cause a shower of clan raids — smaller, less 
equipped, extemporaneous — easily generating a chain reaction of violence” (Krätli and 
Swift 1999:10). 
Processualists view conflicts as a study in complex phases of contests in efforts to establish its 
patterns and processes (Mortiz 2010). Using Pruitt and Kim (2004) one can analyse the 
escalation of pastoralists’ violence through five critical transformations: (1) shift from small to 
large, (2) shift from light to heavy tactics (3) shift from specific to general (4) shift from few to 
many (5) shift from goals of the conflict. Pruitt and Kim (2004) have further offered three 
models of understanding the processes of violence escalation in communal conflicts. These 
include: the contender- model, the conflict spiral model, and the structural change model.  This 
chapter seeks to analyse the Baragoi massacre using the analytical framework of processual 
analysis of conflicts as espoused by Moritz (2010) and Pruitt and Kim (2004). 
Escalation of raids into violence is therefore a process imbued with several factors; according to 
Spencer (1973) raids escalate when the rules of raiding are not adhered to.  Chances of escalation 
are also determined by the numbers of livestock raided. In the event that a huge number of 
livestock is raided the possibility of the onset of revenge raids is hire. Escalation also depends on 
police action. In situations where the police make successful recovery efforts after major raids, 
conflicts easily dissipates but in situations where recovery efforts of the raided animals are 
thwarted by heavy gun fire by the raiders, impatience on the part of the raided morans may 
prompt the victims to ‘take the law into their own hands’ thus adding to the tension and fear that 
already exists in the area. Kratli and Swift (1999), view escalation of communal violence due to 
cattle raiding as the result of ethnic organisation and strategic decision making involving actors 
who are not primarily involved in raiding. They argue that escalation of conflicts stemming from 
cattle raids may in essence be a guise for pursuit of power by interested groups. Escalation of 
conflicts in Northern Kenya is therefore viewed as the pursuit of political, economic or socio-
cultural power by one group over the other through the use of violence. Kratli and Swift (1999) 
therefore argue that violence used in raids is itself a resource employed in the pursuit of power at 
the individual, group or communal levels. In attempts to apply a processual approach to the 
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analysis of pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi, the next section gives a thick description of the 
Baragoi massacre of November 2012. 
7.3.1 From the Raid to the Massacre- A Processual Analysis of Violence 
Using the Baragoi massacre as a case for processual analysis, I draw from Pruitt and Kim (2004) 
and Moritz (2010) among others to provide the perimeter for violence escalation that led to the 
massacre as follows: 
Shift from Small to Large 
Pruitt and Kim (2004) argue that conflicts escalate when actors involved increase from those 
who have primary interest in the dispute to actors who are not directly involved. They argue that 
the entry of these other actors who are remotely involved in the conflict inhibits negotiation and 
conciliation efforts that would occur if the dispute was left to the primary group. In the case of 
the Baragoi massacre, the primary victims were four members of the same family. However, 
immediately after the raid, one of the primary victims used his position as a political leader to 
mobilize Samburu morans as active participants in the search for the raided livestock (NPS 
2013). The mobilisation of Samburu morans and their involvement in these events brought 
tension in Baragoi town (NPS 2013). According to the police report, “the Samburus roamed 
Baragoi town with their firearms” (NPS 2013:7). The tension in Baragoi town was further 
exacerbated by the mobilisation of police officers from other districts, which signaled an 
impending paramilitary operation forcing communities especially the Turkana to mobilize 
defensively to protect their livestock and their villages. The conflict which started as a raid by 
Turkana warriors on a specific Samburu family herd then became an incident with divergent 
actors in pursuit of divergent interests. 
 Shift from Light to Heavy Tactics 
Immediately after the raid there were efforts at inter-communal negotiations using elders as is 
custom with many pastoralist societies (Chopra 2008; Pavanello and Scott-Villers 2013; Okumu 
2013). The Kenya Police report (NPS 2013) indicates that 36 heads of cattle were returned due to 
the efforts of the elders. Even as the elders attempted to rescue a dire situation, their efforts were 
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not helped by a revenge raid by the Samburu morans from El Barta on Lomerok manyatta on the 
29
th
 of October 2012. During this raid 12 Samburu raiders were killed while three Turkana 
warriors were injured while Samburu raiders made away with 205 camels thus further increasing 
tension in the district. This raid ended the elders’ efforts and solidified the hard-line positions 
between the two groups. From then on, there was massive mobilisation of Samburu warriors in 
Baragoi, while the Turkana warriors also mobilized for the defence of their villages, especially 
Lomerok. Police officers from other parts of the province were also brought into Baragoi in 
readiness for a paramilitary operation. A final peace meeting on the 5
th
 of November failed due 
to the unwillingness of both sides to return the stolen animals, thus leading to the launch of the 
‘operation rudisha ngombe’. 
 Shift from Specifics to General 
In the ensuing days after the raid in Lesirkan by the Turkana, the situation soon spiraled into an 
inter-communal affair. This was seen in the Kenya police report (NPS 2013) which recorded the 
mobilisation of up to 600 Samburu morans and KPRs who participated in the 29
th
 October 2012 
raid as well as in the ‘operation rudisha ngombe’ of 10th November 2012. The raid of 20th 
October by the Turkana and the subsequent revenge raid by the Samburu of Turkana camels on 
the 29
th
 of October were also used by political leaders to galvanise support of their ethnic groups. 
This was seen in the frequent political meetings that preceded the ‘operation rudisha ngombe’. 
(NPS 2013)  The participation of armed Samburu warriors and their KPRs in a purely police 
exercise also points to the level of mobilisation and political pressure that was exerted on the 
police officers (NPS 2013). Violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi has therefore 
taken a communal angle, where KPRs are used to bolster communal firepower against enemy 
groups. The Kenyan state is therefore weak in its core duty of protection of citizens’ lives and 
property and thus the involvement of KPRs in the raids and subsequent massacre reveal the 
states inability to monoplise its instruments of violence. 
 Shift from Few to Many 
At the beginning of the conflict, there are few people involved, escalation takes place if for some 
reason more people are drawn into the conflict (Pruitt and Kim 2004). In the case of the Baragoi 
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massacre, the victims of the Turkana raid on the 20
th
 of October 2012 were four Samburu 
households. The raiders were not specifically identified but in the police record (Baragoi Police 
Station 2012) it was noted that the Turkana raiders were tracked to Lomirok manyatta. The 
escalation of this conflict seems to have been propelled by the very fact that one of the victims 
was a local politician (nominated councilor) who not only put the police under pressure but also 
mobilized Samburu KPRs in efforts to recover his animals. The role of this politician in 
escalation of the Baragoi conflict in the following words of the respondent: 
“We reached Lomerok and saw a police helicopter overhead, the police helicopter landed 
nearby and they informed us that they had seen the stolen animals not far away from 
where we were. It was now approaching 5pm, in our vehicle we carried the councilor 
whose cattle had been stolen. He was worried and he was pressuring us to get his 
animals. We were also accompanied by Samburu KPRs”. 
The presence of Samburu KPRs in a police operation has been noted (NPS 2013) to have 
contributed to the massacre. In their submission, the participation of the Samburu KPRs at a time 
of high tension was deemed to show government support for Samburu warriors (NPS 2013). It 
further showed the interest of the involved actors to invest further in the ongoing conflict (Pruitt 
and Kim 2004). 
 Shifts in Goals of the Conflict-From Raids to Ethnic Violence 
According to Pruitt and Kim (2004) escalation of conflicts occurs when the goals of the conflict 
are shifted. To shift the goals of the conflict, Kratli and Swift argue that there must be a huge 
“ethnic fracture” (1999:11) based on hate, fear and distrust, this closes the door on any form of 
dialogue and refocuses the communities on preparations for violence. In the Baragoi massacre, 
the initial goal of the police and the primary victims of the raid from the Samburu side was to 
recover the raided 501 livestock. The goals started to shift the moment Samburu warriors were 
openly mobilized and camped at the DC compound where they were fed and addressed by police 
officers, local politicians and administrators (NPS 2013). The subsequent revenge raid by the 
mobilized Samburu morans which resulted into their making away with 205 Turkana camels and 
the death of 12 Samburu morans further entrenched the need by both sides to revenge. The 
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participation of Samburu warriors and KPRs in the eventual ‘operation rudisha ngombe’ was 
viewed by Turkana respondents
104
 as an attempt by the police alongside their enemies the 
Samburu to ‘finish them’. Thus conflict over raided cattle transformed into inter-ethnic violence 
within a span of 21 days. 
7.4 State/Civil Society Response to Massacres among Pastoralists in Northern Kenya 
Responses to cases of massacres among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya have taken three 
distinct key forms: these included paramilitary operations aimed at disarming the entire 
communities, formation of parliamentary investigation committees to look into the 
circumstances that led to the violence, arrests of local warriors and local leaders accused of 
incitement or logistically supporting or organising for the violence or intervention by civil 
society bodies in to mediate over the conflict. In this section, I seek to review some of these 
state/civil society interventions. 
The Kapedo Massacre 
In the aftermath of the Kapedo massacre, the government of Kenya swung into immediate action 
and the President flew to Kapedo to address an urgent security meeting. In a newspaper report 
(Kipsang’ 2014), the President was quoted to have “ordered pastoralists on the boundary of 
Turkana and Baringo counties to name those behind Saturday’s killing of more than 21 police 
officers ‘by the end of the day’ or face a massive security operation”. The report further indicates 
that Kenya Defence Forces officers were deployed in the area immediately after to commence a 
disarmament exercise targeting the Turkana and Pokot communities living in Turkana East and 
Baringo East areas. Further, the state’s response to the Kapedo massacre can be analysed from 
the Presidents statements (Kipsang’ 2014) below: 
“I’m here today because you took the lives of over 20 officers who were in the line of 
duty,” he said. “I hereby order that you give us the names of those behind the killings by 
the end of today. If you can kill officers in such a manner, you are sending a message that 
there is no government. The government is there and will deal firmly with such 
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 Interview by Turkana moran who participated in the defence of Keekoridony village, November 2014 
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lawlessness. The criminals who killed the officers are well-known and we will not rest 
until they are brought to book. Even if your leaders are claiming that it was a mistaken 
identity, that does not give you the licence to kill.” (Kipsang’ 2014) 
The statement above shows the top-down approach that the Kenyan state embraces when it 
comes to pertinent issues affecting pastoralists in Northern Kenya, there seems to be no space for 
dialogue between the central government and community leaders. The government believes that 
‘orders’ work best in such situations without looking at the root causes of the conflict. At the 
same time it is an admission by the state that the Northern part of Kenya does not ‘feel’ the 
government and thus the need by pastoralists to compete with the state in the ownership and 
execise of the instruments of violence. One month after the launch of the disarmament exercise 
in Kapedo, Kipsang’ (2014) reported that little had been achieved by the operation except for the 
voluntary recovery of 23 guns believed to have been stolen from the slain officers. The manner 
in which the recovery was made also points at the ineffectiveness of disarmament operations as a 
strategry as captured in the statements below: 
“The recovered guns were dropped by bandits at strategic points at night where Pokot 
professionals and elders would pick them up and drop them at the sub-county 
headquarters in Chemolingot” (Kipsang’ 2014) 
“Why kill animals? I think this is no longer a normal operation but is aimed at starving 
the Pokot and ruining their livelihood. Instead of harassing innocent people in shopping 
centres, why don’t the government which has all the machinery go to the forest where the 
bandits are hiding?” (Kipsang’ 2014) 
The recovery of arms during paramilitary operations do not aim necessarily at arresting 
perpetrators of violence but more as a show of power and a reminder to the citizens of the 
existence of a powerful distant state. The surrendered guns are often those that are obsolete and 
generally meant to appease the state. Thus the cycle of violence is never addressed. At the same 
time paramilitary operations are fraught with human rights questions as it involves the 
harassment of citizens and whole communities. It involves the killing of livestock as is captured 
in the statement above, thus evolving into a new phase of state-led violence. 
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The Turbi/Bubisa Massacre 
The state’s response to the Turbi/Bubisa massacre was three fold: the arrest of suspects, 
deployment of the army to ‘bring peace’ and an inter-agency intervention by government 
departments and NGOs to support pastoralists’ and agricultural livelihoods as well as the 
distribution of food and non-food emergency relief to the 6000 people that were directly 
displaced by the violence (Ouko et al 2005:45). Massacres in Northern Kenya tend to highlight 
the reactionary nature of state intervention. In the case of the massacres of Marsabit, the high 
tension and probability of collective violence was rife weeks prior to the Turbi massacre. Ouko 
et al (2005:35) in their investigative mission in Marsabit were informed that the guns used in 
Turbi Primary School had been kept within the school compound. In reaction to the massacre, 
they noted that “thirty suspects had already been arrested, among whom were KPRs” (Ouko et al 
2005:35). It is not clear whether any of these suspects were ever charged. Thereafter the 
government deployed military personnel in Marsabit. The Military Spokesman at the time was 
quoted as follows (Reliefweb 2005): 
“We have deployed a combined team of officers from the military, regular and 
administrative police to the region where the killings took place. The team is carrying out 
an intensive operation with a view of tracking down the attackers and restore security,” 
Further, the government established operational bases for paramilitary police “in Forole, 
Maikona and Hurri Hills” (Ouko et al 2005:31). The policy of establishing paramilitary bases to 
keep inter-communal peace has not been evaluated in terms of its successes, in my own 
observation from Baragoi; it does not in any way affect the planning and execution of raids or 
other forms of collective violence. 
The third approach was aimed at alleviating the suffering of the displaced people of Marsabit. It 
was spearheaded by the Government of Kenya and agencies such as Food for the Hungry 
International (FHI) and the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS). They were involved in 
distributing food to IDPs as well as other utilities such as “blankets, mosquito nets, kitchen sets, 
clothes, jerricans, chlorine tabs, water treatment kits, tents and educational kits” (Ouko et al 
2005:25). In their recommendations, Ouko et al (2005) noted the structural base of the conflict 
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between the Gabra and the Borana as being disputes over land and administrative boundaries. It 
recommended state intervention and community participation in resolving this historical dispute. 
The Baragoi Massacre 
In the case of the Baragoi Massacre, the state/civil society response took several forms. First 
there was a parliamentary investigation committee (KNA 2012:17) which visited Baragoi and 
met community leaders and security officers from the district. It made the following 
recommendations: 
a) The Government should urgently establish specialized units in the hot spot areas of the 
District, e.g. the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) of the Administration Police. 
b) Urgently improve on resource allocation e.g. communication gadgets, vehicles, fuel and 
improved budgetary allocation to the security agencies. 
c)  Ensure optimum staffing of all security departments e.g. Regular Police, Administration 
Police, NIS etc. 
d) Urgent disarmament to be done within the Turkana Community. 
e) Urgent financing of peace and reconciliation activities before the General Elections. 
In essence the Parliamentary investigation committee recommended the militarisation of these 
communities further as a means of stemming the violence. Duirng my time in the field, I 
observed for instance that a part from Nachola GSU camp which was in place before the Baragoi 
massacre, new camps were established in Kampi ya Nyoka, Tuum and Marti. Residents and 
police officers talked to the new kifaru
105
 that had been deployed by the government to track 
cattle raiders in the vast Baragoi district. This has however not stemmed violence among the 
Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. 
 
The next level of state response was the arrest and detention of six Turkana leaders from 
Baragoi, these included four chiefs, a councilor and a KPR on the 13
th
 of November 2012 as 
narrated by Sam
106
 one of the arrested chiefs in the excerpt below: 
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 Local Swahili term used to refer to Armoured Personnel Carriers used by the military 
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 Interview at Baragoi, February 2015 
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“On the 12th of November 2012 in the evening, I received a phone call from the D.O of 
Baragoi that the D.C wanted to meet all the Turkana chiefs in Maralal. I was told to inform 
all the chiefs and assistant chiefs from Marti, Parkati, Baragoi Town, Nachola and Kawap 
locations. We were asked by the D.O to wear uniforms. In the morning of the 13
th
 of 
November 2012, the D.O sent his driver to pick the chiefs of Nachola, while the rest of us 
who were in Baragoi town walked to the D.O’s office. When we arrived he informed us that 
the following chiefs would proceed to Maralal; two chiefs from Kawap location, one chief 
from Parkati location, two chiefs from Marti location and one chief from Nachola location. 
We arrived at the County Commissioner’s office in Maralal where the meeting was chaired 
by a security team from the provincial headquarters in Nakuru headed by the Provincial 
Criminal Investigation Officer (PCIO). Once the PCIO entered the room, there was no 
introduction or formalities, he said “you chiefs and the councilor refused to return the 
livestock and that’s why the police were killed”. We were ordered to remove our hats and 
unforms and to sit on the floor. After a while he ordered the Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) officers to take us away. We were taken to the office of the District 
Criminal Investigation Officer (DCIO) where we were again asked to sit on the floor and 
write the names of Turkana elders and KPRs who had mobilized or participated in the killing 
of police officers. After that we were asked to write statements on the massacre and our 
efforts as chiefs in returning the raided Samburu livestock. After writing statements we were 
taken to Maralal Police Station where we were charged with robbery with violence and 
locked in the cell. The same night at about 10pm the councilor who was on his way to 
Nakuru was arrested and brought to our cell in Maralal. On the 16
th
 of November the 
councilor was also arraigned in court and charged with murder. On the 22
nd
 of November our 
chargesheet was also changed from that of robbery with violence to murder. The same night 
were driven to Nakuru Police Station, we arrived at 1am on the 23
rd
 of November 2012 
where we were again collectively charged with murder at the High Court and remanded at 
Nakuru GoK Prison until 6
th
 of December 2012”. 
 
The states response in charging the Turkana chiefs, KPR and councilor with murder over the 
Baragoi massacre has been analysed by Holtzman (2016:182). He noted that the government in 
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effect blamed itself for the massacre since all those arrested by the state were serving in various 
government positions as chiefs, councilor or KPR. Holtzman (2016:186) argued that in making 
these arrests the state was not in any way seeking justice for the victims but apportioning 
responsibility to those who it felt bore the overall responsibility over the geographical area 
within which the massacre occurred. In effect the chiefs were arrested because the massacre 
occurred within the areas of jurisdiction even though they were not the raiders who killed the 
police. The state response was therefore more of a show of power than a step towards justice for 
the victims as is well noted below by Holtzman (2016): 
“Perhaps most importantly, however, the reason for arresting Christopher and those like 
him is that he was available to be arrested. Those who actually took the cattle remained 
heavily armed in the inhospitable Suguta Valley. Efforts to arrest and recover the cattle 
had already born a concrete result: forty-two police officers had been killed. The 
government needed to demonstrate that it was doing its job” (Holtzman 2016:187). 
The third form of response was by an Inter-Agency team comprising of government departments 
of health, water, education, agriculture, livestock and fisheries supported by Non Governmental 
Organizations such as the Kenya Red Cross Society, World Vision and Caritas which conducted 
a needs asssement following the Baragoi massacre and subsequent conflicts between the 
Samburu and Turkana in 2013 (KIRA 2013:3). The needs assessment established the following 
key problems: 
“190 households had been displaced to Barsaloi following a new attack in Suiyan, further 
it noted that more households from Marti, Ngilai, Maskita, Suiyan and Kawop abandoned 
their settlements due to fear of attacks and insecurity and moved to Morijo, Kadokoi, 
Lenkima, Lesirkan and Barsaloi. Four primary schools and three pre-schools and one out 
of school program were completely closed (Kawop, Wuaso Rongai, Suyan and Maskita 
Simiti)” (KIRA 2013:3-4).  
 
In its recommendations, KIRA (2013:13) emphasized on the need to boost humanitarian support 
towards health and nutrition of displaced families especially children under the age of five and 
pregnant or lactating mothers. It further recommended for the provision of food items to 
displaced school children in various parts of Baragoi. In my own observation the KIRA report 
(2013) exemplifies the cosmetic nature of inter-agency interventions since they do not seek to 
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address the key underyling issues that create new cycles of violence. The report for instance did 
not address the role of politics and unequal distribution of County resources in the cycles of 
violence between the two communities. The inter-agency intervention can therefore be viewed as 
donor-driven and therefore not designed to address the root causes of violence and in itself not 
sustainable in the long run. 
7.5 Conclusion 
From the stand point of processual analysis, escalation of conflict into violence is viewed as 
subject to specific processes that occur to enlarge the number of parties in the conflict from the 
primary disputants. Escalation of conflict incidences into violence and massacres can also be 
seen as subject to the inaction of the state through its security apparatus which prompts citizens 
to ‘take the law into their own hands’. To understand why some conflicts become massacres 
while others do not. We have looked at the events prior to the Baragoi massacre and established 
the participation of politicians and security personnel in a very biased way contributed to the 
violence. The Baragoi massacre draws parallels with the Lokorkor massacre of 1996 which was 
a strategic plan based on the mobilisation and arming of warriors by Samburu and Pokot 
politicians. Mobilisation for war requires ‘war ideology’ that creates a clear boundary between 
the warring groups. Among the Samburu and Turkana, mobilisation is carried out through ethno-
nationalist ideology that is used to entrench the perceived incompatibility of the two groups and 
the inevitability of attacking the ‘enemy’ for the great benefit of the community. In the case of 
the Baragoi massacre, it was established that over 600 Samburu warriors were mobilized for 
violence (NPS 2013). The local catholic priest recalled the tension that engulfed Baragoi town on 
the eve of 10
th
 November 2012. He narrated how the presence of armed Samburu morans led to 
self-imposed curfews in Baragoi town. To him, the politicians on both sides of the ethnic divide 
are in the business of violence for political gain. 
 
The death of the 42 police officers even though officially blamed on Turkana warriors of 
Lomerok has also been blamed on the police strategy of involving Samburu morans in a police 
operation. In an interview with a police officer
107
 who participated in the botched operation, I 
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was informed that many of the dead police officers were actually killed by Samburu morans who 
panicked at the sound of gunfire and started shooting aimlessly. Similar sentiments were 
corroborated by Samburu morans who took part in the operation. This brings into question the 
interests of the police in arming locals and partnering with them in security operations. It points 
to the lack of independence among the local police and gives credence to accusations by locals 
that political leaders influence the security agencies to arm locals and promote violence based on 
ethnic identities. 
 
Pastoralists violence as was witnessed in the Baragoi massacre are therefore products of 
structural causes such as historical marginalisation and insecurity that prevails in Northern 
Kenya coupled with processes that take place after inter-communal raids occur. In the case of 
Baragoi massacre, there were great efforts at mobilisation of Samburu and Turkana warriors for 
attack and defence purposes respectively. In the eve of the massacre, I was informed that 
ammunition became very cheap; meaning supply exceeded demand. The lack of unity of purpose 
among the security agencies further gave an ample opportunity for politicians to play a 
significant role in influencing the arming of warriors. These processes led to the abandonment of 
‘soft’ approaches towards peacebuilding and the adoption of ‘hard’ solutions of planning war. 
Extensive pastoralists’ violence as seen in massacres are therefore products of processes in 
situations where state institutional infrastructure are weak or easily manipulable to the whims of 
local elites. Processual analysis of violence enables our understanding of two key elements of 
collective violence; mobilisation and retaliation. Acts of revenge are used firstly to mobilise 
warrior-age group based on their cultural duty to defend the community but also as part of the 
patron-client relationships between the warriors and the political leaders. Revenge in the Baragoi 
massacre case was therefore not only aimed at getting back the livestock raided earlier by the 
Turkana but also aimed at communicating a political message of power in terms of the skewed 
relationship between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. Processual analysis of violence 
therefore sheds more light on the progression of conflicts and the convergence of culture and 
power as key variables in comprehending socio-cultural strife among distinct groups. 
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State and civil society interventions in violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya have not 
only contributed to further violence but have further led to the militarization of these societies. 
Looking at the Turbi/Bubisa massacres of 2005 and the Baragoi massacre of 2012, one can 
observe similar response by two different governments. The interventions which follow the 
script of arrests of some suspects, deployment of the military/paramilitary units to show the 
‘might or power’ of the government and later the distribution of relief supplies does not do 
enough to address the key issues that catalyse conflicts among pastoralists such as political 
incitements and disputes over administrative and resource boundaries. Further, the 
ineffectiveness of the judicial system has ensured that those arrested are never brought to book 
because the state does not go after the perpetrator but often after those responsible over 
geographical areas (chiefs) within which the violence occurred as we observed in the Baragoi 
case, thus making it difficult for the prosecution to prove its case against suspects. 
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Ungoverned Spaces and Informalisation of Violence in Baragoi- the Case 
of Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) 
8.0 Introduction 
Violent conflict in Northern Kenya that stems from cattle raids and highway banditries can be 
argued to exemplify the inability of the Kenyan state to govern these marginal pastoralists’ dry 
lands (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010). Most of arid Northern Kenya can be categorized as 
ungoverned spaces due to the limited presence of state authority in these areas. According to 
Clunan and Trikunas (2010:17) ungoverned spaces are “social, economic or political arenas 
where states do not exercise effective authority”. The lack of ‘effective state authority’ in 
ungoverned spaces gives rise to alternative authority either as proxies of the state or independent 
from the state (Clunan and Trikunas 2010). In Northern Kenya, the alternative to direct state 
authority in terms of day to day policing and provision of security services is the Kenya Police 
Reserve (KHRC 2010; Mkutu and Wandera 2013; Mkutu 2015). However other sources of 
alternative authority exist in Northern Kenya in the form of cattle warlords and gun runners 
(Analo 2014, The Standard 2012, Osamba 2000).  
 
In this chapter, I analyse the linkages between ungoverned spaces in Northern Kenya and violent 
entrepreneurship (Abbink 2009) aimed at accomplishing socio-cultural, economic and political 
goals of individuals and groups. The institution of KPRs among pastoralist groups in Northern 
Kenya therefore adds to this layer of actors engaged informal violence among the Samburu and 
Turkana of Baragoi. The idea of KPRs as alternative to direct state policing was initially seen as 
viable option aimed at meeting the security needs of locals at minimum cost (Mkutu 2003). The 
deployment of KPRs as the key policing unit in Northern Kenya has been described as “security 
on the cheap” owing to the voluntary nature of the job (Mkutu 2003:14). KPRs were to be at the 
forefront of fighting crime and stemming of raids due to their knowledge of the arid pastoralists’ 
terrain (Mkutu 2015). In my analysis of the linkages between ungoverned spaces and 
informalization of violence in Northern Kenya, this chapter therefore explores the role of KPRs 
along two key arguments; first we analyse the vital role of KPRs as the defender of pastoralists’ 
villages during incidences of violence. Secondly we analyse the role of KPRs in the 
informalisation of violence in Baragoi. KPRs are seen as a state actor (by virtue of provision of 
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arms and ammunition) through which the inability/disinterest of the government facilitates the 
informalisation of violence through the arming of locals to provide for their own security. This 
further enables their illegal participation in ammunition trade, cattle raids and highway bandtries 
against targeted communities or individuals. The next section explores a brief history of KPRs. 
8.1 Kenya Police Reservists of Baragoi 
Kenya Police Reserve was established in 1948 as a volunteer unit. Initially reservists were 
mostly colonial settlers who were armed by the state and called upon from time to time to help 
the police with policing duties (Mkutu and Wandera 2013; Mkutu 2015). At the height of Mau 
Mau rebellion the Kenya Police Reserves Airwing was used by the colonial government to 
reinforce its offensive effort against the Mau Mau (Mkutu 2015). According to Aridi (2013) 
KPRs are mostly found in areas where police presence is limited and are charged with the 
responsibility of protecting cattle kraals as well as accompanying herders to ward-off cattle 
rustlers. The Kenya Police Act section 53 subsection 2 provides that “The reserve may be 
employed in Kenya for assisting the force in maintenance of law and order, the preservation of 
peace, the protection of life and property, the prevention and detection of crime, the 
apprehension of offenders, and the enforcement of all laws and regulations with which the force 
is charged” (GoK 2010). Another unit which is thought to have evolved into what is known 
today as KPRs was the “tribal police”, however, this assumption is erroneous as the tribal police 
later became what we know today as Administration Police (Mkutu 2003:14).  
 
In Northern Kenya, KPRs emerged at the beginning of the Moi presidency in early 1980s. In an 
interview with a retired paramount chief
108
 in Samburu North he stated: 
 
“I am the one who started KPRs in this area. We wanted to address the issue of Ngoroko. 
We all had bows and arrows. I was the operation officer against Ngoroko incursion in this 
area. I recruited Turkana morans to be trained as KPRs in 1980. Personally I was issued 
with a gun by the state in 1980 due to frequent Ngoroko attacks in my location of Kawap. 
The training of KPRs was done in Maralal, At Kawap we had 20 KPRs all were issued 
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 Interview at Natiti Village, February 2015 
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with guns by the government. In Marti we also had 20 KPRs. At that time KPRs used to 
follow orders. Their job was to prevent raids, they had authority more than 
Administration Police, they could arrest any offender” (Interview February 2015, Natiti 
Village) 
In an interview with the retired Paramount Chief of the Turkana of Baragoi, he stated that his 
first recruits into the KPR were “morans, ex-police, tribal police and those who knew how to 
handle guns”109. In another interview with a serving Assistant Chief110 from the Samburu 
community, I was informed that for one to be selected as a KPR, the person must “be a moran of 
good character who owns livestock, disciplined, must not be a thief and must be a person who 
obeys law and order”. A Samburu Sergeant111 of the KPR recalled how he was recruited into the 
service in the early 1990s: 
“I was recruited into KPR when I was still a moran. I was recruited by Chief Lomedero 
of Baragoi town. During that time there were too many wars and many people were 
acquiring guns. I was issued with a MKIV rifle. During that time KPRs mostly had MK1 
and MKIV rifles. In my first war, Rendille cattle were raided by Turkana in Soito el 
Kokoyo when Rendille herders moved to the area for grazing during the drought. Those 
days we used to be given 50 bullets and we would finish them in two days. There were 
too many wars” (Interview January 2015, Baragoi town).  
 
In Samburu North, KPRs (from among the serving moran age-set) are recruited by their chiefs. 
Once a chief has recommended the appointment or replacement of a KPR, the letter to such 
effect is forwarded to the district administrative officials. The district administrative officials 
then forward the same to the head of police within the district (OCPD). The OCPD then instructs 
the head of police within the division (OCS) from where the chief and the KPRs originates to 
issue the appointed KPR with a firearm and specific numbers of ammunition. In some cases the 
district security team also issues the KPR with an identity card that recognizes his designation 
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 Interview at Baragoi AP Camp in October 2014 
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 Interview at Bendera Village (September 2014), Baragoi town (December 2014) Baragoi town (January 2015) 
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and area of operation (location or sub-location). In my focus group discussions
112
 with KPRs 
from the Samburu and Turkana communities, I noted that while some had served as KPRs since 
1996, others had served for 13 years while the majority were young men in their 20s and 
therefore among the current warriors age-sets of the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. On 
issuance with the agreed firearm and ammunition the KPR then signs (puts his thumb print) on 
the Occurrence Book to acknowledge receipt of those items. KPRs do not receive appointment 
letters or a contract detailing their job description.  For instance on 16
th
 April 2009, a rifle MKIV 
of serial number 106055 loaded with two rounds of ammunition was handed over to a newly 
appointed KPR from Nachola location (Baragoi Police Station 2009). Below is an entry in the 
Occcurence Book of Baragoi Police Station showing the handing over of a firearm to a newly 
recruited KPR officer in 2007. 
 
 
Sample of Occurrence Book entry on the 25
th
 November 2007 Source: Baragoi Police Station (2007) 
 
There seems to be no clear policy on the standard number of ammunition to be issued to KPRs 
on recruitment. This is shown on 20
th
 April 2009 when Baragoi Police Post handed over one 
AK47 rifle of serial number 794131 loaded with 15 rounds of ammunition to a newly recruited 
KPR from Kawap location (Baragoi Police Station 2009). The issuance of the firearms though 
four days apart to KPRs from the same community (Turkana) can be seen to vary in terms of the 
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 Focused Group Discussions conducted in Bendera village (Samburu KPRs) and Nachola (Turkana KPRs) in 
October 2014 and February 2015 respectively 
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firearm issued (MKIV versus AK47 and 2 rounds of ammunition vis-à-vis 15 rounds). These 
disparities raise questions of standard and accountability. My inquiries from KPRs through 
focused group discussions
113
 indicated that the amount of ammunition issued to KPRs at any one 
given time almost always depended on the good relations between the area chief and the local 
head of police or the officer in charge of the armoury. These allegations lend credence to issues 
of collusion between police officers, chiefs, KPRs and morans in the trade of government 
ammunition or as Abbink (2009) called it ‘violent entrepreneurship’. Bevan (2008) in his 
research of illegal ammunition trade in Turkana North also noted the flourishing trade in 
Government of Kenya issued ammunition. 
Table 6: Data on KPRs and their Firearms in Samburu North sub-County 
Administrative Area 
(Location) 
Inhabitant Community Number of 
KPRs 
Guns 
South Horr Samburu 61 61 
Tuum Samburu 32 32 
Ndoto Samburu 44 45 
Waso Rongai Samburu 26 28 
Arsim Samburu 16 16 
Suiyan Samburu 44 44 
El Barta Samburu 64 64 
Latakweny Samburu 23 23 
Baragoi Samburu and Turkana 33 37 
Kawap Turkana (now displaced and living at 
Lenkima village) 
15 15 
Parkati Turkana 12 12 
Nachola Turkana 27 26 
Marti Turkana 16 17 
Total Number of KPRs  413 420 
Source: National Police Service: Breakdown of KPRs within Samburu North sub-County (NPS 2013) 
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 FGD with Samburu KPRs at Bendera, September 2014 
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The above table shows the total number of KPRs per location in Samburu North sub-County. It 
is notable that the total number of KPRs differs from the total number of guns issued. In my 
interviews with police officers and senior KPRs I was informed that the extra 7 guns were issued 
to chiefs and assistant chiefs in the respective administrative areas and recorded as KPRs. The 
discrepancy in number indicate lack of clear policy in issuance of state arms and the flexibility 
and power that police officers enjoy in the issuance of arms. This indicates a system of limited 
accountability that is susceptible to abuse. The consequences of which are the many forms of 
insecurity faced by communities in the district. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 10: Identity card issued to a Samburu KPR from Bendera village in Baragoi (Source: Author 2014) 
8.2 The Institutional Strucuture of Kenya Police Reservists 
Kenya Police Reservists as it operates today originates from Kenyan law (GoK 2010). Even 
though this law recognizes the role of KPRs, it does not provide the operational structure of this 
institution. In my own observation, I noted that the institution of KPR is anchored within the 
National Police Service Act of 2010 (GoK). This parliamentary act is implemented by the 
executive arm of the state (the presidency) under which the Ministry of Interior and the 
Coordination of National Government falls. At the same time, the National Police Service Act 
(GoK 2010) provides for the office of the Inspector General of Police as the officer responsible 
for the coordination of police services in Kenya. The Inspector General of Police is therefore 
answerable both to the executive and legislative arms of the state. In its role of coordination of 
national government, the Ministry of Interior retained the Provincial Administration and placed 
officers at the regional (Regional Commissioners), county (County Commissioners), sub-county 
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(sub-County Commissioners) and divisional levels (Assistant County Commissioners) as 
administrators in charge of law and order at their various levels. Coordinatioon of the work of 
Kenya Police Reservists is therefore carried out through two arms of the executive: the office of 
the Inspector General of Police and the offices of the Regional Commissioner of the North Rift 
region. This culminates into the coordination in the selection of KPRs (by chiefs as the lowest 
tier of executive arm of government based at the village/locational level) and their issuance of 
arms and ammunition by the Police Sergeant in Charge of Armoury at Baragoi Police Station. 
This structure is captured in the figure below: 
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Figure 8: The current institutional structure of Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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From the structure in Fig.8 above, we can observe that the current structure is a top-down 
communication model between officers of various ranks. The interests and concerns of the KPRs 
can only be articulated by the chiefs even though they are part of the national security set-up. 
Their link to the National Police Service through the Police Sergeant in Charge of the Armory is 
purely for the distribution of arms and ammunition, the institution of KPRs is an informal 
security arrangement with little checks and balances that enables the informalization of violence 
in Baragoi. 
Figure 9: Proposed institutional structure of National Police Reservists 
 
Source: GoK (2013:7) 
The National Police Reserve Policy Framework (GoK 2013) provides for the formation of the 
National Police Reserve Unit the successor to the Kenya Police Reserve, “the Unit must be 
headed by an officer not below the rank of Assistant Inspector-General who is the Director; a 
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Deputy Director and such other staff as the management of the Reserve may require. The Unit 
should be located in the Office of the Inspector General” (GoK 2013:6). The policy guideline 
proposes the creation of the position of Director of National Police Reserves to report to the 
Inspector General of Police and mandated to undertake general administration, “training and 
efficiency of the Reserve personnel in liaison with the respective County Formations” (GoK 
2013:7). It further proposes the appointment of a Reserve Officer in every County to be in charge 
of National Police Reserves within that County. These officers would then report to the Director 
of Police Reserves who subsequently reports to the Inspector General of Police. The proposed 
policy further envisages the positioning of reserve officers at Divisional Headquarters alongside 
officers from the Administration and Kenya Police Services. My own observation of this policy 
vis-à-vis the situation and role of KRPs in Northern Kenya is that this policy in essence doesn’t 
address the role of reserve officers at the village level and it presumes that police reserves are 
police officers in ‘waiting’. Further it doesn’t address teething problems related to salaries that 
have long bedeviled the KPRs in Northern Kenya. In regards to salaries it proposes the 
following: 
“A Reserve police officer must serve voluntarily and should not be entitled to claim any 
remuneration for his/her services but while undergoing and performing duties should be 
paid such allowances as may be prescribed for a police officer of corresponding rank and 
seniority in such rank” (GoK 2013: 9). 
This does not address the plight of KPRs who have worked as reservists since the 1980s and 
many who have lost lives and livestock in pursuit of raiders. Further this policy does not take 
into account the daily duty of intelligence gathering that KPRs do to enable police action in 
places like Baragoi. 
8.3 Historical Marginalisation and the Informalisation of Violence in Northern Kenya 
Kenya Human Rights Commission (2010) linked the culture of raiding and increased violence 
among pastoralists in Northern Kenya to the historical socio-economic and political 
marginalization of pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya. The existence of KPRs as a policing 
unit in Northern Kenya represents an aspect of that historical marginalisation as well as the states 
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contribution to the Informalisation of violence through the rectuitment and arming of volunteer 
villagers to provide security for themselves on behalf of the state. Schilling et al (2012) 
associated the recruitment of warriors for commercialised raiding among pastoralists in Northern 
Kenya to lack of opportunities occasioned by very low literacy levels among warriors in 
Northern Kenya. They further argued that the limited presence of the state in Northern Kenya 
encourages the presence of other non-state actors such as gun merchants who sell weapons to 
pastoralists. The insecurity occasioned by the absence of state security forces pastoralists to 
provide or guarantee their own security through the acquisition of weapons for defensive and 
aggressive purposes. Enlisting as KPRs therefore provides an avenue through which locals can 
access guns and ammunition legitimately as state security officers which they can equally use for 
illegitimate purposes such as cattle raids and highway banditries. Being a KPR therefore 
provides a window through which an individual can gain power as an owner of a gun thus 
enabling him to defend his family and livestock as well as to contribute to communal effort in 
aggression and defence duties. 
 
Bernt and Colini (2013) view marginalisation as the exclusion of groups of people from access to 
basic human services such as education, health and state protection. Marginalisation in their view 
is associated with being in the periphery of the state in terms of developmental priorities. They 
further link marginalisation to unfair allocation and distribution of state resources. Their 
description of exclusion is derived from Levitas (2007:9) who associates it with “denial of 
resources, rights, goods and services and the inability to participate in the normal relationships 
and activities available to the majority of people in a society”. Kerrow (2015) views 
marginalisation as ‘socio-economic’ exclusion from societal resources. Pastoralists groups in 
Northern Kenya have been historically marginalised since the onset of colonial administration in 
Kenya. State development policy viewed pastoralists groups as ‘uncivilised’ due to their 
nomadic lifestyle and their location in semi-arid environment. Investing in basic infrastructure 
such as schools, hospitals and state security was seen as an expensive venture with no 
‘immediate returns’ as these areas were not viable for agriculture due to limited rainfall.  
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After Kenya’s independence in 1963, a development policy document prepared to chart the way 
forward was passed in Parliament in 1965. The policy paper outlined the development priorities 
of independent Kenya. It stated that “...its approach clearly favours the development of areas 
having abundant natural resources, good land and rainfall, transport and power facilities and 
people receptive to and active in development” (GoK 1965:46). This policy paper clearly laid the 
basis for developmental exclusion of pastoralists’ lands of Northern Kenya since these are areas 
with limited rainfall and land suitable for pastoralism as opposed to agricultural production. The 
policy paper further viewed the people of Northern Kenya as ‘unreceptive’ to development 
owing to their nomadic lifestyle. In essence marginalisation of pastoralists in Northern Kenya 
stems from historical state neglect and underdevelopment which is seen in the absence of the 
state in all forms of socio-economic life of this region. Leff (2009) argued that Eastern Africa 
states’ neglect of pastoralists in the Karamoja Cluster is evident in its policies of coercion and 
repression “a function of comparatively deeply-rooted repressive attitudes toward non-sedentary 
populations” (2009:190). Historical marginalisation of pastoralists groups is therefore at the very 
foundation of increased violence among pastoralists as groups compete over scarce and 
diminishing resources in an environment with limited state security. The absence of the state has 
also contributed to the huge demand of personal and communal security as a public good giving 
room for non-state actors to profit from provision of illegal arms to meet the high demand 
created by absence of state security. 
 
State neglect of Northern Kenya can be seen in its incapacity to allocate resources in education, 
health and security sectors in the arid areas occupied by pastoralists. The limited presence of the 
state and the history of past wars in Northern Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan have 
been blamed for inflow of illegal small arms and light weapons in Northern Kenya (Osamba 
2000; Leff 2009; Mkutu 2007) and the subsequent violence among herders that results from 
illegal flow of arms and ammunition through Kenya’s porous borders. Limited state security has 
also been linked to the rise of non-state actors who trade in illegal firearms (Mkutu 2008; Mkutu 
2007). Proximity to war torn countries in Eastern Africa contributes to trade in illegal arms in 
Northern Kenya (Wairagu and Ndung’u 2003). Illegal gun markets have been documented in 
Isiolo and Northern parts of Uganda (Mkutu 2007; HRW 2002), with the Isiolo route being 
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linked with the inflow of M-16 rifles among the Samburu of Baragoi. The inability of the 
Kenyan state to provide adequate security for its pastoralists citizens in the North has therefore 
created a huge demand for illegal arms to meet the huge demand for personal and communal 
security. Non-state actors such as elites from this region and others who have an interest either in 
the sale of arms, the trade in raided livestock or political offices are therefore part of a network 
of ‘violent entrepreneurs’ who profit from violent cattle raids thus using culture to promote 
violence among pastoralists for personal gain (Abbink 2009). 
 
Straight (2009:23) has linked violence among pastoralists in northern Kenya with decades of 
marginalisation of communities in this area. Straight further argues that the chronic violence that 
affects the marginilised pastoralists of Northern Kenya stems from the classification of 
pastoralists violence as ‘cultural’ and therefore something not worthy of national attention of the 
political leadership in Kenya (2009:24). Linkages between marginilisation and insecurity among 
pastoralists in Eastern Africa has also been pursued by Mkutu (2007) who noted that incidences 
of violence that stemmed from illegally acquired weapons occurred in these areas due to the 
limited presence of state security personnel. According to Mkutu “pastoral areas have 
historically been the victims of marginalization (political, economic and social isolation), with 
the absence of effective governance or, in some places, with the total absence of government and 
judicial systems” (Mkutu 2007:62). Locals therefore have been forced to fend for themselves in 
terms of provision of these services including security. Scheper-Hughes (2006:13) has described 
structural violence as those conditions that “naturalises” or normalizes poverty, hunger, sickness 
or premature death erasing their social and political origins so that they are taken for granted and 
no one is held accountable except the poor themselves”. The KPRs are at the base of structural 
violence in Northern Kenya as it is an embodiment the historic and systemic alienation of 
citizens to their rights for protection by state security apparatus. The institution of KPRs can be 
seen as an avenue for informalisation violence as it offers pastoralists groups a form of ‘indirect 
rule’ making them liable for their own insecurity while at the same time saving the state revenue 
that would otherwise be required to police these vast arid lands (Mkutu 2015:202; Straight 
2009:26). In the next section, my analysis focuses on the linkages between ungoverned spaces 
and Informalisation of violence through KPRs in pastoralist’s lands. 
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8.4 Ungoverned Spaces and Violent Entrepreneurship in Pastoralists Lands 
The minimal presence of state structure within pastoralists rangelands of Eastern Africa has been 
a subject of great discussion (Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008; Matthysen et al 2010; Bevan 2008; 
Powel 2010). These studies have linked limited state presence evident in the incapacity or 
absence of adequate security personnel and the frequency of violent raids. They argue that this 
indicates the inability of the state to protect life and property of its citizens as indications of the 
state weakness in pastoralists’ borderlands. Others (Mkutu and Wandera 2013; Mkutu 2015) 
have described pastoralists lands such as Northern Kenya as ‘ungoverned spaces’ due to the 
limited outreach of the state security apparatus. They have argued that the ineffectiveness of the 
state in these areas play a significant role in violent conflicts that prevail.  Buchanan-Smith and 
Lind (2005:4)  and Mburu (n.d) have further classified Northern Kenya as a “periphery” due to 
“limited government presence”, “inability of the government to maintain basic levels of security 
and historic economic and political marginalisation including lack of investment”. Ungoverned 
spaces are therefore associated with marginalization. They are also seen as arenas for production 
of violence as the absence of the state provides an ample opportunity for non-state actors to 
engage in ‘violent entrepreneurship’ (Abbink 2009). 
 
Drawing examples from Ethiopia, Kurimoto and Simonse (1998) termed the neglect of 
pastoralists groups by states in Eastern Africa as state retreat. Sharamo (2014: 4) described 
Northern Kenya as “bandit kingdom” due to the high levels of insecurity and lawlessness that 
pervade its geographical space and people. Northern part of Kenya has also been described as 
‘Kenya’s Other Frontier’ (Menkhaus 2008). In his discussion of external conflicts among the 
Suri and its neighbours Abbink (2009:41) has described the Suri settlement area as a “remote 
lowland region” far from the Ethiopian government. This further points to the idea of pastoralists 
spaces being ungoverned, in the periphery of the state.  Abbink (2009) attributes the inability of 
the Ethiopian state to monopolise the use of violence among the Suri to its distance from the Suri 
people. Distance here is not only geographical but also in terms of resource allocation priority. 
He associated state neglect of the Suri people with their indifference and ambivalence towards 
state directives from the security forces that from time to time were sent to quell violence within 
their neighbourhood (Abbink 2009).  
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Linking ungoverned spaces, lawlessness and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, 
Masuda (2009:72) has argued that “guns are a violent device for social control, exploitation and 
oppression, and that they are found in marginal areas, where they are used in interethnic conflicts 
and in resistance to the state”. Writing about the Nyangatom’s perception of the Ethiopian state, 
Tornay (2009:86) was informed that it was viewed as a “foreign predatory agency” far from the 
marginal lands of the Nyangatom; indifferent and unhelpful to their day to day struggles. 
Discussing the linkages between state neglect and violence in ungoverned pastoralists spaces 
Sagawa (2010) stated: 
“There was no capacity or will to protect pastoral citizens in the border regions and these 
communities were forced to defend their own lives and property for many years” 
(Sagawa 2010:103) 
Ungoverned spaces have been described as ‘brown areas’ where citizens experience ‘low 
intensity citizenship’ (O’Donnell 1993). ‘Brown areas’ in most world maps indicate places with 
little state interest, lacking data on state intervention programs on key issues such as health, 
security, education, infrastructure and trade. This is the approach of many states with ungoverned 
spaces. Lastly, ungoverned spaces have also been identified as arenas in which ‘shadow 
economies’ grow to fulfill the demand for public goods deprived from citizens through retreat of 
the state (Idler and Forest 2015). The shadow economy that thrives in ungoverned spaces can be 
in the form of trade on illegal goods. The idea of arming locals in ungoverned spaces was 
adopted by the Ethiopian government in the 1990s (Sagawa 2010). Sagawa (2010) was informed 
of cases where government arms issued to the EPRs were used in mounting attacks against 
‘favourite enemies’ of the Daasanach. In Northern Kenya, the ungoverned space left by the 
disinterested state has created a huge demand for security (personal and communal). This space 
has been partly filled by the Kenya Police Reservists. Given its own weak institutional 
framework, KPRs have adopted a ‘quasi state-quasi non-state actor’ position to exploit the 
opportunities available in ungoverned spaces of Northern Kenya through violent 
entrepreneurship. 
 
The presence of KPRs as the only means of effective state authority in the arid lands of Northern 
Kenya indicate the incapacity of the Kenyan state to demonstrate effective state authority in this 
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region. In effect Northern Kenya is ungoverned space. Ken Menkhaus (2007:3) defined 
ungoverned spaces as geographical areas with “weak or non-existent state authority”. Whelan 
(2005) stated that physical ungoverned spaces exist in remote borderland areas of the state. 
Menkhaus (2007:3) further categorises Northern Kenya and Uganda’s Karamoja region as 
ungoverned spaces owing to the “nominal” presence of effective state authority in these regions. 
Menkhaus further expounds that ungoverned spaces are associated with high levels of insecurity, 
the presence of quasi-state security apparatus and the existence of non-state actors who fill the 
vacuum vacated by the state in terms of security provision. Further, ungoverned spaces are 
marked by huge presence of humanitarian agencies and the provision of relief food to locals 
(Menkhaus 2007). 
 
Rabasa et al (2007) have provided a framework for understanding and characterizing ungoverned 
spaces. They argue that ungoverned spaces must be understood in four dimensions: first is the 
extent of state presence in the society. By this they imply that if state presence in society is 
limited for instance to the urban and well infrastructured areas and non-existent in the remote 
and distant borderlands then those unpenetrated areas become the ungoverned spaces within the 
state. Secondly ungoverned spaces can be seen in the extent to which the state enjoys monopoly 
of the instruments of violence in its territory. The existence of non-state actors who use or trade 
in instruments of violence in defiance of the state and the level of circulation of illegal small 
arms within particular regions show the existence of ungoverned spaces within the state. Third, 
the extent to which effective state authority can be put into use at international borders. 
Ineffective state authority at the borders creates room for the activity of non-state actors. These 
areas can thus be termed as ungoverned spaces. Fourth, ungoverned spaces arise when 
governance of some parts or regions of the state are subject to intervention by another state.  
 
Mkutu and Wandera (2013:14) classified Northern Kenya as ungoverned spaces owing to “little 
physical or communication infrastructure, low levels of state presence, and an under-provision of 
state security”. They further link ungoverned spaces with un-ending communal conflicts within 
the state which may at times spill over the international borders due to the remoteness of these 
regions. They further view the neglect of the neighbouring states in securing their frontlines as 
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leading to the definition of these areas as ungoverned spaces e.g. the Karamoja cluster. They 
argue that ungoverned spaces are arenas of illicit enterprise where arms trade and trade in other 
contraband form part of the money-flow. They characterize ungoverned spaces as undeveloped 
and marginalised areas with minimal road and communication infrastructure.  
 
According to Menkhaus (2007) ungoverned spaces in the arid lands of Northern Kenya and the 
Horn of Africa suffer from  population pressure, scarcity of resources, constant paramilitary 
operations to ‘maintain peace’, cattle raiding and ethnic mobilisation for violence. Herbst (2000) 
another proponent of ungoverned space argument contends that the size of the state determines 
its capacity to protect citizens within it. He argues that smaller states have the capacity to effect 
state authority throughout its territory unlike large states. In his argument, geographically larger 
states with scattered populations in its remote areas are more susceptible to violence due to the 
challenges the state faces in effectively providing security in these distant and desolate 
borderlands. Clapham (1986) argues that states decide to avail governance goods depending on 
its economic interests. The existence of ungoverned spaces within states therefore implies the 
lack of economic incentives on that part of the state. This is in line with the Sir Geoffrey 
Archer’s (a colonial administrator in of Samburu areas) view and policy in Northern Kenya: 
“There is only one way to treat these northern territories … to give them whatever 
protection one can under the British Flag and otherwise to leave them to their own 
customs as far as possible, under their own chiefs. Anything else is uneconomical” 
(Barber 1968: 415–16). 
 
Clapham’s (1986) argument on provision of governance goods such as security and other forms 
of development based on economic viability of an area therefore justifies the deployment of 
KPRs as the sole effective means of securing pastoralists livelihoods. In colonial and 
independent Kenya governments’ calculations, Northern Kenya did not have immediate 
economic benefits that warranted investment on state security and thus the option of KPRs; a 
volunteer unit with no remuneration and limited logistical support. According to Clapham (1986) 
Northern Kenya therefore is ungoverned space due to rational calculation by the state based on 
immediate economic returns. Boone (2003) further argues that governed spaces (blue areas) exist 
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where the state is extractive, while ungoverned spaces (brown areas) can be found in areas where 
the state is non-extractive. From the above discussion, one can observe the linkages between 
economic interests of the state and its willingness to invest in particular regions within it. The 
deployment of KPRs to work closely with the chiefs and other administrators therefore served 
the minimum administrative and security needs and enabled the Kenyan state to invest its 
resources in those geographical areas with maximum revenue returns. The disinterest of the state 
as seen in the weak institutional framework of the KPRs has however enabled KPRs to use their 
position of authority not only to protect their villages and to aid the safe passage of livestock in 
these ungoverned spaces but also to engage in violent entrepreneurship through the sale of 
ammunition and engagement in raids. 
8.5 KPRs as Heroes on the Vanguard of Security Issues in Baragoi 
Available data indicate that due to the limited presence of state security personnel in this region, 
KPRs play the policing role. This they do by gathering intelligence on impending attacks, 
tracking and recovery of raided animals, providing security to cattle kraals, providing security to 
herders and livestock in grazing lands, night patrol in the manyattas, engaging raiders on shoot-
outs, monitoring the movement of raiders and reporting to the police conflict incidences that 
occur within their localities. A case in point is captured below:  
“It was reported by a Kenya Police Reservist within Nachola Location in Baragoi that 
today at about 0300 hours 800 armed cattle rustlers believed to be of Samburu origin 
raided Lomirok manyatta situated in Nachola area of Baragoi Division and made away 
with 205 camels belonging to Kelea Lokadongoi. During the incident, the Turkana 
morans shot dead 12 Samburu raiders. In the heavy exchange of fire the following 
Turkana were injured: a Turkana female adult aged 47 years was shot on the right pelvis, 
a Turkana female adult aged 46 years was shot on the scapula whil a Turkana male adult 
aged 43 years was shot on the chest. During the attack KPRs responded and expended 
600 assorted types of ammunition” (Baragoi Police Station Signal 30th October 2012). 
 
Similarly given their knowledge of the terrain, KPRs are critical in the recovery efforts of stolen 
animals. This they do through tracing of livestock footmarks and leading police officers (mostly 
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unfamiliar with the terrain) in grazing lands and bushes where morans hide raided livestock. For 
instance on Monday the 28
th
 of April 2008, there was a shoot-out at a grazing field near Baragoi 
Secondary School. Armed Turkana raiders allegedly attacked Samburu herders and made away 
with 70 heads of cattle. The Samburu KPRs from Bendera village responded to the sounds of 
gunfire and caught up with the raiders at Naagis Grazing reserve where a further exchange of fire 
led to the recovery of all the raided livestock by the Samburu KPRs (Baragoi Police Station 
2008). 
 
KPRs also play a critical peacebuilding role among the Samburu and Turkana. In some cases, 
KPRs pass information on raided livestock brought to their manyattas. In such cases, KPRs 
ensure that such raided livestock are handed back to the owners through the involvement of the 
police. These actions of returning raided livestock reduces tension between morans from rival 
communities and averts possibilities of revenge raids. This also indicates that some KPRs work 
beyond the ethnic divide of the Samburu and Turkana by sharing critical information among 
themselves and also with the police officers to aid recovery of stolen livestock, as illustrated 
below: 
“To the post are two KPRs from Lonyangaten sub-location, they bring one cow 
belonging to a Samburu of Bendera village. The cow is one of the 16 heads of cattle 
stolen at Ngorishe hills grazing field on 24.4.2008. The cow was left behind by rushing 
raiders who raided Bendera village. It is now handed over to the owner” (Baragoi Police 
Station Occurrence Book 1
st
 May 2008). 
 
In their role of gathering intelligence on the movement of raiders, KPRs work very closely with 
chiefs from their own administrative areas. Given that raiders often group in pasturelands or in 
nearby thickets before launching raids. KPRs play a significant role in passing information on 
the sighting of raiders and thus preventing loss of lives and livestock. The Occurrence Book of 
Baragoi Police Station recorded various instances of this role by KPRs: 
“Now to the post is the senior Chief of Elbarta who reports that he had communicated 
with his KPRs from Loruko who informed him that a group of Turkana cattle rustlers 
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attempted to raid the cattle grazing at Loruko but the KPRs were ready and overpowered 
them” (Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book, 7th September 2008). 
 
“One Samburu KPR from Tuum made a report that today the 28th of December 2013; 
four suspected Turkana raiders were spotted by the advance party of KPRs heading to 
Simale village. An exchange of fire ensued between the suspected raiders and the KPRs 
forcing the suspects to run away” (Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book 27th 
December 2013). 
 
KPRs are vital for the protection of pastoralists’ villages and many times they are the first 
causalities during raids. In my focused group discussions
114
 with KPRs from both communities, 
every KPR had a bullet scar. From Bendera village alone, seven
115
 KPRs were killed during the 
Baragoi massacre in November 2012. On the 12
th
 of February 2011, Pokot raiders killed a 
Samburu KPR at Suiyan. On 23
rd
 April 2011, Turkana raiders attacked Samburu herders at 
Lbaaoibor grazing field and killed a Samburu KPR. On 8
th
 June 2011, Pokot raiders attacked 
Samburu herders in Ndonyo nkere and killed a Samburu KPR. Lastly, on the 18
th
 October 2013, 
Turkana raiders attacked Samburu herders in Waso Rongai, killed two KPRs and made a way 
with their G3 rifles (Baragoi Police Station 2013). Further cases of KPRs being killed during 
raids in Northern Kenya in recent times have been reported in Turkana and Baringo Counties 
(Leting 2015; Kipsang 2015). 
 
Lastly in my interviews I was informed of cases where Turkana and Samburu herders locally 
trade in arms and ammunition which are later used in raids and other forms of violent actions. 
Cases of trade in weapons and ammunition were reported and recorded by the police as captured 
below: 
“To the post is the Assistant chief of Bendera sub-location accompanied by a KPR who 
make a report that they received information that one Lperis Lombeu bought an AK47 
                                                          
114
 Focused Group Discussions with Samburu and Turkana KPRs in 2014 
115
 Focused group discussions with Bendera KPRs in September 2014 
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rifle from a Turkana man at Leilei. They went to his manyatta and after interrogating him 
he showed them the rifle but refused to surrender it” (Baragoi Police Station 2009). 
KPRs with their local knowledge of illegal weapons trade can thus be vital in stemming the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons as they are familiar with the terrain and their 
operations in grazing lands and watering places locate them at the venues of illegal arms sale. 
8.6 KPRs and Violent Raids in Northern Kenya 
KPRs have been accused of using their government issued firearms and ammunition to join 
raiding parties, engaging in ammunition trade, loaning their firearms to raiders, taking part in 
highway banditries and using their guns to seek employment as private security guards (Weiss 
2004; Mkutu and Wandera 2013; Mkutu 2015). Cases of KPRs being killed during raids have 
raised the questions of ill-discipline among the KPR ranks, lack of loyalty to the state (but rather 
to the ethnic group or moran-age group), and the use of government issued firearms to commit 
crime for personal gain. For instance on the 21
st
 of October 2011, a Rendille KPR was among the 
injured raiders who were arrested by police in a failed raid attempt at Kawap village of Samburu 
North sub-County. The said KPR participated in the Kawap raid while armed with a state-issued 
MKIV rifle of serial number T33913 loaded with 17 rounds of ammunition (Baragoi Police 
Station 2011). This shows the institutional weakness that exists in the management of KPRs as 
they are not monitored on how and where they use their firearms and ammunition, thus many 
join raiding parties for self-gain. 
My argument here is that the ungoverned space that is Samburu North enables KPRs to play a 
significant role in the ‘violent entrepreneurship’ value chain (Abbink 2009) that prevails between 
security personnel, chiefs, KPRs and morans from both the Samburu and Turkana communities. 
In focused group’s discussions116 with KPRs, I was informed that the 303 ammunition that is 
used in MKIV and MKI rifles is often purchased from corrupt police officers for Kenya Shillings 
300 per bullet. Another source of ammunition for the AK47 rifles are political leaders and gun 
runners who obtain their supplies from Isiolo and Lodwar towns. Leilei town on the Turkana side 
of Baragoi town is a hub for illegal firearms and ammunitions sale. It is notable that Samburu 
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 FGD at Bendera village in September 2014 
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and Turkana do trade in arms and ammunition with each other. Their transactions contribute to 
the production of violence between the two groups in grazing lands and within cattle kraals. 
Incidences of cattle raids in Samburu North have been alleged to promote the selling of police 
ammunition through chiefs and KPRs. In police records from Samburu North instances of huge 
amounts of ammunition issued to chiefs have been recorded (Baragoi Police Station 2009). On 
the 24
th
 June 2009 7.62mm 100 rounds of ammunition was handed over to the Chief of Uaso 
Rongai to be supplied to KPRs in his location. Similarly on the 25
th
 June 2009 another 100 of 
7.62mm special ammunition was handed over to the chief of South Horr to be distributed to 
KPRs within his location (Baragoi Police Station 2009). Further cases of handing over large 
numbers of ammunition to chiefs occurred on 1
st
 July 2009 (ammunition handed to chief South 
Horr). It is worthy of note that above mentioned cases of arming of KPRs through chiefs do not 
correspond with any dates when raids occurred. A curious case of massive distribution of 
ammunition to KPRs occurred on 26
th
 December 2012. On that day a Senior Sergeant of the 
Kenya Police was recorded in the Occurrence Book to have taken 2400 ammunition of 7.62mm 
and 960 of 7.65 mm special ammunition to KPRs based in Masikita village (Baragoi Police 
Station 2012).  This is in contradiction to clear policy which requires the issuing of ammunition 
to KPRs to be done through the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) in liaison with the Officer 
Commanding Police District (OCPD). Incidences of irregular arms transfer from the police to the 
KPRs and chiefs validate the argument and evidence by Bevan (2008) on trade by security 
officers on government arms and ammunition. 
 
Evidence from police reports indicates the complicity of KPRs in raids. In many of these cases, 
killed raiders have turned out to be KPRs who joined raiding parties using state firearms. In the 
Baragoi massacre that occurred on the 10
th
 of November 2012 (NPS 2013) official police reports 
indicated that 7 Samburu KPRs who took part in the botched operation were killed. There are 
cases where police investigations have revealed the use of KPR issued guns in cattle raids among 
the Samburu and Turkana. Cases of misuse of arms are further captured in police records as 
indicated below: 
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“The Officer Commanding Police Post (OCPP) now detains the rifle of one KPR from 
Marti location. Rifle serial number MKIV 14244 with 10 rounds of ammunition. It is 
detained pending ongoing investigations against the KPR” (Baragoi Police Post 
Occurrence Book 6
th
 October 2008). 
Other incidences where KPRs have been found to have misused their government issued 
firearms by engaging in raiding can also be found in police records (KHRC 2010). On 12
th
 April 
2010 a Samburu KPR was arrested and his MKIV rifle of serial number A65301 with 5 rounds 
of 303mm ammunition detained after he was found to have taken part in a raid against the 
Turkana (Baragoi Police Station 2010). Similar incidences of KPRs using their arms to engage in 
cattle raids were captured in police records: 
 
“To the Post are two Turkana KPRs who hand over a MKIV rifle serial number 360574 
loaded with 3 rounds of ammunition which belongs to one Echomo Lokolonyei, a KPR 
who is under arrest at the post for the offence of stealing stock” (Baragoi Police Post 
Occurrence Book 9
th
 June 2008). 
There have been cases where KPRs have colluded with morans from their ethnic groups to plan 
and execute raids against their enemy communities (KHRC 2010). While some chiefs also 
covertly support these raids, at times chiefs who disagree with these raiding plans are threatened 
by the same KPRs. Given the lack of an institutionalised code of conduct and proper training, 
KPRs can therefore be a security threat not only to their ‘traditional’ enemies but also internally 
to those who challenge their raiding plans. A case in point was the report by the then Senior 
Chief (now retired) of Elbarta who was threatened by his own KPRs for naming raiders from the 
Samburu community. His report is captured in police records as follows: 
“The Senior Chief of Elbarta reports that yesterday the 18th of January 2013 at about 
1900 hrs he had a baraza with members of the public from Bendera sub-location. This 
was over the issue of stolen goats and sheep belonging to the Turkana community by 
Samburu morans. The goats/sheep had been raided by Samburu morans on the 16
th
 
January 2013 and brought to Bendera. At the meeting he asked the community to return 
the stolen animals or else return the guns issued to KPRs. This is when some members 
turned against him when he mentioned the following suspects: Elmetaba Lelekalabu, 
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Antony Leakono and Kamshina Lelet. They then threatened to kill the chief and started 
firing in the air. The named suspects were however not at the meeting as they were said 
to have driven the animals towards Ndoto in Loikumkum sub-location. Other members 
shielded the chief and escorted him to his home. But those who threatened to shoot him 
told him that they will never return the stolen animals. They included: a Samburu KPR (a 
guard at Kenya Power Station, Baragoi), L. Leakono who holds an illegal AK47 and 
Kamuri Letilipa, a KPR” (Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book 19th January 2013). 
The illustration above shows the power that KPRs derive from ownership of arms as it 
emboldens them to challenge the authority. Chiefs are key in the appointment of KPRs (Mkutu 
2007; Mkutu and Wandera 2015) but as can be seen above, the power of guns bestows upon 
KPRs their own ability to choose to respect or undermine institutionalised authority. Cases of 
KPRs participating in pastoralists’ violence are common owing to the lack of supervision, 
training and remuneration. It points back to Mkutu’s (2007) assertion that KPRs as an institution 
is indeed ‘security on the cheap’. 
8.7 KPRs, Arms and the Politics of Violence in Samburu North 
Since the upsurge of violent raids in 1996, acquiring arms has been vital to the survival of 
pastoralists’ households among the Samburu and Turkana. While illegal arms have found their 
way into Samburu North through gun traders and politicians; the battle for the balance of power 
has also been reflected in the manner in which different communities lobby and influence the 
local police to attain more KPRs. Having more KPRs means having more ‘legal’ firepower 
directed against the common enemy. In Samburu North, the Samburu administrative areas tend 
to have more KPRs than the Turkana areas. The issue of imbalance in the arming of KPR is seen 
by the Turkana as a deliberate measure aimed at entrenching the ability of the Samburu to 
militarily prevail in conflict situations against their Turkana neighbours. The disparity of KPR 
guns allocated to KPRs among the Samburu and Turkana was noted by KNCHR (2008)  as one 
of the key complains in their fact finding mission on Samburu and Turkana violence in Baragoi. 
In their assessment they noted that three quarters of KPR guns (especially G3s) were allocated to 
Samburu KPRs, while Turkana KPRs constituted 25 per cent of KPRs in Baragoi. Similarly, in a 
memorandum to the Minister of Internal Security during a leaders meeting in Baragoi in 2009, 
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the Turkana informed the minister of the imbalance in the distribution of walkie talkies to KPRs 
in Baragoi with the Turkana KPRs receiving 20 per cent while the Samburu recived 80 per cent 
(Ekiru 2009). The politics of arming of KPRs is another facet of the role of violence in power 
politics between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi, in a recent petition to the President of 
Kenya, the Samburu North MP (a Samburu) asked for the replacement of Samburu KPR guns 
from MKIV to more automatic versions such as AK47 and G3. In his request, the MP 
specifically mentioned the administrative areas (Samburu areas) in which KPRs guns needed to 
be replaced and left out Turkana administrative areas of Baragoi. This further reinforces my 
argument that to the local Samburu and Turkana and their leaders, KPRs and their arms represent 
symbols of communal firepower against common ‘enemy’ communities. Reinforcing communal 
firepower therefore provides the needed edge against one’s enemies in contests over land, votes 
and pastures in the absence of the state. To the politicians, the ability to provide better firepower 
to morans and KPRs entrenches the patron-client relationship that enables their preservation of 
political power through re-elections (Lentoimaga n.d). 
 
There have been incidences where KPRs have been disarmed owing to what police describe as 
illegal use of state firearms. In other cases, political meddling by rival group have led to pressure 
forcing the police to disarm KPRs in certain administrative areas while leaving other areas fully 
armed with their rifles (Baragoi Police Station 2012). This precipitates imbalance of power and 
encourages raiders to attack areas perceived to be vulnerable. Following the Baragoi massacre 
there was political pressure from politicians for the disarming of Turkana KPRs whom they 
accused of loaning their guns to aid Turkana warriors who killed the police, Samburu warriors 
and Samburu KPRs in the botched Lomerok raid of 10
th
 November 2012. The order to disarm the 
Turkana KPRs was however carried out in Parkati village some 80 kilometers away from the 
scene of the Baragoi massacre. Parkati village is often attacked by the Pokot from Baringo 
County and Turkana clans from Lokori in Turkana South. The disarming Parkati KPRs due to 
political pressure from Samburu political leaders who argued that Turkana KPRs were part of the 
warriors who participated in the killing of police officers in the Baragoi massacre. This led to the 
vulnerability of the village. The following KPRs from Parkati (including the chief) were 
disarmed (Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book November 25
th
 2012): 
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 G3 serial number 005624 with ammunition belonging to Assistant Chief Parkati 
 MKIV serial number N24652A with 9 rounds of ammunition from the head of KPR 
in Parkati 
 MKIV serial number PF 401881 with 5 rounds of ammunition from a KPR officer 
 G3 serial number 97496391 with 81 rounds from a KPR officer 
 MKIV serial number U37347 with 8 rounds of ammunition 
 MKIV serial number AA22028 with two rounds of ammunition 
 MKIV serial number 18545 with 3 rounds of ammunition 
 MKIV serial number 13144 with 5 rounds of ammunition 
 MKIV serial number F2487 with 2 rounds of ammunition 
 MKIV serial number B17345 with 5 rounds of ammunition 
Cases of temporary disarmaments of KPRs based on local political dynamics not only endanger 
the whole community who are exposed to more attacks but also drives the need to acquire illegal 
arms that further increases the levels of insecurity among the Samburu and the Turkana.  
8.8 Privatisation of KPRs in Samburu North 
High insecurity levels in Northern Kenya occasioned by limited presence of police personnel has 
increased the demand for KPRs as an alternative policing option. In studies of KPRs and their 
welfare in Turkana County (Mkutu and Wandera; Mkutu 2015) have established a trend where 
KPRs are increasingly being hired by NGOs, oil exploring companies, community banks, 
politicians, businessmen and even churches as paid private security.  Hiring of KPRs as private 
security for organisations and individuals further reinforces my argument of pastoralists 
Northern Kenya as ungoverned spaces where the demand for personal and property security as a 
public good is in short supply. The privatisation of KPRs raises the question of the sources of 
ammunition that are utilised by KPRs in these private engagements. In essence it forces KPRs to 
acquire illegal ammunition to be ‘suitable’ for the job. It creates a ready market for ammunition 
trade and places KPRs as key actors in this trade. Further the hiring of KPRs as private security 
guards deprives herders of the security back-up they need to traverse pasturelands during the dry 
season. It exposes herders to vulnerability to attacks especially during the dry period when 
livestock have to trek long distances in search of pasture and water. 
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Cases of KPRs abandoning their core responsibility of providing security to pursue other 
interests can be blamed on the volunteer and non-remunerational nature of the task. In focused 
group discussions I was informed that KPRs do not earn any salary or allowances for the security 
services they provide. Cases of drop-outs by KPR recruits have therefore become common as 
young men seek more productive opportunities. A case in point is captured in the following 
excerpt: 
“Firearms from the following KPRs have been detained. N. N holder of firearm serial 
number 17325 with 3 rounds ammunition and E. E holder of firearm serial number F2487 
with 3 rounds of ammunition. The above KPRs are all from Parkati location. The chief of 
Parkati and the area councilor complained to the DC’s office that the said KPRs are no 
longer living in Parkati and there is need to recruit new KPRs to ease the security burden. 
In Parkati currently there are only 2 KPRs deployed at Parkati Primary School guarding 
the children against bandit attacks” (Baragoi Police Post Occurrence Book 21st May 
2008). 
KPRs are also increasingly being hired as body guards by politicians, thus shifting their loyalty 
and main responsibility from the protection of whole communities to that of the individual. 
Cases of privatisation of KPRs have been found to expose their villages to possibilities of attacks 
from rival communities and to deny the villages a channel through which information on 
insecurity incidences can be relayed, especially those that take place in the grazing fields. Since 
the coming of County governments, Samburu County has created another layer of armed guards. 
These are pastoralists’ youth who have in the past three years been employed as game rangers in 
the County. While the ‘traditional’ KPR is a volunteer officer with no uniform and remuneration. 
The County Ranger is an ‘upgraded’ KPR with uniforms, better weapons (mostly G3 rifles) a 
patrol vehicle and a salary (about KES 10,000 per month). The creation of this new group of 
arms holders (from warrior age-sets) also adds another layer of actors armed by the state but 
poorly supervised. Recruitment of rangers is also a matter of political contestation, in a meeting 
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of Samburu elders that I attended at Baragoi laga, the reformed moran
117
 that was chosen to be 
employed as a ranger was rejected by the local MP in favour of another who was a known 
rustler. Recrutiment of KPRs also comes with political undertones of marginalisation. The 
Turkana have complained of the skewed manner of recruitment of both the traditional KPRs and 
the County Rangers, they argue that Turkana areas have fewer KPRs who are often disarmed 
during periods of tension between the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi to limit the military 
power of the Turkana and to make them vulnerable to Samburu attacks. Militarization of 
communities through KPRs, rangers and chiefs within a system of limited supervison and checks 
largely contributes to the informalization of violence in Baragoi.  
Photo 11: KPR officer armed with a MKIV rifle employed as a security guard at a Community Savings Bank 
in Baragoi town, September 2014 (source: Author) 
8.9 KPRs and their Loyalties: Tribe or State? 
The conduct of KPRs in Samburu North also brings forth a critical issue of loyalty when dealing 
with security matters. Turkana and Samburu KPRs are firstly loyal to their ethnic groups, their 
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 Reformed morans among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi are members of the Serian-Ekthil group, serian is 
a Samburu word for peace, ekthil also means peace in Ng’irutukana 
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chiefs and political leaders. As much as they receive arms and ammunition from the state, the 
firearm is viewed by the community members as a communal asset. Further there have been 
cases where KPRs have given out their guns to their brothers or other kin to use in the grazing 
fields. In my interview with a KPR Sergeant
118
 he affirmed that many pastoralists’ boys are 
trained on shooting skills using KPR guns given to their elder siblings or fathers.  This raises 
questions of the net effect of having KPRs as a local force. Is it beneficial to the communities or 
does it in a big way contributes to the militarization of ethnicities between the Samburu and 
Turkana? Cases of KPRs being supplied with ammunition by political leaders
119
 in Samburu 
County were prevalent during my time in the field, this further raise the critical question of 
where their loyalties lie. Is it with the state or with the politicians? The arming of KPRs by 
political leaders contributes in a big way to well organised raids that lead to massive losses by 
the Samburu and Turkana as they trigger cycles of revenge raids. The increased role of political 
leaders especially within the Samburu County Government further shows the distance between 
the Kenyan state and the people of Samburu North. The ethnicisation of arming of KPRs 
promotes ammunition trade and encourages raiding and other forms of violent entrepreneurship 
among the Samburu and Turkana. 
8.10 Chiefs as KPRs 
Police records from Baragoi Police Station reveal that chiefs in all the locations and sub-
locations are also allocated weapons and ammunition as KPRs. In my study area, I interviewed 
two Turkana chiefs who previously served as KPRs. In both cases, the KPRs-turned chiefs 
informed me that they still retained the firearms issued to them in their capacities as KPRs. 
Further, they continued to receive even a higher allocation of ammunition from the police. The 
Police Act (GoK 2011) does not foresee this level of abuse when it comes to the appointment of 
KPRs. The double roles of chiefs as KPRs further contributes to the operational confusion and 
shows the ease with which one can become a KPR. A former KPR from Kawap location for 
instance became an Acting Chief when his chief was indicted over allegations of supporting 
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 Interview at Baragoi town January 2015 
119
 Discussions with security officers in January 2015 in Baragoi town 
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Turkana raids against the Samburu. The acting chief
120
 of Kawap told me that he was able to 
obtain a G3 rifle as well as his old MKIV rifle that he was allocated as a KPR. On the issue of 
ammunition, he informed that he receives ammunition from the police but many times he is 
forced to go to the illegal gun market in Leilei since the government supply is irregular and very 
insufficient. The unclear policy surrounding the appointment of KPRs aids the trade in 
ammunition in Samburu North and contributes in a significant way in the violent raids that 
Baragoi is synonymous for. In the police records, I noted that the Senior Chief of Baragoi 
location in his capacity as a KPR was given 80 rounds of ammunition (Baragoi Police Station 
2012). 
8.11 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to link the idea of informalization of violence via KPRs with ungoverned 
spaces such as pastoralists’ lands of Northern Kenya. I focused on the role of the Kenya Police 
Reserves a volunteer unit that is deployed by the Kenyan state to provide policing and security 
services to pastoralists’ villages and grazing fields in Northern Kenya. Focusing on Samburu 
North district, I have argued that the KPRs as semi-state actors in Baragoi are facilitated by the 
neglect/disinterest of the Kenyan state in the ungoverned spaces that exists in Northern Kenya 
(Menkhaus 2007; Idler and Forest 2015). The deployment of KPRs by the Kenyan state can be 
seen as a stop-gap measure for the security challenges that bedevil the whole of Northern Kenya. 
However, given the volunteer nature of their job, KPRs owe their loyalties to their communities 
and their guns are seen as communal assets. KPRs are therefore critical in defending their 
communities but also very vulnerable in being part of the violent entrepreneurship through the 
sale of ammunition and participation in cattle raids and highway bandtries using state issued 
arms and ammunition. The recruitment of KPRs also is masked with local power politics where 
the chiefs are at liberty to propose their kin or friends to these positions. The institutional 
weaknesses observed in the operations of KPRs can therefore be analysed from the standpoint of 
divided loyalties that the KPRs owe to chiefs who appoint them, to the police who issue them 
with the guns and ammunition, to the community that they hail from and to themselves as unpaid 
and unsupervised officers who have needs and interests to achieve with a loaded gun at their 
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 Interview March 2015 at Lenkima village 
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disposal. The institution of KPRs therefore exemplifies the role of the state in the informalization 
of violence in Northern Kenya. It shows the role of the state in abrogating its core duties of 
security provision for citizens and sub-contracting (without pay) fellow citizens to provide their 
own security. For warriors, being a KPR presents one with the opportunity and power to traverse 
the legality (through ownership of state-issued gun and ammunition) and the illegality (using the 
state-issued gun and ammunition to commit crime) for individual and communal benefit. 
 
While past studies have blamed pastoralists’ violence on the proliferation of illegal arms and 
ammunition through non-state actors; I argue in this chapter that the state through KPRs are a 
critical part of the value chain of actors that exploit the ungoverned space in Samburu North to 
benefit from violent entrepreneurship and establish a system of informalization of violence 
among the Samburu and Turkana. In this case study, incidences of massive transfer of 
ammunition during periods of peace indicate that the police in Samburu North collude with 
KPRs to sell ammunition. Similar cases were found in Turkana North in a study by Bevan 
(2008).  The existence of KPRs as the only source of security for pastoralists in Northern Kenya 
demonstrates the distance between the state and the citizens. This resonates with the description 
of O’Donnell (1993) of ‘low intensity citizenship’ and its links with the ‘shadow economy’ as 
experienced by citizens in ungoverned spaces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 213 
 
Women as Targets in Violent Raids: A Consequence of Institutional 
Change or Part of Traditional Raiding Culture? 
 
9.0 Introduction 
Anthropologists have documented the treatment of women during cattle raids by different ethnic 
groups in the Karamoja Cluster. While others saw women from ‘enemy’ groups as ‘moving 
assets’ to be abducted and integrated into their ranks as wives, others saw women from ‘enemy’ 
groups as ‘fair game’ whose killings during raids bestowed socio-cultural pride marked by rituals 
that ensured upward social mobility.  While these two distinct perspectives do not expressly 
agree on the treatment of women during episodes of pastoralists’ violence, they at least show that 
the assumption that pastoralists norms of cattle raiding uniformly protected women, children and 
the aged is not factual. This chapter examines the various forms of violence directed at women 
among the Samburu and Turkana communities of Baragoi. It seeks to understand whether 
expanded forms of violence are a consequence of the breakdown of the traditional institutions 
that ‘protected’ women, children and the aged against violence during raids. 
 
It has been argued that pastoralists’ societies that share the cultural practice of cattle raids had an 
institutional framework that protected women, children and the aged against any acts of violence 
(Akabwai and Ateyo 2007; Hutchinson 2000; Schilling et al 2012; Pkalya et al 2004).  
According to these scholars the killing of women and children was in essence a taboo and an 
indication of cowardice as opposed to the pride and valor that warriors sought in raids. Other 
authors have described the many cases where women had special powers and performed certain 
rituals to protect their households, especially their sons during raids. These scholars have further 
argued that women could also use their positions of authority in the household to prevent their 
sons from going to raids (Pkalya et al 2004). Further examples of centrality of women in 
peacemaking among pastoralists is given by Akabwai and Ateyo (2007:17) who narrated how 
Didinga women from South Sudan initiated peace talks by accompanying their men to visit the 
Dodoth in neighbouring Uganda. Akabwai and Ateyo (2007) argue that it’s the presence of 
Didinga women in their entourage to Dodoth country that protected Didinga elders from attack. 
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The peace agreement between the Didinga and the Dodoth that ended cattle raids and hostilities 
that had been ongoing since 1973 was sealed by the presence and lead of Didinga women in 
1992. The presence of pastoralists’ women in this case signified a peaceful encounter and served 
as a basis for inter-communal peacebuilding after two decades of inter-tribal warfare.  
 
While violence against women during cattle raids has been blamed majorly on the proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons in pastoralist areas (Hutchinson 2012; Leff 2009; Triche 2015; 
Small Arms Survey 2013) , this chapter seeks to broaden this argument by looking at the variety 
of violence incidences that women suffer in pastoralist areas of Baragoi. Drawing from police 
reports, interviews and event calendars’, this chapter seeks to debunk the notion that the 
proliferation of arms is the sole source of violence against women (Kratli and Swift 1999). It 
looks at violence targeting women to be a broad spectrum of incidences including rape during 
raids, killing or stealing of milking stock, destruction of women’s economic initiatives, domestic 
water points and threats of violence towards ‘enemy’ women seeking alternative livelihood 
options such as burning of charcoal or looking for firewood for sale in the grazing lands.  
This chapter further looks at the changing status of pastoralists women from a position of 
protectors to that of targets. Drawing from primary and secondary data, this chapter seeks to 
contrast the social positioning of women pastoralists. In so doing, I analyse how women were 
central to arbitration and peacemaking during episodes of traditional cattle raids vis-a-vis the 
current positioning of women pastoralists as ‘fair game’ and as major victims of pastoralists’ 
violence. Drawing from cases in the Karamoja cluster, this chapter further illustrates the 
changing structure and modus operandi of today’s cattle raiding incidents as compared to raids as 
they were conducted in the earlier and mid-1900s. It seeks to highlight and contrast the treatment 
of women as assets during raids in traditional raiding and their targeting in modern day cattle 
raids. This chapter embeds its theoretical basis on performative vis-à-vis primordial ethnicity. I 
argue that in traditional cattle raids that occurred before 1960s, women were seen in different 
light: as assets (women could be abducted alongside the raided cattle to increase the population 
of the raiders and be integrated in the raiders community), women were also seen as custodians 
of peacemaking instruments such as pregnancy belts (Pkalya et al 2004), these could be used to 
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deter conflicts or to prevent young men from going to raid (Bianco 1991:770). Further women 
were seen as protectors and could give special charms to protect their sons from enemy attacks.  
This chapter therefore argues the alteration of the position of women from protectors to targets 
can be explained through the changing interpretations of ethnicity (Hutchinson 2000). In her 
argument, Hutchinson states that in traditional raids among the Dinka and Nuer, women were 
treated as assets owing to the fact that a woman could get married across ethnic lines. Increased 
violent raids among many pastoralists in Eastern Africa has ‘solidified’ interpretations of ethnic 
identity and in many ways inhibited cross-ethnic marriages. This has led to more stringent 
interpretations of ethnicity based on common ancestry and shared cultural values. Hutchinson 
(2000) has described the increased targeting of women as a ‘fair game’ in violence situations 
using ethnic lenses as the ‘militarisation of ethnicity’. Women whose ethnicity was judged 
depending on those of their progeny no longer enjoy this privilege. As a result, Hutchinson 
argues that violence that targets women can be explained through stringent interpretation of 
ethnicity (through primordialist lenses). Thus women perceived to be from other ethnic groups 
are no longer seen as assets to be abducted to swell up the productive front of the raiders 
communities but as fair targets whose humiliation or killings bestows sense of ‘justice’ and 
honor to the enemy community thus escalating violent raids. In the next section I analyse the 
social positioning of women and children in traditional cattle raids. 
9.1 Women in Traditional Raids 
Several authors have highlighted the significant roles that women either played in encouraging 
raids or those they played to prevent warriors from raiding (Pkalya et al 2004; Schilling et al 
2012; HSBA 2012). In his study of pastoralists groups within the Ilemi Triangle, Nene Mburu 
(2001) was informed of the social sanctions that would befall raiders who dared attack women, 
children and the aged. Pkalya et al (2004) have elaborated the prominent roles that women 
played as peace makers and arbiters in intra-communal and inter-communal conflicts among the 
Pokot, Samburu and Turkana. In their study, they outlined several ways in which pastoralists 
women were regarded as custodians of special rituals and blessings that enabled men’s success 
or failure in raids.  For instance Pkalya et al (2004) mentioned the Pokot birth belt called 
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Leketio
121
 worn by women after giving birth to the first child. Among the Pokot, Leketio is 
believed to protect a woman’s children from harm (Bianco 1991:776). "To tie on a lökötyö is to 
make a kind of prayer…a lökötyö can be worn for a grown child who is sick, or raiding cows” as 
a prayer, a protection by the mother to the child against risks and misfortune (Bianco 1991:779). 
In their study in Northern Kenya, Pkalya et al (2004) were informed of the use of Leketio by 
Pokot women to prevent harm or injury to their progeny in a number of ways:  
“Before warriors set out for a raid, each of them informs his mother so that she can wear 
the belt while he is away. To prevent conflicts, women refuse to wear the belts prompting 
the warrior to abandon the mission. Women could also lay their belts in front of warriors 
who are about to go for a raid. Crossing a leketio is considered a curse. For instance, 
when fighting is raging, a woman may remove her leketio and lay it between the fighting 
men. The fight ceases immediately. The concept of using pregnancy belt to halt or 
prevent conflicts is the same in all the 18 Kalenjin sub tribes” (Pkalya et al 2004:39).  
 
Other examples of the exalted social position of women during conflict can further be drawn 
from Hutchinson (2000). In her study of inter-ethnic violence and cattle raids among the Dinka 
and Nuer people of South Sudan, she noted that at the beginning of the war in early 1980s 
women were treated as “illegitimate targets” (2000:11). She further noted that women were seen 
as “points of safe refuge” (2000:11) meaning that taking refuge in a woman’s hut, or hiding 
behind a woman could prevent a man from imminent attack.  She further argues that these rules 
were maintained and adhered to because breach or attack on women was believed to precipitate 
escalation of violence. Houtteman (2010) also gives the example from the Daasanech that yelling 
in grief by a mother of a dead raider or a woman whose livestock had been taken by raiders was 
believed to be a curse that followed the killer and required several steps of purification rituals to 
re-integrate into society. 
 
On the other hand, Gulliver (1951) described the Turkana raids as a free for all kind of attack in 
which the killing of men and married women occurred. However, he states that Turkana warriors 
often abducted boys and girls during their raids. Abduction of boys and girls was aimed at 
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swelling the raiders’ ranks with future raiders and wives. The girls were not mistreated but 
adopted by the raiding families and married off to their sons or their kin at a later stage. Krätli 
and Swift (1999) makes the argument that the abduction of young girls and young boys was 
justified by the notion that children were not classified into the age-set systems that many of the 
pastoralists follow and were therefore classified alongside animals thus part of the raids.  
Hutchinson (2000) further argues that even though Nuer and Dinka women were ‘protected’ 
through an institutional framework that sanctioned violence against women during raids; women 
were expected to advance the war effort by having more babies to swell the numbers of future 
warriors and women who would be a source of bride-wealth. 
 
Evidence of socio-cultural honours bestowed upon warriors for the killing of women is seen in 
the scarification marks on the bodies of the Turkana and Karimojong (Gulliver 1951; Knighton 
2007). Based on data from cases of deaths during raids among the Karimojong, Knighton argued 
that for every three men that were killed in raids, a woman was killed. This implies that men 
were at the fore front of defensive and offensive acts of violence during raids. Women suffered 
violent actions during ambush, retaliatory attacks or in an all-out war between distinct ethnic 
identities. Houtteman (2010:140) also indicates that in Daasanech raids women were not spared 
either. However, the socio-cultural value of killing women was differentiated by that placed on a 
raider who killed a male enemy. A warrior who killed a male enemy was required to spear an ox 
as part of the cleansing ceremony while the killer of a woman was required to spear a goat in 
similar ceremony. Abbink (2009:33) argues that in the earlier periods (mid 1990s), Suri culture 
protected women and children from ‘enemy’ community. They were spared during raids. As late 
as 1999, Hutchinson (2009) recorded the raiding of Nuer cattle camps by Dinka raiders during 
the grass-roots inter-ethnic peacebuilding meetings in Bahr el-Ghazal. During this raid, several 
women and children from the Nuer community were abducted along with the 2000 cattle stolen. 
Houtteman (2010) in his study of killings, identity and ethnicity among the Daasanech in 
Ethiopia was informed through interviews of the existence of Turkana women who were 
abducted as girls by the Daasanech raiders and later raised and married to Daasanech. According 
to Houtteman (2010) Daasanech traditional raiding allowed the killing of married or older 
women but aimed at the capture of young boys and girls. The next section gives an analysis of 
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the changing social positions of women during cattle raids and plausible causes of increased 
targeting of women. 
 
While many scholars have argued that traditional raiding had rules that ensured the protection of 
women, children and the aged (HSBA 2012; Schilling et al 2012 Hutchinson 2000), older 
literature points out that many pastoralists cultures never had specific distinctions when it comes 
to targeting of raid victims. In many cases women from other ethnic groups were viewed as fair 
game (Gulliver 1951; Almagor 1979; Fukui 1979).  Archival records also disagree with the 
notion of overall protection of ‘enemy’ women during raids. Four Merille raids against the 
Turkana in 1957 over a period of 30 days led to the killings of 47 men, 72 women, 35 boys and 
27 girls (KNA DC/ISO/2/1/15
122
). Along the Kenya-Uganda border, raids between the Turkana 
and the Matheniko resulted in the killing of an eight-month pregnant woman from the Turkana 
community in February 1960 (Uganda Protectorate, 1960). Knighton (2007: 472) dismisses the 
argument that pastoralists’ norms prohibited violence against women and children as “colonially 
induced imagination of Victorian morality”. Drawing from the Karimojong, he argued that 
women were seen and are still seen as part of the collective war effort. Therefore attacking 
women was well accepted and did not draw any negative sanctions on the warrior. Abbink 
(2009:45) further pointed at the ‘modern’ indiscriminate killings which occur during Suri raids 
against their neighbours. He mentions “the gunning down of young girls in Adikyaz in 1993” to 
show the minimal value to which Suri people attached to women from enemy groups. 
 
Modern raids are marked by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and its 
substitution of the spear. The use of guns has been blamed for the targeting of women during 
raids (Gray et al 2003; Mirzerler and Young 2000; Mkutu 2007). It is argued that while spears 
required raiders to get close to their target in order to be accurate and have maximum impact, the 
use of guns has depersonalized combat during raids. Raiders no longer have to get closer to the 
target (HSBA 2012; Kratli and Swift 1999). Guns therefore made women and children legitimate 
targets since it gave raiders an opportunity to target those far, or those inside a house. This has 
psychologically dehumanized targets. Incidences where women have been killed or injured 
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during raids are well captured in police reports and event calendar interviews by women in 
Samburu North. Buchanan-Smith and Lind (2005) have pointed out the differential impacts of 
modern-day raiding among the Turkana of Northwestern Kenya. In their study, modern day 
raiding was seen to be the genesis of female-headed households among the Turkana. Describing 
the raids during the period of south-south war between the Dinka and the Nuer in the late 1990s, 
Hutchinson (2009:50) noted that in the ensuing militarization of ethnic relations “everyone 
became vulnerable to attack, even new born children, pregnant women and the elderly”. This 
study therefore attempts to put into perspective the reasons behind modern-day targeting of 
women by analysing the changing value-system through which women were perceived among 
the Turkana and Samburu. In this analysis I follow Hutchinson (2000) in arguing that increased 
targeting of ‘enemy’ women in raids, through rape in the grazing fields and shootings in Baragoi 
town exemplifies a more stringent perception of the ‘enemy’ woman. A woman from the ‘other’ 
community is no longer seen as ‘passage’ through which any man, whether Samburu or Turkana 
can receive progeny and add to the numbers of his clan or community. Rather a woman from the 
‘other’ community is increasingly seen as an enemy just like their warrior brothers and therefore 
an easy target for violent action since in many cases women do not carry arms. In the next 
section, I advance conceptual explanations for increased targeting of women during raids. My 
analysis if focused on the concept of primordialism and how its use and interpretation in 
situations of heightened tension among the Samburu and Turkana increases the possibilities of 
women being viewed as ‘enemies’ based on their ethnic identities unlike in the past when 
women were viewed to ‘belong to everyone’. 
9.2 Primordialism and Treatment of the ‘Other’ as a Basis for Targeting of Woman in 
Violence among the Samburu and Turkana 
Primordialism means the classification or categorisation based on the society/community within 
which one is born. Rex (2002:91-92) further adds that primordial relations and identification is 
based on “shared kinship, neighborhood, language, religion, shared, customs, shared code of 
division of labour and shared history”. The essence of primordialism as an identity marker in 
society is further explained by Geertz (1963:109) as one based on the “givens of existence” as a 
‘natural occurrence’. The notion of primordiality being a ‘given’ is however contestable given 
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our awareness of construction and reconstruction of social relations from time to time throughout 
human history (Eisenstadt 2002; Horowitz 1998).  
Drawing from Barth (1969), Rex (2002) argues that ethnic identity may sometimes not 
necessarily be defined by cultural attributes, language or common neighbourhood but rather by 
the immediate needs of the community. In other words, ethnic identity may be ‘conferred’ upon 
certain people within the same neighbourhood when it serves the interests of a collective for 
instance through marriage or cooption of abducted women during raids. This is what Rex (2002) 
has described as instrumentalist approach to ethnicity. He argues that ethnic identity is not based 
only on language, culture and religion but also driven by “rational and purposive association” 
(2002:95). Further, Rex (2002) argues that socio-cultural relations between groups may be 
redefined from time to time depending on the situational interests of those groups. Eisenstadt 
(2002:37) has argued that primordiality can be used by collectivities in their struggles for 
resources and distribution of power. Primordiality is therefore used as a socio-economic or even 
political boundary for excluding others within the same neighbourhood. It sets a criterion on who 
is a friend and who is an enemy. In war situations, primordialism becomes the basis for identity 
and enables the differentiation between enemy and friend. In violence situations primordialism 
prescribes and legitimizes violence against ‘soft’ targets in the enemy camps. During periods of 
tension in Baragoi town when armed warriors roam the night, Samburu and Turkana warriors use 
specific forms of identity like asking a stranger in either Samburu or Turkana language the 
names of the clan which the ‘stranger’ belongs. Failure to grasp and answer the question 
portends danger as it means that the ‘stranger’ is an ‘enemy’. 
Horowitz (1998) has also pointed out at the two approaches of primordiality; the view of it as a 
basis for exclusion of others based on ‘nature’ or ‘givens’ while other view it as a social 
construct manipulated by elites to further individual interests during periods of war. 
Primordialism is also used by ethnic groups to define the ‘stranger’ and the code of conduct 
towards him or her. Melotti (1986) has argued that conflicts between groups arise from coded 
interactions. There are codes of amity between one’s own group and codes of enmity towards the 
‘other’. Coding of inter-group relations is further argued to be strategic and rational. In situations 
where the survival of the group is not under any threat by its neighbours, then the code of amity 
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is engaged while the code of enmity is used when there is competition over resources that 
threaten the livelihoods of the group. Primordialism can therefore be used as a strategy of war, a 
means of excluding others, target and justify violence against others during periods of insecurity 
(Harvey 2000).  To comprehend the phenomenon of increased targeting of women in pastoralists 
violence, in the next section I analyse two contrasting forms of ethnicity: perfomative and 
primordial to explain the shift in interpretations of women’s identities as a key explanation for 
increased violence against women among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. 
9.2.1 Performative vis-à-vis Primordial Ethnicity 
Comparative analysis of performative forms of ethnicity vis-à-vis primordial forms of ethnicity 
can help to comprehend the reasons why women were treated as ‘protected assets’ during 
traditional raids (Hutchinson 2000). Similar analysis can also help us understand the reasons why 
pastoralists’ women are increasingly being targeted in violent raids (Hutchinson 2000). This 
analysis goes beyond the usual understanding of increased violence among pastoralists to be 
driven by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Understanding social change and 
categorisation from performative to primordial ethnicity may help to explain cases of rape 
against women caught by raiders while looking for firewood in the grazing lands or the killing of 
goats by raiders among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. According to Houtteman (2010) 
pastoralists groups in the Karamoja cluster aret patrilineal in societal organisation. Women 
married across ethnic divide conferred ethnic identity of their husbands to their children. For 
instance a Turkana woman married to a Samburu conferred Samburu ethnic identity to her 
children. Women were therefore viewed to belong to everyone (Hutchinson 2000; Houtteman 
2010). Incorporation of single girls through abduction during raids was therefore seen as a 
positive thing and aimed at swelling the numbers of the community for future reproductive 
purposes. Drawing on examples among the Daasanech, Houtteman explains: 
“When caught in a raid, a girl might be given to a father’s brother of the raider. The 
father’s brother will consider her as his own child and she will become Daasanech when 
circumcised together with other girls of the family. Later on, her new father will give her 
away as a bride and will get bridewealth for her” (Houtteman 2010:135). 
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This shows that girls were considered to belong to everyone; their ‘ethnicity’ was transferable 
before they got married from one community to another. Ethnic identity of women only was 
solidified after getting married and having children with their husbands. Among the Daasanech 
protection of girls during raids is linked with their being considered assets to be raided together 
with the livestock and brought up among the raider community as part of them.   
9.3 Primordialism as a Basis for Targeting of Women among the Samburu and Turkana 
Samburu and Turkana groups are patrilineal in societal organisation. Women leave their homes 
after dowry is paid and join their husbands’ compounds. The husbands have control over 
resources and each married woman is allocated her herd for the substance of her household. 
Offspring’s of women bestow ethnic identity of their husbands to their children. Inter-communal 
marriages have occurred for a long time in history. In public meetings that I attended, there was 
always the discourse among the elderly members of the two groups that ‘we are all Samburu’. 
This implied that even though the two communities identified themselves as separate and distinct 
units, they were interrelated and of ‘mixed blood’ due to numerous cases of inter-marriage over a 
long period of time. This is the essence of performative ethnicity (Hutchinson 2000); a woman’s 
ethnicity was seen as the ethnicity of her husband. A Samburu woman marrying a Turkana man 
became a Turkana woman and vice versa. Women were therefore accorded the ethnicity of their 
husbands. Girls were seen to belong to all thus explaining the many occasions when girls were 
abducted.  
 
However, there are no recent cases of Samburu women getting married to Turkana. Cases of 
Turkana women marrying Samburu men have also reduced with a few notable ones being the 
marriage of elite Turkana to a few elite Samburu. In Baragoi, Samburu men married to Turkana 
men were all living in Baragoi town. I was informed by a prominent Samburu politician
123
 that 
living with a Turkana woman in the Samburu manyatta was not ‘safe’. In essence one can argue 
that intermarriages between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi have dwindled over time as 
primordial forms of identification have taken over from more performative criterion of identity 
that was the prism for viewing women and girls in former times. Women are no longer seen as 
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‘belonging to everyone’ (Hutchinson 2000) but more strictly as belonging to Turkana or 
Samburu men. The Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights (2008:10) in its fact finding 
mission of the Samburu-Turkana conflict in Baragoi described the situation as “tribal and shoot-
on site” violence. This in essence shows the solidification of identities between the two groups, 
and its role in targeting of the ‘other’. This case can further be illustrated by the killing of a high 
school student on the 28
th
 of March 2015 at Baragoi town (Baragoi Police Station 2015). The 
said student was of mixed parentage, the father being a Samburu married to a Turkana woman 
and living on the Turkana side of the road that divides the two ethnic territories. In the height of 
tension that had swelled after revenge attacks since October 2014, the high school student was 
shot twice in the chest and killed as he entered his father’s compound in Naling’ang’or village by 
suspected Samburu marksmen. He was in essence a Samburu but was seen more as a Turkana 
given his physical location (his father’s home on the Turkana side) and the company he kept of 
fellow Turkana high school boys (Baragoi Police Station 2015). In discussions with a Turkana 
assistant chief
124
 who was the first person on the scene, I was informed that the killing of the 
student was part of the targeted killing of Turkana elites that had been proposed by a Samburu 
Member of Parliament who promised morans to pay certain amounts of money for every elite 
killed. The killing of a high school student was to be rewarded with Kenya Shillings 20,000 
while killing of university students was to eb rewarded with Kenya Shillings 50,000 and the 
killing of those educated and employed was to be rewarded with Kenya Shillings 100,000. In 
further discussions with the police, I was informed that the footprints of the killer was traced to 
the Samburu side of the road, next to Kenya Power Station, however, they were unable to arrest 
any suspects. In the next section, I look into specific cases and forms of violence that women of 
Baragoi continually face due to the ethnic rivalry and recurrent strife that is common among 
these pastoralists. 
9.3.1 Pastoralists Violence and Its Effects on Women in Baragoi 
“During a raid by the Turkana I lost all my goats, they also killed my son Loshuku, he 
was killed by the Turkana at Mt. kosikosi” (Interview February 2015 in Ngilai village) 
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The conflict between the Turkana and Samburu has been experienced differently by men and 
women. While men have been the major combatants fighting and dying in raids; women’s roles 
have oscillated between encouragors of raids, victims, survivors and heads of female-led 
households due to the death of their husbands and sons in raids. In women’s stories of ‘war’ the 
Turkana and Samburu narrate how the conflict has contributed to constant movement due to 
insecurity. As one Samburu lady
125
 told me: “I lost my cattle twice while leaving in Tuum, then 
we migrated to South Horr, the Ngoroko again attacked South Horr and we moved to the top of 
Mount Ng’iro. While there the Ngoroko attacked us again at Koskosi (the top most part of Mt 
Ng’iro), they killed Loshami my brother after that my husband decided that we go to Ngilai”. In 
this case modern day raiding is associated with helplessness and unpredictability of day to day 
life. Movement from place to place that is the basis with of nomadic pastoralism is seen not only 
as  a means of seeking greener pastures in Baragoi but as a safety measure given the rampant 
nature of violence that started with Ngoroko attacks. 
Turkana-Samburu violence can also be seen in its effects on women relationships across the two 
ethnic groups. An 82
126
 year old Samburu woman told me that many years ago (probably in the 
early 80s) the Samburu and Turkana lived together in Nachola (now a Turkana domain). This old 
lady had a Turkana friend whom she gave her sae (Samburu necklace beads). Her friend’s name 
was Losike. Even though she blamed the Turkana for ‘starting the war’ her story puts into 
perspective the common past of the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi and how women were 
viewed by society at that time and how they viewed each other. Increased violence led to the 
movement of the Samburu out of Nachola. It contributed in a big way to loss of friendships 
between Turkana and Samburu women and the nurturing of enmity. This further shows the 
replacement of performative ethnicity with a more primordialists’ view of pastoralists’ women. 
A Turkana respondent
127
 from Nachola recounted how she had experienced the Samburu-
Turkana violent conflict. To her the raids that became more violent in the early 1990s have 
brought pain, suffering and fear. Apart from having lost 400 livestock due to Samburu and Pokot 
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attacks, she described the fear of going to the ‘bush’ to cut trees for burning charcoal. She noted 
that the conflict between these communities has in many ways limited women’s livelihood 
options as safety is not guaranteed at home or in the bush. 
9.3.2 Forms of Violence Targeting Women Livelihood Bases among the Samburu and 
Turkana 
Women tend to suffer four major forms of violence during raids among the Samburu and 
Turkana: They lose their husbands or sons who would offer protection and leadership at home. 
Losing husbands force them to mostly be inherited where they lose status and are then treated as 
second class wives. Secondly women are directly targeted by raiders or killed in cross fire 
especially when the attacks are within the manyatta. Third, violence during raids in the 
manyattas leads to killings of milking stock and the loss of goats or milking camels directly 
affects nutrition balance of the household. Fourth, the case of Kawap demonstrates how violent 
raids impact on collective women’s effort. In this case, a poultry project ran by Turkana women 
was destroyed and burnt in a raid by the Samburu of Uaso Rongai in 2013. This section will give 
illustrations on each of these forms of violence as drawn from my experience from Samburu and 
Turkana of Baragoi. 
 
Loss of male relatives in raids 
Death of male relatives during raids deprives households of security and labour required for the 
mobility of livestock during the dry periods. Men in pastoralists’ societies are in charge of 
security in the grazing fields and in the manyatta. Loss of male relatives during raids almost 
always coincided with the loss of cattle since men are the defenders of livestock. Deaths of 
husbands, brothers or sons during raids portend a life of despair for pastoralists’ women given 
the patriarchal nature of their societal set-up. Decision making on the welfare of the animals and 
sale are mostly made by men.  In Samburu North, women who have lost their husbands during 
raids are forced to move out of pastoralism and settle in Baragoi town. Where they seek 
alternative means of survival such as sale of charcoal or employment as domestic workers to 
civil servants working within the sub-County headquarters. According to Salome Leparie, an 88 
year old Samburu woman, the conflict between the Samburu and Turkana made her ‘poor’. Her 
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only son Koona Leparie was killed by Turkana raiders at Lbaibor plains. In the same raid she lost 
five expectant camels. She associates the death of her son with poverty. She argued that as a 
widow, her hope was on her son and losing him led to the loss of her camels. Loss of male 
relatives symbolizes the loss of power by the victims’ family since males in these pastoralists 
groups are socialized to be aggressive protectors of the household. The death of male relatives 
further shows the power of violence to transform social relationships as women have to step in 
and provide security for the household through acquisition of arms and learning how to use them. 
Women as Direct targets in raids 
Cases of where women have borne injuries or died in raids are increasingly common among the 
Samburu and Turkana. In run up to the Baragoi massacre, the Samburu attacked Lomirok (in a 
revenge raid) on the 29
th
 of October 2012. On the Turkana side a 47 year old woman was shot on 
the right pelvis while a 46 year old woman was shot on the scapula. This perhaps shows that the 
revenge raid targeted a manyatta (Lomirok). Rape during raids can also be argued to signify the 
solidification of ethnic identity and the legitimization of any form of violence against the ‘other’ 
irrespective of gender. A case in point is captured in a police signal below: 
“On 30th June 2011 a 17 year old Samburu girl from Seren location was herding her 
father’s camels in Lemalong area when suspected Turkana raiders armed with rifles 
attacked and gang raped her, the attackers later tied her beside a tree along the road. The 
raiders made a way with 5 camels and headed towards Kawap area” (Baragoi Police 
Station Signal June 30
th
 2011) 
Incidences of rape during raids can be seen as the projection of ethno-nationalistic violence that 
prevails between the Samburu and Turkana onto the bodies of women. Rape in this case not only 
serves to humiliate and violate the woman and her family but the woman’s body becomes part of 
the battle field in which ethnic enmities are squared out (Das 1996:68). Forms of violent action 
such as rape can be viewed as tools of enhancing primordial identity in the sense that in ‘normal’ 
raid situations rape or the possibility of gang rape as is recorded above is not part of the mission. 
The mission being to acquire livestock and escape as soon as possible. But in situations of 
enhanced tensions, targeting of women from the ‘enemy’ group enables the flourish of these 
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forms of violence as women are perceived as soft targets. Raping of ‘enemy’ women during raids 
imply the changing of raiders’ perceptions of women. They are no longer seen as belonging to 
everyone but strictly as enemies. Rape during raids is therefore a front within which primordial 
identity and humiliation of the ‘enemy’ is executed. In another illustration, a 72 year old 
Samburu woman
128
 narrated how her daughter who was in primary school was killed by Turkana 
raiders in Lbaiboor. According to her, the girl saw the raiders and started running away out of 
fear but she was still shot on the back despite the fact that she posed no threat as a young woman. 
She wondered how raiding had changed overtime as during her time such girls would have been 
abducted and taken with the cattle. She blamed the coming of guns and the ‘disrespect’ of the 
Turkana warriors for the killing of her daughter. In essence blaming the rifles has been part of 
anthropological literature. But as Sagawa (2010:87) argued interpreting social change in through 
the prism of technology exclusively does ignores other factors that contribute towards socio-
cultral change in any society. In the case of the Samburu and Turkana, the killing of women in 
raids, or rape during raids can also be seen as part of the wider contest over power and hegemony 
among pastoralists in Baragoi. Raping a woman from the ‘enemy’ community fulfills ‘victory’ at 
least psychologically to the perpetrator. While at the same time handing ‘defeat’ to the victim, 
her family, clan and community at large. 
Killing of milking stock during raids 
“I lost 70 goats in Loriu in 1997; I was only left with one male goat. Furthermore my eldest 
son who was just a boy Kinipat Loputh was killed by the Samburu who took my goats; I had 
no milk for my children” (Interview February 2015, Logetei village).  
Violent raids have a direct impact on household food supply, while raiders have been noted to 
target the bodies of women through rape and killings. Targeting livestock under the direct 
control of women can also be seen as a form of violence against the household. Since pastoralists 
highly depend on milk and milk products, the raiding of all milking goats alters the ability of the 
household to sustain itself. As this respondent indicated, the raiding of her goats forced her to 
take up charcoal burning as an alternative means of survival. 
                                                          
128
 Interview Ngilai village February 2015 
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Photo 12: Turkana woman milking a goat in Logetei village in December 2014 (Source: Author) 
Similar cases of killings of livestock were also noted down by chiefs from the Samburu and 
Turkana communities. In the case of the Tiyale massacre of September 2011, a Turkana chief 
recorded the killing of 200 camels and 600 shoats through government gunfire during a 
communal punishment operation aimed at rounding up Turkana livestock for the compensation 
of Rendille herders. 
Destruction of women-led initiatives and household services 
On the 20
th
 of October 2013, following a series of revenge raids between the Turkana of Kawap 
and the Samburu of Uaso Rongai, the Samburu raiders attacked Kawap village. The attack 
involved massive destruction of Kawap Primary School, the newly built Kawap Dispensary, 
Kawap Administration Police post, Kawap village, the Catholic Church and the teachers’ 
quarters. To the women of Kawap the vandalism of the newly built dispensary was a great loss. 
A part from the fact that the Turkana of Kawap were then forced to flee and seek residence 
among their kin in Lenkima as internally displaced persons (IDPs). The women of Kawap in an 
 229 
 
interview
129
 were distraught over the loss over the newly constructed dispensary and their 
inability to renovate it (having been displaced due to insecurity). To them, the new dispensary 
was in a big way a relief to many women who had in the past given birth at home with some 
facing child delivery complications that resulted in deaths. They informed me that the dispensary 
was built with the contribution of women and its loss was painful.   
In the Kawap raid, Naletae women group’s poultry farm was destroyed by Samburu raiders who 
carried off 78 layers and six bags of chicken feed (culturally the Samburu don’t eat chicken). 
This project was a part of the now famous ‘table banking’ initiatives in which pastoralists 
women form groups and initiate joint projects to increase their financial independence. In the 
Kawap raid, the water pump through which women got their water for household use was also 
vandalized and the generator stolen. In my interviews with Kawap women, the destruction of 
tinga
130
 as they called it was a source of pain. Access to water for domestic use normally takes a 
backseat in many pastoralists’ societies as the men have enormous control over water sources 
and their priority is watering their animals. Women therefore are forced to compete with animals 
in accessing water. In the case of Kawap women, the water pump was within Kawap Primary 
School just a few meters away from their manyatta therefore easily accessible and convenient 
unlike in places such as Kadokoyo manyatta in Marti where women have to walk for 2 
kilometers to access water for domestic use. The destruction of these key facilities during raids 
points to the increased violence on facilities that promote the wellbeing of the household, thus 
affecting women directly. Raiding between the Samburu and Turkana from a primordialist view 
does not aim just to acquire livestock but to destroy the livelihood of the other as is the case with 
the Turkana of Kawap. 
                                                          
129
 Interview at Lenkima village February 2015 
130
  Swahili word used variously to mean ‘machine’ but can also mean ‘tractor’ in this case used to mean diesel 
engine water pump 
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Photo 13: The vandalized Kawap Dispensary in March 2015 (Source: Author) 
9. 4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have focused on the targeting of women during violent raids among the Turkana 
and Samburu. While the proliferation of arms has often been blamed as the key basis upon which 
targeting of women during raids was based; I have argued that targeting of women has to do with 
a more stringent differentiation of friend and enemy. While women were in the past seen in some 
communities as ‘moving assets’ to be abducted to swell the numbers of the ‘enemy’ 
communities. This is no longer the case between the Turkana and Samburu as more primordialist 
definition of the ‘enemy’ has taken root. I have argued that whether by spear or by the gun, the 
definition of the ‘enemy’ from a primordialist perspective could be key to understanding the 
justifications for increased targeting of women in violent raids. 
 
This chapter has further expanded the range or forms of violent actions that target women and 
women’s’ livelihood bases through a primordialist perspective. I argue that once the definition of 
the ‘enemy’ is arrived at women from the ‘enemy’ groups are seen as soft targets and therefore 
suffer many other forms of violence besides killings or gun-shot wounds. Acts of violence such 
as the killing or raiding of milking stock are symbolic in meaning as milking stock and calves 
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represent a means through which pastoral societies renew their reproductive capacities of 
survival and thus killing of these symbols of renewal not only imply the destruction of household 
and communal fertility but also the destruction of household wealth stored in the reproductive 
capacity of female animals (Blystad 2005:113). 
 
Violence aimed at the destruction of domestic water points, the damage of women investments 
such as joint poultry projects and the creation of an atmosphere of fear that prevents women from 
fetching firewood or burning charcoal in the grazing lands for sale communicates the 
transformation of the pastoralists household as an arena of war and shows the dynamic nature of 
violence and its translocation from the grazing fields to the households. Targeting of women in 
raids points to the role of violence in expanding cultural parameters of behavior among groups, 
the expanding meanings and purposes of violence among pastoralists that target pastoralist’s 
women, further points to the role of primordiality in sustaining identity conflicts among 
pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya. Targeting of women in pastoralists lands can be argued to 
bring forth episodes of structural, political, economic and sexual violence (Broch-Due 2005:28). 
In the case of Baragoi, the body of the woman seems to be entangled in these modalities of 
violence which inevitably reproduce each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 232 
 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
10.0 Introduction 
Pastoralists’ violence in Eastern Africa has been a subject of different methods of analysis. 
While the phenomenon of violence has been diagnosed as a factor of environmental change, 
others have looked at it as a product of advancement in war technology; still some scholars have 
seen violence as a consequence of the ineffective of local and state conflict resolution 
institutions. Pastoralists violence has further been attributed to disputes over land and boundaries 
a well as local political competition. These studies have mostly viewed violence as a negative 
by-product of disorder in society. In this thesis, violence is seen in two key perspectives; (1) 
Violence as catalyst of social processes of change (2) Violence as a resource through which the 
navigation of day to day life is carried out. In looking at violence as an agent of societal change, 
I explored the production of violence and its impact on the socio-political relations among the 
Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi in the long term. Secondly, in analysing violence as a resource, 
I focused on the day to day uses of violence in the interactions between the Samburu and 
Turkana. Violence is seen as a means through which certain individual, collective and communal 
goals can be achieved or preserved through cattle raids, highway banditries, collective violence 
or even in relations with the state. In so doing, this study argues that violence among the 
Samburu and Turkana is not new; it is a historical phenomenon which has adopted various 
meanings and purposes overtime depending on the immediate circumstances of individual and 
group needs. Its long term impacts are however seen in terms of people’s choices and the 
leverage that they have in making their everyday socio-political decisions.  
10.1 Recommendations 
This study sought to comprehend the meanings and purposes of socio-cultural practices that 
constitute pastoralists violence from the anthropological perspective. The analysis of the data 
presented here has drawn on different conceptual perspectives. Understanding violence among 
pastoralists as an evolving phenomenon aimed at meeting new challenges is vital in prescribing 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms that draw on these new situations. Through 
the study of violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi and its situatedness in pre-
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colonial and colonial history, it is vital that violence be analysed not only from its proximate 
causes but a deeper historic comprehension is required for effective intervention programmes. 
Actors in pastoralists’ violence have always been portrayed as ‘outsiders’ or ‘illicit businessmen’ 
the case of Baragoi runs in contrast to this view. Pastoralists are themselves the major actors in 
violence, they use violence as an agency through which they negotiate day today socio-economic 
and political relationships based on their ethnic and groups identities as Turkana and Samburu. 
Therefore understanding pastoralists as key actors in violence and not just as victims is a vital 
step in comprehending the failure of many intervention programmes who have previously 
approached peacebuilding among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya through tokenism and 
other livelihood support strategies such as loaning or replacement of stolen livestock as these 
serve as motivation for new cycles of pastoralists’ violence.  
 
Another key point is the role of power in violence, analysis of pastoralists violence has focused 
on external issues such as climate change, commercialisation and even proliferation of arms 
without giving a critical look at how socialization of pastoralists warriors inculcates warrior 
ethos that entrenches contests for power even at the lower villages’ levels between the two ethnic 
groups (Wasamba 2009). Random shootings in the grazing lands may not be necessarily cases of 
attempted cattle raids but a show of power to the perpetrators community and an avenue to gain 
social leverage among one’s peers for killing the ‘enemy’. Power therefore plays a significant 
role not only when viewed from the political angle but when ‘isolated’ violent incidents occur. 
Incidental power contests between warriors are the sparks that create chains of violence that 
engulfs whole communities in ‘all out wars’. 
The key role of revenge in the reproduction of violent action especially in cases of massacres has 
not been a subject of inquiry by scholars who have worked with pastoralists in Eastern Africa. In 
all cases that I have reviewed, massacres were the result of revenge raids. The Turkana and 
Samburu concept of revenge is based on the need to even for past acts or raids or violence 
against their kin. While revenge can be undertaken by a group of warriors in support of one of 
their own, major incidences of large scale violence as was observed in the case of the Baragoi 
massacre also show the ability of the whoel community to come together and organize revenge. 
Revenge is enmeshed in pastoralists’ cultures and their local politics of power and hegemonic 
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control. As noted by Galaty (2016) revenge denotes the characterization of violence as a process. 
One case of revenge leads to another even if it takes one year. Revenge is therefore a debt that 
must be paid on behalf of those killed in previous attacks or animals lost. Understanding acts of 
revenge is vital in formulating effective peacebuilding programmes. In many cases revenge raids 
leads to massacres and displacement of people. Recovery from revenge raids take longer due to 
its organisation and massive impacts on pastoralists livelihoods in terms of deaths, destruction, 
fear, insecurity that inhibits other aspects of pastoralists livelihoods such as mobility of livestock 
and trade. Effective programmes must therefore be designed to understand the key roles that 
culture and power plays in pursuit of revenge violence. 
The role of the state in pastoralists’ violence through the KPRs exposes the weak policing system 
that has bedeviled Northern Kenya since the colonial period. With more resources coming into 
places like Baragoi, through the devolved system of government, it is vital that police operations 
be upgraded and professionalized for effective and responsible service to the people of Northern 
Kenya as a whole. The unprofessionalism and lack of proper supervisory structure within the 
KPR is partly responsible for sale or misuse of state arms and ammunition by KPRs. National 
and County governments therefore have a responsibility to put in place an effective policing 
system that is responsive to the nomadic needs of the people of Northern Kenya. 
While effects of violence on pastoralists households have been studied and documented in terms 
of migration, nutrition and responsibility changes. Targeting of women by warriors during 
violence has not gained much attention probably due to the assumption that women were 
traditionally protected during raids. This study shows that this is not the case. It further shows 
that violent actions directed towards women have increased to include the targeting of milking 
stock and rape of women from ‘enemy’ groups. While this study sought to understand the 
conceptual justification of these new forms of violence targeted at women it is vital that further 
research be done to establish the psychological and social impacts of these acts on women and 
women led households in pastoralists’ communities for effective programmatic interventions. 
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10.2 Conclusions 
Violence among pastoralists in Baragoi can be seen to be rooted in the historical nature of the 
contest over its social and physical spaces. Even though the meanings and purposes of violence 
have changed overtime, the use of violence to achieve various ends has remained a constant. 
Except for the colonial period, in this thesis I have argued that violence among the Turkana and 
Samburu have been part and parcel of the history of Baragoi. Violence among the pastoralists of 
Baragoi has been used as a message in itself especially in retaliatory cases such as the Lokorkor 
massacre of 1996. At other times, violence has been used to convey messages of strife and 
incompatibility of resource sharing institutions. In such cases, the place and the identity of the 
violence victim have played a significant role in their chances of experiencing violence. 
 
Even though previous studies on pastoralists conflicts have discounted the role of culture and 
focused more on the ‘commercialisation’ debate. This study shows that as much as pastoralists’ 
warfare is getting modernized through the use of automatic weapons, organisation of raids, 
highway banditries and  collective violence, culture plays a critical role in the organisation and 
mobilisation of warriors especially in revenge situations. As was shown in the case of the 
Baragoi massacre, organisation for violence calls for the participation of warrior age-sets and is 
organised within the wider goal of ‘protecting’ the community. Violence could be aimed at 
displacing opponent ethnic groups but its mobilisation is based on group identities such as those 
belonging to certain warrior-age-sets. Culture however has a significant influence on the nature 
of violence, as was shown in chapter three.  Culture designates the areas where violence is 
practiced before it is eventually carried out on perceived enemies. In the case of Baragoi, 
socialization on violent behavior is carried out in the grazing fields and most of the eventual 
violence also occurs in the grazing fields. Culture therefore designates the areas for the practice 
of violence. As is seen this thesis, shepherds or lchekuuti are socialized into violence from an 
early age as they are the ones who do the actual herding of livestock under the supervision of 
warriors. Within these spaces (grazing lands) they are also trained to shoot, thus the socialization 
into violence takes place under the cultural context of mentorship with the goal of providing 
protection to ones livestock and community. Grazing fields are therefore arena for the production 
and reproduction of violence among pastoralists groups. 
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Actors in the practice of violence have changed depending on the purpose of violent action. In 
cases of more traditional raids, warriors are still the key actors whenever there is need to 
replenish stock for survival purposes. However, pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi can be argued 
to have taken a political angle since the mid-1990s. Competition for power marked with the 
growing population of the Turkana threatens the Samburu political hegemony within Samburu 
North constituency and this has led to increased violence in election years as was witnessed in 
August to December 1996 and again in October and November 2012.  The need to push the 
Turkana ‘beyond the Suguta Valley’ that was started in the 1960s by Samburu leaders after 
losing an election to a Turkana candidate to represent Samburu district in the Legislative 
Assembly seems to find relevance every time there is a political contest in the offing in Baragoi.   
Violence as a means of getting or preserving political power can further be seen in the role of the 
new political class at the Samburu County Assembly. As documented in chapter four, local 
politicians are at the fore front in the distribution of arms and ammunition as part of ‘protection’ 
politics. Distribution of arms and ammunition leads to militarisation of communities and 
increases the probability of violence especially when political leaders incite warriors. The 
meanings of violence are changing especially under the new political dispensation as violence is 
increasingly used in pursuit of political power under the guise of ‘protection politics’. Whereas 
the devolved governance system was expected to bring equity in development, it has 
inadvertently brought forth new divisions along ethnic lines between the Samburu and Turkana 
and also clan divisions among the Samburu as groups compete for resources and job 
opportunities within the new political structures. Political leaders have not hesitated to exploit 
their new powers to incite people into violence along ethnic lines as a means of maintaining their 
patron-client relationships and preserving power. 
Progression of pastoralists’ conflicts into episodes of collective violence shows that secondary 
actors play a significant role in undermining inter-communal avenues of peacemaking. As was 
seen in the Baragoi massacre, efforts at recovery of stolen livestock normally kicks in once the 
facts of a raid have been lodged with the authorities. Political leaders play a significant role in 
pursuing ‘paramilitary operations’ especially when it is directed against their opponents. Given 
the political power and influence held by politicians and their control of resources at the 
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constituency and ward levels. This gives them the leverage to mobilise for violence despite the 
best efforts of the police as was seen in the case of the Baragoi massacre. Preventing episodes of 
collective violence is therefore linked with minimizing the efforts of political leaders to influence 
the mobilisation of warriors.  
The role of state in pastoralists’ violence can be seen in its creation of an enabling environment 
for the practice and production of violence. The ungoverned spaces that exist in much of 
Northern Kenya is an indictment of the culpability of the state in protection of its citizens and 
their properties in the pastoralists borderlands. Institutional weakness and lack of supervision of 
the KPRs further compounds the problem of violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya. As 
documented from police reports from Baragoi Police station, cases of misuse of state firearms 
and ammunition by KPRs show that government arms and ammunition play a significant role in 
pastoralists’ violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. The role of KPRs as actors in 
pastoralists’ violence needs to be emphasized here. KPRs in Baragoi by virtue of the legal arms 
and ammunition are the only actors that seem to transcend the ‘legality and illegality pendulum’ 
of violence. The power of a legal firearm from the state gives the KPR the power not only to 
defend themselves and their communities but also the illegal leverage to use the government 
issued gun and ammunition to conduct raids and highway banditries for personal benefit. Cases 
of KPRs loaning their guns to peers and kinsmen show the institutional weaknesses that bedevil 
the very idea of volunteer police and highlight the role of KPRs and the state as key actors in 
violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. 
Targeting of women during raids through violent actions such as rape, killing of milking stock 
and destruction of women-groups initiatives shows the evolution of violent behavior among 
pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya. Acts of violence are increasingly seen as justified as long 
as the victim comes from the ‘enemy’ community. These primordial justifications play a critical 
role in the organisation and mobilisation of collective violence. The use of primordialism as a 
mobilisation tool is critical in understanding cycles of violence and the role of political leaders in 
these massacres. 
In conclusion, the changing meanings and purposes of pastoralists’ violence has in effect been a 
driver for societal change among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi from the pre-colonial 
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times to date. Violence in effect is a means through which groups continually negotiate and 
renegotiate their socio-cultural spaces and re-assert their distinct identities, these actions 
however, reinforce their diversities and produces more violence (Broch-Due 2005:1-2). Violence 
is thus a significant determinant of people’s patterns of behavior in terms of choice of residence 
areas, trading routes, fencing patterns, access to water sources and grazing lands, and even 
marriage partners. Understanding violence among groups therefore requires comprehension of 
the repertoire of cultural practices that inform its projection into socio-economic, environmental 
and political contests of every day realities. As Straight (2009:27) stated, analysis of pastoralists 
violence through the prism of culture and tradition must also take into account how these 
‘cultural’ small wars are continually used to compete for resources and political power at the 
local and national levels. In the case of Baragoi there is a strong linkage between cultural small 
wars and decades of socio-economic and political marginalisation, thus making it inevitable for 
violence and local politics of marginalisation to continually reproduce each other (Straight 
2009:27). Violence has thus become an agency through which societal change is carried out 
among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. 
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Appendix I: Interview Guide-Event Calenders to Women 
History of Cattle Raids 
i. How many cattle raids have you experienced in your life time? Can you name 5 most 
devastating cattle raids you have experienced in your lifetime? Why were these 
devastating? 
ii. When did you experience the last raid? Who were the raiders? How many livestock did 
you lose? 
iii. Is there a difference in the way cattle raids are conducted now and before 1980s? What 
has changed? And why do you think cattle raiding has changed? 
iv. Did elders sanction cattle raids that you participated in? Do elders still have a role of 
blessing raiders before cattle raiders? 
v. Have you lost livestock during cattle raids before? How many livestock have you lost? 
vi. Did you conduct revenge cattle raids to regain your stolen livestock after suffering a raid? 
How many times did you embark on revenge cattle raids? How did you organize these 
raids? Did you need blessing of elders to embark on cattle raids? 
vii. Have you participated in cattle raiding in cattle raids before? How many cattle raids did 
you participate in? How many livestock did you gain from cattle raids? Which cattle raid 
was most memorable for you? 
Consequences of Cattle raids 
i. Have you lost family members due to cattle raids? How many? And when did you lose 
them? 
ii. How many of your family members have been maimed due to violent cattle raids? When 
were they maimed? Were they maimed while taking part in a raid of while defending 
family/clan livestock? 
iii. How many times have you been forced to relocate to new homes/settlements due to 
insecurity occasioned by cattle raids? Have you lost land due to violent cattle raids? How 
many acres/hectares?  Who lives in your land now? 
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iv. Have you ever been forced to depend of relief supplies after being impoverished by 
violent cattle raids? How many times have you had to depend on relief foods? 
v. Has violent commercialised cattle raids prevented you from accessing some cattle 
markets? How many markets have been closed due to insecurity occasioned by violent 
cattle raids? 
vi. Do you own a gun? When did you acquire the gun? Why did you acquire it? Did you buy 
the gun or did you inherit it? How do you use your gun? For defence or aggression?  
vii. Do your relatives borrow your gun to conduct raids on neighbouring communities? How 
often? Do you benefit from the proceeds of raided livestock in this case? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix II: Focus Group Discussion Guide 
i. What is livestock raiding? 
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ii. Does your community practice cattle raiding? Why? 
iii. Are there different types of cattle raiding practiced in your community? 
iv. Has the practice of cattle raiding changed in your community over the last century? 
v. Are the incidences of cattle raiding increased or decreased in your community and why? 
vi. Have you ever participated in cattle raids? What are/were your motivations? 
vii. Does your community derive any benefits from cattle raids? What are these benefits? 
viii. How does cattle raids affect inter-communal relations between your community and your 
neighbours? 
ix. How often does warriors from your community conduct cattle raids against your 
neighbours? 
x. Does cattle raids escalate inter-communal violence between your community and 
neighbouring groups? 
xi. What rules or norms must be obeyed during cattle raids? Who monitors and sanctions the 
rules of cattle raiding? 
xii. Are there compensation mechanisms between your community and their neighbours 
whenever a breach of norms occurs during raids? 
xiii. Are the benefits of cattle raiding distributed to community/clan members or are the 
proceeds for personal gain? 
xiv. Has the proliferation of guns changed the conduct of cattle raiding?  
xv. How have guns impacted on the levels of violence accompanying cattle raids? 
xvi. Is there a link between violent cattle raids and land conflicts in your community? 
xvii. Is there a link between violent cattle raids and local representation politics? 
xviii. How does cattle raids over land tenure/security affect pastoralism as a livelihood system? 
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xix. Are violent cattle raids linked to sedenterisation policies of the government of Kenya? 
How? 
xx. Are there inter-communal peacebuilding mechanism between your community and the 
neighbouring pastoralists groups? 
xxi. Which actors are involved in mediating conflicts to prevent escalation after violent cattle 
raids? 
xxii. How does violent cattle raids impact on security (individual security, community/local, 
national and regional security)?  
xxiii. How can violent commercialised cattle raids be resolved and what modes of cooperation 
exist and how can this cooperation be sustained? (Discuss how the groups deal with 
conflicts, national policies towards resolving the problem, their role in resolving the 
conflict, new mechanisms and how cooperation can be promoted).  
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix III: Participant Observation Guide 
What to observe?  
 
i. Group differentiation within the community, how do elders dress and carry out 
themselves in comparison to elders? 
 
 279 
 
ii. Inter-communal interactions. Do the communities interact? Do they share 
neighborhoods? Pastures? Markets? Schools? Health centers? Administrative officials? 
Are there designated Samburu parts of Baragoi town and Turkana parts of Baragoi town? 
 
iii. Weapons. What kind of weapons do adult male respondents walk around with? Are they 
clubs, sticks, spears, bows and arrows or guns (types)/legal or illegal? 
 
iv. Herds. The size of herds, how big are herds? How are herds managed? Do herders have 
guns? At what age are boys allowed to openly carry guns? How far is the pastureland 
from pastoralists’ settlements? 
 
v. Social organization. How does the community organize itself? Is there a marked 
differentiation between the organization of elders and that of warriors? 
 
vi. Leadership. Are there distinct leaders among the elders? Warriors? What roles do elders 
play? What roles do warriors play? 
 
vii. Settlements. Where do warriors live? Where does the rest of the community/clan live? 
 
viii. Rituals. What kinds of rituals take place in pastoralists’ societies? Who are the 
participants in these rituals? What are the meanings of these rituals? And what are the 
impacts of these rituals on communal and inter-communal relations among pastoralists 
groups? 
ix. Consequences of raids. Are there visible evidence of raids? Are there abandoned 
pasturelands? Displaced households? Burnt houses? Abandoned settlements? Maimed 
family members? Graves for victims of cattle raids? 
 
x. Roles. What roles do warriors play in pastoralists’ societies? What roles do elders play in 
society? What roles do women play in society? 
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xi. Social Relationships that exist in the community (who is related to who, what are the 
types of relationships, how are these relationships built and how are these relationships 
influencing each other in terms of cooperation or conflict)  
 
xii. Atmosphere. What is the prevailing atmosphere in the environment (are there tensions, 
how are people interacting, talking and perceiving each other)  
 
xiii. Features. What are physical features seen in the community (droughts, water scarcity, 
desertification, land degradation, bush building, pasture land, organisation of farming and 
herding activities)  
 
xiv. Cattle markets. Who comes to the market? Warriors? Elders? Women? Are the markets 
homogenous or heterogeneous? Is there armed security in the markets? Who provides 
armed security? Government? Kenya Police Reservists? Warriors? 
 
xv. Relief food distribution centres. Who comes for relief food? General members of 
pastoralists groups? Displaced pastoralists? How far is the relief distribution centres from 
pastoralists settlements? 
 
xvi. Inter-communal peace meetings. When and where are inter-communal peace 
treaties/negotiations conducted? What rituals are performed? Who is present at these 
ceremonies? Are women present? Are warriors present? Are elders present? 
 
xvii. Office of the chief/Police station. Who comes to report incidences of cattle raids to the 
chief/police? How often does this occur? How many police officers are there at the 
station? How far is the police station from the incidence of cattle raids? How equipped 
are the police to tackle livestock raids? How many cars? 
 
xviii. Traiders. Who are traiders?  Are they identifiable? Do they belong to pastoralists groups? 
Are they known to members of pastoralists groups? Who else do they work with? Do 
 281 
 
they command any influence among warriors or within the community? Are they 
respected? Are they feared? 
 
xix. Elites and pastoralists violence in Baragoi, what is their role. How has the new devolved 
system stemmed or abbeted livestock raids between the Turkana and Samburu of 
Baragoi? How do political leaders and other elite relate to warriors from the Sambur and 
Turkana communities?  
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Appendix IV: Chronology of Violent Incidences between the Turkana and Samburu Communities 
Reported At Baragoi Police Station 2008-2015 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                                  
Date Incident 
Action by Government of 
Kenya/Police 
Remarks 
22/1/2008 
It was reported by A. E from Parkati that his 34 camels were 
stolen by raiders suspected to be Samburu and driven towards 
Waso Rongai 
Patrol team pursued the 
same and headed towards 
Waso Rongai 
Stolen stock recovered 
and handed  over to 
owner 
15/4/2008 
It was reported by one Turkana male adult  that on the 15/4/2008 
at around 8.00pm raiders suspected to be Samburus raided his 
manyatta, shot his son namely N. L on his right leg and made 
away with 100 heads of cattle and headed towards Ngoriche hills 
Patrol team comprising 
GSU, regular and 
administration police 
dispatched to the scene 
Case pending under 
investigation 
31/1/2010 
Lena Kira, Lepi Lemaye and Ntonge Andrea all of Samburu do 
report that at about 0900hrs unknown goats belonging to Lemasen 
Ntali of Ndoto location were stolen by people believed to be 
Turkana 
Patrol under Sgt. Mark , 
visited scene footmarks 
headed towards Lomirok 
Matter pending under 
investigation 
24/2/10 
Jackson Lelek a Samburu male adult from Masikita location do 
submit a report that on 20/2/2010 at about 18.00hrs his 15 
donkeys were stolen while graying in a nearby field. Footmarks 
headed towards Lomirok 
Patrol dispatched 
All goats recovered on 
29.2.2010 and handed 
over to owner 
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28/2/2010 
Adrian Lolmi Samburu male adult do submit a report that he lost  
his unknown number of shoats at Baragoi lager at about 4.00pm 
by raiders believed to be Turkana 
Patrol dispatched 
All goats recovered on 
29/2/2010 and handed 
over to the owner 
23/4/2010 
Assistant chief Suiyan-Barsaloi area a Samburu male adult do 
report that on the 23
rd
 April 2010 at about 4.30pm his 132 cattle 
were stolen by people known to him as: 1 Mache Leade, 2. Yama 
Leadu 
Scene visited 
Case pending under 
investigation 
10/1/2011 
At Nachola area, groups of Pokot raiders attacked herds and drove 
away unknown number of goats and killed one boy namely Uma 
Loka aged 18 years vide signal CR1/1/3 
Area patrolled 
Case under 
 
 
pending investigation 
10/1/11 
Suiyan location a group of bandits believed to be Turkana raiders 
attacked Samburu herders and shot the following herders dead: 
Lechuka Lenaiguro aged 70 years and Loiti Lenegwe aged 65 
years. No animals were stolen as the KPRs intervened and 
restored order vide signal CR1/1/1/4 
Areas patrolled 
Case pending under 
investigation 
5/2/2011 
At Elbarta location in Lbaaoibor grazing field a group of raiders 
attempted to raid cattle during day time and were overpowered by 
KPR who killed one raider nothing was stolen 
Area patrolled 
Case pending under 
investigation 
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12/2/11 
Marti location a group of suspected Pokot raiders attacked 
Samburu herders and stole 35 cattle which later were intercepted 
by KPR and returned to owners. At the same time a KPR namely 
Tupa Lepe was killed by bandits. On the 18/2/2011 at 
Lowangenethin in Nachola location, unknown number of Pokot 
attempted to attack Turkana residents to raid 300 cows but were 
overpowered by the KPRs who killed one raider at the scene and 
also one resident was injured slightly by a bullet but nothing was 
stolen. 
Area patrolled 
Case pending under 
investigation 
12/3/11 
Nachola location suspected Pokot raided Turkana herders and 
killed one Naspan Eregae aged 65 years and stole 91 cattle, 53 
camels and 1400 goats/sheep which were later recovered 
Scene visited 
Case pending under 
investigation 
23/4/11 
Lbaaibor grazing field. A group of Turkana raiders attacked 
Smaburu herders and killed  one KPR James Lepar aged 23 years, 
Lteje Leparo aged 12 years and stole 381 cattle 
Scene visited 
Case pending under 
investigation 
9/5/11 
Waso Rongai. A group of Turkana raiders attacked the manyatta 
and stole 541 goats and sheep which were intercepted by the 
combined security forces and overpowered the raiders and 
returned the animals to the owners and one AK 47 Serial No. 
Scene visited 
Case pending under 
investigation 
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09330 with empty magazine was recovered 
20/5/11 
Tuum-Larerok area a group of Turkana attacked Samburu herders 
and drove away 67 cattle, 13 sheep which were later intercepted 
and all returned to owners by a combined security forces. Two 
raiders were shot dead during the incident 
Scene visited 
Case pending under 
investigation 
17/6/11 
At Ngike Ndonyo Nkuroto graying field a group of Turkana 
attempted to raid Samburu livestock but were overpowered by 
KPRs and one was killed 
Area patrolled 
Case pending under 
investigation 
21/6/11 
Kawap village unknown bandits attacked Kawap but noting was 
stolen as the KPRs overpowered them 
Area patrolled 
Case under 
investigation 
20/6/11 
At Parkati area, Pokot raiders attacked the area and stole 2756 
goats/sheep and two people killed: Emu Loda, 20 years of age and 
Loka Lokolo 25 years no recoveries made 
Area patrolled 
Case pending under 
investigation 
2/7/11 
Seren within Ndoto location a group of Turkana raiders attacked 
Seren herders and stole 5 camels that were being escorted by one 
young girl whom they raped and released unhurt no recoveries 
were made 
Area patrolled 
Case pending under 
investigation 
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10/11/12 
Operation mounted by ASTU, GSU, GD and Aps under command 
of an Assitant Commissioner of Police to recover 501 heads of 
cattle stolen from Lesirkan 
Police officers drawn from 
Central, Nyanza, Rift 
Valley, Western provinces 
other than GSU and ASTU 
deployed to intensify 
patrols within Baragoi and 
its environs 
Efforts to recover the 
firearms are ongoing. 
Seven suspects were 
arrested in connection 
with the death of 
police officers and 
arraigned before court 
24/11/12 
20 heads of donkeys stolen from Masikita. Reports made by the 
Assistant Chief  
Scene visited,  no recovery 
or arrest made 
Case pending under 
inquiry 
25/11/12 
Murder report made by one Somali male adult Abdi J. The 
deceased Ali M whose body was found at Ilaut location. Remains 
ferried to Kor in Marsabit for burial 
OCS visited the scene. 
Case file opened and 
several suspects arraigned 
before Nakuru High Court 
Case pending before 
High Court in Nakuru 
30/11/2012 
John Lobu, a Samburu male adult reports the theft of his donkeys 
valued at Kshs.15000-the raiders are believed to be from Turkana 
community 
Scene visited. No arrest 
made or recovery made 
Case pending under 
inquiry 
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20/12/2012 
Somi Lechu a Samburu male adult from Waso Rongai reported 
that raiders believed to be of Turkana origin invaded Waso Rongai 
with the intention to steal livestock but their mission was thwarted 
after exchange of fire with Samburu KPRs 
KPRs resupplied with 
enough ammunition 
Patrols mainly by 
KPRs intensified 
within volatile village 
26/20/2012 
Kia Lona a Samburu male adult reports the theft of his 16 donkeys 
by unknown number of raiders. KPRs followed the footprints 
which led towards Lomerok 
Patrol team led by OCPD 
visited the scene 
No arrest or recovery 
made 
27/12/2012 
Chief Elbarta reports the theft of cows within Ngilai village. Five 
animals were stolen but two were recovered. Complainant is 
Ltumesen Ltangwas 
Patrols intensified No arrests made 
9/1/2013 
Two KPRs Ekale Kotal and Lokwamor report the recovery of 
seven camels within Baragoi. They managed to recover  six of 
them belonging to former MP Peter Lengees 
Camels handed over to 
Joseph L. from Ngilai for 
safe custody waiting 
collection to Loyangalani 
Case closed with no 
other police action 
16/1/2013 
Loka Kalo a Turkana male adult reports that bandits believed to be 
from Samburu community attacked him within slaughter house 
and made away with 200 sheep and goats. Attackers are said to 
have headed towards Bendera 
Scene visited. No arrest or 
recovery made. 
Investigations continue 
Patrols intensified 
within Bendera and 
Ngilai villages 
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14/2/2012 
Boni Lokwa a Turkana male adult from Huruma reports the loss 
of one sheep. He found his fence broken by  thieves 
Scene visited, footmarks 
traced to Nalingangor 
Case pending under 
investigation 
22/2/2013 
Attempted robbery: sub-chief of Bendera reported that raiders 
suspected to be of Turkana origin attacked Bendera village. They 
used G3 and AK47 rifles. 10 cartridges were recovered. No cattle 
stolen no injuries inflicted 
OCS and team patrolled the 
said area. No arrest made 
and area left calm 
Case pending under 
inquiry 
22/2/2013 
Ltosi Lepe a Samburu male adult reports theft of livestock at 
Lesirkan. He claims that four of his cattle were grazing and failed 
to return in the evening. Efforts to follow their footmarks bore no 
fruits 
Investigations commenced. 
Complainant recorded 
statements 
Case pending under 
inquiry 
24/2/2013 
Ako Lesa a KPR and watchman at Samburu Traders Sacco report 
the loss of his goat during the night. He followed the footmarks 
and managed to find where the goat was slaughtered 
Scene visited and action 
taken 
Case pending under 
investigation 
28/2/2013 
South Horr Chief reports the theft of 2200 goats by unknown 
bandits from Loonjorin sub-location within South Horr. He alleges 
that the bandits were from Turkana community and headed 
towards Parkati after the incident 
Patrols intensified 
No recovery or arrest 
made 
1/3/2013 
Assistant Chief Loonjorin reports that raiders suspected to be of 
Turkana origin attacked Loonjorin center and made away with 300 
Patrols intensified No recovery or arrests 
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goats, 50 sheep. The raiders were armed with guns and shot 
several times in the air but no injuries occurred. They fled towards 
Parkati 
made 
16/3/13 
Samburu herdsmen while grazing their cattle near Baragoi Boys 
were attacked by raiders believed to be Turkana origin. Fierce 
exchange of fire ensued. One cow belonging to a Mr. Leti was 
shot, no casualty reported, no cattle stolen 
Scene visited 
Case pending under 
investigation 
23/3/13 
Mr. Loba, a Turkana male adult was grazing his livestock of 200 
sheep within Leilei when he was attacked by three armed 
Samburu morans. They took away his sheep and followed a laga 
towards DC’s office 
Scene visited 
Case pending under 
investigation 
25/3/13 
Highway bandits attacked ACTED
131
 employees at Mbukoi area. 
They stole laptops, mobile phones, cash and other personal items 
of unknown value. They were on official duties travelling towards 
Maralal aboard a motor vehicle registration number KBS 012N 
Toyota. 
Scene visited by police 
officers from Marti assisted 
by KPRs. Two laptops 
recovered and as well as 
assorted clothing. No 
arrests made 
Case pending under 
investigation 
                                                          
131
 A French humanitarian NGO working supporting emergency relief and other alterbative livelihood programmes among pastoralists in Northern Kenya 
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1/4/13 
Unknown number of raiders attacked Loketei village and stole 12 
camel calves. Footmarks followed and headed towards Bendera 
village 
Patrols intensified with a 
view to collect intelligence 
Reliable information 
indicates that the 
animals were driven 
towards Masikita 
2/4/13 
Leako Ltaba reported that his children were looking after 14 
calves within Bendera village when armed raiders attacked them 
and took away the animals. No injuries reported 
Scene visited No recovery made 
18/4/13 
Ngima Lemar 32 years old reported that a young herds boy 
looking after his father’s 202 goats at Ndiku grazing field in 
Masikita’s Simiti village when three armed rustlers believed to be 
Turkanas ambushed the youngster and took away all the animals. 
The raiders murdered the young man by cutting his neck with a 
sword. Local KPRs responded and fierce exchange of fire ensued. 
100 animals were recovered 
A combined patrol of Aps, 
regular police and RDU 
visited the scene 
Case file opened 
18/4/13 
Police received information through telephone that a body of 
unknown adult male was lying dead within Soito area. 
Scene visited, body 
recovered and ferried to 
Maralal District Hospital 
for identification and post 
mortem 
No report made so far 
to police over missing 
person 
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19/4/13 
Steven Lekupe, a resident of Munanda village reports that at 
unknown time, unknown people believed to be of Turkana origin 
invaded his compound and stole a he-goat. He had earlier 
relocated his livestock from Lesirkan area. Footmarks were 
tracked and led the police towards Leilei 
Scene visited and necessary 
action taken 
Case pending under 
investigation 
21/4/13 
Shooting incident report by one Lpari Lonng a KPR at Waso 
Rongai on the 20
th
 April 2013 at unknown time. Unknown number 
of raiders invaded Waso Rongai in a bid to steal stock. Their 
mission was thwarted by local KPRs who engaged them in a fierce 
exchange of fire. They spent 103 rounds of ammunition. No 
injuries reported. The raiders did not steal anything 
 Unconfirmed report 
10/4/13 
Armed robbers attacked KWFT personnel travelling to Maralal 
aboard motor vehicle registration number KAW 837Y belonging 
to the said company a few kilometres from Barsaloi market and 
stole mobile phones, documents and cash, Kshs. 47000. No arrest 
or recovery made 
Scene visited. Victims 
escorted to Maralal 
Case pending under 
investigation 
9/2/5/13 It was reported by a Turkana male adult by the name Niku Loko 
that on 1
st
 May 2013 at about 2200hrs four raiders made away 
Scene visited by police but 
no arrests made 
Case pending under 
investigation 
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with four donkeys but abandoned them after hot pursuit by KPRs 
23/6/2013 
It was reported by one Turkana male adult namely Echag Locho a 
resident of Loketei village that raiders suspected to be Samburu 
raided the village and stole 3 donkeys which headed towards 
Mnanda 
Patrols intensified No recoveries 
25/6/2013 
It was reported by one Eri Losi that on the 23
rd
 June 2013 raiders 
suspected to be Samburu herdsmen raided a manyatta and stole 23 
donkeys and the same headed towards Ngilai village 
Patrols intensified No recoveries 
2/7/2013 
It was reported by one the Assistant Chief Logetei sub-location 
that on 2/7/2013 at about 0200 hours unknown people took away 
his six donkeys and the footmarks headed towards Mnanda 
Patrol intensified No recoveries 
4/7/2013 
It was reported by one Nathi a Turkana female adult from 
Nalingangor village that on the 4
th
 July 2013 at about 1620hrs her 
sheep were grazing at Natiti area whereby a group of Samburu 
morans attacked the herders and made away with 152 goats/sheep 
Scene visited No recoveries 
08/07/2013 
On the July 7
th
 2013 at about 1730hrs three raiders believed to be 
of Turkana origin were spotted by Samburu KPRs/herdsmen 
whereby an exchange of fire ensued and one of the raiders was 
shot dead. The body was later identified by relatives and local of 
Scene visited and necessary 
action taken 
Case under 
investigation 
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Leilei village to be one of a Turkana male adult aged 29 years who 
was allegedly mentally retarded and had been missing from 17
th
 
June 2013 
12/7/13 
It was reported by the Assistant Chief Lkayo sub-location that he 
received a phone call from Sarima village that about 70 armed 
raiders attacked Sarima manyatta and stole 11 camels after a fierce 
exchange of fire. During the incident one Turkana male adult  was 
shot dead 
Scene visited No recoveries 
7/2013 
It was reported by one assistant chief of Waso Rongai village that 
he received a call informing him that raiders suspected to be of 
Turkana origin made away with 40 goats and footmarks headed 
towards Natiti village 
Scene visited No recoveries made 
21/7/2013 
It was reported by one Joseph N. a Turkana male adult from 
Loketei village that on 21
st
 July 2013 at about 0300hrs, unknown 
people took away two camels from his home and the footmarks 
headed towards Natiti area. However the camels were later 
recovered at Bendera sub location but no arrests were made. They 
were handed over to the owner 
Scene visited 
Animals handed over 
to owner 
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24/8/13 
On the 24
th
 August 2013, it was reported by one Ekwa Losa that 
while he was grazing goats/sheep at Polytechnic grazing fields 
two raiders one armed with AK47 rifle and believed to be  of 
Samburu origin attacked him and made away with about 200 
goats/sheep. 
28 sheep/goats have been 
recovered. 
 
Case pending under 
investigation 
28/7/2013 
It was reported by GSU officers from Nachola GSU camp that on 
the 28
th
 July at about 1730hrs, raiders believed to be of Pokot 
origin attacked three herds boys at Naturkan are of Nachola 
location and opened fire and shot one boy namely Thita Lume 
injuring slightly on the back. They took away 100 goats/sheep 
Patrols intensified No recoveries 
8/8/2013 
It was reported by Peter Lekei a Samburu male adult from 
Bendera location that his three cows were grazing near Baragoi 
Boys Secondary School when unknown people drove them away 
towards Nalingangor village. However the area chief was 
informed accordingly and with the assistance of the local KPRs 
the three cows were recovered at Nachola area and handed over to 
the owner. 
Patrols intensified 
Animals handed over 
to owner 
4/9/2013 Loko Losi reported that four Turkana raiders attacked his son who 
was grazing their animals and went away with 20 camels of 
Scene visited but no 
recoveries made 
Case pending under 
investigations 
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unknown value 
18/9/2013 
A number of Turkana tribesmen attacked Samburu herdsmen at 
Soito area and made away with 49 herds of cattle 
A security team was 
dispatched and recovered 
all the stolen stock 
No arrests made 
23/9/13 
Lemo Loat of Tuum and reports that on the 20
th
 September 2013 
at about 6,30pm their 15 calves were stolen from the grazing field 
by people believed to be Turkana 
Scene visited and 
footmarks headed towards 
Lomerok area 
No arrests made 
26/9/13 
On the 26
th
 September 2013, Nichol Lepe and Sanya Lenimaga 
were shot and injured by people suspected to be of Turkana origin 
at Ngorishe area while riding a motorcycle 
Scene visited and area 
combed but no arrests 
made 
Case pending under 
investigation 
28/9/2013 
It was reported by assistant chief of Baragoi township that armed 
Samburu raiders attacked herders at Nalingangor area and made 
away with unknown number of goats and sheep and shot dead one 
David L aged 18 years and a standard eight pupil at Nalingangor 
Primary School 
Scene visited and body 
removed to Baragoi 
mortuary. Footmarks 
headed towards Bendera 
location 
Case pending under 
investigation 
18/10/2013 
One Lelki Lesna reports to his area chief that unknown people 
stole four of his goats and escaped to unknown destination. The 
incident happened at Waso Rongai village 
Scene visited and police 
took all the necessary 
action. The complainant 
did not volunteer to record 
Case pending under 
investigation 
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any statement 
18/10/13 
It was reported by the Assistant Chief Baragoi township location 
that he received a phone call that unknown number of raiders 
attacked Waso Rongai village and made away with unknown 
number of livestock 
A patrol team was 
dispatched to the scene and 
it was established that 
raiders believed to be of 
Turkana origin raided at 
most eight manyattas and 
made away with 280 cows 
and 440 goats. 
Two KPRs were shot dead 
and their rifles G3 
S/No.299859 and G3 S/No 
97-96917 were lost 
An inquest file has 
been opened 
19/10/13 
One Samburu male adult namely Njeku Leima reported that while 
grazing within Baragoi boys areas, he was accosted by Turkana 
bandits who stole from him 64 goats and drove the animals 
towards Lomirok 
A quick action by the 
security personnel thwarted 
any efforts by raiders as the 
animals were recovered 
and handed over to the 
owner 
No arrests made 
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20/10/2013 
Emu Loasa a Turkana herdsman from Leilei village reported that 
raiders believed to be Samburu invaded his manyatta and took 
away 80 goats 
Scene visited and 
footmarks headed towards 
Bendera-Ngilai area 
Case pending under 
investigation 
20/10/13 
It was reported by Chief Kawap location that raiders believed to 
be of Samburu origin invaded Kawop location and caused a 
massive destruction of school dispensary and the manyattas and 
the total value of the destruction is estimated to be 550,000 
Kenyan shillings which include learning materials, solar panel and 
solar battery. 
Scene was visited and 
necessary action taken. 
Exhibits were recovered 
from the scene 
Case pending under 
investigation 
20/10/2013 
The chairlady of Naletae women group a Turkana female adult 
Ms. Chitine Koe reported that they had fled their manyattas amid 
fears in the area. During their absence people believed to be 
Samburu morans invaded their homes and took away 78 chicken 
which was part of the wealth of the women group 
Scene visited by police and 
the  necessary action taken 
Investigation 
continues 
25/11/13 
Assistant Chief Baragoi township reported that at unknown time 
raiders believed to be of Turkana origin raided Suiyan location 
and made away with unknown number of camels 
Scene visited by police and 
the footmarks followed 
towards Lomirok area 
Investigation 
continues 
27/10/13 chief of Parkati location reported that on 25
th
 November 2013 
raiders believed to be of Samburu origin attacked the said village 
Patrols intensified 
Investigation 
continues 
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but no stock was stolen and no injuries reported 
28/10/13 
Loki Lonyei reported that at about 1000hrs his goats were being 
grazed at Baragoi Secondary and were stolen by three armed 
Samburu morans and the herdsman went missing 
A patrol was dispatched to 
the scene to pursue the 
raiders. The missing person 
was found dead at the 
scene 
Case pending before 
court. No recoveries 
2/11/13 
 the Assistant Chief Nalingangor  sub-location within Baragoi 
reported that he received a message that unknown raiders attacked 
Morilim village Nachola location and made away with unknown 
number of animals 
A patrol team was 
dispatched to the scene and 
it was established that three 
manyattas at Nakuprat 
village were attacked by 
about 100 Pokot and made 
away with almost 500 
cattle 
No recovery made 
4/11/2013 
 Kultirenti Lesita reported that on the 2
nd
 November 2013 raiders 
believed to be of Turkana origin raided Masikita village and made 
away with 50 donkeys 
A patrol team was 
dispatched to area and 
patrols intensified 
No recoveries made 
5/11/2013 A high profile security meeting held at Lakira Guest house within 
Baragoi drawing elders from Turkana and Samburu communities 
The launching of operation 
to mop up illegal arms 
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and attended by the local DC, SOOPS GSU, OCPD , D/ACP, SP, 
Senior Police and KDF officers, members of the public and peace 
committee members. The meeting touched on issues of conflict 
resolution and peaceful co-existence and reforming local police 
reservists, mopping up of illegal firearms. Both communities 
failed to reach amicable solution which forced the Deputy County 
Commissioner to allow Operations Commander to give 
ultimatums leading to the launching of operation okota silaha 
haramu. The meeting ended peacefully later on 
dubbed ‘operation okota 
silaha
132’ 
13/11/2013 
Ekar Kue (4) and Mako Abraham reported that they were attacked 
by a group of raiders believed to be of Samburu origin who stole 
20 goats from their manyatta. They recovered one bullet cartridge 
of AK47 rifle within the compound. The raiders drove away the 
animals towards Baragoi Secondary School 
Scene visited and necessary 
action taken. No recovery 
or arrest made. 
Investigation continues 
Patrol intensified 
within Bendera and 
Ngilai villages 
13/11/13 
Nailu Leparn (37) a Samburu male adult reported the theft of his 
two heads of cattle valued at Kshs. 60,0000 
Police officers visited the 
scene and took necessary 
action, however no arrests 
nor recovery made 
Case pending under 
investigation 
                                                          
132
 Operation to mop up illegal firearms 
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15/11/13 
Lesle Rian and Lebara Lmana both reported that their 7 cattle 
were stolen by unknown cattle rustlers. The hoofmarks headed 
towards Lomirok area 
Scene visited and no arrests 
nor recovery made 
Case pending under 
investigation. 
27/11/13 
Highway Banditry: Sete Nyagah a Kikuyu male adult, Lowan 
Loiko and Francis Nawer both Turkana male adults reported that 
while driving from Ngurunit in a motor vehicle registration 
number KVG 518, they were stopped by a group of Samburu 
morans 9 in number who were armed with assorted rifles who 
stole 5 litres of oil from the vehicle and also damaged the drivers 
safety belt using their swords. They shot at the motor vehicle on 
the left side forcing the driver to stop. They further robbed them of 
mobile phones and other property of unknown value 
Scene visited and no 
recovery or arrest made 
Investigations 
commenced on the 
incident as joint 
patrols intensified 
within the border 
trading center 
29/11/2013 
Muia Lenau a Kenya Police Reservist from Tuum location 
reported that while driving a motor vehicle registration number 
KAJ 397C Land rover he was accosted by three armed bandits 
who fired at his vehicle but he defied their orders and sped away. 
Nobody was injured and the vehicle was not damaged 
Police visited the scene and 
intensified patrols within 
Tuum and environs 
Case pending under 
investigations 
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17/12/13 
Senior Chief Baragoi Location, reports to the police that on the 
previous day at about 11pm people suspected to be of Turkana 
origin attacked Bendera village and shot one moran namely 
Satuna Lepareiya on the chest. The victim was rushed to Baragoi 
sub-district hospital where he died while undergoing treatment 
More patrols intensified 
within the affected area 
despite escalating tension 
No arrests made. 
Police at the scene of 
crime recovered three 
rounds of 7.62mm 
special ammunition. 
Case pending under 
inquiry 
18/12/13 
At about 7.30pm at Natiti village within Kawap location one 
Turkana male adult namely Lokot Loike was inside his manyatta 
when he heard five gunshots towards his hut. Luckily neither he 
nor his family was injured. The suspects did not steal anything 
Scene visited and five spent 
cartridges of AK47 
recovered 
No arrests made. Case 
pending under inquiry 
19/12/13 
It was reported by one Alfred Wame a Kikuyu male adult that 
while in Kawap trading center loading a water tank to his lorry 
with the help of four other persons a sudden shoot out ensued 
from suspected thugs almost five in number. During the incident 
nobody was injured but the thugs robbed the reportee of property 
of unknown value 
Area patrolled and 
photographs taken 
Case taken over by 
DCIO 
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1/12/13 
Shooting incident report was made by Petro Loe and Kelvin Lesei 
both from Bendera village that they were attacked by two Turkana 
morans who were armed with AK47 rifles who shot them but 
luckily missed. Their mission was to steal the stock but were 
unsuccessful 
Scene visited and action 
taken. No arrest made 
Case pending under 
investigation 
4/12/13 
Joseph Lempa a Samburu male adult reported the theft of 33 goats 
at unknown time. They are valued at Kshs. 33,000 
A joint patrol comprising 
of KPRs, Aps and regular 
police dispatched within 
the area 
3 goats recovered 
within the thickets 
after intensified patrol, 
Investigation in 
progress 
11/12/13 
Lemoe Leono and one KPR Mr. Leson Leno reported that one 
cow and its calf went missing 
Scene visited by a patrol 
team within Leilei village 
The area assistant 
chief have been 
informed for further 
follow up 
12/12/13 
Lkitar Lekit a Samburu peasant from Bendera village reports that 
at around 0200 hours, raiders believed to be of Turkana origin 
raided his manyatta and stole 20 goats 
Patrols intensified within 
the affected area 
Case pending under 
inquiry 
27/12/13 It was reported by Chief Inspector of the GSU camp at about 
0800hrs that one KPR made a report at their camp that about 4 
The patrol team comprising 
of operation personnel 
Joint patrols 
intensified 
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raiders believed to be of Turkana origin were spotted by a team of 
local KPRs 
from Tuum operation camp 
were dispatched into the 
area. Area patrolled and 
left calm 
31/12/13 
Attempted robbery with violence report. It was reported by one 
Samuel a Kikuyu male adult that two robbers who were armed 
with AK47 rifles entered into his house and shot two bullets but 
nobody was injured. The thugs hurriedly escaped without stealing 
anything 
Scene visited. No arrests 
made 
Case pending under 
inquiry 
14/01/14 
Robbery with violence report. It was reported by one Lillian of 
South Horr through phone that on 13
th
 January 2014 at about 
2100hrs she was attacked by robbers armed with assorted rifles. 
They robbed her of cash Kshs. 54,000 and other shop goods 
Scene visited and necessary 
action taken. Patrols 
intensified 
Investigations in 
progress 
10/2/14 
It was reported by a group of Turkana men that on 9
th
 February 
2014 at around 16.30hrs raiders believed to be of Samburu origin 
raided their manyatta and made away with seven camels 
Police visited the scene and 
took necessary action. 
More patrols intensified in 
the area 
A pending 
investigation file 
opened to this effect 
17/2/14 It was reported by one Steph Lekapi of Lesirkan that on 16/2/2014 
at around 1500hrs while grazing in the field, 20 calves went 
A combined patrol team of 
Aps, GSU, Regular police, 
Recovery made 
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missing ASTU and local KPRs 
traced footmarks which led 
them towards Kawap 
direction 
23/2/14 
It was reported by Mrs. Rael Letoi accompanied by Josep Eboi 
and other members of the public that unknown person shot one 
Francis E. aged 25 years who died instantly 
The body was released to 
the family for burial 
arrangements. Scene was 
visited and necessary  
action taken 
Inquest file opened 
and investigations 
commenced 
24/3/14 
It was reported by one John Luk that he was attacked by robbers 
who were armed with M16 and AK47 rifles. They shot several 
bullets at his motor vehicle until the driver stopped.  The robbers 
were six in number, they robbed him of KES 124,000 
 
Investigation 
underway 
4/4/14 
It was reported by one KPR that on the 26
th
 March 2014 at 
1505hrs raiders believed to be from Turkana community attacked 
four Samburu herdsmen. The raiders were 15 in number and drove 
the cows towards Parkati area 
A patrol team left to Tuum 
operation camp and 
pursued the raiders but no 
recoveries or arrests made 
Patrols intensified in 
the area. 
 305 
 
4/4/14 
Patrol back/Prisoners in/Firearms recovered: a patrol team which 
left new site operation camp at 0900hrs reports back to the station 
with the following information. The patrol teams were drawn from 
KDF, ASTU, GSU, AP and Regular Police. They spotted several 
armed bandits travelling towards Bendera village from Lomirok 
village. The officers confronted the bandits to surrender after 
which some of them started to run away. The officers chased them 
and managed to arrest three suspects namely Ekut Apoo aged 21 
years, Ekri Elka 19 years and Ibas Eso 16 years. The officers 
recovered 7 rifles and ammunition 
 
Investigation 
continues 
7/4/14 
Further stoke theft vide OB11/27/4/14. It was reported that three 
Samburu male adults namely Githinji lost 82 cows, Ntele lost 40 
cows and Mathenge lost 40 cows in a Turkana raid of Samburu 
herders at Tuum airstrip 
A patrol team dispatched to 
the area but no recovery 
made 
Case pending under 
inquiry 
7/4/14 
It was reported by Loi Loo and Lokwa Lokon both residents of 
Natiti village that one 7
th
 April 2014 at around 1600rs raiders 
believed to be of Samburu origin attacked one herds boy namely 
Lobenyei and made away with unknown number of goats and 
sheep 
A patrol team comprising 
of GSU, AP and regular 
police dispatched to the 
area and all animals were 
recovered 
The team recovered 59 
goats 
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9/4/14 
It was reported by one the assistant chief of Lonyangaten sub-
location and the chairman of Kawap primary School that they 
received intelligence report that some items were being stolen 
from Kawap dispensary and Kawap Administration Police Camp 
The County Commander 
Samburu County Mr. 
Wambani SSP, AP, SSP 
accompanied by DCIO 
Samburu Central, SP, 
DAPC Samburu North 
visited the scene to 
investigate the report 
Case pending under 
investigation 
19/4/14 
Further report made to OB11/27/3/2014. It was reported by one 
Loi Lenom who hails from Tuum village that he too lost 16 cows 
to the raiders who stole Samburu cattle on the 24
th
 March 2013 at 
1500hrs. the footmarks headed towards Suguta valley 
Area visited and no 
recovery made 
Case pending under 
inquiry 
27/5/14 
Senior security officers led by the County Commissioner, County 
Commander and County Intelligence Officer, Samburu County all 
arrive in Baragoi for a security meeting within Tuum location 
The meeting resolved to 
send a team to approach 
their Turkana County 
security team to help solve 
the Tuum crisis which 
arose through a raid by 
Turkana who moved the 
livestock to Turkana 
Local chief of Parkati 
sent under escort to 
Lokori in Turkana 
County to initiate 
dialogue aimed at 
recovery of cattle with 
elders and local 
administration. 
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county 
4/6/14 
A team of Police officers who escorted the chief of Parkati 
location to Lokori area of Turkana county returned to Baragoi 
after conducting dialogue with the authorities in Lokori 
conclusively, the issue was left with the security team in Lokori. 
However it was believed that the stolen cattle from Tuum are 
hidden within Lokori area 
 
Case pending under 
inquiry 
7/6/14 
Loio Koi a Turkana male adult reported that while looking after 
his 60 shoats he was accosted by seven Samburu morans who 
drove away the whole of his herd 
A patrol team comprising 
of Aps, Regular Police, and 
local KPRs were mobilized 
to comb the area 
All animals were 
recovered and handed 
over to the owner 
16/6/14 
AP Sergeant of South Horr Post reported that two raiders 
suspected to be of Turkana origin raided the area with intention of 
stealing livestock and in the process shot one herdsman Siligwa 
aged 19 years 
The KPRs from the said 
location engaged the 
raiders and they escaped 
without stealing anything 
No arrests made 
18/6/14 
Leleruk reported that she received a report from her herder that 
her stock got lost. The animals were 20 in number 
A patrol team dispatched to 
the said location but no 
recovery or arrest made 
Case pending under 
inquiry 
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19/7/14 
Rojo Loteg reported that his 40 goats were stolen by raiders 
believed to be of Samburu origin while grazing within Kenya 
Power area who were armed with G3 rifles and threatened to shoot 
him 
Police officers visited the 
scene and recovery made 
but no arrest 
All animals recovered 
and handed over to 
owner 
31/7/14 
Kapi Leiro reported that his seven goats went astray while grazing 
along the Laga 
He was advised to trace the 
footmarks with the help of 
KPRs and report back to 
police 
 
7/9/14 
KPRs reported that on Friday the 5
th
 September 2014 during 
evening hours 15 donkeys went astray and they tried to trace the 
footmarks which disappeared within Baragoi Boys Secondary 
School 
 
7 donkeys recovered 
and handed over to 
owner 
9/9/14 
Chief Parkati reported that cattle rustlers believed to be from 
Pokot community raided Lkayo sub-location and stole unknown 
number of animals 
Patrol dispatched to the 
area 
Pending under 
investigation 
18/9/14 
Mobile report: a report received from members of the public 
indicates that there was a shooting incident between herders and 
raiders from the Samburu and Turkana communities and two 
herders were allegedly severely wounded 
The police visited the scene  
and the injured were taken 
to Baragoi sub-district 
hospital for treatment 
Case pending under 
investigation. 
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18/11/14 It was reported from AP camp Morijo that a group of about 50 
raiders believed to be from Pokot community raided Mbukoi area 
and managed to take away 300 herds of cattle from the Samburu. 
They engaged in a fire fight with Samburu KPRs where most of 
the cattle were recovered and 30 of cattle went missing. Two 
Samburu morans were injured and tow Pokot raiders shot dead. 
Scene visited by police and 
patrols intensified 
afterwards in view to stop 
such occurrences 
No arrests made and 
case under 
investigation 
22/11/14 It was reported by Assistant Chief of Nalingangor sub location that 
at Lowararik grazing field the Turkana and Samburu were grazing 
about 100m apart before a gun fight ensued and a male Turkana 
adult was shot dead. No livestock stolen 
Scene visited by patrol 
team 
Case pending under 
investigation 
4/12/14 It was reported by one Samburu herdsman and a KPR that on the 
night of 2
nd
 December 2014 at about 2300hrs unknown people 
broke into his house and stole 7 goats 
Scene visited and patrol 
team dispatched to follow 
the footmarks of the 
animals. No recoveries 
made. 
Case pending under 
investigations 
5/12/14 It was reported by Assistant Chief of Bendera sub location that a 
Samburu male adult aged 30 years was shot while riding a motor 
cycle carrying one 36 years old male adult. They sustained 
gunshot wounds on their thighs, buttocks and legs but nothing was 
stolen from them. They were admitted at Baragoi District Hospital 
Area visited and the police 
patrol team combed the 
area. No arrests made. 
Case pending under 
investigations 
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and later transferred to Maralal 
15/12/14 It was reported by Assistant Chief Loonjorin sub location that in 
Ijuuk village of Tuum location, three armed raiders from the 
Turkana community attacked a KPR and took away his G3 rifle. 
The KPR sustained injuries  
Patrol team comprising of 
police officers and KPRs 
dispatched immediately. 
No arrest made but rifle 
found abandoned within 
Loonjorin area 
Case under 
investigation 
24/12/14 It was reported by a Samburu male adult from Oldoinyo Narok in 
Suiyan location that unknown people believed to be Turkana 
raided his home and stole 50 goats and 4 donkeys 
KPRs engaged the raiders 
in a gun fight and 
overpowered them. Scene 
visited 
Recovery of the 50 
goats made and 4 
donkeys went missing. 
Case under 
investigation. 
29/12/14 It was reported by a Samburu of 60 years from Bendera village 
that raiders believed to be from Turkana community raided 
Ngoriche grazing field and made away with 60 goats 
Contingent of police 
officers followed the 
footmarks which headed to 
Suguta valley 
No recovery made. 
Case under 
investigation 
1/1/15 It was reported by Assistant Chief Ngilai sub location that 
Samburu and Turkana herdsmen met at Loworariak grazing field 
and a fierce fire exchange ensued. Two herdsmen from Turkana 
Patrol team comprising of 
officers from Baragoi and 
Kambi ya Nyoka Operation 
No arrest made. Case 
under investigation. 
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community were shot dead while two Samburu morans were 
seriously injured. 
Camp dispatched to the 
area. No livestock stolen 
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Appendix V: Ammunition and Firearms Issued to KPRs in Baragoi from 2007-2014 
Date Firear
m 
Issued 
Serial No. Ammunition 
Issued  
Chief/ 
KPR 
Administrative 
Area 
Ethnic 
Group 
Reason for issuing 
firearm 
 
21.01.2007 G3  97-96370 4 rounds KPR Waso Rongai Samburu Issued to new KPR 
25.11.2007 MKIV 402182 10 rounds of 
.303mm 
ammunition 
KPR Tuum  Samburu Issued to new KPR 
26.07.2008 G3 F96563 40 rounds KPR - Samburu Issued to new KPR 
16.04.2009 MKIV PF 
106055 
2 rounds of 
.303 
ammunition 
KPR 
Assistant 
Chief 
Nachola Turkana Issued to new KPR 
20.04.2009 AK47 79431 15 rounds KPR 
Chief 
Losurkoi Turkana Issue to new KPR 
16.06.2009 - - 100 rounds of 
7.62mm 
Chief Waso Rongai Samburu  Distribution to KPRs in 
Waso Rongai location 
17.06.2009 - - 100 rounds of 
7.62mm 
Chief South Horr Samburu Distribution to KPRs in 
South Horr location 
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01.07.2009 - - 100 rounds of 
7.62mm 
Chief South Horr Samburu Distribution to KPRs in 
South Horr location 
30.07.2009 MKIV 630038 One magazine 
and 5 rounds 
of ammunition 
KPR Bendera Samburu Issued to new KPR 
24.02.2010 AK47 794438  11 rounds of 
7.62mm 
special 
KPR Nachola Turkana Issue to new KPR 
09.08.2011 G3 97-96370 4 rounds KPR - Samburu Rifle handed back to 
KPR after case against 
him finalised 
3.11.2011 G3 96-082362 - KPR Suiyan Samburu Stolen in 2007 and 
recovered on 21.10.2010 
24.10.2011 - - 100 rounds of 
7.62*39mm 
KPR South Horr Samburu Distribution to KPRs 
01.11.2011 G3 97-96210 19 rounds of 
7.62*51mm 
KPR Tuum 
 
Samburu Issued to new KPR 
24.01.2012 MKIV 1185A - KPR Nachola Turkana Issued to new KPR 
09.03.2012 MKIV D39061 10 rounds of 
.303 
- Ndoto Samburu Issued to new KPR 
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ammunition 
02.07.2012 MKIV L-8440 - KPR El Barta Samburu Issued to newly 
appointed KPR 
02.07.2012 MKIV W-12629  KPR El Barta Samburu Issued to newly 
appointed KPR 
25.11.2012 G3 A3653092
6 
80 rounds Senior 
Chief 
Baragoi 
Location 
Baragoi  Samburu Firearm returned to 
chief-KPR after having 
been withdrawn during 
the disarmament 
exercise 
30.11..2012 MKIV 6904685B 4 rounds KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
30.11.2012 MKIV E27063A 6 rounds KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
30.11.2012 MKIV 4539341 7 rounds KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
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30.11.2012 G3 A3 
9796067 
12 rounds KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
30.11.2012 G3 A3 
9796657 
11 rounds KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
30.11.2012 G3 A3 97-
96300 
19 rounds KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
30.11.2012 G3 FMP 93-
006688 
15 rounds KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
01.12.2012 MKIV 162234 - KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
01.12.2012 MKIV 167464 - KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
 
01.12.2012 MKIV B 18238 5 rounds of 
.303 
ammunition 
KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
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01.12.2012 MKIV 26064 5 rounds of 
.303 
ammunition 
KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
01.12.2012 MKIV 972475 5 rounds of 
.303 
ammunition 
KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
 
 
01.12.2012 MKIV - 8 rounds of 
.303 
ammunition 
KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
 
01.12.2012 MKIV PF 
402036 
5 rounds of 
.303 
ammunition 
KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
 
01.12.2012 MKIV 2218 12 rounds of 
.303 
ammunition 
KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
 
01.12.2012 MKIV PF 
205370 
7 rounds of 
.303 
ammunition 
KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
 
01.12.2012 MKIV 220358 5 rounds of 
.303 
ammunition 
KPR El Barta Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
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07.12.2012 G3 22553346 20 rounds KPR - Samburu - 
10.12.2012 G3 A3 
36530926 
80 rounds Chief Baragoi  Samburu Returned to KPR after 
having been withdrawn 
during disarmament 
 
26.12.2012 MKIV 37852 3 rounds of 
.303 
ammunition 
KPR El Barta Samburu - 
26.12.2012 MKIV K2506 2 rounds of 
.303 
ammunition 
KPR El Barta Samburu - 
 
26.12.2012 - - 2400 of 
7.62mm and 
960 of 7.65mm 
KPRs Masikita Samburu Re-issue of ammunition 
to KPRs 
26.12.2012 - - 200 of 7.62mm 
and 100 of 
7.62mm 
special 
KPRs Waso Rongai Samburu Re-issue of ammunition 
to KPRs 
27.12.2012 - - 100 rounds of 
7.62*51mm 
Chief El Barta  Samburu Distribution to KPRs in 
El Barta Location 
29.12.2012 - - 320 rounds KPR  
Chief  
Latakweny  Samburu Distribution to 16 KPRs 
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29.12.2012 - - 330 rounds KPR  
Chief 
Ndoto  Samburu Distribution to 33 KPRs 
14.01.2013 - - 200 rounds of 
7.62*51mm 
KPR Lesirkan  Samburu Distribution to 20 KPRs 
15.01.2013 MKIV
.303 
FB24304
A 
- KPR Bendera sub 
location 
Samburu Returned to Baragoi 
Police Station after the 
killing of Bendera KPR 
Ltaano Lekuye 
15.01.2013 - 
 
- 50 rounds KPR  South Horr Samburu Distribution to South 
Horr KPRs 
02.02.2013 G3 95-057778 - KPR  El Barta Samburu Assigned to new KPR 
12.02.2013 - - 150 rounds of 
7.62mm*39 
200 rounds of 
7.62mm*57 
KPR Masikita, Marti, 
Latakweny and 
Ngilai 
Samburu Distribution to KPRs in 
four locations 
12.02.2013 G3 278959 10 rounds KPR Waso Rongai Samburu Newly Assigned KPR 
12.03.2013 - - 100 rounds of 
7.62mm *51 
Assistant 
Chief 
Masikita Samburu For resupply to KPRs 
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12.03.2013 - - 100 rounds of 
7.62mm *51 
KPR 
Chief 
Tuum Samburu Re-issue of ammunition 
to KPRs after expending 
ammunition during an 
attack on 10
th
 March 
2013 
14.03.2013 MKIV 848893 4 rounds KPR Bendera Samburu Newly Assigned KPR 
19.03.2013 - - 320 rounds 
7.62mm*51  
160 rounds 
7.62mm*51 
Assistant 
Chief 
KPR 
Baragoi Samburu For distribution to KPRs 
of Tuum and Masikita 
 
27.03.2013 MKIV 37852 3 rounds of 
.303 
KPR 
Chief 
Masikita, 
Elbarta 
Samburu Newly Assigned KPR 
after the death of the 
holder in the Baragoi 
massacre 
06.04.2013 - - 160 rounds of 
7.62mm *51 
20 rounds of 
7.62mm*39 
Assistant 
Chief 
Loonjorin sub 
location 
Samburu Distribution to KPRs in 
Loonjorin 
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14.04.2013 - - 300 rounds of 
7.62mm *39 
100 rounds of 
7.62mm*51 
Assistant 
Chief 
Baragoi Samburu Distribution to KPRs in 
Suiyan and Masikita 
areas 
28.04.2013 - - 160 rounds of 
7.62mm*51 
Chief Waso Rongai Samburu Replacement of 
ammunition expended 
by 10 KPRs in Waso 
Rongai during a 
livestock raid on the 24
th
 
December 2012 
21.05.2013 MKIV 22276A 3 rounds KPR - Turkana Issued to newly assigned 
KPR 
21.05.2013 MKIV BM 11668 5 rounds KPR - Turkana Issued to newly assigned 
KPR 
16.06.2013 - - 100 rounds of 
7.62mm 
ordinary 
 20 rounds of 
7.62mm 
special 
Assistant 
Chief 
Loonjorin sub 
location 
Samburu For distribution to KPRs 
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27.06.2013 G3 
 
A3-96067 
 
10 rounds of 
7.62mm*51 
KPR 
 
- Samburu Issued to newly assigned 
KPR 
27.06.2013 G3 9796064 20 rounds of 
9796064 
KPR - Samburu Issued to newly assigned 
KPR 
3.07.2013 - - 100 rounds of 
7.62mm *51 
and 30 rounds 
of 7.62mm *39 
special 
KPR Tuum Samburu Distribution to KPRs in 
Nyiro Division 
4.07.2013 G3 FMP 
235803 
One magazine 
and 20 rounds 
of 7.62mm*51 
KPR Nachola Turkana Issued to new KPR 
 
08.11.2013 - - 1000 rounds of 
7.62mm*51  
200 rounds of 
7.62mm*39 
Assistant 
Chief 
Baragoi Samburu For distribution to KPRs 
in Ndoto, Lesirkan and 
South Horr 
22.09.2014 G3 97-06906 19 rounds of 
7.62mm 
KPR Bendera  sub 
location 
Samburu The rifle had been 
detained while the KPR 
was under  investigation 
 
